THE DOCTRINE OF RECOGNITION
(PRATYABHIJNA PHILOSOPHY)

BY R.K. KAW

विश्वेश्वरानन्द-संस्थान-प्रकाशनम्—४१३

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THE DOCTRINE OF RECOGNITION

(PRATYABHIJÑĀ PHILOSOPHY)

A STUDY OF ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT
AND PLACE IN INDIAN AND WESTERN
SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

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VISH VA BANDHU
General Editor

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VISHVESHVARANAND I

1967

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प्रकाशकृत्—विश्वेश्वरानन्द-संस्थानम्

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FOREWORD

The work which is now being presented as No. 40 of the *Vishveshvaranand Indological Research Series* is an important contribution to Indian philosophical literature. As indicated by the title, it deals with the *Pratyabhijñā Darśana* (the Doctrine of Recognition), the main philosophical system of the Kashmir Śaivas. The school emerged in the second half of the ninth century and developed in two stages, the earlier as represented by Somānanda's *Śivadṛṣṭi* and the later by Utpaladeva's *Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā* and its exposition by Abhinavagupta. An attempt is made in this work to discuss about the origin and development of the system and to affiliate it to the thought of the Upaniṣads. The work reviews also the allied philosophical movements in India and the West and indicates what specific contribution the Pratyabhijñā makes to philosophy.

The work was originally submitted by its author, Dr. R. K. Kaw, as a thesis to the Panjab University at Lahore, which approved it for the award of the Ph.D. Degree. I am glad to note that the work has since been duly revised by the author on the lines indicated to him. It is to be hoped that this work, as now being presented, will be of interest to students of Indian philosophy, in general, and to those of Kashmir Śaivism, in particular.

I thank our Publication Department and the V.V.R.I. Press for all the care they have taken in bringing out this volume in a proper form.

Vishveshvaranand Institute,
Sadhu Ashram,
Hoshiarpur (Pb.),
'*Śivarātri*',
March 9, 1967.

VISHVA BANDHU
General Editor

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PREFACE

The attention of modern scholars was drawn to what is known as the *Pratyabhijñā System of Philosophy* very late in the annals of Indological research. Before the literature on the subject, distinguished as *Pratyabhijñā Literature*, was discovered in Kashmir by Dr. G. Bühler in 1876 A.D., the system had remained sealed in manuscripts and shelved in the houses of a few traditional Pandits in Kashmir. As will be noticed, the study of the system by modern scholars started from very recent times. A brief review of the earlier studies, given below, will indicate the nature of the work so far done on the subject and the object of the present study.

The first notice of the system : The system came to the notice of the modern scholars in 1858 A.D., when *Sarvadarśana Saṁgraha* of Mādhavācārya, an epitome of the sixteen systems of philosophy, edited by Ishvarachandra Vidyasagara, was published for the first time in the *Bibliotheca Indica*. This well-known work reviews, perhaps, in the gradually ascending order of importance, from the Vedānta point of view, the sixteen most important philosophical systems, including the three Śaiva systems, *Nakulīśa-Pāśupata*, the *Śaiva* and the *Pratyabhijñā Darśana*, current in Southern India in the 14th century A.D. Though not of much importance in itself, it aroused interest among the modern scholars in the so-called minor systems of thought and was translated into English by E. B. Cowell and A. E. Gough. In this work, the Pratyabhijñā system is the eighth and the Vedānta system of Śaṅkarācārya the last and considered as the highest among the sixteen systems described.

Discovery of the Pratyabhijñā literature : Nevertheless, until about the year 1876 A.D. the Pratyabhijñā Śāstra remained unknown to the modern scholars. In the year 1875, G. Bühler, while on a tour, under the orders of the Government of India, for a search of Sanskrit manuscripts, discovered in Kashmir the works composed by Kashmiris under the general name *Śaiva Śāstra*. Having collected a number of manuscripts, he divided some portions of these referring to the philosophy of the Śaivas into two classes according to the two great Śaiva schools of Kashmir : *Spanda Śāstra* of Vasugupta and the *Pratyabhijñā Śāstra* of Somānanda and Utpaladeva. Dr. Bühler points out in his report that the Pratyabhijñā system 'appears to be pure idealism and an application of Śaṅkarācārya's

Kārikā, by Abhinavagupta, and the credit of discovering this important commentary in Kashmir and getting it published under very difficult circumstances goes entirly to Dr. Pandey. Bhāskarācārya, the commentator of the *Vimarśinī*, lived possibly in the 18th century, being seven generations ahead of his present successor. Another notable work on the subject, by K. C. Pandey, namely, *Bhāskarī* Vol. III, presenting an English translation of the *Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī* in the light of the *Bhāskarī*, together with an outline of the History of the Śaiva schools, appeared in the year 1954. As regards Abhinavagupta's contribution to the Pratyabhijñā system of philosophy, K. C. Pandey states, in his *Abhinavagupta*, the work mentioned above, "The philosophical system of Kashmir, with Abhinava's contribution to it left out of consideration, loses most of its importance.' The scholar however remarks, "It is not possible for us to attribute the authorship of any particular theory to Abhinava as we can do to Kant or Hegel."

The *Secret of Recognition* (*Pratyabhijña-hṛdayam*), translated into English by Kurt F. Leidecker from its original translation in German by Rev. Emil Baer, was published in the year 1938 in the Adyar Series No. 18. It contains, in its introductory pages, a Note by S. S. Suryanarayana Shastri on 'the Pratyabhijñā system and the Śaiva Siddhānta' of South India. As regards the origin of the Pratyabhijñā philosophy in Kashmir, the scholar observes in his Note No. 36 (given in his book, p. 108) : "We might make mention of the tradition according to which Śaṅkara in his travels came near Kashmir. The activity of this greatest of India's monists falls into the first half of the ninth century and comes, therefore, at the same time as the appearance of Vasugupta (cf. Chatterji, *Kashmir Śaivism*, p. 23). Hence it is not improbable that he imparted the impetus to the monistic movement in Kashmir (cf. Farquhar, *An outline of the Religious Literature of India*, p. 198)."

In addition to the work done by the scholars mentioned above, we cannot afford to ignore the important contributions made to the study of this subject by some other writers. Dr. Radhakrishnan has devoted a chapter (No. 10) in his *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, to the Pratyabhijñā system. From this it is clear that this eminent scholar has noticed this as one of the notable schools. He remarks that "the devolopment of Śaivism in the extreme south of the country as well as in the extreme north, that is, in Kashmir, is a wonderful example of India's cultural unity." MM. Gopinath Kaviraj has written a few articles on the subject in some leading papers. Prof. Lacchmidhar has given a brief description of the Pratyabhijñā school in his book, namely, *The Birthplace of Kālidāsa*. C. Hayavadana Rao has made casual remarks about some of the doctrines of this system in his

Introductory Volume (No. I) of the *Śrīkara-Bhāṣya* on the *Vedānta-sūtras.*

Object of the present study: As is apparent from the above, this system of philosophy has been studied, heretofore, by so many scholars, but, so far, no attention seems to have been devoted to a serious study of its origin and development and its specific contribution to philosophy, Indian and Western. It is the first attempt to trace the origin of the various doctrines of this school to the philosophic ideas in the Vedic hymns and the Upaniṣads and the Buddhist sources. These studies reveal that the system has evolved, of course, from the same fountain-head where all other schools of Indian Philosophy, like the Sāṁkhya, the Vaiśeṣika, the Vedānta, the Vaiyākaraṇa and so on, had their origin. With the exception of its specific differences, in some view points, from the Buddhist and the Vedānta systems, some additions and alterations made in certain theories existing in the older systems and some tenets and technical terms derived from the Śaivāgamas (scriptures of the Śaiva school), the system is not fundamentally different from the Vedānta.

The earlier studies do not differentiate the philosophical content from the theological matter of the Śaiva school. An attempt has been made, for the first time, to treat the philosophical content (or philosophy proper) of the Pratyabhijñā system almost apart from the dogmas of the Śaiva cult. It appears that the system of philosophy presented in the Pratyabhijñā literature has not, so far, been understood in its proper context. In the present study, the various tenets of the system have been properly co-ordinated with great fidelity to the original. In these studies the two stages of the development of the system have been noticed, one, the earlier stage represented by the work of Somānanda, the founder of the school, the second, the later stage as represented by the doctrines taught by Utpaladeva, the disciple of Somānanda, and further elaborated by Abhinavagupta.

An attempt has been made to review, in brief, the allied philosophic movements in India and the West, with a view to making a comparison and contrast between the various doctrines of the Pratybhijñā school and the allied doctrines of other systems, and arrivlng at a clear position which this system of thought occupies in the domains of Indian and Western Philosophy. It has been pointed out that the system has, indeed, made a radical revision or re-orientation of the Indian and Western systems of philosophy.

From the earlier studies, it has been noticed that some of the opinions of scholars do not accord with facts. It is not possible to agree with Dr.

K. C. Pandey in holding that the great Śaṅkarācārya, the expounder of the Vedānta system, had any share in the preaching or practice of the Tāntric philosophy, not to speak of its having an influence on the Pratybhijñā system. The statement of Paranjoti that Śaṅkarācārya was an adherent of the Śākta sect or that his *Advaita* system is influenced by Tantric theory is far from true. The view held by Prof. Lacchmidhar that the Pratyabhijñā system was known to Kālidāsa and that *Abhijñāna Śākuntalam* is an allegorical representation of this philosophy has no bearing on the facts. The philosophical significance attached by the scholar to some common words and ideas occuring in Kālidāsa's *Śākuntalam*, is rather far-fetched. It has been established on textual evidence that the Pratyabhijñā system of philosophy originated in the ninth century A. D., which is, beyond any doubt, posterior to Kālidāsa's date by a period of four centuries. All such controversial view-points have been discussed at proper places in this work.

The major part of this work is primarily based on the direct study of the texts on the subject. The earlier works by various scholars have been drawn upon, firstly, for supplying the needs of the general reader and, secondly, for a critical and comparative examination of different views held.

The present work was submitted in 1943 as a thesis to the Punjab University, Lahore, and approved for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. It has been revised subsequently from the point of view of its publication in an abridged form. Additions and alterations have also been made wherever necessary in the light of the later studies. The thesis as a whole —the matter, the argument, the plan and presentation—as approved by the examiners, has, however, been kept intact. Owing to lack of space it could not be possible to include the full treatment of the philosophical movements in the West as given in the original thesis, but the brief epitome given in the present publication (chapters Nos. XXV and XXVI) will, I hope, suffice to direct the reader to the common philosophical ideas and problems in Indian and Western thought. The importance of this work is indicated by the two eminent scholars in their remarks (as examiners of the thesis) : "......the author shows much originality in dealing with the problems of the Pratyabhijñā philosophy and he has adduced many new facts and discovered many new relations." (Principal S. N. Dasgupta). "......the author has dealt with an unexplored field and has mastered the material sources and brought together a vast amount of important and interesting information." (Dr. S. Radhakrishnan).

I wish to keep on record my deep debt of gratitude to the under-mentioned scholars, with whom I had the privilege of coming in contact during the course of my studies for preparation of this thesis: Dr.

Siddheswar Varma, M.A., D. Litt. (London), retired Professor, and the late Pt. Shrichand Shastri, Tāraka Darśana Tīrtha, Vidyānidhi, Nyāyālaṅkāra, Tāraka-śiromani, the late Principal, Sanskrit College (Raghunath Mahavidyalaya), Jammu, under whose able guidance I worked for some years during the initial stages of my work ; the late Prof. Lacchmidhar, M.A., Ph. D., Delhi University, who was appointed by the Panjab University as my supervisor ; the learned Pandits of the Kashmir Research Department, namely, Madhusudhan Kaul Shastri, M.A., M.O.L. ; Harabhatta Shastri ; Vidya-varidhi Shivnath Sharma Shastri, D. O. C. ; Shrikantha Kaul, M.A., M.O.L. ; and other Śaiva scholars of Kashmir who helped me in my study of the literature on the subject ; Dr. Hirananda Shastri, M.A., D. Litt., the late Government Epigraphist for India and the Director of Archaeology and Research, Kashmir State, and Dr. G.M.D. Sufi, M.A., D. Litt. (Paris), formerly, the Registrar, University of Delhi, who read through some portions of my thesis and gave many valuable suggestions ; J. C. Chatterji, P. T. Srinivasa Iyengar, L. D. Barnett, Rev. Emil Baer (German Indologist) and his English translator Kurt F. Leidecker and K. C. Pandey, to whom goes the credit for setting out earlier on their literary expeditions and discovering new coasts of knowledge in this domain of study.

I must also acknowledge my indebtedness to all those eminent scholars, too numerous to mention here, especially Dr. S. Radhakrishnan and late Dr. S. N. Dasgupta, whose valuable contributions to the Indian philosophical literature have served as a beacon-light in the present study.

I am grateful to Acharya Vishva Bandhu, M.A., M.O.L., Shastri (Pb.), D. Litt. (*h.c.*), O 'd A. (Fr.), Kt. C. T. (It.), Director, Vishveshvaranand Institute, for accepting this thesis for publication by the Institute and for giving valuable advice towards its revision. My sincere thanks are due to Shri K. V. Sarma, M.A., Curator, whose generous help and valuable suggestions, I constantly availed of during the course of the revision of the thesis and its publication. To Principal Bahadur Mal I am thankful for his advice at the initial stages of this publication. My thanks are also due to Shri Jayanarayan Sharma, M.A., Shri Ravikant, M.A. and Shri Dev Raj Gupta, M.A. and Shri Chandra Prakash, M.A., who helped me in preparing the Index and reading the proofs.

Vishveshvaranand Institute,
Hoshiarpur (Pb.),
1st January 1967.

R. K. KAW

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Preliminary : The name of the system ; Place of its origin : Emergence of Pratyabhijñā school ; Its connection with other systems of Indian Philosophy ; Its connection with Śaṅkara's school of Vedānta ; Development of the Pratyabhijñā system ; Exposition of its doctrines : A bird's eye-view of Pratyabhijñā metaphysics ; Place of Pratyabhijñā in Indian and Western systems of Philosophy ; Philosophic movements in India and the West.

PRELIMINARY

The name of the system : There has been a controversy among scholars regarding the name of the system. Dr. K. C. Pandey prefers to call this system *Trika*, as he says in his book *Abhinavagupta—An Historical and Philosophical Study*, "It is a misnomer to call this system of philosophy '*Pratyabhijñā*' or '*Spanda*' as much as it would be to call India 'Calcutta' or 'Bombay'." (p. 169f.) The scholar does not seem to differentiate Pratyabhijñā as 'the Philosophy proper of the Trika system' as Pt. Madhusudan Kaul puts it in his Preface to *Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī*, Vol. I. It is the philosophical content of the Trika which is called Pratyabnijñā by Mādhavācārya in his *Sarvadarśana Saṁgraha* (14th century) on the basis of the title *Īśvara Pratyabhijñā* given by Utpaladeva to his *Kārikās* which form the main treatise of the system. But before Utpaladeva gave this title to his *Kārikās*, the sytem appears to have been called *Śaiva Darśana* as indicated by the title of Somānanda's work *Śivadṛṣṭi*. The system must have been known as Pratyabhijñā in the later ages as it is called so by Mādhavācārya in the 14th century. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan also calls it the Pratyabhijñā system in his *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, for the said reason.

K. C. Pandey, gives various reasons why the system is called Trika: As stated in *Parātriṁśikā*, the system as a whole is called Trika in Śaiva literature since it deals with the triple principle, *Śiva*, *Śakti* and *Aṇu* ; or *Pati*, *Pāśa* and *Paśu* ; or *Nara*, *Śakti* and *Śiva* ; or *Parā*, *Aparā* and *Parāparā* ; or it is called Trika for the reason that its chief authority is the triad consisting of the three chief *Āgamas*, viz. *Siddha*, *Nāmaka* and *Mālinī* (*Tantrāloka* 1. 36), or for another reason that it includes all the three systems, broadly speaking, *Bheda*, *Abheda* and *Bhedābheda*. It is also called Trika for the reason that it teaches the three-fold method of Āgamic

TO

Dr. S. RADHAKRISHNAN,

(PRESIDENT OF INDIAN UNION)

EMINENT SCHOLAR AND PHILOSOPHER.

realisation, viz. *Śāmbhavopāya*, *Śaktopāya* and *Āṇavopāya*.[1] As is apparent, in this wider sense, it is not possible to say that Trika is a system of philosophy. It is true that Pratyabhijñā and Spanda are parts and very important parts of the Trika system, but severally they do not present the whole of what Trika represents. If there is any part which can be said to be of philosophical import in the true sense, it is the Pratyabhijñā Śāstra, not any other branch of Trika system, Spanda etc. This part can be called the 'Pratyabhijñā Philosophy,' but Spanda Śāstra cannot be called the 'Spanda Philosophy,' nor, as a matter of fact, the whole system as 'Trika Philosophy.' K. C. Pandey states, in the Introduction to *Bhāskarī* II, "But before Mādhavācārya gave this title to the system in his *Sarvadarśana Saṁgraha*, it was known as *Svātantrya-vāda*, a name by which it is referred to by Abhinavagupta in his *Vivṛti Vimarśinī*."[2] *Svātantrya-vāda* could not have been a popular name of the system, as it is only one of the doctrines included in the Pratyabhijñā Philosophy.

Again, J. C. Chatterji states that "on the Trika there were many treatises each of which was called a *Śastra*, but these works do not represent so many different systems but only treatises on the various aspects of the same system of thought."[3] Evidently J. C. Chatterji could not differentiate the Pratyabhijñā Philosophy from the whole system represented by the 'Trika Śāstra'. Dr. Kurt F. Leidecker also states in his Notes to the Translation of *Pratyabhijñā-Hṛdaya*[4] that the Trika, Spanda as well as the Pratyabhijñā are the designations of one and the same system and that distinction made by Dr. Bühler between the Spanda and the Pratyabhijñā is erroneous. The learned doctor is not only incorrect to suppose that Trika, Spanda and Pratyabhijñā represent one and the same system, but also fails to notice that Pratyabhijñā is the only 'Philosophy proper of the Trika', whereas Trika is the name of the whole system of religious cult with different branches, evolved from Tāntric and Āgamic dogmatism. It may be pointed out that 'Spanda' branch of Trika has, for its main subject matter, the three mystical ways to the realisation of the divine *Śakti*, viz. the *Śāmbhava*, the *Śākta* and the *Āṇava*. They are mere dogmatic statements of the fundamental principles of the Spanda system. The Spanda literature which grew on the basis of *Śiva Sūtras* does not represent any manual of philosophy as the Pratyabhijñā Śāstra does. Metaphysical reasoning is the

1. K. C. Pandey, *Abhinavagupta-An Historical and Philosophical Study*, 170.
   See also J. C. Chatterji, *Kashmir Śaivism*, p. 1, fn. 2.
2. *IPVV*, I, 9. Cited K. C. Pandey, *Bhāskarī*, II, iii.
3. J. C. Chatterji, *Kashmir Śaivism*, 7.
   Chatterji was unable to say that *Pratyabhijñā* only represents the Philosophy of Trika system.
4. *The Secret of Recognition*, Kurt F. Leidecker, Notes, 101.

essence of a philosophical system. It is to this philosophical content ot the system that Utpaladeva gives predominance in his whole work (*IPK*) and treats the Āgamic tenets in only a few Sūtras of Āgamādhikāra (part III of his work), thus relegating the religious dogmatism to a subordinate position.

This system of philosophy is also commonly known as "Kashmir Śaivism." Śaivism or Śaiva system is a more comprehensive term representing all the dualistic, non-dualistic and dualistic-cum-non-dualistic systems evolved from the Śaivāgamas and the Śaiva Tantras. Śaiva system means any system based on Śaiva Tantras or Āgamas. Sixty-four systems of the Śaiva cult are mentioned in the Śaiva scriptures of Kashmir which include Trika as one of them. Pratyabhijñā is the philosophical content of the Trika, as is apparent from Utpaladeva's work.

Place of Origin of the System: As a matter of fact, the Pratyabhijñā system arose in Kashmir, but K. C. Pandey presumes that the system was not indigenous to the valley but was introduced and developed by two ancestral lines which came there from outside. In support of this view, he cites two references : one, according to the ending verses of *Śivadṛṣṭi*, the Śaivāgamas were brought to Kashmir by Saṁgamāditya, the fourth ancestor of Somānanda, who is stated to have come there from Kailāsa; second, according to *TĀ*, 37, Atrigupta, the renowned Śaiva philosopher of Kanauj and the earliest known ancestor of Abhinavagupta, was brought to Kashmir by king Lalitāditya sometime after 740 A. D. On the basis of these two evidences, the scholar concludes that, for building a monistic system of its own, Kashmir needed men and material which were supplied by the two ancestral lines which came to Kashmir from outside.[5] With reference to the first evidence, *viz.* the mythological origin of Śaivāgamas from Śrīkaṇṭha or Bhairava in Kailāsa (the abode of Śiva) and their spread in Kashmir by the fourth ancestor of Somānanda, it may be noted that these are not the historical facts but are intended to give sanctity to Śaivāgamas. Really we have no trace of the system outside Kashmir before its emergence in the valley in the time of Somānanda and Utpaladeva.

With regard to the second evidence (cited by the scholar), as given above, it may be observed that Dr. Pandey accepts, on the authority of *TĀ* Commentary III, 194, that Abhinavagupta learnt Trika Darśana from Lakṣmaṇagupta, a native teacher of Kashmir, and not from any outsider or the descendent of his ancestor Atrigupta.[6] It is amusing to

5. K. C. Pandey, *Ibid.*, 83-84.
6. *Ibid.*, 11.

note that while Pt. Madhusudan Kaul had made a statement, in *IPV*, II, Introduction, 7, that 'Abhinavagupta received instruction in the Pratyabhijñā Śāstra from his father Lakṣmaṇagupta...', Dr. Pandey objects that 'Lakṣmaṇagupta, though undoubtedly a teacher of Abhinava in Pratyabhijñā, was certainly not his father' and, therefore, it requires correction.[7] In this statement, the scholar himself admits that Lakṣmaṇagupta did not belong to Abhinavagupta's immigrant ancestral line but was born from some other native family of Kashmir. It is, however, certain that Lakṣmaṇagupta, the teacher of Abhinavagupta, himself learnt the Pratyabhijñā system in Kashmir and not outside. Jayaratha, the commentator of *TĀ*, states in clear terms that the Pratyabhijñā Darśana (the monistic system) emerged and flourished in Kashmir, and it is from this country that it spread in other parts of India. He says that all the originators of this monistic system were the natives of Kashmir, namely Somānanda, Utpaladeva and others, and the system was not to be found elsewhere before its origination in Kashmir' (*deśe 'nyasminnadṛṣṭo*). While it spread from Kashmir (*kaśmirebhyaḥ prasṛtya*), it was received and held in high esteem by the people of other countries as an unique thing like saffron.[8]

Even though it may be admitted that Abhinavagupta, the expounder of the system, belonged to an immigrant ancestral line, Somānanda and Utpaladeva, the original teachers, were definitely the natives of Kashmir. It is not understood how K. C. Pandey categorically states that 'men and material were brought to Kashmir from outside for building a monistic system of its own'. The fact is that Kashmir was from ancient times a well-known seat of learning and the philosophic knowledge was no innovation there. The Pratyabhijñā system was only a logical development of the philosophical ideas prevailing in Kashmir at the time of its origination.

Emergence of Pratyabhijñā School: There are evidences to show that, while a number of old cults and religious practices flourished in Kashmir from the dawn of history, at times, various religious and philosophical doctrines reached there from outside its boundaries. Śiva worship or Śaivism occupied the first place among the Hindu cults of the valley

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7. *Ibid.*, 5
8. श्रीसोमानन्दनाथप्रभृति-गुरुवरादिष्ट-सन्नीतिमार्गो
लब्ध्वा यत्रैव सम्यक्पटिमनि घटनामीश्वराद्वैतवादः ।
कश्मीरेभ्यः प्रसृत्य प्रकटपरिमलो रञ्जयन्सर्वदेश्यान्
देशेऽन्यस्मिन्नदृष्टो घुसृणविसरवत्सर्ववन्द्यत्वमाप ।

from the earliest times. Buddhism, a historic movement, spreading far and wide, was also welcomed by Kashmiris some time before Ashoka (273–232 B. C.). Kashmiris became active participants in the Buddhist ideology since that time. Nāgasena (150 B. C.), the reputed author of *Milinda-Panho*, is said to be a Kashmiri. Kumāralabdha, one of the four luminaries of Buddhism, is also known to be a Kashmiri. Nāgārjuna, a native of Berar, stayed to study in Kashmir for long. 'Aśvaghoṣa is said to have been brought by Kanishka (78-102 A. C.) from Pāṭliputra to function as the Vice-President of the Great Buddhist Council held in the Kuṇḍala-vana-vihāra (near about the present Harwan water reservoir) in Kashmir.'[9] K. C. Pandey writes that Buddhism had a stronghold in Kashmir since the time of Ashoka. It was in Kashmir that Kanishka convened an assembly of the Buddhist theologians. The existence of Buddhism was particularly felt by the Śaivas when Kanishka made a gift of Kashmir (*Kanishka-puram*) to Buddhist church and Nāgārjuna came to power and began to preach Buddhism. The aggressive attitude of Nāgārjuna is referred to by Kalhaṇa and by Varadarāja in his *Śiva-sūtra-vārttika*.[10] Buddhism and Brāhmaṇic cults, however, existed peacefully side by side in Kashmir for centuries before Kalhaṇa's time.[11] Heun Tsang and Ou-kong, who visited Kashmir during the years 630-645 and 759-763 A. D. respectively, witnessed Buddhism flourishing in the country and being patronised by the rulers. In spite of the phenomenal success which Buddhism had in Kashmir, Śaivism continued to be a vital force from the past. A revival of Śaivism, however, came in the valley from the seventh century A. D. Śaṅkarācarya (780-812 A. D.) is said to have visited Kashmir to giva a final blow to Buddhism there. Eighth and ninth centuries of the Christian era seem to have witnessed a religious upheaval in Kashmir[12], as a result of which Buddhism appears to be disappearing and the old Hinduism, particularly Śaivism, taking hold of the people. It was, just after the decay of Buddhism, that *Śiva-sūtras*, which form the bedrock of Kashmir Śaivism, are said to have been revealed by Lord Śiva to the sage Vasugupta. In the ninth century A. D., Kashmir was a meeting-ground of the various philosophical currents. It was from a concourse of the then prevailing various religious and philosophical ideas as professed by Buddhists and the followers of other orthodox creeds : the Vaidikas, the Śaivas, the Śāktas, the Vaiyākaranas (Grammarians),

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9. *Research* I, 4.

10. K. C. Pandey, 'Kashmir Śaivism', *History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western*, 1, 381.

11. M. A. Stein, *Chronicle of the Kings of Kashmir*, I, Introduction, 9.

12. Madhusudan Kaul, *IPV* II, Introduction 1.

the Sāṅkhyas, the Naiyāyikas, the Vedāntins and the upholders of the Yoga system, that a monistic school of Philosophy, known as Pratyabhijñā, emerged in the Śaiva-fold in the valley of Kashmir. It seems that the originators of the system borrowed most of the philosophical ideas from the said systems, for the enrichment of their own.

Its connection with other systems of Indian Philosophy: The Kashmir Śaivas claim that the system, which they generally call by the name 'Trika' is the highest monistic system based throughout on the sacred authority of Śaivāgamas, to which they ascribe divine origin and eternal existence. They categorically refuse to recognise the authority of the Vedic scriptures and aim at refuting the view points of the Vedānta and other systems evolved from the Vedic sources. They assign superiority to the Pratyabhijñā system which, in their view, is the only perfect and correct system transcending all other systems of philosophy. It will be clear from the following pages that in its main doctrines the Pratyabhijñā system is not fundamentally different from the ancient Vedānta, i.e. the Vedānta as initially set forth in the Upaniṣads, which are the fountain-head of all the systems of thought in India. It may be observed that there is a common theme in all the philosophical systems of India, the Sāṅkhya, the Vaiśeṣika, the Vaiyākaraṇa (the Grammarians' School), the Buddhist and the Vedānta, including the Pratyabhijñā system or, as a matter of fact, any other Śaiva system that arose in India. These systems, however, differ from one another in holding different points of view, in propounding some new theories of their own and also adopting different nomenclature, viz. technical terms. The Kashmir Śaivas, the originators of the system, have incorporated most of the ideas from the Sāṅkhya, the Vaiyākaraṇa, the Buddhist and the Vedānta systems and have presented their various doctrines in a technique of their own, based upon certain tenets derived from the Saivāgamas, which distinguish the Pratyabhijñā system from the other systems.

Its connection with Śaṅkarācārya's School of Vedānta : There are two versions of the connection between the Pratyabhijñā Philosophy and the Śaṅkarācārya's system. One is according to Bühler who says : 'This system (Pratyabhijñā) does not appear to be older than the end of the ninth century A.D. and because it is of so late a date, it seems to me most probable that its resemblance to Śaṅkarācārya's doctrines cannot be purely accidental. The connection between Śaṅkarācārya's school and the Pratyabhijñā points also to a Kashmirian tradition which asserts that the great Ācārya of the South came to Kashmir and was vanquished in a disputation by the chief exponent of the Pratyabhijñā

doctrines'.[13] Thus, according to Bühler's point of view, it is possible that Śaṅkarācārya's system of Vedānta may have somewhat influenced the Pratyabhijñā school. Another version of the incident may be read from K. C. Pandey's account in his book, *Abhinavagupta*.[14] He writes that the decline of Buddhism had started in Kumārila Bhatta's time (750 A.D). 'Śaṅkarācārya visited Kashmir sometime in the second decade of the ninth century A.D. after giving his final blow to Buddhism in the rest of India. The influence of Śaṅkara's Tāntric philosophy on Trika is so great ... This visit of such a great person (Śaṅkara) ... purged the local faith of its Buddhistic element and strengthened the position of the new Tāntric creed.'[15]

We come to know from Dr. Bühler's account that Śaṅkarācārya visited Kashmir and held a discussion with 'the chief exponent of Pratyabhijñā doctrines (Abhinavagupta)' in which the former was vanquished. According to tradition in Kashmir, Śaṅkara preached his idealistic philosophy as expounded in his *Vedānta Sūtra Bhāṣya*, wherein *Māyā-vāda* or *Adhyāsavāda* is one of the prominent doctrines. But this philosophy did not appeal to Kashmirian philosophers like Abhinavagupta. Further investigation in this connection establishes that this supposed discussion between Śaṅkarācārya and Abhinavagupta never actually took place because the former flourished in 778-820 A.D., while the latter lived towards the eleventh century A.D. But, even if the supposed disputation took place between Śaṅkarācārya and some one else, the only bearing that it has on our subject is that, according to tradition, the superiority of Kashmir Śaiva Philosophy had to be admitted by Śaṅkarācārya. But, there exists no internal evidence to this effect in any of his main works. According to the *Śaṅkara Digvijaya* of Mādhava, which is noticed under a slightly different name *Sūkṣma Śaṅkara Vijaya* in Dr. Aufrecht's *Cat. Cat.*, we have a different account of the disputation between Śaṅkarācārya with some person named Abhinavagupta outside Kashmir who was a Śākta contemporary of Śaṅkarācārya. This namesake of Kashmirian Abhinavaguptācārya belonged to Kāmarūpa (Assam). He was a great opponent of the monistic theory of Śaṅkara. He is stated to have engaged Śaṅkarācārya in a controversial discussion (Śāstrārtha) when the latter reached Assam in the course of his *digvijaya*. In that discussion he was defeated and so he became a disciple of the victor.[16] But regarding these

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13. G. Bühler, *Report of a tour in Search of Sanskrit Manuscripts*, 1877-78.
14. K. C, Pandey, *Ibid*., 88-90.
15. *Śaṅkara Digvijaya* XVI, 54-80, Ref. cited, Pandey, *Abhinavagupta*, 88-90.
16. K. C. Pandey. *Ibid*., p. 2.

accounts we have got no reliable evidence. It cannot also be supposed that it is this account which somehow became current in Kashmir under different circumstances.

From Dr. Pandey's version of the connection between the two systems, it is evident, not that Saṅkarācārya's Philosophical thought was rejected or refuted by Kashmirian Philosophers, but his Tāntric Philosophy, which he propagated in Kashmir influenced the Trika System. In this connection it may be remarked that the well-known historical Śaṅkarācārya, the expounder of the *Vedānta Sūtras* and the *Upaniṣads*, never upheld, preached or practised any kind of Tāntric Philosophy in his system (darśana). The internal evidence from his main works, the *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya* and the *Upaniṣad Bhāṣya*, shows that neither the Tantra technique, nor the Tāntric doctrine was ever known to Śaṅkarācarya, the great Vedānta Philosopher. The occurrence of some philosophical ideas and technical terms as common in Śaṅkarācārya's *Dakṣiṇāmūrti Stotra* (*DMS*) and *Iśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī* (*IPV*), as pointed out by Dr. Pandey in certain quotations from both these works on pages 88-89 of his work *Abhinavagupta*, do not show the influence of any Tāntric philosophy on the Pratyabhijñā, as we are familiar with these ideas and terms in the early Upaniṣads and also in Bādarāyaṇa's *Brahma Sūtras*. It is not understood what specifically Tāntric is noticed in these ideas which represent more or less the Vedāntic thought.

The common idea underlying *DMS*, 2 and *IPV* I, 182[17] is that "the objective world is manifested (*prakāśayet*) by the Supreme Being (*Cidātman*) by the force of his will (*icchā-vaśāt*) like the creation of a Yogin without any extraneous substance." This evidently is a doctrine of the Upaniṣads which is incorporated by Bādarāyaṇa in his Vedānta system in *Brahma Sūtra* II, i, 25—"*devādivadapi-loke*" Śaṅkarācārya in his commentary on the *sūtra*, explains that creating the world, in the case of Brahman, is the same as creation of Gods, Yogins and others in their ordinary experience

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17. वीजस्यान्तरिवांकुरो जगदिदं प्राङ्निर्विकल्पं पुन—
मायाकल्पितदेशकालकलना-वैचित्र्य-चित्रीकृतम् ।
मायावीव विजृम्भयत्यपि महायोगीव यः स्वेच्छया
तस्मै श्रीगुरुमूर्तये नम इदं श्रीदक्षिणामूर्तये ॥

DMS 2, and

चिदात्मैव हि देवोऽन्तःस्थितमिच्छावशाद् बहिः ।
योगीव निरुपादानमर्थजातं प्रकाशयेत् ।

IPV I. 182.

from mere will *(saṅkalpa)*. There is nothing specifically Tāntric in the terms *Māyā*, *svecchā*, *Cidātmā* and *icchā*. The common idea contained in *DMS*, Commentary (2), 13 and *IPV* 1, 39[18] is that a sentient being *(cetana)* is endowed with Knowledge *(Jñāna)* and Activity *(Kriyā)*. These are the very life of the living beings and are also potent to create the universe. This idea is initially found in *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*: *"parāsya śaktir vividhaiva śrūyate, svābhāvikī jñānabala-kriyā ca"* (*Śv. Up*. VI, 8). As regards the common expression *"sattā sphurattā"* found in *DMS* Commentary (2), 13 and *IPV* I, 207,[19] it may be remarked that in Weber's *Indische Studien IX*, page 163, we find that the word *'sattā'* (existence) occurs in *Nṛsimha-tāpinī Upaniṣad* and *Rāma-tāpinī Upaniṣad* 287. *'Sphurattā'* in the sense of 'manifestation' is often used in Vedāntic texts. Finally, the common idea underlying *DMS* Commentary (2), 50 and *IPV* I, 29,[20] viz. that the powers of Knowledge *(Jñāna)* and Activity *(Kriyā)* comprise the sovereignty of the Supreme Being (Ātman), occurs in *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* VI, 8, cited above.

From these quotations given by K. C. Pandey, it is rather evident that there is a close resemblance between the doctrines of the Vedānta and Pratyabhijñā systems, as has also been observed by Bühler in his *Report*. It may be pointed out that *Tantra Śāstra* has incorporated a large stock of doctrines and technical terms from the Vedic and Āgamic sources, which seems to be the possible basis of K. C. Pandey's observations. It appears that the doctrines and technical terms mentioned in the quotations referred to by the scholar are borrowed by the *Tantra Śāstra* from the Upaniṣads which are definitely the earlier sources of the Vedānta and other systems; these doctrines are not taught for the first time in Tantras. Besides, Tantras mainly teach Tāntric processes by virtue of which they represent a distinct school, but K. C. Pandey has not been able to trace any such

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18. ज्ञानक्रिये जगत्क्लृप्तौ दृश्यते चेतनाश्रये ।

    DMS Comm. (2), 13 and

    ज्ञानं क्रिया च भूतानां जीवतां जीवनं मतम् ।

    IPV 1, 39

19. तस्मात् सत्ता स्फुरत्ता च सर्वत्राप्यनुवर्तते ।

    DMS Comm. (2), 13.

    सा स्फुरत्ता महासत्ता देशकालाविशेषिणी ।

    IPV 1, 207.

20. ज्ञातृत्वमपि कर्तृत्वं स्वातन्त्र्यं तस्य केवलम् ।

    DMS Comm. (2), 50.

    कर्तरि ज्ञातरि स्वात्मन्यादिसिद्धे महेश्वरे ।

    IPV I, 29.

doctrine either in the Śaṅkara's school of Vedānta or in the Pratyabhijñā System. In fact, he quotes no reference from Śaṅkarācārya's main works, about the occurrence of any Tāntric idea or expression. This want of internal evidence from his works shows that he never had any share in the preaching or practice of Tāntric Philosophy. Therefore, the view that there was a great influence of Śaṅkara's Tāntric Philosophy on Trika or Pratyabhijñā is incorrect.

The reference to a verse in the *Saundarya Laharī* to prove that Śaṅkarācārya accepted the authority of Tantras does not appear satisfactory, for the reason that there is a doubt regarding Ādi-Śaṅkarācārya's authorship of this *Stotra*. The *Saundarya Laharī* is a devotional poem addressed to the Goddess, abounding in rhetorical descriptions of Her sublime beauty incorporating Tāntric and Yogic ideas, with the exception of a few verses containing some common Vedāntic thoughts. It appears that these ideas are not at all the product of a philosophic genius like Śaṅkarācārya. According to A. Avalon, the translator of *Ānanda Laharī* ('Wave of Bliss'), Śaṅkara's authorship of Tāntric works is a hotly discussed point among scholars, which is still unsettled.[21] A. Avalon does neither accept nor refute the point that "Ādi-Śaṅkara", the Vedānta philosopher, was also the author of the Tāntric works. He says, "Amongst other matters yet to be determined is the age of Ādi-Śaṅkara himself". There can, therefore, be no reliance on this work as an evidence to prove that Śaṅkarācārya had any inclination towards the Tāntric practices prevalent in Kashmir or elsewhere and to support or propagate the Tāntric creed in any of his genuine works. As regards 'his establishing *śrī-cakra* in some of his *maṭhas*,' it is possible that perhaps some name-sake of the great Śaṅkarācārya, the Vedānta philosopher, following the Tāntric creed, might have installed *śrī-cakras* in certain *maṭhas*, as we know of numerous Śaṅkarācāryas following diverse philosophic and religious creeds who have occupied the sacred *pīṭhas* (seats of learning) in several *maṭhas* in southern India associated with the name of the great Śaṅkarācārya. Moreover, K. C. Pandey gives no evidence to prove that Ādi-Śaṅkarācārya installed the *śrī-cakra* in any *maṭha*.

We, therefore, agree with Professor Bühler's view and conclude that Pratyabhijñā system is greatly influenced by Śaṅkara's Vedāntic doctrines and not that Śaṅkarācārya taught any Tāntric philosophy which influenced the Pratyabhijñā system. For similar reasons, as put forth above, we cannot also agree with Paranjoti in holding the view, in her book on the *Śaiva Siddhāntam*, that "Śaṅkara was an adherent of the Śākta sect, and his

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21. A. Avalon, *Ānanda Laharī*, 2nd ed., Adyar: Madras, 1924, Introduction.

system of *Advaita*, though to all appearances independent of *Śākta Āgamas*, is yet influenced by the Tāntric theory." It is unfortunate that these scholars do not base their conclusions on evidences from Śaṅkara's main works on the Vedānta system which he represents in the Indian Philosophy. There is hardly anything to show in Śaṅkara's *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya* and the *Upaniṣad Bhāṣya* that his system of Advaita is influenced by the Tāntric theory.

Development of Pratyabhijñā System : Somānanda, in the second half of the ninth century A. D., for the first time, laid down briefly the main doctrines of the system in his work *Śivadṛṣṭi*. He is, therefore, known as the founder of the school. Somānanda's disciple Utpaladeva, who lived in the tenth century A. D., formulated the doctrines, taught by his teacher, in his *Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā*. He can rightly be called the systematiser of this philosophy, like Bādarāyaṇa, the systematiser of the Vedāntic doctrines of the *Upaniṣads*. The well-known Abhinavagupta, who flourished towards the end of the tenth and the beginning of the eleventh century A.D., made this system of philosophy intelligible in his two commentaries on *Pratyabhijñā Kārikā*. He, therefore, occupies the same position in this realm of thought (as the expounder of the system) as Śaṅkarācārya holds in the domain of the Vedānta.

The basic texts mentioned above show two distinct stages of the development of the system :

(1) The earlier stage is revealed in the teachings of Somānanda in his work *Śivadṛṣṭi*. At this stage, the name of Somānanda's system appears to have still been *Śaiva Darśana*, as is indicated by the title of his work, by which any Śaiva system was generally called in ancient days. Somānanda refutes all the older systems, not only the Vaidika system but also the different schools of Śaivas and Śāktas and introduces in his work new trends of thought and view-points which were, later on, systematised by his pupil Utpaladeva.

(2) The later stage of its development in the final form is represented by Utpaladeva's work, the *Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā* or *Sūtra*. The *Kārikā* is expounded by Abhinavagupta in his two commentaries, one short, called *Vimarśinī*, and the other long, called *Vivṛti-Vimarśinī*. At this stage, Utpaladeva evidently meant to name the system as the Pratyabhijñā Darśana, as is indicated by the title of his work, *viz. Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā*.

Exposition of its Doctrines : An attempt is made in this book to explain the various tenets of the Pratyabhijñā system from a first hand study of the original texts. The doctrines of the system in the earlier and

the later stages of its development are treated separately in two different sections, viz. *Somānanda's Philosophy* and *Utpaladeva's Philosophy*. A free translation of the ideas given in the relevant texts, *Śivadṛṣṭi* and *Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā* and the two *Vimarśinīs*, has been given in proper context for a faithful representation of the various doctrines of the system. All these doctrines are put together in the present work as integral parts of the whole of the Pratyabhijñā philosophy. No attempt has been made to give the literal translation of the Sūtras or the commentaries. On the other hand, a clear exposition of the doctrines is aimed at by interpreting as much of the comprehensive and abstruse texts as possible.[22]

A bird's eye-view of Pratyabhijñā metaphysics :[23] The chart facing this page gives a graphic representation of the central doctrine of the

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22. Attention of the readers is invited to the English translation of the *Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī* by K. C. Pandey in *Bhāskarī* III, which has appeared in the 'The Princess of Wales Sarasvatī Bhavana Texts' No. 48 and also English translation of *Śivadṛṣṭi*, Canto I, by Raniero Gnoli, which is published in *East and West*, 8(1957-58) 16-22.

23. In India religion has led to philosophy, and for this reason the technical terms employed for metaphysical principles are the words which are commonly used in the religious literature as names of gods and goddesses. *Śaivism* or *Śaiva Darśana* is, as the very word indicates, an outgrowth of Śaiva religion which recognises Śiva as the highest God. It will be admitted that the originators of the Pratyabhijñā philosophy were the devotees of God Śiva (Maheśvara) and his consort Śakti and naturally they employed the various names of these divinities to represent the different metaphysical principles in the Pratyabhijñā system. Thus, we find the term *Maheśvara* or *Parama Śiva* applied for the Ultimate Reality, *Māheśvarya* for 'the Sovereignty of the Lord's Will', i.e., the absolute liberty and autonomy of consciousness, and the self-dependent power of the Ultimate Being (Maheśvara). *Śiva* stands for the Cognitive Power and *Śakti* for the power of Action and so on. It may also be noticed that, in the Vedānta system, the Ultimate Reality is named *Brahman*, since the originators of the school were the worshippers of God Brahman, the creator or the God of Knowledge (Vedas). The word *Brahman* is used by the Vedāntins for the Ultimate Reality in the neuter gender, while the Śaivas use the word *Maheśvara* for the same principle in the masculine gender. The system of nomenclature in any school of Indian philosophy is unlike that in the Western Science or Metaphysics in which we find the technical terms often used after the names of the scientists who discovered certain scientific principles and laws of nature. There is, of course, a number of other technical terms employed in the system taken from a stock of common words, not necessarily used in the religious nomenclature. For instance, the word *Pratyabhijñā* is used in the particular philosophic sense as the *recognition* of the identity of the individual self (Ātman) and the Supreme Being (Maheśvara) or the awareness of the supreme inheritance of the individual 'self'; *Prakāśa* as Self-manifestation or Self-consciousness in which the objects are merged; and *Vimarśa* as power of perception in which objects have distinct reality of their own.

Pratyabhijñā Philosophy, the whole cosmogonic theory laid down in the system. In this chart, *Maheśvara*, the Supreme Being (the Ultimate Cause, the Reality) is compared to the nutritional fluid in the earth which transforms itself into the tree of cosmos and which runs as sap or essence through its every branch, leaf, flower, fruit, etc. This is called *Śiva-rasa* or *Cid-rasa*. It grows into this cosmos by the 'Sovereignty of His will', technically called *Māheśvarya* or *Svātantrya Śakti*, which is the force that impels, the force of spontaneity (urgency), instinct and spring of life. The creative power of Maheśvara has a two-fold nature,—*Prakāśa*, the power of manifestation, and *Vimarśa*, the power of perception. *Prakāśa* and *Vimarśa*, constituting the two-fold nature of *Śiva-rasa*, shoot forth first into a common stalk and further sprout into two branches, the former growing into the branch of the Cognitional power (*Jñātṛtva-Śakti*) and the latter into that of the power of Action (*Kartṛtva-Śakti*). The two branches are distinguished, one as the subjective branch, perceiving subject, and the other as the objective branch, what is external to the mind. These two branches correspond respectively to the Universal Consciousness, represented by *Śiva*, and the Universal Energy, represented by *Śakti*, in the universe around us. The subjective branch of Cognitional power (*Jñātṛtva-Śakti*) further shoots forth into three distinct branches, the power of Remembrance (*Smaraṇa-Śakti*), the power of Knowledge (*Jñāna-Śakti*) and the power of Differentiation (*Apohana-Śakti*). The branch A, in the chart, represents the expansion of the *Jñātṛtva-Śakti* of Maheśvara, i.e. the Universal Consciousness, or the Psychological aspect of the Reality.

The objective branch, viz. the power of Action (*Kartṛtva-Śakti*), is governed by three laws of Relation,—viz. the Law of Division, the relation of Plurality and Unity (*Bhedābheda*), the Law of Perception, the relation of Perceiver, perception and the object perceived (*Māna-tat-phala-meya*) and the Law of Causation, the relation of Cause and Effect (*Kārya-Kāraṇa*). The power of Action (*Kartṛtva-Śakti* or *Kriyā-Śakti*) thus turns into the Constituent power (*Nirmāṇa-Śakti*). The division in *Kriyā-Śakti* is caused by the time factor (*Kāla-Śakti*) which is also one of the powers of Maheśvara. The objective branch, having grown into the Constituent power (*Nirmāṇa-Śakti*), shoots forth into thirty-six branches, viz. *Tattvas* (categories) or principles of creation. All these are explained in the following chapters. The branch B, in the chart, represents the expansion of *Śakti* or *Kriyā-Śakti* of Maheśvara, the Universal Energy, the Physical aspect of the Reality. From these evolved *Tattvas* emanate the whole universe consisting of innumerable subjects and objects, sentient and insentient beings, suns and moons, stars and planets, rivers and mountains, trees and plants, flowers and fruits, and what not. This emanation of the Universal Being (Maheśvara)

into the cosmos is impelled by His power of Will (*tat-sāmarthyaṁ svātantryam*).[24]

Turning away from the macrocosm to look at the microcosm, which exists everywhere around us and within us, there exists a permanent Self (Ātman), or soul, in every individual being which is endowed with the three potential powers (*Śaktis*) of will, cognition and action (*Icchā*, *Jñāna* and *Kriyā*). The first power is technically called *Svātantrya-Śakti* (Sovereignty of his Will), which is the impetus behind all his creative thought and activity. The soul is also the substratum of the powers of Remembrance (*Smaraṇa-Śakti*), Knowledge (*Jñāna-Śakti*) and Differentiation (*Apohana Śakti*), which are the three different forms of the cognitive power of the self. The Pratyabhijñā clearly analyses all the human faculties—man's entire physical, mental and spiritual organism—and explores the deep layers of his consciousness.

In relation to the macrocosm, i.e. the universe around the individual beings, the said powers are indispensable to all creative activity in Nature outside. This creative activity on the part of the Universal Being permeating the universe accounts for the emanation of infinite sentient and insentient beings from its two aspects, *Śiva* (the Supreme Consciousness) and *Śakti* (the Universal Activity, Force or Energy). The latter materialises in the form of the Ultimate Substance with which the physical universe is made. And this emanation is explained as due to the Sovereignty of Will attributed to the Supreme Being, known technically as *Māheśvarya*, which in relation to an individual being is generally called *Svātantrya-Śakti*. The Pratyabhijñā assumes all volitional, cognitive and conscious-physical acts at the empirical level as essential for the existence of the universe. It will thus be seen that the conception of the macrocosm in the system is based on a very deep study of the microcosm.

It is evident from the above that the position of Pratyabhijñā is perhaps unique in the treatment of spirit and matter as two distinct realities presenting in the universe in innumerable forms of animate and inanimate objects or, in other words, sentient and insentient entities. These two realities, however, unify and resort ultimately to a single Reality, the Absolute Being (Maheśvara), of which these are the two aspects. Thus

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24. It is this image (cosmos), the visible body of the Lord. Maheśvara, *Bhairava* ('Formidable'), having wonderous powers, as depicted in the chart, facing p. 12 above, which the Śaiva adorer pictures in the following verse:

श्रयाणं चिद्रसस्यौघं साकारत्वमुपागतम् ।
जगद्रूपतया वन्दे प्रत्यक्षं भैरवं वपुः । (Quoted, Śaivāgama)

the diversity in the cosmos as emanating from unity is apt to fit in with this monistic system. Spirit and matter are both dynamic in this system, as the spirit is characterised by thought and matter by activity or presentment of force or power (*Kriya-Śakti*). Will is the static centre of all activity of the soul, while intellection and physical activity are its dynamic aspects.

The Pratyabhijñā philosophy, it may be remarked, probes deep into the nature of the Reality underlying the universe both in regard to its psychological and physical aspects. It has gone to the extent of establishing not only that plants and trees are endowed with life just like the other kinds of living beings, but soil and water out of which they grow, nay, even inane matter, which according to modern science is unconscious and dead, possesses a continuous life-force or conscious life-activity. The valuable studies of astronomers, mathematicians and physicists have revealed the foundation stones and the dimensions of the universe, and have enriched mankind by their demonstration of the power and sweep of the human intellect. But ali such scientific investigations have remained practically wanting in this aspect of study—the study of life in the universe. It is only recently that attempts have been made to explain 'life'. The main emphasis of science is now changing from the study of the elementary forces and simple particles to the complexities of living textures. Philosophy started its quest mainly in the direction of the study of life. While tracing the beginnings of Philosophy, Maulana Azad explains the object for which Philosophy has stood from time immemorial.[25] He says that Philosophy is the quest for finding out the meaning of life and existence. He adds that two questions arose in the mind of man as soon as he began to think : "what is the meaning of his life; and what is the nature of the universe he sees all around". The beginning of systematic speculation marked the birth of philosophy. He concludes, "The pilgrims of philosophy did not succeed in securing the object of their quest but they have, in the course of their journey, obtained something else of great value : in their search for philosophy they discovered science. Science has brought to man new power, but has not given him peace ..." The Maulana, therefore, suggests : "The time has now come when philosophy should turn its attention towards the problem of human peace." It will, however, be noticed that Indian philosophy, if properly understood in the light of the Pratyabhijñā system, has already revealed a knowledge of paramount importance conducive to human peace and progress. A proper study

25. Cf. his Introduction to *The History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western*, Ed. S. Radhakrishnan, London, 1952, vol.I, pp. 13-27 ,

of the Pratyabhijñā system will perhaps lead to a better understanding of 'man's nature' or, in other words, revaluation of man's estimate of himself.

Place of Pratyabhijñā in Indian and Western systems of Philosophy: The present work reviews the allied philosophical movements in India and the West as represented by :

1. The Śaiva systems of India ;
2. The Vedic and the Buddhist systems of Indian Philosophy ; and
3. The Western Schools of Philosophy.

A comparison and contrast is made between the various doctrines of the Pratyabhijñā system and the allied doctrines of other schools to indicate the contribution of the system to world philosophy.

Philosophic Movements in India and the West: In the development of philosophical thought in India there arose two main movements, the Vedic and the non-Vedic. The Vedic movement grew within the ambit of Vedic scriptures and the non-Vedic movement developed from the *Śaivāgamas*, the scriptures of the Śaivas. The former movement started sometime between the second and the third millennium B. C. when the Aryans settled in India and produced their literature, known as the 'Vedic literature'. Some hymns of the *Ṛgveda*, the oldest of the Vedas, and the later Vedic literature, like the Upaniṣads, indicate that various speculations were held by the Vedic Indians regarding the origin and nature of creation. Rational philosophical thinking, in fact, grew in India from the age of the Buddha. The earliest philosophic doctrines, such as Vijñāna-Vāda and Kṣaṇika-Vāda evolved from the Buddhists. Later on, the speculations of the Upaniṣads assumed different forms in various systems of philosophy which developed in post-Vedic ages. Different philosophical theories evolved from various schools of thought, such as, *Dvaita* (dualism), *Advaita* (non-dualism), *Viśiṣṭādvaita* (modified non-dualism) and *Dvaitādvaita* (dualism-cum-monism). The non-dualistic doctrine culminated ultimately in Śaṅkarācārya's school of Vedānta.

The *Śaiva* movement in India dates from centuries earlier than the Vedic movement. The excavations of Mohenjo-daro and Harappa have revealed that the Śaiva cult was in vogue as far back as 3000 B.C. Sir John Marshall says, "Amongst the many revelations that Mohenjo-daro and Harappa have had in store for us, none perhaps is more remarkable than the discovery that Śaivism had a history going back to the Chalcolithic age or perhaps even farther still." The philosophical speculations seem to have also been growing among the Śaivas who lived side by side with the Vaidikas long before the Christian era. The different Śaiva sects also

held varied philosophical theories, such as *Dvaita* (dualism), *Advaita* (non-dualism), *Dvaitādvaita* (dualism-cum-monism) and so on, like the similar schools of the Vedic fold. The non-dualistic trend of thought in the Śaiva movement finally culminated in the form of the Monistic system of Pratyabhijñā Philosophy.

In Europe, the philosophic conceptions started in Greece with the question as to 'what constitutes the *primordial natural force-principle*', from about 600 B.C., when Thales declared water to be the first principle—'*the Universal Substratum, Prima Materia of all things*, of which the other bodies are mere modifications'. Thales was followed by other Greek philosophers, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Pythagoras and so on who, in the beginning, held materialistic conceptions of the Universal Substratum or the Prima Materia of all things. The materialistic conceptions of the ultimate *cause* (Reality) were followed by the three idealistic movements of the later Western philosophy which culminated in Hegel's *Absolute Idealism*. Further scientific inquiry into various physical phenomena revealed certain primary truths or general laws of nature. Herbert Spencer felt the existence of some *Unknown Reality* of which Matter, Motion and Force are but symbols. While generalizing all phenomenal changes under one *Unknown Reality*, he held that Spirit and Matter are its two aspects.

From a study of various systems of philosophy, it is observed that there has been a struggle for reaching Unity, viz. Monism ; and to arrive at that Unity, there have been two courses, so to say, two contending problems, viz. *Idealism* and *Realism*, both in the Indian and Western systems of Philosophy. In the opinion of the the present writer, the Pratyabhijñā is perhaps a better representation of the philosophic quest. The first thing to be noticed is that the Pratyabhijñā is a school of spiritual Pragmatism ; it has taken into serious consideration the human interests. Its conception of Reality is not an impersonal being but a personal self comprehending in himself all things that are human. It aims at bringing into awareness spiritual kinship and creating a feeling of oneness and freedom among individuals. It believes that man is the architect of his own fate and seeks to cure the element of vileness, wickedness and baseness in the nature of man. The cause of suffering is the obscuration or unawareness of one's profounder faculty, which results in *Malas* (impurities) and *Pāśas* (fetters). *Siddhi* (happiness and success) is achieved by the removal of the veil of obscuration (*mohāpasāraṇa-mātram*). The author says that Pratyabhijñā is laid down for the success of man without much effort (*janasyāyatna-siddhyartham*).

Pratyabhijñā is, in its essence, a deep study of man possessing the highest potentialities. The system unfolds man's supreme inheritence, his profounder faculty or creative power, which comprises his powers of comprehension and action and sovereignty of will. The human being is absolutely free (*svatantra*) in creating a world for himself, a new world, a better and happier world. The system has laid emphasis on the need of recognising (*Pratyabhijñā*) of Self (*Ātman*), the profounder faculty within us. The more we realize in ourselves the supreme nature of Self (*Ātman*), the more powers of knowledge and action (*Jñāna Śakti* and *Kriyā Śakti*) we manifest and exercise through our mind and body. The necessity of supersensuous experience for self-realization, like the processes of intuition, moral discipline and spiritual training, is recognised in the system as an aid to recognition, owing to the limitations of man's sense and reason. The modern psychologists have also admitted : 'The conscious Self of each of us does not comprise the whole of consciousness or of the faculty within us. There exists a more comprehensive consciousness, a profounder faculty within us, which for the most part remains potential only.'[26] Pratyabhijñā, *i.e.* the recognition of the supreme nature of self, is prescribed in the system for the service of man, as a means of attaining all that is of highest value.[27] Thus the system lays down the psychological basis for the elevation of human personality, viz. the mental, moral and spiritual elevation of hmanity.[28]

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26. F. W. H. Myers, *Human Personality*, p. 13.

27. कथंचिदासाद्य महेश्वरस्य दास्यं जनस्याप्युपकारमिच्छन् ।
समस्तसंपत्समवाप्तिहेतुं तत्प्रत्यभिज्ञामुपपादयामि ॥

(*IPK*, I. i, 1)

28. According to the metaphysical point of view the Pratyabhijñā leads a person to become aware again of the fact that the individual self (*Paśu*) is identical with the Universal Being (*Pati*, *Śiva* or *Maheśvara*) or, in other words, to know the supreme nature of 'self'. In the Vedānta and other schools of Indian Philosophy, the knowledge (*Jñāna*) of the identity of the individual soul (*Ātman*) and the Universal Soul (*Brahman*) is generally considered the highest ideal. According to the Pratyabhijñā system, Parama-Śiva, the Ultimate Being, who is aware of His Transcendental nature in that state, while adopting the limited form of an individual being (*Paśu-bhāva*) by the sovereignty of His Will (*Svātantrya-Śakti*), forgets (loses the awareness of) His real nature by His own deluding power (*Māyā-vimohinī Śakti*) and becomes limited in his powers of thought and action, thus turning into an inferior being (*Paśu*), characterised as possessing *alpa-kartṛtva* (limited power of action), *alpa-śaktitva* (limited potency) and *alpa-jñātṛtva* (limited power of knowledge). The Pratyabhijñā enables him to recognise his own supreme nature already known to him before his individuation and thus restores his higher and deeper powers already innate in him. *Recognition* (*Pratyabhijñā*) is distinguished from *knowledge* (*Jñāna*) in the sense that in the former state

As will be clear from the following pages Pratyabhijñā is a school of education for liberty (*svātantrya*), freedom of will, thought and action. It teaches, on a rational and scientific basis, the unity of mankind, the unity of all living beings, in fact, the unity of life in the entire universe, (*svātmaiva sarva-jantūnām eka eva maheśvaraḥ*). It recognises the democratic idea of sovereignty of human individual, i.e. superiority and dignity of man, and lays emphasis on *equality* and *universal brotherhood of mankind,* irrespective of diversity of caste, creed, colour and nationality. These are indeed the essentials of a modern democratic society. Pratyabhijñā has thus shown to mankind a new way (*navo mārgaḥ*) to human peace and freedom. The school has given for the world the same inspiring and thought-provoking message as we find in the *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad* 6 and 7 :

"He who sees all creatures in himself, himself in all creatures, does not show abhorrence to any one. Knowing all living beings to be one's own self, seeing the unity of mankind, how can there be delusion, suffering or sorrow."[29]

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the identity of the individual self and the Supreme Being (or, in other words, the supreme nature of 'self') is not, in reality, unrealised before (*nānanubhūtaḥ*), but is only forgotten ; and this experience is revived in the state of *Recognition*, while realization in the form of mere *knowledge*, according to the point of view of the Vedānta system, is lacking before its attainment. This is one important point of difference between the Pratyabhijñā and the Vedānta system.

29. यस्तु सर्वाणि भूतान्यात्मन्येवानुपश्यति ।
सर्वभूतेषु चात्मानं ततो न विजुगुप्सते ॥
यस्मिन्सर्वाणि भूतान्यात्मैवाभूद्विजानतः ।
तत्र को मोहः कः शोक एकत्वमनुपश्यतः ॥

The ultimate aim of Indian philosophy is best given in the words of Dr. S. Radhakrishnan :—

"... ... Within each incarnate soul dwells the good-consciousness which we must seek out and awaken. When mankind awakes to the truth, universal brotherhood will follow, ... One whose life is rooted in the experience of the Supreme, spontaneously develops love for all creation. He will be free from hatred for any man ... ... He will boldly work for a Society in which man can be free and fearless ... ... He will oppose terror and cruelity ... ... He will give voice to those who have no voice."

What we need is 'a recognition of those supreme ends of life to which science and organisation, discipline and obedience are to be harnessed.'

CHAPTER II

RELIGIOUS AND PHILOSOPHIC BACKGROUND

Cultural history of Kashmir, a brief survey; Religious beliefs of the earliest inhabitants of Kashmir; Origin of Śiva worship in Kashmir; Śaivism in Kashmir; Buddhism in Kashmir; Origin of philosophic movement in Kashmir; Survey of the early philosophical speculations and doctrines.

Cultural History of Kashmir, a Brief Survey: According to tradition, as first recorded in *Nīlamata-purāṇa*,[1] the whole land which forms the Kashmir valley, was in former times one vast lake known as Satī-sar[2] (the lake of Goddess Satī) whose waters were drained off by a certain ancient sage, named Prajāpati Kaśyapa, by cutting a gorge in the ring of mountains below the present Baramulla town. This legendary account of the origin of Kashmir by desiccation of the lake surrounded by mountains, is maintained by Kalhaṇa in his *Rājataraṅgiṇī*[3] and also by the later historians. The Nāgas were, perhaps, the original inhabitants of the valley as mentioned in the *Nīlamata-purāṇa*, who seem to have formerly lived on the mountains. Piśācas or the Dardic Aryans were among the first settlers in Kashmir. This is supported by certain references in other Purāṇas which mention Dards among the tribes inhabiting Kashmir. After settling in the Pamir region, the Dardic Aryans appear to have spread themselves to modern Chitral and Gilgit and from there

1. This is the earliest extant work in Kashmir and is supposed by Dr. Bühler to be the record of the time not older than the sixth or seventh century A.D.

2. यैषा देवी उमा सैव कश्मीरा नृपसत्तम ।
श्रासीत् सरः पूर्णजलं सुरम्यं सुमनोहरम् ॥ *Nm.* 31
मन्वन्तरेषु पूर्वेषु नासीद् देशम् इमं किल ।
कश्मीराख्यं बभूवास्मिन् कथं वैवस्वतेऽन्तरे ॥ *Ib.* 50
तस्यां तु भूमौ भवति सरस्तु विमलोदकम्॥
षड्योजनायतं रम्यं तदर्धेन च विस्तृतम् ।
सतीदेश इति ख्यातं देवाक्रीडं मनोहरम् ॥
श्राकाशम् इव गम्भीरं जलजैश्च विवर्जितम् ।
शीतलामलपानीयं सर्वभूमिमनोहरम् ॥ *Ib.* 65-67 (सतीसरोवर्णनम्)

3. पुरा सतीसरः कल्पारम्भात्प्रभृति भूरभूत् ......
कश्यपेन तदन्तःस्थं घातयित्वा जलोद्भवम् ।
निर्ममे तत्सरो भूमौ कश्मीरा इति मण्डलम् ॥ *Raj. I.* 25-27

arrived in the valley of Kashmir. Whatever the exact date of their advent in the valley, there is no doubt that they flourished in Kashmir after the Nāgas, but a long time before the arrival of the Indo-Aryans from the passes leading into the valley from its west or south-west. It has been admitted that during the period intervening the settlement of Piśācas in Kashmir and the arrival of the Indo-Aryans, the Nāgas and the Dardic Aryans had mixed racially.[4] *Nīlamata-purāṇa* mentions also that the men of four castes (Aryans) were introduced into Kashmir by Kaśyapa, after its creation from the lake. This account cannot, however, be believed. The *Ṛgveda* does not mention Kashmir. The lack of reference in the *Ṛgveda* suggests that the Indo-Aryans were not aware of Kashmir, or, at any rate, had not settled in the valley during the period. *Mahābhārata* makes a passing reference to Kashmir's geography and its king. Pāṇini, in his *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (6th century B. C.), takes notice of Kashmir. In the *Rājataraṅgiṇī*, Kalhaṇa, on the basis of *Nīlamata-purāṇa*, connects the reigns of his first two rulers of Kashmir, Gonanda I and Damodara I, with the time of the great Bhārata war. It is mentioned that the two rulers went to Mathura and took part in the war against Kṛṣṇa and were killed.[5] Considering the hurdles the Indo-Aryans had to face in subduing north-western India, it is probable that their penetration into the secluded valley of Kashmir was an event of post-Ṛgvedic age and around the time when the great Bhārata war took place in the plains of India. This war is generally believed to have occured around B.C. 1000; Kalhaṇa takes the time of Mahābhārata to about 2448 B. C. It will not, therefore, be hazardous to assert that Indian culture along with the various forms of religion then followed in the country must have spread in the valley by the time of the great Bhārata war.

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4. H. N. Kaul, 'A Survey of the origin of the people of Kashmir (2)', *Kashmir Today*, 3.i (Sept. 1958) 5-8.

5. तस्मिन् कालेऽत्र समभूत् राजा विशदकीर्तिमान्।
काश्मीरान् पालयन् सौम्य गोनन्द इति संज्ञया ॥ *Nm.* 11
दामोदराभिधस्तस्य सूनू राजाऽभवत् सुधीः ।...॥ *Ib.* 20

अथोपसिन्धु गान्धारविषयेऽभूत् स्वयंवरः ।
यत्राहूताः समाजग्मू राजानो वीर्यशालिनः ॥

तत्रागतं समाकर्ण्य वासुदेवं स्वयंवरे।
जगाम माधवं योद्धुं चतुरङ्गबलान्वितः ॥ *Ib.* 24, 25
ततः स वासुदेवेन युद्धे तस्मिन्निपातितः ।...॥ *Ib.* 27

Religious beliefs of the earliest inhabitants of Kashmir: The geographical position of Kashmir, situated as it is in the midst of high mountains, shows that it might have long remained secluded and so unaffected by any external influence. But, it seems that, while a number of old cults and religious practices flourished in the valley, at times different religious and philosophical doctrines reached there from outside its boundaries. Various evidences point to the fact that the inhabitants of Kashmir professed, from the earliest times, both Aryan and aboriginal beliefs which prevail even at the present day. It has been stated that, in very ancient times, aborigines settled in villages throughout India, perhaps including Kashmir, who followed their own particular creeds which consisted in the worship of demoniacal gods and appeasing of ghosts and evil working spirits. After the Aryans migrated to the land, they gradually came into contact with the aborigines and, in course of time, it must have become necessary for them to adopt some of the religious beliefs of the other.[6] According to the evidence of the *Nīlamata-purāṇa*, there existed in Kashmir, from the dawn of history, a polytheistic religion, which included, among many primitive types of worship of the aboriginal deities like Nikumbha and his followers (ghosts), Nīlanāga, the serpent lord, birds such as crows, the liṅga of Śiva on Śiva-rātri and other festivals, Gaṇeśa, Vināyaka, Gandharvas and Piśācas, etc., the worship of the Vedic and Purāṇic gods, and even that of the Buddha as an avatāra.[7] It is stated that after Kashmir had been produced from the lake, Kaśyapa settled people in it. The gods as well as the Nāgas received their place and the goddesses occupied it in the form of rivers. Piśācas too inhabited this country but were ordered by Kaśyapa to settle in it for only six months in the year. He told them, "During the six months of the winter, Nikumbha, the king of Piśācas......, will occupy Kashmir with fifty millions of his warriors." He, then, introduced the men of the four castes from various countries. They dwelt in it for only six months in the year. Further, we learn that, when the four yugas were completed, there was an old

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6. In very ancient times aborigines settled throughout the villages of India where 'the aboriginal primitive ritual was ministered by local sorcerers and priests... The new-comers (Aryans) remained for some time uninfluenced by non-Aryan religions, but in course of time it became necessary to recognise their worship of the demoniacal gods and appeasing of ghosts and evil working spirits... In course of time the aboriginal deities were raised to new honour and rank as manifestations or servants of *Śiva* and *Viṣṇu* or their *Śaktis* (female consorts).'

Encyclopaedia of Ethics and Religion. Art. 'Śaivism.' *Cf*. Art. 'Hinduism', Vol. VI, 702-a.

7. *Nm*. 629, 635, 674, 681, 1049 ff. It is a later addition or interpolation. Nilamat belongs to B.C. not A.D. Its language has been changed (as that of Lalleshwari's saying) to suit Paninian Sanskrit, by the man who introduced Buddha in it.

× Sakti worship came first and then Shiva worship followed.

Brahmin Candradeva by name, descended from Kaśyapa, who neglected to leave the country with the other inhabitants. Him the Piśācas caught, and played with him as children play with birds tied to a string. He suffered much at their hands. At last he came to Nāga Nīla who received him in his dwelling place, where he remained for the six months of the winter season and learnt from his host a number of rites, the object of the observance of which was to deliver the country from the Piśācas and from excessive cold. A great many of these rites agree with the Purāṇic ceremonies and festivals.[8]

Origin of Śiva Worship in Kashmir: S. C. Ray observes that the earliest inhabitants of Kashmir probably cherished some aboriginal beliefs, the details of which are not traceable now. The snake cult or Nāga worship seems to have been established in the valley from a remote period and had undoubtedly been one of the earliest religions of the land. In the third century B. C. Buddhism seems to have made some headway into Kashmir, converted a large number of people and overshadowed the Nāga cult which ultimately sank into oblivion. Among Hindu gods, Śiva either originated or entered the valley sometime before the faith of the Śākya prince made its entrance and was later followed by *Viṣṇu*, *Sūrya* and other Brāhmaṇical gods and goddesses.[9] In reference to the snake cult, we may cite H. H. Wilson, who writes, "Originally, no doubt, it (the religion of Kashmir) was ophite or snake worship but this is a part of the Hindu ritual and the Nāgas are included in the orthodox pantheon. The adoration of Śiva was soon engrafted upon this, even if the two rites were not originally identified."[10] We, however, find that Hinduism of Śaivaite* character and Buddhism became dominant religions of the inhabitants of Kashmir in the early ages.

The excavations of Mohenjodaro and Harappa have revealed that Śiva worship was in vogue** in India as far back as 3000 B. C., *viz.* in the age of Indus Valley Civilization. Numerous references in the Vedas, the Brāhmaṇas, the Upaniṣads, the epics and the Purāṇas, as pointed out by scholars like S. Radhakrishnan, C. Hayavadana Rao, R.W. Frazer and Hardayal, show that the worship of Śiva was prevalent in India in the Vedic age. Some of the references clearly prove that this form of worship was

** Even before that. 3000 B.C. is an arbitrary date.

8. Bühler, *Report*, *Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1877, Extra Number, 39-40.

9. S. C. Ray, *The Early History and Culture of Kashmir*, VI, 140.

10. H. H. Wilson, *Essays on the Hindu History of Kashmir*, quoted in 'A Survey of the Origin of the People of Kashmir' (2)', *Kashmir Today*, 3.i (Sept. 1958), 5-8.

gradually borrowed by the Aryans from the non-Aryans.[11] S. C. Ray says, "The history of the introduction of Śaivism in Kashmir is shrouded in mystery. It is not known whether the Śiva of Kashmir was an

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11. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*; C. Hayavadana Rao, *Śrīkara Bhāṣya on Vedānta Sūtra*, Vol. I, Introduction; R. W. Frazer, *Indian Thought, Past and Present*; Hardayal, *The Bodhisattva Doctrine*.

References to Śiva worship:

Śiva is mentioned in *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* (*sarvavyāpī sa bhagavān tasmāt sarvagataḥ śivaḥ*, III, 11). Śaiva sect is mentioned in Pātañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* (150 B. C.) and Śiva is praised in *Mahābhārata*. Śaivas are also mentioned in *Milinda Panho* (P. 191, line 6 ff. *śiva vāsudeva ghanika*). Magesthenes wrote that Indians also worshipped 'Dionysos' (identified with Śiva). (cf. Hardayal, *The Bodhisattva Doctrine*).

In the *Ṛgveda*, Rudra represents Śiva who is not mentioned by that name in it. There has been some discussion as to the identity of Rudra, the Vedic God, and Śiva. According to Sāyaṇa, there is hardly any doubt that Rudra is to be understood as Śiva. At any rate the Hindu commentators so understood him. Sāyaṇa defines the name Rudra to mean 'he who makes us weep, who causes all to weep at the end of time'; thus Rudra is identified with the destroying principle or Śiva.

In the sixteenth chapter of the *Vājasneyī Saṁhitā* of the *White Yajurveda*, God Rudra is spoken of by a large number of epithets which, later, are peculiar to Śiva. To these, in 39th chapter, are added Iśāna (ruler) and Mahādeva (Supreme God) which perhaps indicate the final conversion of Rudra into Śiva.

In the first part of the *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa* attached to the *Atharva-veda* we find the mention of Śiva which would seem to show that in post-Vedic times, if not already in the *Brāhmaṇa* period (800-500 B. C.), Śiva had become fully established in place of Rudra. In *Atharva-veda* Rudra is, indeed, elevated to a higher position.

In the *Mahābhārata*, there are numerous references to Śiva. The duality of his nature is to be seen in the epic as well. He is commonly styled *Mahādeva* or the great God and *Devādhideva*, the God of gods. He is also called *Paśupati* and is described as rejoicing in the company of *Umā*.

Among the *Purāṇas*, which favour the religion of Śiva, are the *Skanda*, the *Śiva*, the *Liṅga* and the *Bhaviṣya*. The *Mārkaṇḍeya* and the *Padma purāṇas* inculcate the belief that Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva are only one being.

In the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, Śiva has not yet become the name of Rudra though its frequent use as an adjective in connection with the latter indicates that it is in course of becoming fixed as the proper name of the highest God. In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, the *Ṛgveda* conception still persists. The Rudras, the progeny of Rudra, are called the ten vital breaths (*Prāṇas*), with the heart as the eleventh, which seems opposed to the description of Śiva as the destroyer of life. The double conception of creator and destroyer seems to be maintained here.

In the *Bhagavad-gītā*, the supremacy of Śiva as the ruler of the world is maintained. Referring to the Rudras, Śri Kṛṣṇa identifies himself with Śaṅkara, which would seem to stress the aspect of beneficence associated with him (*Bhag. Gītā* X, 23).

Liṅga worship : Śiva has been identified with Avestic Saurva (*Zend-Avesta, S.B.E.* 4, liii, *Pahalvi Texts S.B. E.*, 5, 104). The earliest reference to *Liṅga* is to be found in the *Ṛgveda* where the context shows that it refers to a kind of worship prevalent not among the Aryans but among their enemies, which one authority identifies with the Dasyus. The worship of the *Liṅga*, it has been suggested, has been taken to correspond with the worship of phallus, the emblem of the generative power in nature, especially in certain religious or solemn usages. In one passage of the *Ṛgveda*, Indra is requested not to allow those whose God is *Śiśna* to disturb the rites of the singers (*Ṛgveda*, VII, 21, 5), while in another he is spoken of as 'having acquired the riches of a city after having killed those whose God is *Śiśna*. Bhandārkar does not quote the exact reference to the *Ṛgveda*, for the statement. Prof. A. A. Macdonell likewise refers to two passages in the *Ṛgveda* but does not set down the exact reference (Macdonell, *A History of Sanskrit Literature*, 153). R. G. Bhandārkar thinks that as we find phallic worshippers being denounced by the Aryans in those passages, Aryans must be taken to have been averse to such worship. He suggests that there is no trace of this characteristic (i.e. the worship of the *Liṅga* or the phallus) in the earlier literature, so far as we have examined it, thereby meaning the *Ṛgveda*. He also points out that this kind of worship should have been borrowed by the Aryans from the barbarian tribes with whom the Aryans came in contact. In this view the learned classes did not adopt it all at once, but only gradually. (Cf. Bhandārkar, *Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and Minor Religious Systems*, 114-15).

In the *Śukla Yajurveda, Liṅga* worship is in the advanced state where it is a part of the Soma sacrifice. The worship of the *Liṅga* is held to be recognised in the *Pravargya* (*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, *S B. E.*, Vol. 44, xlvii). It might, perhaps, be inferred that Śiva worship and the identification of such worship with the *Liṅga* had become general by then.

In *Mahābhārata* we find the worship of the *Liṅga* referred to in many passages. By the time of the epic period *Liṅga* had come to be recognised as the emblem of Śiva. In post-Vira-Śaiva period the development of the *Bhakti* doctrine and the reaction induced by philosophic ideas made the *Liṅga* the great object round which a complete system of philosophical thought and ritualistic worship came to be evolved. Śiva possesses in himself a Śakti, or power consisting of the rudiments of the individual soul and the material world, and from this Śakti develops the whole world. (Cf. C. Hayavadana Rao, Introduction to *Śrīkara Bhāṣya*, Vol. I.)

Śakti worsip prevailed originally among non-Aryans and was gradually adopted by the Aryans. She is affiliated with the Goddess of the *Ṛgveda*, Vāgāmbhṛṇī Devī (*Ṛgveda*, Vāk Sūkta, X, 125). It is interpreted to be in honour of the primeval energy of life, the divine Śakti. Dr. Peterson understands it as Parā-vāk, the transcendental Word. (Cf. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, *The Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, Chap. *Śāktism*).

R. W. Frazer points out references to Rudra and Śiva in the Vedas and concludes that 'Rudra as Śiva was, therefore, evidently a deity of non-Aryan folk and was admitted into Brāhmaṇism only as a compromise with the beliefs and worships of powerful aboriginal foes.' He says further, 'it has been held that of all the forms to be met within our temples from mount Everest to Cape Comorin, the form of the *Liṅga* is most universal. It is, in fact, the most ancient form of worship. Greek writers thought that Śiva represented Herakles because both carried a club. The coins of

immigrant from the neighbouring Indus valley or was of local origin."[12] If we believe Kalhaṇa, communication existed, as said above, between Kashmir and the plains of India from the days of the Mahābhārata war. It is, therefore, certain that the introduction of Śiva worship into Kashmir from India must have taken place as early as the age of the great Bhārata war.

Śaivism in Kashmir : The facts furnished by Kalhaṇa in his *Rājataraṅgiṇī*, the chronicle of the kings of Kashmir, indicate, in the main, the wide prevalence of the Śaiva cult in the valley from an early period. There are innumerable references to the foundations of Śiva shrines and erection of temples in honour of Śiva. As the first reference to Śiva worship, Kalhaṇa writes that there was a shrine of Vijayeśvara even in pre-Aśokan days. Aśoka himself built two temples of Śiva-Aśokeśvara and was the devotee of Bhūteśa (Śiva). Śaiva faith became predominant in the valley in the centuries following the Kārkoṭa period. Avantivarman (A.D. 855-883) was a devotee of Śiva. Śaivism received patronage from the Utpalas, who succeeded the Kārkoṭas. It flourished also under the second Lohara dynasty.[13] Śiva Śrīkaṇṭha was regarded in the valley as the promulgator of the Śaivāgamas. Kalhaṇa refers to the Tāntric cult which is closly connected with Śiva worship. When Buddhism entered into Kashmir some time before the reign of Aśoka (272-232 B.C.), there already existed a religion, the prominent feature of which was the worship of 'God Śiva in company of his female consort Pārvatī or Śakti'. In this form of worship, God Śiva and his Śakti, adored as father and mother of all creation, symbolize the two generative principles of the universe, viz. male and female cosmogonic principles. Thus, Śiva worship and Śākta faith are closely associated with one another.

Buddhism in Kashmir : It is commonly believed that the Buddhist period in Kashmir follows from the third century B.C. with the reign of Aśoka (272-232 B.C.), but the new faith seems to have obtained a footing in

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Huvishka, the Scythian emperor in North India, in the early centuries of the Christian era, represent Śiva, bearing club. The worship of Apollo had in Persia, been mingled with the worship of the Sun-God Mithra. This worship, in India, had further become merged into that of Apollo, identified as Śiva during the time of Indo-scythian rulers of North India.

These references clearly show that the worship of Śiva was accepted by the immigrants into India in the beginning, identifying Him with gods of similar characteristics of their own original places of inhabitance. (Cf R. W Frazer, *Indian Thought, Past and Present*, 1915).

12. S. C. Ray, *The Early History and Culture of Kashmir*, 140.
13. *Ibid.*

the valley much earlier, since it was prevalent there in the time of the native king Surendra, who ruled some time after the Buddha but before Aśoka.[14] The Ceylonese chronicle, *Mahāvaṁśa*, preserves an account of the introduction of Buddhism in the valley by Majjhantika (Madhyantika) who was sent to Kashmir by Aśoka to propagate the new faith. This fact is recorded also by the Tibetan writer Tārānātha who says that Madhyantika found twelve Vihāras in existence at the time of his arrival. We learn from Kalhaṇa that Kashmir formed a part of the empire of Aśoka, who was a follower of the Buddha. It is in the reign of king Aśoka that Buddhism spread all over India and flourished in the valley by the side of ancient Śaiva faith. Kashmir was a great centre of Buddhism under the Kushans. It was under the auspices of Kaniṣka, the Kushan ruler, that the Great Buddhist Council was held in Kashmir. It seems that in the beginning the religious policy of the Buddhists was non-interfering and the Brāhmaṇas of Kashmir did not feel its advent seriously. The *Nīlamata-purāṇa* records that in Kaniṣka's reign (A. D. 125-160) excesses were committed by the Buddhists under the lead of the famous Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna. We further learn that the Buddhists defeated the learned classes of people in Kashmir by preaching their own nihilistic doctrines. In consequence, the 'time-honoured ceremonies' followed by the Kashmirians had to be suspended. The Nāgas, perhaps a class of the original inhabitants of the valley, were greatly provoked and with their help one Brāhmaṇa, named Candradeva, finally restored the traditional customs and freed the land from the plague of the Bhikṣus.[15] Even after this incident, the Buddhist cult was there in a very flourishing condition. As recorded by Kalhaṇa, Meghavāhana, Lalitāditya, and many other rulers or the members of the royal families built monasteries and stūpas there. This fact is in full accord with the report of the Chinese pilgrim, Ou-kong. That Buddhism was patronised equally along with other orthodox creeds by the rulers of Kashmir is evident from the gifts and endowments made by them, especially by king Lalitāditya, and by the members of their courts. The worship of the Buddha was recognised in Kashmir from ancient times, as is evident from the *Nīlamata-purāṇa* which mentions the celebration of the Buddha's birthday as a great festival.[16] The thriving state of Buddhism in Kashmir after the Kushan ruler, Kaniṣka, is testified by archaeological evidence, and that, during the reign of Kārkoṭas, i.e. during the 7th and 8th centuries A.D., is also attested by the evidence of the Chinese

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14. J. N. Ganhar, P. N. Ganhar, *Buddhism in Kashmir and Ladakh*, 15.
15. *Nm*. 424-29. Ref. Introduction to *Nm*., Ed. Kanjilal and Zadoo.
16. *Nm*. 809-16.

travellers Hieun Tsang, who visited Kashmir during the years A.D. 631-633, and Ou-Koug, who came there in A.D. 759. They spent many years in the valley in pilgrimages to holy sites and in studying Sanskrit. Both of them witnessed Buddhism flourishing in the country. All this shows that Buddhism and Brāhmaṇical cults existed peacefully side by side in Kashmir for centuries before Kalhaṇa's time.[17]

Origin of philosophic movement in Kashmir (under the impetus of Buddhism): It has been said above that Buddhists existed in Kashmir for many centuries and lived peacefully along with Brāhmaṇas, who were the followers of Śiva-Śakti cults from very early times. Consequently, the exchange of views on religious matters between the two sects was inevitable. The influence of the Buddhistic thought upon the people of Kashmir was so great that, during the eighth and ninth centuries of the Christian era, the ancient Śaiva faith was gradually vanishing.[18] A religious upheaval, however, came in the ninth century A.D. which brought about the waning of Buddhism and the revival of ancient Śaiva faith in the country. It will be observed that Buddhists initiated a critical view in matters which were so far believed only as gospel truths. The various philosophical doctrines evolved from Buddhists, such as *Vijñānavāda* and *Kṣaṇikavāda*, which were already known in Kashmir. Under the impetus of the Buddhistic thought, various schools of philosophy developed in the valley (as in the rest of India) among the non-Buddhists, viz. Brāhmaṇas, Vaidikas, Śaivas and Śāktas. The people were also well versed in the doctrines of the *Vaiyākaraṇas* (Grammarians), Sāṅkhyas, Naiyāyikas and the Yoga system which had come into the valley from India through the ages. Consequently, in the ninth century A. D., there existed a concourse of various religious and philosophical currents 'converting the valley into a battle-ground' at the time of the rise of the Pratyabhijñā system.[19]

As has been observed above, Śiva-Śakti cults were prevalent in every part of India long before the Vedic age. In course of time there grew a mass of literature of these cults, known as *Āgamas* and *Tantras*, side by side with and possibly independent of the Vedic scriptures. Consequently, in a place like India where different schools of thought grew gradually in the Vedic fold, there developed similar schools within the

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17. *Cf.* M. A. Stein, *A Chronicle of the Kings of Kashmir*, I, Introduction, 9.

18. Madhusudan Kaul, *IPV* II, Introduction, i.

19. *Ibid.*, Ref. also K. C. Pandey, *History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western*, I, Kashmir Śaivism, 381.

'Kashmir was the meeting-ground of the various philosophical currents at the time of the rise of the monistic Śaivism.'

ambit of Śaiva fold. S. G. Sakharpeker mentions in his paper on 'Śaivāgamas'[20] that before the arrival of Śaṅkarācārya on the religious stage, the Āgamavādins of Śaiva school were divided into different schools, *viz.* Mahāpāśupatas, Śaiva Siddhānta, Nipāla-Pāśupatas, Kashmir Śaivas and Vīra-Śaivas. These different Śaiva sects held varied philosophical theories, such as *Dvaita* (dualism), *Advaita* (non-dualism), *Viśiṣṭādavaita* (modified non-dualism) and *Dvaitādvaita* (dualism-cum-monism)[21] like similar schools in the Vedic fold.

Survey of the earlier philosophical speculations and doctrines : The rudiments of every system of philosophy in India originally existed in the Vedas, the Upaniṣads and the Buddhist sources, which subsequently developed into different systems with some additions and alterations. These germinal ideas constitute the common theme or skeleton of various systems, of course, including the Pratyabhijñā system. They, however, differ from one another in propounding some new doctrines of their own and coining different nomenclature. The main ideas constituting the central theme of the Pratyabhijñā Philosophy are traced by Prof. Lacchmi-

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20. S. G. Sakharpeker, Paper entiled 'Evolution of Śaivāgamas', *Proceedings of the Seventh All-India Oriental Conference*, 1933, pp. 65-70.

21. (a) *Mahāpāśupata* School is the oldest of these sects, It upholds the *Dvaita* theories. The school is mentioned in *Mahābhārata*. It dates from the second century B.C. According to this system, the supreme soul and individual souls are distinct entities and the Pradhāna is the constituent cause of the material world.

(b) The *Śaiva Siddhānta* School is known as the early Śaiva system. This is also dualistic. It differs from Pāśupata School in holding that the individual soul in the delivered condition becomes Śiva himself, i.e. attains perfect resemblance with God Śiva, though he does not possess the power of creation.

(c) The *Nipāl Pāśupatas* have not got any peculiar doctrine to distinguish them from *Mahāpāśupatas*.

(d) The *Vīra Śaiva* School is known to be posterior to *Śaiva-Pratybhijñā* School of Kashmir. The School appears to have been developing earlier than its actual origin. In the form of religion, the distinctive feature of which is *Liṅga* worship, it dates from earlier than 3000 B. C. As a School of thought it is popularized by Bāsava in the south in the 12th century A. D. It is characterised as *Bhedābheda* school of thought. It is also known as *Dravidian School of Śaivism*. This system appears to be based upon Kashmir Śaiva System, as C. Hayavadana Rao thinks.

(e) The Kashmir *Śaivas* divide into two main Schools—known as *Spanda* and *Pratyabhijñā*. The *Spanda* School is the earliest school of Kashmir *Śaivas*. They hold that intense Yogic contemplation is needed for release. The three methods of gaining release are mentioned in the Śiva Sūtras. The *Pratyabhijñā* School represents the monistic system of Śaiva philosophy.

dhar in the *Nīlamata-purāṇa*.[22] L. D. Barnett, while bringing to notice the similarity between 'modern theology of South India' and 'the ancient teachings of the north', endeavoured to indicate what, in his opinion, the links are which join the two, and ultimately both of them to the school which is represented by the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*.[23] Some verses occuring in this Upaniṣad, indeed, give almost the same or similar ideas as we find in the *Nīlamata-purāṇa* representing the central theme of the

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22. The main ideas contained in *Nīlamata-purāṇa* verses (*Nos*. 1270-74, 1283-86 1294-95.) are as follows :—

Indra has 'recognised' (*abhijñātaḥ*) Śiva as the only Supreme Lord (*maheśvaraḥ*), Cause of all causes (*Kāraṇa-kāraṇam*), all-doer and all-knower (*sarva-kartā ca sarvajñaś ca*) (1270-71), who by his free will (*icchā*) creates the universe comprising animate and inanimate objects. It is the creeper of power (*śakti-latā*) of the Lord (Prabho) which manifests the world from itself (*jagad bhāsayate bhavāt*) (1272-73). The Lord brings into existence (lit. supports) the three worlds by his Māyā (the wonderous power) (*māyā-dhṛta jagat-traya*) (1283). Śiva has no extraneous motive for his acts of creation etc. other than His own nature (*tava kāryam na vidyate*) (1285). He is the eternal witness (*sākṣivat sthitaḥ*) (1286). *Moha* or delusion is produced by Śiva's own Śakti, namely, Māyā Śakti (*tavaiva māyayā mohitena*) (1294). Indra has known the Supreme Lord (*Śambho*) only by His favour (*prasanno'si dhruvam śambho yena jñāto'si vai mayā*) (1294).

(Text) एवमुक्तस्तु शक्रेण ब्रह्मा वचनमब्रवीत् ।। *Nm*. 1269
मा मा शक्र वदेरेवमभिज्ञातोऽसि पुत्रक ।
एष सर्वेश्वरः शक्र एष कारणकारणम् ।। *Ib*. 1270
...स एष सर्वकर्ता च सर्वज्ञश्च महेश्वरः ।। *Ib*. 1271
यदिच्छया जगदिदं वर्वर्ति सचराचरम् ।
यस्य शक्तिलता सेऽयं सूर्यचन्द्रात्मनः प्रभोः ।। *Ib*. 1272
पुष्पिताऽखिलमेवेदं जगद्भासयते भवात् ।
त्वमहं चापि यस्यैव शासने समवस्थितौ ।। *Ib*. 1273

From Indra's prayer to Śiva.

...मायाधृतजगत्त्रय । *Ib*. 1283
...तव कार्यं न विद्यते । *Ib*. 1285
...साक्षिवत् स्थितः । *Ib*. 1286
तवैव मायया पूर्वं मोहितेन जगत् प्रभो ।
प्रसन्नोऽसि ध्रुवं शम्भो येन ज्ञातोऽसि वै मया । *Ib*. 1294

23. L. D. Barnett, 'Notes on Śaiva Siddhāntam,' *Le Museon*, 1909.

pratyabhijñā System.[24] As a matter of fact, these are the common ideas which connect the Pratyabhijñā system with the Vedānta school. Pt. Sūryanārāyaṇa Śāstrī and some other scholars of his view think that the *Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad* and *Kaivalya-Upaniṣad* have probably grown under the shadow of Āgamas, as is indicated by the sectarian title given to the Ultimate Cause (Śiva), symbolised generally by the term Brahman in the earlier Upaniṣads.[25] It will be clear from the following that the ideas referred to above do not only occur in these two upaniṣads but are scattered also in various other upaniṣads as well as in the hymns of the *Ṛgveda*. These ideas have been traced below from the Vedas and the Upaniṣads :—

(1) **Abhijñāna or Pratyabhijñāna** : This term generally implies knowing or recognising Self as the supreme Being or the Ultimate Reality, called Brahman in the Vedānta system and Maheśvara in the Pratyabhijñā. The various upaniṣads enjoin the injunction : 'Know thy self', as, for instance, "*ya ātmā......so 'nveṣṭavyaḥ sa vijijñāsitavyaḥ*" ('That Ātman should be sought for ; that one should desire to understand') ;[26] "*ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ*" ('Ātman is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected on and to be meditated upon')[27] ; and so on. On the basis of these expressions in the upaniṣads, Bādarāyaṇa lays down the sūtra "*athāto brahma-jijñāsā*" ('After that, enquiry into Brahman is essential')[28]. It appears that, before Somānanda, the term *Pratyabhijñā*, applied to the knowing or recognising of self, did not imply any special philosophic conception such as is attached to it in the system.

(2) **Kāraṇa-kāraṇam** : The upaniṣads directly speak of Brahman (the Supreme Being) as the Ultimate Cause of the Universe as, for instance, "*sa kāraṇam karaṇādhipādhipo*" ('He is the Cause, the lord of the lords of the senses').[29] But the idea has come from the *Ṛgveda*.

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24. तमीश्वराणां परमं महेश्वरं ... ॥
परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च ॥
न तस्य कश्चित् पतिरस्ति लोके न चेशिता नैव च तस्य लिङ्गम् ।
स कारणं करणाधिपाधिपो न चास्य कश्चित्-जनिता न चाधिपः ॥
Śvet. up. VI, 7, 8, 9.

मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम् ।
तस्यावयवभूतैस्तु व्याप्तं सर्वमिदं जगत् ॥ *Ib.* IV, 10

25. S. S. Sūryanārāyaṇa Śāstrī, *Śivādvaita of Śrīkaṇṭha*.
26. *Chānd. Up.*, VIII, 7, 1.
27. *Bṛhad. Up.*, IV, 5, 6.
28. *Brahma-sūtra*, 1, i, 1.
29. *Śvet. Up.*, VI, 9.

We find the starting point of the pantheistic doctrine that 'everything is God and God is everything' in the *Puruṣa-sūkta* of the *Ṛgveda* "*puruṣa evedam sarvam yad bhūtam yacca bhavyam*" ('*Puruṣa*, the Primeval Man, is this all, that has been and that will be').[30] In another verse this *Puruṣa*, God, is allegorically stated to become the portions of the universe in the act of creation : "*candramā manaso jātaś cakṣoḥ sūryo ajāyata, mukhād indrás cāgniś ca prāṇād vāyur ajāyata ; nābhyā āsīd antarikṣaṁ......*" ('The moon was born from His mind ; sun was born from His eye ; Indra and Agni—gods of rain and fire—from His mouth ; from His breath Vāyu—god of Wind—was born. From His naval was produced the air—antarikṣa ; from His head the sky was evolved ; from His two feet the earth, from His ear the quarters,...').[31]

The beginnings of philosophical speculation appear first in the 'Hymn of Creation'.[32] The seer, in his curiosity to know the Ultimate Cause of this universe, starts speculating : 'There was not the non-existent nor the existent then (before creation) (*nāsad āsīn no sad āsīt tadānīm*)[33]. After some conflicting ideas coming into his mind, he found that there existed One Being and exclaimed in his deep thought : 'That one breathed, windless, by its own power ; other than that there was not anything beyond' (*ānīd avātaṁ svadhayā tad ekaṁ, tasmād dhānyan na paraḥ kiṁ canāsa*)[34]. After further meditation, the sage observes, 'That One arose through the power of heat (tapas)' (*tapasas tan mahinājāyataikam*)[35]. By heat (tapas) he means 'the first conscious activity' or 'brooding', as he further says, 'Desire in the beginning came upon that, (desire) that was the first seed of mind' (*kāmas tad agre sam avartatādhi, manaso retaḥ prathamaṁ yad āsīt*)[36]. And he says that in this desire 'the sages seeking in their hearts with wisdom found out the bond of the existent in the non-existent' (*sato bandhum asat nir avindan hṛdi pratīṣyā kavayo manīṣa*)[37]. According to the Pratyabhijñā system, '*Icchā-Śakti*' (power of will), attributed to the Supreme Cause (*Maheśvara*), is the first process in the act of creation. The same idea is centralised in the verse of the *Nīlamata-purāṇa* treated under item 4 below. The idea that the universe is God, is the fundamental conception in the

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30. *ṚV.*, X, 90, 2.
31. *Ibid.*, 13-14.
32. *ṚV*, X, 129.
33. *Ibid.*, 1.
34. *Ibid.*, 2.
35. *Ibid.*, 3.
36. *Ibid.*, 4.
37. *Ibid.*

upaniṣads, such as, in *Īśāvāsya Upaniṣad* : *'īśāvāsyam idaṁ sarvaṁ yat kiñca jagatyāṁ jagat'* (All this universe is pervaded by God)[38] and so on.

(3) **Sa eṣa sarva kartā ca sarvajñaś ca maheśvaraḥ** (He is omnipotent and omniscient) : In *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* the powers of Knowledge and Action are attributed to the Supreme Cause (*Maheśvara*) : *'parāsya śaktir vividhaiva śrūyate, svābhāvikī jñāna-bala-kriyā ca'* ('The Lord's powers are great and various. The powers of knowledge, energy and action are inherent in him') [39] The idea in the Pratyabhijñā system that Self possesses the powers of remembrance (*Smṛti*), knowledge (*Jñāna*) and differentiation (*Apohana*), already occurs in the *Bhagavad Gītā* : *"mattaḥ smṛtir jñānam apohanaṁ ca."*[40] This idea existed long before the emergence of Pratyabhijñā philosophy as the *Bhagavad Gītā* which forms a section of the *Mahābhārata* is a work of the early Christian era, 500 B.C. to A. D. 200, according to some authorities.

(4) **Yadicchayā Jagad idaṁ varvarti sacarācaram** ('By whose desire exists this universe') : The reflective desire of multiplying is assigned to the Supreme Cause (Self or Brahman) in the following Upaniṣadic verses : *'ātmā vā idam eka evāgra āsīt, nānyat kiñcana miṣat; sa aikṣata lokān nu sṛjā iti'* ('In the beginning this Ātman was one only... He desired to create the worlds')[41] ; *'yaḥ sarvajñaḥ sarva-vid yasya jñānamayaṁ tapaḥ ; tasmād etad brahma nāma-rūpam annaṁ ca jāyate'* ('From Him who perceives all and who knows all, whose brooding consists of knowledge, from him are born this Brahman, name and form and food')[42] ; *'Sad eva, saumya, idam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam......tadaikṣata, bahu syām prajāyeyeti ...,* ('Being only, my dear, this was in the beginning, one only without a second. It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth')[43]; *'Sa īkṣaṁcakre..., sa prāṇam asṛjata'* ('He thought...He sent forth Prāṇa, i.e. He created life')[44]. On the basis of these *Śrutis* (passages of the upaniṣads) Bādarāyaṇa laid down the Sūtra *'īkṣater nāśabdam'*[45], according to which 'reflective desire' is assigned to the Ultimate Cause before the creation.

(5) **Yasya śaktilatā...jagat bhāsayate** (Whose power manifests itself as the universe) : This tenet is put in the Pratyabhijñā system in

38. *Īśa. Up.*, 1.
39. *Śvetā. Up.*, VI, 8.
40. *Bhag. Gītā*, XV, 15.
41. *Aitareya Up.* I, i.
42. *Muṇḍaka Up.*, I, i, 9.
43. *Chānd. Up.*, VI, ii, 1-3.
44. *Praśna Up.*, VI, 3-4.
45. *Brahma-sūtra*, I, i, 5.

the expression, *'Śivaḥ sarvam iti'* (All this is Śiva) and in the Vedānta system in the expression, *'Brahmaivedaṁ sarvam'* (All this is Brahman). In both the systems, the Supreme Being (Śiva or Brahman) is stated to exist in His two aspects, Transcendence (*Para*) and Immanence (*Apara*) or, in other words, *Viśvottīrṇa* and *Viśvamaya* respectively. According to this tenet, the Supreme Being manifests itself as this world and is also beyond this world. This idea is already given in the upaniṣads, such as, *'dve vāva brahmaṇo rūpe mūrtaṁ* caivāmūrtaṁ *ca'* ('Brahman has two forms, mūrta (Immanent) and amūrta (Transcendent)')[46]; *'etad vai, satya-kāma, paraṁ cāparaṁ ca brahma* (Two verily are the forms of Brahman, Para and Apara)[47].

(6) Māyā-dhṛta-jagattraya (The Lord brings into existence or supports the three worlds by His Māyā): In this expression Māya does not denote Śaṅkara's principle of Nescience, but the wonderous power (*Māyā-Śakti*) of the Lord. This ideas is also not new either to *Nīlamata-purāṇa* or the Pratyabhijñā Śāstra, but occurs in the upaniṣads, such as in *'māyāṁ tu prakṛtiṁ viddhi, māyinaṁ tu maheśvaram; tasyāvayava-bhūtais tu vyāptaṁ sarvam idaṁ jagat'* (Māyā is the Cause of this universe and Maheśvara, the Supreme Being, is the possessor of *Māyā-Śakti*; the constituents of *Māyā-Śakti* pervade through whole of this universe)[48]. In this verse Māyā represents the power (*Śakti*) which manifests itself in the form of the world. The conception of Māyā is already developed in the hymns of the *Ṛgveda* as self-transforming power, such as in "*indro māyābhiḥ puru-rūpa īyate*" (Indra assumes diverse forms by his power of *Māyā*). The term 'Māyā' was used in the same sense later in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (II 5.19), in the Māṇḍūkya *Kārikā* (II, 19) and in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* (IV. 10). The idealistic conception of the term Māyā is, however, a later growth in Indian Philosophy.[49]

Tava kāryaṁ na vidyate (The Supreme Being has no motive for his acts of creation etc.): This idea does not occur for the first time in the *Nīlamata-purāṇa* or in the *Śaiva-darśana* of Somānanda, but it exists already

46. *Bṛhad. Up.* II, iii, 1.

47. *Praśna Up.* V, 2

48. *Śvet. Up.*, IV, 10.

49. Māyā is used by Gauḍapāda in the sense of wonderous power and is the nature (*svabhāva*) of Ātman. In fact, 'the term denotes the beginningless cosmic principle which hides the reality from the perception of man'. Gauḍapāda uses it in the sense of (1) inexplicability of the relation between the Ātman and the world, (2) the power of Iśvara and (3) the apparent dreamlike character of the world. The Śāṅkara school of Vedānta takes the term in the third sense, as the principle of Nescience and the Pratyabhijñā uses it as the veiling power of the Lord (*māyā vimohinī-śakti*).

in Bādarāyaṇa's *Brahma Sūtra*, which belongs to about the first or second century B. C. In *Brahma Sūtra* II, i, 32, the *pūrva-pakṣin* questions : 'Brahman is not the creator of the universe on account of beings engaging in any action having motive' (*na prayojanavattvāt*). This is answered in the next sūtra, II, i, 33, 'But Brahman's creative activity is mere sport such as we see in ordinary life' (*lokavat tu līlā-kaivalyam*). In these Sūtras it is proved that Brahman in creating the world has no motive in the strict sense of the word but follows a mere sportive impulse. Gauḍapāda also states, in *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣat Kārikā* 2, that the Lord's adopting bodies is mere sport (*krīḍāmātram*), as is evident from "*devasyaiva svabhāvoyam, āptakāmasya kā spṛhā*". In *Brahma-sūtra* II, i, 25 (*devādivad api loke*), Bādarāyaṇa explains that Brahman's acts of creation etc. are actuated from His mere will (*Saṅkalpa*), just like those of gods, yogins and other beings[50]. Somānanda states that even in adopting celestial or hellish bodies Śiva has got no motive other than his own nature (*svabhāva*) or sport (*krīḍā*) : "*krīḍayā duḥkhavedyāni karmakārīṇi tatphalaiḥ ; sambhatsyamānāni tathā narakārṇava-gahvare ; nivāsīni śarīrāṇi, gṛhṇāti parameśvaraḥ*"[51].

Sākṣivat sthitaḥ (Śiva is the eternal witness) : This idea is also not new to the *Nīlamata-purāṇa* or any Śaivāgama which existed earlier. It occurs in the upaniṣads, such as in *Śveta. Up.* (VI, 11) : "*Sākṣī cetā kevalo nirguṇaś ca.*"

The idea incorporated in the system that *Moha* or delusion is produced by Śiva's own Śakti, namely, *Māyā-Śakti*, as contained in the last verse (*Nm.* 1294) quoted above seems to be the result of the influence of Śaṅkara's system of Vedānta upon the Pràtyabhijñā School. But, in the latter system, it is a power and not a fictitious principle.

Other philosophical theories evolved from the Vedas and the Upaniṣads : In the *Atharva Veda*, *Kāla* (Eternal Time) is celebrated as Primeval Deity and is propitiated as one of the rudiments of creation : "*saptacakrān vahati kāla eṣa...sa imā viśvā bhuvanāny añjat ; kālaḥ sa īyate*

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50. Sadāśivendra Sarasvatī explains the Sūtra in his *Vṛtti* as follows :

"यथा देवाः पितरा ऋषय इत्येवमादयश्चेतनाः स्वसिद्धिसामर्थ्यात् साधनान्तरं बाह्यमनपेक्ष्य संकल्पमात्रेणैव नानाविधकार्यकर्तार उपलभ्यन्ते, तद्वद् ब्रह्माप्यसहायमेव जगदुपादानं कर्ता च..."

(As gods, fathers, ṛṣis and other beings of great power who are of intelligent nature are seen to create many and various objects, such as palaces, chariots etc., without availing themselves of any extraneous means, but by their mere intention (*saṅkalpa*), so Brahman himself is the material cause of the universe as well as the creator.)

51. *ŚD* I, 37.

prathamo nu devaḥ; sa eva saṁbhuvanāny ābharat..."[52]. *Kāla* (Time) is one of the thirty-six *tattvas* (principles of creation) in the Pratyabhijñā system. In *Śveta. Up.*, various alternatives are stated to account for the cause and purpose of creation in which *Kāla* (Time) is mentioned as one of them: "*kālaḥ svabhāvo niyatir yadṛcchā, bhūtāni yoniḥ puruṣa iti cintyam*"[53]. In addition, the Pratyabhijña, in accordance with the other alternatives mentioned in this verse, regards the creation as the manifestation (*Vibhūti*) of God, due to the will (*Saṅkalpa*) of God and for the sake of enjoyment (*Bhoga*) and sport (*Krīḍā*) of God. Gauḍapāda, in his *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā*, takes notice of the various alternatives regarding the origin and purpose of creation, as given in *Śvet. Up.* I.i,2 and declares that it is the inherent nature of the shining one (*devasyaiva svabhāvo'yam*). Bādarāyaṇa and Somānanda agree with this conception. Śaṅkara's school of Vedānta adopts the idea that it is of the nature of dream (*svapna-māyā*), which is opposed in the Pratyabhijñā school.

The doctrine of Śiva-Śakti, i. e. the male and female cosmogonic principles as the rudiments of creation, seems to have been developed from the basic idea given in the hymn of creation: '*retodhā āsan, mahimāna āsan; svadhā avastāt, prayatiḥ parastāt*' (*Ṛgveda*, X, 129, 5) ('There were impregnators, there were powers; there was energy below, there was impulse above.') Prof. A. A. Macdonell states, in his notes on this stanza, that '*retodhās* and *mahimānas* are contrasted as male and female cosmogonic principles to which correspond respectively *prayatis* and *svadhā*'. The idea of male and female cosmogonic principles is originally borrowed by Aryans from aborigines of India who were the worshippers of the male and female generative principles, Śiva-Śakti, believed to be the architects of the universe. The reflection of this idea is, however, present in this stanza.

Theory evolved from ancient grammarians: According to the school of ancient grammarians, *Śabda-para-brahman* (the Transcendental Word) is the Supreme Cause of the Universe. This doctrine is, indeed, very old. The basic idea of this doctrine occurs in hymns X, 125 and X, 71 of the *Ṛgveda* in which the divine *Vāk* is propitiated as the germinal Cause of the Universe. The same idea appears in the grammarian's system as *Sphoṭavāda*, according to which both *Vāk* (speech) and *Vācaka* (the substratum of speech, i. e. the objects) are originated from the *Śabda-para-brahman*. In Somānanda's *Śivadṛṣṭi*, is given a long controversial discussion which leads to the essential attributes of the Ultimate Cause.

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52. *Ath. Veda*, XIX. 53, 2–4.
53. *Śvet. Up.*, I, 1, 2.

Theories evolved from Buddhists : The technical terms *Anuttara* (the Ultimate) and *Paccabhiññā* (the Pāli form for *Pratyabhijñā*) appear to have their origin in the Buddhist systems. According to the Buddhists the special feature of knowledge (*saññā*, the Pāli form for *sajñā*, meaning the conceptual knowledge) is recognizing (*paccabhiññā*) by means of a sign (*abhiññānena*, the Pāli form for *abhijñānena*). The theory of *Sarvāstivāda* or *Bāhyārthavāda* originated from the school of *Mahāyāna* Buddhists. According to it, the reality of the external as well as the internal world is asserted. The Pratyabhijñā School mentions this theory, but holds that all external and internal objects are included in One Supreme Cause (*Maheśvara*). The doctrine of Plurality upheld by the school is rejected by the Pratyabhijñā system. *Śūnyavāda* is the earliest doctrine founded by the *Hīnayāna* Buddhists. According to it, everything is void. It is rejected both by the Vedānta and the Pratyabhijñā Schools. *Kṣaṇikavāda* (Doctrine of Momentariness) is another well-known doctrine of the Buddhists, according to which everything in the world is of momentary existence. The fleeting existence of objects in this theory is explained by its analogy with the flame of a lamp which, though changing every moment, yet appears to be one continuous entity. *Vijñānavāda* (pure Idealism) is another doctrine of the Buddhists. According to this doctrine, the ideas, which are momentary, are the only Reality. This corresponds with the idealism of Western Philosophy as enunciated in the Dialectic theory. Both these doctrines, *Kṣaṇikavāda* and *Vijñānavāda* appear to have combined together to form *Ābhāsavāda* (Doctrine of Manifestation) in the Pratyabhijñā system. The idea of manifestation (*ābhāsa*) appears to have been elaborated from the idea of the Buddhist '*rūpam*,' (form) and from the doctrine of momentariness. The Pratyabhijñā system has, however, refuted the theory of momentariness of both, perceiving selves and the objects perceived.

Various theories evolved from the Brāhmaṇical Schools . The Materialists and Atomists—who can be called the physical philosophers of India—assigned the cause of the universe to various original substances like the five elements or the atoms. All other schools hold, in some or the other form, that the universe is the product of the Supreme Spirit, *Ātman*. For instance, the Sāṅkhya and Yoga schools hold that the universe is the transformation of the Supreme Spirit (*Cit*), while, according to Vedānta, it is the result of *adhyāsa* (superimposition) based on Nescience (*ajñāna*), but whose substratum is real Brahman. The Pratyabhijñā system maintains that the universe is the real form of Śiva, the Absolute Cause.

The theory of Realism, known in Indian systems as *Ārambha-vāda* or *Asatkārya-vāda*, was upheld chiefly by the Mīmāṁsā School of Jaimini, the

Nyāya system of Gautama and the Vaiśeṣika system of Kaṇāda. According to it, the effect (*Kārya*) did not exist at all before creation. Everything that we find in the universe is formed out of seven categories (Padārthas) of the ultimate realities. The doctrine is impugned by Śaṅkarācārya in his *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya* II, i, 17 and 18. It does not also accord with the doctrine of Tattvas of the Pratyabhijñā School. The theory of Evolution, called *Pariṇāma-Vāda* or *Satkārya-vāda* holds that the effect (*Kārya*) is as real as its cause (*Kāraṇa*). According to this theory, the products simply roll themselves out from the potential state as a tree comes out by itself from the seed, i.e. things are not created but evolved. The Sāṅkhya and Yoga schools uphold this theory. The Pratyabhijñā system maintains this theory with some modification. The theory of manifestation called *Vivarta-vāda*, or the doctrine of the production of the phenomenal world, holds that the originating Reality (*Brahman*) remains what it is and yet brings about the result (*jagat*). The result is rolled out from its cause and yet the cause remains unchanged. This theory is known in Indian philosophy also as *Satkāraṇa-vāda*, the favourite theory of Śaṅkarācārya. According to it, the manifoldness of the universe consists only of ideas, objectified, of names and forms (*nāma-rūpa*), as they are called, backed up and made substantial by one and the only reality. *Ārambha-vāda* and *Pariṇāma-vāda* are entirely rejected by the Pratyabhijñā school while *Vivarta-vāda* is accepted in a slightly altered form, called in the system as *Ābhāsa-vāda*.

The Sāṅkhya system is known from its twenty-five categories (*tattvas*) of creation which have been incorporated by the Pratyabhijñā system with slight modifications in their definition. These are supplemented by the eleven Tattvas more, borrowed from *Śaivāgamas*, which are originally enumerated in *Mālinīvijayottara Tantra*. The *Guṇa* theory of the Sāṅkhya system, according to which the *Pradhāna*, the state of equipose of three *Guṇas* (qualities), is the germinal cause of the universe, is rejected in the Pratyabhijñā system, as in the Vedānta school, for the reason that *Pradhāna* is not a sentient principle. *Paramāṇu-kāraṇa-vāda* (the atomic theory) of the Kaṇāda maintains that the world emanates from atoms set in motion by *Adṛṣta*, the invisible and unseen principle. It is not accepted by the Pratyabhijñā system like the Vedānta school, as the atoms are not asserted as sentient.

The tenets derived from the earlier sectarian systems : Besides the eleven additional Tattvas, the system has incorporated the three *Malas* (impurities) and the three *Upāyas* (means of liberation) etc. from Tantras and Āgamas. All these ideas are treated in the *Āgamādhikāra* of the Pratyabhijñā Śāstra. The Pāśupata system declares that *Pati*, the highest

Lord, is both the material as well as the operative cause of the world. Śaṅkarācārya argues against this doctrine. Somānanda makes a passing reference to it.

Śaṅkarācārya, who flourished between A. D. 780 and 820, mentions all the above-noted doctrines in his *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya* and refutes them one by one, but there is no mention about the Pratyabhijñā system. The possible reason for the absence of this system in Śaṅkarācārya's works is that it was either not in vogue in his time or it had not much influence on the philosophic ideas then prevailing. Somānanda, on the other hand, refers to all these earlier doctrines together with numerous minor systems of Vedānta, such as *Śuddha-vedānta-vādins, Sphuliṅgātma-vādins* and others (cf. ŚD, IV). This seems to indicate that the system did not exist in Śaṅkarācārya's time.

To sum up, all the philosophical ideas, briefly surveyed above, prevailed in Kashmir before the emergence of another distinct system, called the Pratyabhijñā Darśana. The Buddhist ideas as well as the monistic philosophy of Śaṅkarācārya had a predominant influence upon the philosophic tendencies of the time. Thus, with all these prevailing ideas, the philosophical soil was complete in all respects from which the offshoot of the Doctrine of Pratyabhijñā was destined to grow. The credit of implanting and nurturing this doctrine in the philosophical soil, now ready for fruition, goes to Somānanda, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, who were born in Kashmir in highly learned Śaiva families.

CHAPTER III

HISTORY AND LITERATURE

Mythological origin of the system; Chronology of the Pratyabhijñā literature; The time of its existence,—K. C. Pandey's view ; Lacchmidhar's view ; *Śākuntalam*, an allegorical representation or dramatisation of Pratyabhijñā (Lacchmidhar's view); The pioneers of the system : Somānanda—the originator, Utpaladeva—the systematiser, Abhinavagupta—the expounder; the later teachers.

Mythological Origin of the System : According to the orthodox tradition, the Saivāgamas are of eternal existence and are known to have gradually appeared in sixty-four systems, all classed into three divisions : (1) *Advaita* or *Abheda*, teaching unity, (2) *Bheda*, teaching diversity, and (3) *Bhedābheda*, teaching unity in diversity. It is said that in course of time Śaivāgamas were lost from the world and Śiva, out of compassion for the suffering humanity, wished to revive them again. The sage Durvāsas was then inspired by Śiva to spread the knowledge of the Śaivāgamas. He created three mind-born sons (1) Tryambaka, to preach *Abheda* (monism), (2) Āmarka, to preach *Bheda* (dualism) and (3) Śrinātha, to preach *Bhedābheda* (dualism-cum-monism). The *Abheda Śāstra*, teaching unity, appeared again in three classes (systems) : (i) the *Āgama Śāstra*, (ii) the *Spanda Śāstra* and (iii) the *Pratyabhijñā Śāstra*.[1] The first of these Śāstras has come down to us in the form of the *Śiva Sūtras*, the notable work of Vasugupta. It is stated that Vasugupta found the Sūtras on the Mahādeva hill in Kashmir, engraved on a well-known stone Śiva-pala, which were revealed to him first in a dream by Lord Śiva. He taught the Sūtras to Bhaṭṭa Śrī Kallaṭa and his other disciples. The second Śāstra, namely the *Spanda Śāstra*, appeared in the form of *Spanda Kārikās* or *Sūtras*, the metrical exposition of the *Śiva Sūtras*, and their commentaries, *Vivṛti* and *Pradīpikā*. The *Spanda Śāstra* gives a broader exposition of the main principles of the first system. The *Śakti Tattva*, as a principle of creation, is given the first place and is treated as inseparate from the Ultimate cause, the *Śiva Tattva*. The third Śāstra, viz. the *Pratyabhijñā Śāstra*, appeared in the form of 'the Sūtras (aphorisms), the commentary, the gloss, the two explications, the greater and the lesser, the five topics and the expositions'[2].

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1. J. C. Chatterji, *Kashmir Śaivism*, 5–21 ; *Tantrāloka* I, 35.
2. सूत्रं वृत्तिर्विवृतिर्लघ्वी-बृहतीत्युभे विमर्शिन्यौ ।
   प्रकरण-विवरण-पञ्चकमिति शास्त्रं प्रत्यभिज्ञायाः ॥

Mādhavācārya, *Sarvadarśana Saṁgraha*, Government Oriental Series No. 1 ; Poona, 191,

The *Pratyabhijñā Śāstra* was regarded by its originators as *manana* or *vicāra* śāstra, vi . the philosophy proper of the *Trika* system. Somānanda who is spoken of as the originator of reasoning (*tarkasya kartā*) was the founder of this philosophical system. According to the last few verses suffixed to *Śivadṛṣṭi*, the only extant work of Somānanda, he was the nineteenth descendant of the line of teachers of the *Abheda* system which started from Tryambaka, the first teacher and propagator of the monistic Śaivāgamas. Somānanda calls the system *Śaiva-darśana* as is evident from the title of his work *Śivadṛṣṭi*, for *dṛṣti* which can be derived from *dṛś* (*prekṣaṇe*) means the same as *darśana* or a system of philosophy. Utpaladeva, the disciple of Somānanda, formulated the doctrines, taught by his Guru in *Śivadṛṣṭi*, in the *Pratyabhijñā Kārikā*. It was from the title of Utpaladeva's work that the system came to be called *Pratyabhijñā-darśana*, whereas it was still known as *Śaiva-darśana* in Somānanda's time, as is apparent from the title of his work. The work of Utpaladeva *IPK* is in metrical sūtra form. The sūtras were provided, by the author himself, with a gloss (*Vṛtti*) and a commentary (*Ṭīkā*). The former is extant upto *IPK* III, 20 and is published in KSTS No. XXXIV. The remaining part of the *Vṛtti* and the entire *Ṭikā* are irrecoverably lost. Abhinavagupta, the disciple of Utpaladeva's successor Lakṣmaṇagupta, wrote two commentaries on the *Pratyabhijñā Sūtras*, one short, called *Vimarśinī* (or *Laghu-vimarśinī*), and the other long, known as *Vivṛti-vimarśinī* (or *Bṛhad-vimarśinī*). Abhinavagupta, the great expounder of *Pratyabhijñā Śāstra*, is also the author of the voluminous work *Tantrāloka* and its epitome *Tantrasāra*, besides many other smaller works, such as *Paramārthasāra*, *Bimba-pratibimba-vāda*, etc. Among the later teachers of this system, Khemarāja is known from his commentary on *Paramārthasāra*, Śivopādhyāya from his commentary on *Tantrāloka* and Bhāskarācārya from his commentary, *Bhāskarī*, on *IPV*.

It is clear from the above that there were, strictly speaking, only two systems, one the *Spanda* Śāstra and the other the *Pratyabhijñā Śāstra*. The first starts from Śrīkaṇṭha, the incarnation of Śiva, promulgator of the Śaivāgamas, and was carried on by Vasugupta, to whom were revealed the Śiva Sūtras, and further by the line of his disciples,—Kallaṭa, Pradyumna Bhaṭṭa, Prajñārjuna, Mahādeva Bhaṭṭa, Śrīkaṇṭha Bhaṭṭa and Bhāskara. The other system was started by Somānanda and was continued by the line of his disciples—Utpaladeva, Lakṣmaṇagupta, Abhinavagupta, Kṣemarāja, Yogarāja, Jayaratha, Śivopādhyāya and Bhāskarācarya. The literature of the latter system is already given above under (B) *Select Texts and Studies*.

Chronology of the Pratyabhijñā-Śāstra : It is suggested by G. Bühler, in his *Report of A Tour in Search of Sanskrit Manuscripts in*

Kashmir etc.,[3] that the basis for the history of the Pratyabhijñā system is the date of Abhinavagupta, who, according to his own statement in the concluding verses of his work, finished writing *IPVV* in the 90th year of his age when 4115 years of Kali era had passed. This date corresponds to A.D. 1014. *Tantrāloka*, in which he often quotes from *IPV*, is clearly of later date, while *Tantrasāra* is of still later date. Utpaladeva, who was separated from Abhinavagupta by only one teacher, Lakṣmaṇagupta, lived probably in the first half of the tenth century, and Somānanda, the Guru (teacher) of Utpaladeva, lived towards the close of the ninth century. Vasugupta, who was the teacher of Somānanda, and his contemporary Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa lived possibly by about A.D. 850. This is supported by the evidence that Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa flourished in the reign of king Avantivarman (A.D. 855-883) of Kashmir, according to Kalhaṇa's *Rājataraṅgiṇī*, and was the teacher of Abhinavagupta's teacher. Thus Somānanda and his contemporary Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa definitely lived in the second half of the ninth century. Kṣemarāja, the commentator of *Pratyabhijñā Hṛdayam*, and Yogarāja, the commentator of *Paramārthasāra* of Abhinavagupta flourished in the eleventh century, Jayaratha, the commentator of *Tantrāloka*, in the twelfth century and Śivopādhyāya and Bhāskarācārya in the eighteenth century.

According to Somānanda, his fourth ancestor, Saṃgamāditya, came from Kailāsa and settled in Kashmir, by about A.D. 800 and the latter was the fifteenth in the line of the teachers beginning from Tryambaka or Tryambakāditya, the first teacher of the monistic Śaivāgamas, who handed down the doctrine in succession to the last teacher. According to the traditional method of reckoning twenty-five years for each generation, the total period of the fifteen teachers of monistic Śaivāgamas comes about four centuries. Thus, Tryambaka lived, most probably, towards the end of the fourth century A D. The date of the emergence of the Pratyabhijñā school, however, synchronises with the date of its founder Somānanda i.e. the end of the ninth century A.D. and not with the date of Tryambaka, the propagator of the monistic Śaivāgamas.

There is a controversy among the scholars about the time of the origin of the system. Attempts have been made to prove that this particular philosophic tradition goes back to the end of the 4th century A.D. and that its tenets were known to Kālidāsa (5th century A.D.) and appear in the *Nīlamata-purāṇa* (6th or 7th century A. D.). These views do not

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3. Pub. in *Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1877-78, Extra Number.

seem to hold much water. It will be made clear in the following pages that Somānanda was the first to lay the foundation stone of the system in the 9th century A.D.

The time of its existence,—K. C. Pandey's view : Dr. K. C. Pandey states in his Introduction to *Bhāskarī* II (p. iv), that "Somānanda represents himself to be the 19th descendent of Tryambaka ... Therefore, if we follow the traditional method of allowing twenty-five years for each generation, we will have to admit that a period of four hundred and fifty years intervened between Tryambaka, the propagator of the monistic Śaivāgamas, and Somānanda (who lived in the 9th century A.D.)." It may be admitted that the Āgamic tenets, which are included by Somānanda in his *Śivadṛṣṭi* amidst the philosophical contents, are derived from the monistic Śaivāgamas, said to have been first propagated by Tryambaka, and as such, their traditional knowledge, indeed, goes back to hoary ages, but it is not possible to agree with Dr. Pandey's conclusion : "The philosophic tradition, therefore, which Somānanda systematises goes back to about the end of the 4th century A. D.". Dr. Pandey, however, admits that "Somānanda is the first to make a definitely rationalistic approach to the problem of the Ultimate Reality. He distinctly refers to the various prevailing schools of thought and rationally proves the unsoundness of their theories."[4] He, indeed, refutes and criticises so many earlier systems by contradicting their various theories and puts in nutshell his own new philosophical view-points and thus brings a radical change in the prevailing philosophical thoughts of the time. We can, therefore, say that it is Somānanda who laid the foundation-stone of a new system, known as the Pratyabhijñā School of Kashmir and not that the particular philosophic tradition existed before his time

Lacchmidhar's View : Prof. Lacchmidhar attempts to prove, in his book *The Birthplace of Kālidāsa*, that the Pratyabhijñā Philosophy existed in Kālidāsa's time' (5th century A. D.). Firstly, according to him, "Śaivism followed by Kālidāsa is a monistic philosophy which is no other than the Pratyabhijñā Philosophy of Kashmir." Secondly, as he says, "Kālidāsa propounded the Philosophy of Pratyabhijñā in his works, particularly *Śakuntalam* ... which is the allegorical representation of this philosophy."[5] The reasons given by Prof. Lacchmidhar need be examined with reference to these two points. There is no evidence in *Abhijñāna Śākuntalam*, or in any other work of Kālidāsa to show that the Pratyabhijñā system existed in his time, nor is there any reference to the doctrines of the system in his works.

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4. *Bhāskarī*, II, iv-v.
5. Lacchmidhar Kalla, *The Birthplace of Kālidāsa*, Delhi University Publication, No. 1, 1926, 27-31.

It can be admitted that Kālidāsa was a worshipper of Śiva and followed Śaivism of the non-sectarian type, but there is no reason to agree with Lacchmidhar's remark : "We shall find that the type of Śaivism represented by Kālidāsa is the same that Mādhavācarya describes as the *Pratyabhijñā Darśana* or Recognitive System, which is the Kashmirian Śaivism." Pratyabhijñā, as a distinct system with a name given to it, originated in the ninth century A.D., being taught then for the first time by Somānanda and his disciple Utpaladeva and not by any earlier teacher during the time of Kālidāsa or before him as supposed by Lacchmidhar. Kālidāsa lived in the fifth century A. D., five centuries earlier than Somānanda. Prof. Lacchmidhar says that the Pratyabhijñā system was known to Kālidāsa, because "the Śaivism of Kālidāsa was essentially monistic in its character." It may be noted that it is the monistic doctrine of the Upaniṣads which was known to Kālidāsa and by which he was influenced, as is stated by Hillebrandt[6] and other scholars, and not by the Pratyabhijñā system.

The next point which Prof. Lacchmidhar tries to make in his book is that there was no "total dearth of ancient monistic Āgamas in Kashmir". This point does not go to prove that the system of Pratyabhijñā Philosophy existed in Kālidāsa's time. The only work which can be said to be a monistic Āgama that has come down to us is the *Śivadṛṣṭi* of Somānanda and this did not exist in Kālidāsa's time. But even assuming that there existed various ancient Śaivāgamas, monistic or of any other kind, the existence of any connected system of philosophic thought such as the Pratyabhijñā, directed against the rival theories of other schools of thought, like the Buddhist, the Vedānta etc., earliar to Somānanda, is not proved. Somānanda was the first to collect together all the philosophic thoughts from the various systems as well as the Āgamas and give it a skeleton form of a distinct system of philosophy which was later on formulated by his pupil, Utpaladeva.

Here is an important point that needs consideration. Apparently Prof. Lacchmidhar is correct when he says, on the basis of verses Nos. 1270-74, 1283-86 and 1294-95 of *Nīlamata-purāṇa* quoted by him in note No. 123 given in his book *The Birthplace of Kālidāsa* :[7] "Now, whatever may be the original form of Śaivism in Kashmir, it cannot be denied that in very early centuries monistic Śaivism......representing the Pratyabhijñā doctrine is already existent in the *Nīlamata* which in its present form is assigned the date sixth or seventh century A.D., at any rate, earlier than the revival of Vedāntism by the great Śaṅkara." The

6. Hillebrandt, *Kālidāsa.*

7. See above page 30, footnote 22.

question arises : Do these ideas only comprise the main doctrine of the Pratyabhijñā philosophy ? We admit that these ideas play a prominent role in the system, but they represent not only the central theme of the Pratyabhijñā philosophy but also that of the Vedānta system. If such is the case, what are the distinctive features of the two systems of philosophy, by which they differ from one another ? Perhaps Prof. Lacchmidhar takes no notice of this point. All these ideas are taught initially in the Upaniṣads, and it is from this fountain-head that these ideas are incorporated in the *Nīlamata-purāṇa* as well as in the Vedānta and the Pratyabhijñā systems. There is nothing new in the ideas given in the above-mentioned verses of *Nīlamata* which existed earlier than the emergence of the Pratyabhijñā system. These ideas are not the distinctive features of the Pratyabhijñā philosophy which are essentially something more and somewhat different from them. In reference to the central theme common in the Pratyabhijñā system and the Vedānta, the attention of the readers is drawn to Chapter II, paragraphs under 'Survey of the earlier speculations and doctrines' (pp. 29 ff.), in which most of these common ideas are traced from the Vedas, the Upaniṣads and other earlier philosophical literature grown from the Vedic and Buddhistic thought. Therefore, to denote the full implication of the Pratyabhijñā in these ideas which existed earlier, is not quite sound. These ideas have possibly been incorporated by Śaivas into some Śaivāgama texts from the Vedic sources and also by Kashmiris into the *Nīlamata*, either from the Śaivāgamas or directly from the Vedic sources. It will be noticed in this book that the system while incorporating these ideas certainly made some additions and alterations to the earlier doctrines of the Upaniṣads and thus made a radical revision or reorientation of the Vedānta system.

'Śākuntalam', an allegorical representation or dramatisation of the Pratyabhijñā Philosophy (Lacchmidhar's view) : Prof. Lachhmidhar has also tried to prove in his book[8] that "Kālidāsa propounded the Pratyabhijñā Philosophy of Kashmir" in his works, particularly *Śakuntalam.* He says, "Kālidāsa was a follower of the ancient Pratyabhijñā Philosophy of Kashmir, and that the beautiful drama of love between Duṣyanta and Śakuntalā is also a beautiful allegory on the tenets of the Pratyabhijñā Philosophy of Kashmir..." He further says : "In order to popularise this Pratyabhijñā Philosophy in its early days of promulgation, Kālidāsa hits at the happy device of writing an allegory on the basis of the love story of Śakuntalā in the *Mahābhārata.*" We shall now try to discuss how far Prof. Lacchmidhar's view is tenable.

8. Lacchmidhar Kalla, *The Birthplace of Kālidāsa*, Delhi University Publication, No. 1, 1926, 27-31.

We find that the learned professor has strained the specific philosophical ideas in some of the common words occurring in *Śākuntalam* which are used in technical sense in the Pratyabhijñā system and twisted the tenets of the system in the various love-incidents of the drama. In support of this he has given neither positives nor parallels. There is no evidence in *Abhijñāna Śākuntalam* or any other work of Kālidāsa to show that he wrote *Śākuntalam* as an allegorical representation of the Pratyabhijñā Philosophy with the specific object of popularising it 'in its early days of promulgation' From some words, such as '*abhijñāna*' etc. used by Kālidāsa, we have no reason to infer that *Śākuntalam* is an allegory on the tenets of this philosophy. For instance, Kālidāsa did not use the word '*abhijñāna*' to denote any philosophic significance as we find in the technical term '*Pratyabhijñā*' used in the system. Prof Lacchmidhar, however, says, "The word *abhijñāna* or *pratyabhijñāna*, which occurs so frequently in the drama, should be taken in its philosophic sense. 'The poet has given us an important suggestion in using the word *abhijñāna* in such a prominent place as the title of the book itself *Abhijñāna Śākuntalam*, which should signify in its philosophic sense the drama dealing with the 'recognition of divine *Śakti*', or, in other words, realization of God." In this connection we may remark that the word *abhijñāna* or *pratyabhijñāna* means 'recognition' in the ordinary sense. The word denotes the experience in which direct perception (*dṛṣṭa*) is associated with memory (*smaraṇa*), and ordinarily the word is used for this meaning in our every-day life.[9] For instance, we say, 'Here is Devadatta ; I recognise him to be the same person whom I met some years ago in Burma' Recognition takes place by perceiving some sign which recalls the memory of the object previously perceived. In the drama of *Śākuntalam*, the recognition of the heroine by the sign of the finger-ring plays, no doubt, an important part ; hence the word '*abhijñāna*' is used by Kālidāsa in the title of the book to denote this implication. But the word '*abhijñāna*' as used in *Śākuntalam* cannot convey the philosophic significance of the term '*Pratyabhijñā*', occurring in this system of philosophy. In this case also '*Pratyabhijñā*' means 'Recognition', a mental process embodying the association of direct perception (*anubhava*) with memory (*smṛti*), but this process relates to the realization or recognition

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9. स्मरणानुभवारूढा सामानाधिकरण्यधीः
संस्कारेन्द्रियजन्या च प्रत्यभिज्ञा प्रकीर्तिता।

(*IPV* I, 20 Fn.)

of divine Śakti.[10] So, to attach this significance to the word '*abhijñāna*' or '*Pratyabhijñāna*' is evidently far-fetched.

We shall now follow how Prof. Lacchmidhar twists the philosophy of Pratyabhijñā in the love-incidents of *Śākuntalam*. He writes, "It is highly probable that the idea of allegorical representation of the Pratyabhijñā tenet, on the basis of a love story, was suggested to the mind of Kālidāsa by a love-metaphor of a similar character that might be current among the teachers of the Pratyabhijñā Philosophy in his day and employed to illustrate the novel point of the Pratyabhijñā, as we note that the metaphor of love was employed by Utpala who reaffirmed the Pratyabhijñā doctrine and who might have borrowed that love-metaphor from the ancient sources and traditions of that philosophy in Kashmir, as previously known to Kālidāsa."[11] It may be questioned : Why Kālidāsa did not make any explicit reference, in his *Śākuntalam* or any other work, to the Pratyabhijñā Philosophy which he intended to popularise? If he knew this philosophy and deliberately invented the allegory in *Śākuntalam* on the basis of its tenets, he should have clearly declared it in the drama, and preferably at the outset of it. Prof. Lacchmidhar presumes that the incidence of the recognition of the heroine by the perception of the finger-ring bringing to the mind of Duṣyanta the re-collection of his former love, indicates that Kālidāsa must have known the Pratyabhijñā Philosophy in which the *Recognition* of the divine *Śakti* is similarly caused by the direct perception (*anubhava*) of some of its aspects associated with the recollection (*smṛti*) of its other aspects.[12] But

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10. तस्य महेश्वरस्य प्रत्यभिज्ञा—
प्रतीपमात्माभिमुख्येन ज्ञानं प्रकाशः प्रत्यभिज्ञा ।
(*IPV* I, 19-20)
दृष्टस्मरणयोरैक्ये स्थिते तदुपपद्यते ।
तथा सा प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्स एवायमिति स्थितिः ॥
(*ŚD* IV, 119-20)

11. Lacchmidhar Kalla, *The Birthplace of Kālidāsa*, Delhi University Publication, No. 1, 1962, 27-31.

12. Compare—
तैस्तैरप्युपयाचितैरुपनतस्तन्व्याः स्थितोऽप्यन्तिके
कान्तो लोकसमान एवमपरिज्ञातो न रन्तुं यथा ।
लोकस्यैष तथानवेक्षितगुणः स्वात्मापि विश्वेश्वरो
नैवालं निजवैभवाय तदियं तत्प्रत्यभिज्ञोदिता ॥ *IPV* II, 273-4

किन्तु अभिज्ञानाभरणदर्शनेन शापो निवर्तिष्यते ।
अथवा ईदृशोऽनुरागोऽभिज्ञानमपेक्षते कथमिवैतत् ।
यदहमिदानीं त्वया प्रत्यभिज्ञातमात्मानं पश्यामि ।
(*Śākuntalam* IV, VI, VII).

this supposition is baseless, as there can be no motive in his remaining silent about the system of thought which he meant to propagate in the *Śākuntalam*. From the coincidence of a love-metaphor in the Pratyabhijñā Philosophy and that of a similar character in *Śākuntalam*, with the distinct incidence of recognition, it cannot be concluded that the latter is borrowed by Kālidāsa from the ancient sources and traditions of that philosophy in Kashmir, and has not originated from his mind. It is, moreover, presumed by Prof. Lacchmidhar that the same love-metaphor was employed by Utpaladeva in the tenth century A.D. to illustrate the novel thought of the Pratyabhijñā, as it might have been current among the teachers of the philosophy from the days of Kālidāsa[13] or even before him. The learned professor has profusefy compared the incidents in *Śākuntalam* with many different ideas in the Pratyabhijñā Philosophy, such as the comparison of the dramatic *Sṛṣṭi* with the universe stated to be 'the expression of divine love,' Duṣyanta and Śakuntalā (the hero and the heroine) with Śiva and Śakti, Śakuntalā appearing 'big with child' with Śakti carrying and developing the seed of Śiva's *icchā* (desire) to create the universe and so on, and on the basis of mere analogies concludes that *Śākuntalam* is the dramatisation of this philosophy. But it may be noted that the philosophy of Pratyabhijñā can hardly be woven into a drama by such comparisons.

All the above indicates that the Pratyabhi ñā system, which appeared in Kashmir in the ninth century A.D. as a distinct school of monistic philosophy, did not exist in Kālidāsa's time, in the fifth century A.D., as there is no positive evidence to show that this philosophy was known to Kālidāsa. On the other hand, he is known to be an *Advaita-vādi* Vedāntin as is affirmed by some scholars, like Hillebrandt, who are of the opinion that he was influenced by the philosophy of the Upaniṣads and *Bhagavad-gītā* which existed long before him.[14] Dr. Keith also remarks in his *A History of Sanskrit Literature* (p. x) that 'much more ingenious is an effort to fix his (Kālidāsa's) home in Kashmir, and to trace in his poetry an adumbration of the Pratyabhijñā Śāstra of that land.. ...' We must,

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13. *Ibid.*

14. "In spite of being a devotee of the Muse, Kālidāsa shows a thorough acquaintance with the darśanas or systems of Indian Philosophy. His writings are saturated with profound devotion for his favourite deity, Śiva' and other gods of the Indian mythology...... Even a cursory view of his works will show that he was influenced by the philosophy of the Upaniṣads and the *Bhagavad-gītā*. He was an *Advaita-vādī* Vedāntin, though he recognised the value of other systems of philosophy as far as they harmonised with his own. Kālidāsa appears to be a monotheist than monist..,"

(Hillebrandt, *Kālidāsa.*)

however, admit that in Kashmir, where Kālidāsa is supposed to have been born and bred up, there already existed various doctrines of the Śaivas, the Buddhists, the Sāṅkhyas, the Vedāntins and other schools that gave an impetus to the development of a tendency of thought from which emerged the Pratyabhijñā system with distinctive features of its own, in the ninth century A.D. That this system is, indeed, the logical continuum of the earlier philosophic tendencies of the thinkers of the land is indicated by a mention of numerous prevailing schools of thought in *Śivadṛṣṭi* of Somānanda, with whose points of view he does not agree.

The pioneers of the system,—Somānanda the founder : In the last chapter of the *Śivadṛṣṭi*, Somānanda gives the following account of his person. He says, the secret doctrines of Śaivāgamas, formerly residing in the mouths of seers, somehow disappeared from the world. Once Śiva, in the incarnation of Śrīkaṇṭha, roaming over the Kailāsa mountain, wished to do a favour to the suffering humanity. He directed the sage Durvāsas to revive the secret Śāstra, the Śaivāgamas. Durvāsas produced his mind-born son Tryambakāditya and after imparting to him the secret knowledge, disappeared. Tryambaka also created a mind-born son for the revival of the knowledge of the Śaivāgamas and disappeared from the world. This process continued upto the fifteenth generation of the mind-born successors of Tryambaka, who were known as Siddhas.

The fifteenth Siddha, known by the name of Saṁgamāditya, having married a brāhmaṇa girl, came wandering from Kailāsa to Kashmir where he settled. After him the doctrine was handed down from father to son, viz. from Saṁgamāditya to Varṣāditya, then to Aruṇāditya, and next to Ānanda, the father of Somānanda.[15] In the same verses which give the

15. कैलासाद्रौ भ्रमन् देवो मूर्त्या श्रीकंठरूपया ।
अनुग्रहायावतीर्णश्चोदयामास भूतले ॥
मुनिं दुर्वाससं नाम भगवानूर्ध्वरेतसम् ।
नोच्छिद्येत यथा शास्त्रं रहस्यं कुरु तादृशम् ॥
ततः स भगवान् देवादादेशं प्राप्य यत्नवान् ।
ससर्ज मानसं पुत्रं त्र्यम्बकादित्यनामकम् ॥
तस्मिन् संक्रमयामास रहस्यानि समन्ततः ।
सोऽपि गत्वा गुहां सम्यक् ... ... तत्र ससर्ज मनसा सुतम् ।
............तत्पुत्रोऽपि तथा तथा ॥
सिद्धस्तद्वत्सुतोत्पत्त्या सिद्धा एवं चतुर्दश ।
यावत्पञ्चदशः पुत्रः सर्वशास्त्रविशारदः ॥

personal account of Somānanda, the line of the teachers beginning from Tryambaka is named *Traiyambaka*. Somānanda tells us that his family name is *Teramba* in the language of the country he lived in (*teramba deśabhāṣayā*).[16] In Kashmir, at present, none of the families is called by this name. We, however, have a slightly altered name *Trambi*, the family name of some Paṇḍits and also some Mohammedans, possibly converts, in Sopore and thereabouts where Somānanda is presumed to have lived.

Somānanda's work : Somānanda states that he has written 'the Prakaraṇa named *Śivadṛṣṭi*'.[17] This is the only work of Somananda upon which is admittedly based Utpaladeva's *Pratyabhijñā Śāstra*. As stated by Abhinavagupta, Pratyabhijñā is the reflection of Somānanda's knowledge. The *Śivadṛṣṭi* is the earliest work of Pratyabhijñā school. It has been commented upon by Utpaladeva, the direct disciple of Somānanda. Unfortunately, Utpaladeva's commentary, in the form in which it has come down to us, in the published text (KSTS—No. LIX) as based on a single manuscript, does not go beyond its chapter IV, 74. Somānanda had also written a short commentry—*Vṛtti* (gloss) —on his own work *Śivadṛṣṭi* which is now lost. The closing verses of *Śivadṛṣṭi* beginning from '*Śaivādīni rahasyāni*' (VII, 107) upto the end of the work seem to belong to the now-lost *Vṛtti*. In certain manuscripts, these verses are introduced with the words : '*taduktam śivadṛṣṭi-vṛttau*' (these are given in *Śivadṛṣṭi-vṛtti*).[18] This is also indicated by verse 106 of the Canto VII of *Śivadṛṣṭi* : "*Iti kathitam aśeṣam...*' which appears to be the last verse of the main work, as it is composed in a longer metre (*Mālinī*) while all the rest of the work is written in the shorter metre (*Anuṣṭubh*). Thus, the account of Somānanda's descent from Tryambaka, which was originally a part of the *Vṛtti*, is

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... ...
ब्राह्मणेन विवाहेन ततो जातस्तथाविधः ।
तेन यः स च कालेन कश्मीरेष्वागतो भ्रमन् ।।
नाम्ना स संगमादित्यो वर्षादित्योऽपि तत्सुतः ।
तस्याप्यभूत् स भगवानरुणादित्यसंज्ञकः ।।
आनन्दसंज्ञकस्तस्मादुद्बभूव तथाविधः ।
तस्मादस्मि समुद्भूतः सोमानन्दाख्य ईदृशः ।।

ŚD VII, 107-120

16. एवमेषां त्र्यम्बकाख्या तेरम्बा देशभाषया ।। *Ibid.* 121 b.

17. करोमि स्म प्रकरणं शिवदृष्ट्यभिधानकम् ।। *Ibid.* 121a.

18. J. C. Chatterji, *Kashmir Śaivism*, 24, fn.

annexed to the main work by some later writer. In addition to *Śivadṛṣṭi*, Somānanda is known to have also written *Parātriṁśikā-vṛtti*, a prose commentary on *Parātriṁśikā*. This work is also lost but is frequently quoted by Abhinavagupta in his commentary on the *Parātriṁśikā*. Prof. R. Gnoli writes that 'Outside Kashmir, the *Śivadṛṣṭi* must also have been studied in Southern India. An old manuscript, in Telugu characters, with an erroneous title is to be found in the library of the Theosophical Society, Adyar. Another manuscript is preserved in the library in Madras.'

Somānanda's contribution to philosophical thought : Somānanda distinctly refers to various prevailing schools of thought most of which he considers unsound. His attacks are primarily directed against *Śabda-brahma-vāda* of Vaiyākaraṇas and the *Śaktyadvaya-vāda* of a section of Śaivas themselves. The other systems, such as the various schools of Buddhism, the monistic Vedānta, the Jainism, the Sāṅkhya, the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika, he criticises only summarily. He incorporates some of the doctrines of these systems with slight alterations, especially the doctrines of the Vaiyākaraṇas and the Buddhists. He takes the doctrine of monism direct from the system of Vedānta, but modifies it in the direction of the Śaivāgamas. Somānanda emphatically upholds the doctrine of monism in his system and supports the same even by quotations from Vedic scriptures as '*puruṣaḥ sarva evedam*' (*ŚD* III, 66). This line occurs in the Ṛgveda X. 90. He maintains the doctrine of Transcendence and Immanence (Para and Apara) as taught in the Upaniṣads (*ŚD* I, 48). The doctrine, that occurs in Bādarāyaṇa's system, that all plurality is evolved from the will of the Supreme Spirit like the creation of a Yogin from the power of his will is affirmed by Somānanda (*ŚD* I, 44 and III, 35). The *Svātantrya-vāda* of Pratyabhijñā system is mainly based upon this doctrine.

Somānanda makes also a passing reference to the doctrine developed from the Kāla hymn XIX, 53, in the *Atharvaveda* (*ŚD* VI, 30). According to it, Time is the Supreme Cause and the world is insentient and a mere name. The doctrine is upheld by certain philosophers called, by Somānanda, '*Kāla-kāraṇikas*'. In his system, Time is not the Ultimate Cause, but one of the categories of creation (*Tattvas*).

Somānanda is in favour of the doctrine of the ancient Grammarians (*Vaiyākaraṇas*) according to which the Transcendental Word (*Śabda-parabrahman*) is the Supreme Cause of the universe. He gives a long discussion on this doctrine in *Śivadṛṣṭi* II, entitled *Paśyantī-vicāra*, in which he arrives at the essential nature of the Ultimate Cause, viz. its powers of will, knowledge and action, which are indispensable for creation. This doctrine is thus reinterpreted by Somānanda and incorporated by him in his system in a modified form. The *Sphoṭa-vāda* of the later grammarians,

according to which the supersensuous entity, *sphoṭa*, manifests the sense of the words is refuted by him (*ŚD* II, 60).

Somānanda refers to a number of doctrines of the various schools of Vedāntins which he rejects in his *Śivadṛṣṭi.* Although some of these do accord with the tenets of his system, yet he seems to be opposing them without assigning any reason. The various schools of Vedāntins are mentioned by him. For instance, the *Citra-brahma-vādins* hold that Brahman assumes diverse forms of the world objects (*ŚD* VI, 3). The school of *Nānātma-vādins* attributes plurality to Ātman (*ŚD* VI, 3). Another school of Vedāntins referred to maintains that Ātman or Brahman is the Material Cause (*Upādāna-rūpa*) of the universe (*ŚD* VI, 8). The school of *Bhrānti-vādins* states that the world is an illusion and hence unreal (*ŚD* VI, 9). Somānanda mentions the doctrine of the *Ātma-vādins* that Ātman, the individual soul, is the Supreme Spirit (*Brahman*) and also the doctrine of *Neti-vādins* which is contrary to the former (*ŚD* VI, 9). Somānanda mentions also the view held by the school of *Sphuliṅgātma-vādins* that the individual souls are related to *Brahman* as sparks are to the fire (*ŚD* VI, 10). The doctrine of the school of *Pratibimba-vādins* is also referred to, according to which Ātman is the reflection of Brahman (*ŚD* VI, 11). Somānanda mentions another school of Vedāntins which maintains that Ātman adopts the form of the diverse creation as His sport. This view seems to have been objected to (*ŚD* VI, 12), although Somānanda had to accept it as the only motive on the part of the Creator for His acts of creation etc.. He mentions the Śaṅkara's school of Vedānta which holds that *Ātma-brahman* possesses the innate ignorance which is dispelled by acquiring knowledge (*ŚD* VI, 12). He seems to be against this view, as according to his school, Ātman is not unknown before, but is only forgotten and is recognised as known already (*nānanubhūtaḥ*). The school of *Bheda-vādins* declares that Ātman is different in different bodies and plurality (*bheda*) is inherent in the world (*ŚD* VI, 13). Another school maintains that the individual souls in different bodies are, in essence, one with the Supreme Soul (Brahman) like waves which are one with the ocean (*ŚD* VI, 13). According to some *Vedānta-vādins*, ignorance (*Avidyā*) binds Ātman (*ŚD* VI, 14). In *Śiva Sūtras*, the same doctrine is taught without any alteration in the Sūtra : "*ajñānam bandhaḥ*". So Somānanda has got no reason to object to it. He refers to another school of Vedāntins which holds that knowledge (*Vidyā*) and ignorance (*Avidyā*) are the two means by which Brahman liberates the limited souls (*jīvas*) and binds them with the world, respectively, without affecting its own pure nature (*ŚD* VI, 17). All these doctrines are mentioned in *ŚD* VI.

Again, Somānanda refers to different views held by various schools in respect of the relation between Ātman (*Śiva* or *Brahman*) and the

universe, against which he argues as follows. A school of Vedāntins maintains that the Supreme Soul (*Svātman*) assumes the form of the world by means of knowledge (*Vidyā*) (*ŚD* VI, 18). Ignorance (*Avidyā*) is not contrary to Brahman but a means, according to Bhagavān Vīrya and his followers (*ŚD* VI, 19). The *Gītā* (Chapter XI) shows immanence of the Lord in this universe (*Viśvarūpaḥ*). These two doctrines are not supported by any reasoning (*ŚD* VI, 20). If ignorance is asserted to be of real nature, it is then identical with knowledge. An unreal thing like absence of knowledge cannot be called inexistent as it is the cause of the universe which is real in nature (*ŚD* VI, 21). If ignorance (*Avidyā*) is of contrary nature (*jaghanya-rūpā*) and is desired to be discarded, it cannot be connected with the real universe. In that case some other reason will have to be sought for establishing the existence of the creation (*ŚD* VI, 22). If *Avidyā* is asserted to be its cause according to the favourite theory of the Vedāntins, then, being insentient (*jaḍa*) in nature, it can act as cause to bring about the effect, viz. the world, which must be of the same insentient nature (*ŚD* VI, 23). On the other hand, as the world is characterised by knowledge (*Vidyā*), some other Being as Lord (*anyeśvara*) is to be sought as the creator (*ŚD* VI, 24). The School of Ārhatas (Jains) regards Jina as God and *Jīvas* (individual beings) are all different from one another. They do not individually show the greatness of the God until they get enlightenment, when they become identical with Him (*ŚD* VI, 25). By destruction of ignorance *Jīva* is said to become God Ārhant Himself. Somānanda seems also to be against the view held by some Vedāntins that God is without a form (*nirākāra*), for in that case He can be supposed to be void (*Śūnya*) (*ŚD* VI, 26). He seems also to be opposed to different schools of Sāṅkhyas holding varied views, such as Ātman is independent with regard to creation, God is not indispensable for creation, and so on (*ŚD* VI, 27). Somānanda makes a passing reference to the view held by Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika Schools that God is different from individual beings (*jīvas*). He questions, how can they (*jīvas*) be separate from God (*ŚD* VI, 28)? Somānanda refers to a view held by some other school that Brahman is devoid of consciousness (*Saṁvit-śūnya*) or insentient, asserting that Prakṛti is identical with the Lord (*ŚD* VI, 29) This seems to be an attack against the Sāṅkhya School, against which Somānanda strongly protests. One more unknown school of Vedāntins, namely, *Ṣaḍdhāma-vādins*, is also mentioned. The point of view of this school is not clearly stated but Somānanda seems to refute the school by saying that if their view were asserted, then Brahman would be eternally bound by chains (*ŚD* VI, 31).

Somānanda mentions certain doctrines of other orthodox Brāhmaṇical schools with which he seems to be quite familiar. The *Pariṇāma-vāda*, the

doctrine of Transformation, appears to be favoured in his system (*ŚD* III, 38). Patañjali's Yoga System is also known to Somānanda (*ŚD* III, 99). Somānanda disagrees with the view of the Mīmāṁsakas, called *Svarga-mukti-vādins*, that release (*Mokṣa*) is the attainment of *Svarga* (Paradise) (*ŚD* VI, 32). He does not also favour the doctrine of *Pañcarātra-vādins* according to which Brahman is the Lord called Vāsudeva in the system (*ŚD* VI, 16).

Certain important doctrines of the Buddhists are also mentioned by Somānanda. The *Vijñāna-vādins* hold that the world is the transformation of consciousness (*Vijñāna*) (*ŚD* VI, 33). Another school of Buddhists, popularly known as *Vaināśikas*, maintains that the Ultimate is void (*Śūnya*) (*ŚD* VI, 36). They are also known as *Śūnya-vādins* (Nihilists). Somānanda refers to the school of Buddhists called *Kṣaṇika-vādins* who teach the doctrine of momentariness. According to this theory, everything in the world is momentary (*ŚD* VI, 36). As already stated, these doctrines are not recognised by him.

Somānanda refers to some of the doctrines of the Śaivas themselves with which he does not agree. For instance, he is opposed to the view held by the allied school of *Śāktas* that the universe is the product of Śakti (Universal Energy). Somānanda corrects the view in his system. According to his point of view, Śakti alone cannot exist; the existence of Śiva as substratum of power, or possessor of Śakti (*Śaktimān*), must be admitted. Without Śiva, Śakti cannot even move. Thus Somānanda holds that Śiva combined with Śakti is the Supreme Cause.

Somānanda does not take Māyā to be a fictitious entity, as in Śaṅkara's system, but as the limiting and veiling power of the Lord (*ŚD* I, 32).[19] The doctrine of manifestation (*Ābhāsavāda*) appears also to be known to Somānanda, as is evident from the use of the word *ābhāsa* in certain passages in *Śivadṛṣṭi*, such as '*jaḍābhāsam*' (*ŚD* I, 33), '*ābhāsa-rūpataḥ*' (*ŚD* III, 78) and '*bāhyābhāsa-kriyodgamāt*' (*ŚD* VI, 58). The doctrine does not seem to be enunciated distinctly anywhere by Somānanda. It is one of the prominent doctrines of the Pratyabhijñā system elaborately

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19. आत्मप्रच्छादनक्रीडां कुर्वतो वा कथंचन ।
मायारूपमितीत्यादि षट्त्रिंशत्तत्त्वरूपताम् ॥
बिभ्रद्भिर्भर्तिरूपाणि... ... ...

ŚD I, 32-3.

developed by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta perhaps under the direct influence of Śaṅkara's *Vivartavāda*[20].

Utpaladeva, the systematiser : Utpaladeva follows Somānanda in taking up the sacred cause and presenting the points of view of his teacher in a systematic form. He has left a meagre account of his person, the time of his life and the composition of his works. In *Tantrāloka*, 37, he is stated to be both son and pupil of Somānanda.[21] In *IVP* IV, ii, 3, he calls himself the son of Udayākara.[22] In the introductory verses prefixed to his commentary (*Vṛtti*) on Somānanda's *Śivadṛṣṭi*, he states that he was induced to write it at the request of his son Vibhramākara and class-mate Padmānanda.[23]

Utpaladeva's Works : *Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā-Kārikā* is Utpaladeva's chief work, which is the main treatise on the Pratyabhijñā system. In fact, the system owes its name to this work. It is based upon the doctrines taught by Somānanda in his *Śivadṛṣṭi*, and is composed in concise sūtra form. The work is divided into four *Adhikāras* (sections) each of which is subdivided into a number of Ahnikas (Cantos). Utpaladeva wrote also a brief commentary (*Vṛtti*) on his *Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā-Kārikā*, which is mainly concerned with the analysis of the metrical sūtras in prose order. Certain ideas contained in the

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20. From a note in his commentary on *ŚD* III, 78, "तदेश्वरव्यवस्थानादवस्त्वाभासरूपत:", Utpaladeva appears to be under the influence of Śaṅkara's *Vivartavāda*, as is evident from the following :-

यत् पुनः स्वरूपेण प्रकाशते तच्छिवरूपवस्त्वात्मकमेव, व्यवहारस्तु न कदाचित् वास्तवोऽपि तु भ्रम एव, अवस्त्वपि ईश्वरात्मैवावस्त्वाभासरूपेण तस्यावस्थानात् । (*ŚD*, p.129)

On the other hand, Somānanda uses the term *jaḍābhāsam* with reference to insentient material objects in *ŚD*, I, 33 "यावत्स्थूलं जडाभासं संहतं पार्थिवं घनम् ।"

This is explained by Utpaladeva as follows :—

"तदुक्तम् जडाभासं काष्ण्यात् जडोऽप्रकाश आभासो रूपमस्येति ।"

In *ŚD* VI, 58, Somānanda apparently uses the term *ābhāsa* in the sense of the xternal manifestation of the objective world, which shows that he too asserted *Vivartavāda*, though in a modfied form :-

भावानां चित्रशक्तीनामभेदो हेमभेदवत् । वैलक्षण्यमपूर्वत्वं बाह्याभासक्रियोद्गमात् ।

21. सोमानन्दात्मजोत्पल-लक्ष्मणगुप्तनाथः । *TĀ*, 37.

22. जनस्यायत्नसिद्धयर्थं उदयाकरसूनना ।
ईश्वरप्रत्यभिज्ञेयमुत्पलेनोपपादिता ॥ *IPK* IV, ii, 2.

23. विभ्रमाकरसंज्ञेन स्वपुत्रेणास्मि चोदितः ।
पद्मानन्दाभिधानेन तथा सब्रह्मचारिणा ॥ *ŚD I*, .

Kārikās are expanded in the *Vṛtti*, for clarification. *Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā-Ṭīkā* was another important work of Utpaladeva considered to be an authoritative work on the Pratyabhijñā system, but unfortunately it seems to be irrecoverably lost. It was a detailed commentary on *IPK* by the author himself. On this *Ṭīkā* a long commentary (*Vivṛti-vimarśinī*) is written by Abhinavagupta, which is published in three volumes (in *KSTS*). Utpaladeva's other works are *Ajaḍa-Pramātṛ-Siddhiḥ*, *Īśvara-Siddhiḥ* with *Vṛtti*, *Sambandha-Siddhiḥ* with *Vṛtti*, and a *Vṛtti* on Somānanda's *Śivadṛṣṭi*. The first three are smaller treatises which, put together, are called '*Siddhitrayī*' and are published in a single volume, along with Utpaladeva's own *Vṛtti* on *IPK*, of *KSTS* (No. XXIV). The fourth work, Utpaladeva's *Vṛtti* on *Śivadṛṣṭi*, is published in *KSTS*, Volume No. LIV. This *Vṛtti* does not go beyond the 74th verse of Canto IV, and the rest of it seems to be lost. *Parameśa-stotrāvalī* or *Śiva-stotrāvalī* is also mentioned among his works.

Utpaladeva's place in the domain of philosophy : Utpaladeva's works, mentioned above, are replete with polemic directed against the various controversial theories propounded by other rival systems. From these works, Utpaladeva appears to be a born genius. Besides Śaivāgamas he seems to have mastered the Buddhist, the Sāṅkhya, the Vedānta and all other systems of philosophy. Whereas Somānanda laid dawn briefly the main doctrines of the monistic system of *Pratyabhijñā*, Utpaladeva addressed himself to the task of formulating the doctrines taught by his Guru. By his penetrating insight together with his masterly and exhaustive studies, he was capable of bringing into bold relief all the major points of view of Somānanda given in mere outline and embedded in a mass of lengthy reasoning and polemics. He brought in a short compass of 191 kārikās or sūtras all that Somānanda taught in 740 verses. The object of Utpaladeva was, first, to canonise the new system of Śaiva Monism and to establish it on philosophical basis ; second, to check the Buddhist inroads levelled against it ; and lastly ; to popularise the system as superior to all other prevailing systems of philosophy.[24] Utpaladeva's *IPK* is indeed an unique and outstanding contribution to the Indian philosophy.

The philosophical acumen of Utpaladeva can be noticed from a brief survey of the ideas contained in his works. His *Siddhitrayī* indicates that he was originally brought up as a student of Vedānta. In this work he criticises the Buddhist and Sāṅkhya systems in the same manner as done by

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24. *IPV*, II, Introduction by Madhusudan Kaul, p. iv.

Saṅkarācārya in his *Vedānta-Sūtra-Bhāṣya*. These three smaller treatises show a close kinship between the two schools, the Pratyabhijñā and the Vedānta.

The *Siddhitrayī* deals with the elementary doctrines of the Pratyabhijñā school. In the *Ajaḍa-Pramātṛ-Siddhiḥ*, Utpaladeva attempts to prove that the perceiver cannot but be sentient (*ajaḍa*). Jīva, the limited perceiver, is endowed with *Caitanya* (consciousness) and is higher than the insentient creation, but is limited in his powers, i. e. he possesses '*alpakartṛtva*' (limited power of action), '*alpaśaktitva*' (limited capacity or potency) and '*alpajñātṛtva*' (limited power of knowledge) which makes him fall short of Īśvara. In the *Īśvara Siddhiḥ*, he demonstrates that Īśvara is the Supreme Perceiver and is above Jīva, the limited perceiver, as he is omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent. The limitations condition the functions of the Jīva. Īśvara is superior to Jīva because he is beyond the limitations of any kind. He is possessed of the intelligent agency '*buddhimatkartṛtva-viśiṣṭa*' which represents perfect sentiency. The sentient agency assumes two forms, Jīva as the limited perceiver and Īśvara as Unlimited Perceiver.[25] In connection with his refutation of the doctrine of *Vijñāna-vādins*, he says in *Ajaḍa-Pramātṛ-Siddhiḥ*, that in the state of general momentariness of objects we are unable even to discriminate between sentient and insentient entities.[26] In the same work, Utpaladeva asserts also the subjective idealism, because, as he says, the existence of insentient objects depends upon the perceiving subjects. The objects have no reality of their own other than that of the perceiving self. The creation of the objective world is the result of the perceiver's *Svātantrya*, viz. the sovereignty of his will. The perceiver (self) pervades the objects as their self and makes them manifest. A sentient being is capable of manifesting objects and not an insentient agency. Like Śaṅkarācārya, in *Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya* II, 1 and 2, Utpaladeva also proves that the insentient agency like the *Pradhāna* of the Sāṅkhyas cannot be the cause of this orderly and

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25. द्विधा स एष एवात्मा मितोऽपरिमितस्तथा ।
प्राणादिना निरुद्धोऽणुः परमात्मा त्वखण्डितः ॥ *APS*, 16.

26. विज्ञानसंतानवादिनां मते सर्वेषां भावानां क्षणिकत्वात् स्वलक्षणात्मके प्रातिस्विके स्वरूपे विशेषाभावः संतानिन एकस्यानुसंधातुरनभ्युपगतत्वात् । एवं चेतनाचेतनानामपि स्वात्मनि निर्विशेषत्वं । *APS Vṛtti* 1.

यथा सदसतां नैव विशेषोऽस्ति निजात्मनि ।
जडाजडानामप्येवं नास्त्यसाविति निश्चयः ॥ *APS* 1.

diverse universe. The Maker (*Nirmātā*) and the Governor (*Īśvara*) of the world cannot, therefore, be other than the sentient Lord having the knowledge of diverse processes of architecture (*vicitra-racanā*), and not an insentient principle like *Prakṛti*, lacking knowledge (*jaḍā*). The *Īśvara-Siddhiḥ* is thus an attack on the Sāṅkhya system. Utpaladeva says that the powers of will (*Icchā*), Knowledge (*Jñāna*) and Activity (*Kriyā*) are indispensable for Īśvara to be potent for his functions of creating the orderly world. *Pradhāna* or *Prakṛti* evidently lacks these characteristics because it is insentient, according to the Sāṅkhya system.[27] The *Sambandha-Siddhiḥ* is devoted to a study of the philosophy of relation (*Sambandha*). Utpaladeva discusses, with amplification of arguments, the existing link that binds the individual soul with the universe. The same subject is similarly dealt with in the *Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Sūtras*, II, ii-iv. Utpaladeva establishes the relation of 'unity in diversity' (*Bhedābheda*) with reference to the world not as based upon the principle of Nescience (*Māyā*), as explained by Śaṅkarācārya, but as the result of real manifestation according to his theory of *Ābhāsavāda*. By this theory he explains the plurality consisting of 'subject', 'object' and 'awareness' in conformity with the doctrine of monism. Śaṅkarācārya explains the relation of *Asmat* (subject) and *Yuṣmat* (object) according to his theory of *Vivarta-vāda*. He maintains that the objective world denoted by '*Yuṣmat*' (You) is the result of the operation of the illusive principle *Māyā* and is based upon error or wrong perception. But *Ābhāsavāda* being, no doubt, a form of *Vivartavāda* (theory of Manifestation) is based upon a different view. While in the *Vivartavāda* the manifestations are unreal appearances caused by error, those in the *Ābhāsavāda* are real facts of experience. According to this new theory, Śiva is immanent in this world which is his own manifestation, as well as transcends it. The relation between the subject (the perceiver) and the object (the world) is that of the Manifester and the manifested. The world is, so to say, manifested on the screen of the Ultimate Being which is held by Śaṅkara to be the superimposition on the Supreme Self (*Brahman*). The difference between the *Ābhāsavāda* of Utpaladeva and the *Vivartavāda* of Śaṅkara is that the appearences in the former comprise the very nature of Śiva and do not cease after being 'recognised', whereas, in the latter, these are caused by wrong perception or illusion (*bhrānti*) and must, therefore, cease after the knowledge of the real background is achieved. In the former case

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27. वैचित्र्यकारी यो यत्र स तत्रेश्वर इष्यते ।
न च प्रधानस्येच्छादिसंभवः पुरुषार्थता ॥ *Is*, 36

the interpretation of the world (*viśva*) changes only after 'recognition', while it continues to exist as before. In the latter case the world is illusion and Brahman is beyond it and the only real Being.

Utpaladeva takes great pains, in the *Pratyabhijñā Sūtras*, to demonstrate the existence of the eternal Lord to counterinfluence the Nihilistic teachings of the Buddhists. The Nihilists hold that everything is momentary. The fleeting objects in the world appear only as permanent and continuous, just as a train of momentary flames becoming visible in quick succession appears as a continuous flame. The self also is not a continuous and lasting entity. In the general state of momentariness, as presumed by Nihilists, even perception is not possible since the notions of 'I' (subject), 'awareness' and 'object' belong to three different moments of time and, as such, are not joined in one identical relation not involving the three successive stages. As the Buddhists have no reason to suppose that these three notions do not involve three successive stages, so the perception according to their theory of momentariness is impossible. It is not also possible to suppose the self to be a momentary entity, since we are all conscious of our identity that we persist in all our changing states of consciousness, and though our ideas are continuously changing with the changing objects, we remain unchanged all the same.[28] Utpaladeva argues against the theory of momentariness, in the *Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Sūtras* I, iii, to prove the existence of one persistent Self, on the basis of the phenomena of remembrance.[29]

Utpaladeva further establishes that this persistent Self is Infinite Consciousness, Self-dependent and All-powerful (*Svatantra-śaktimān*). Somānanda holds that the world is One Ultimate Śiva (*Sarva eva śivaḥ sthitaḥ*). This idea, being originally an outcome of the Upaniṣads was, no doubt, taken up by Somānanda from Śaivāgamas in which it seems to have been incorporated by the earlier Śaiva thinkers from the original sources, but he did not give any rational proof in support of it. It seems he did not go deep into the question : "How all this is the ultimate Śiva ?", but he only tried to establish this truth by means of similies which are diverse and varied. Leaning to the *Pariṇāma-vāda* (theory of Transformation), he states at one place : "*kuṇḍalādiṣu bhāveṣu sarvathaiva*

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28. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, I. 33.

Refer to the argument put forth by Prakāśātman in *Pañcapādikā* against the theory of momentariness.

29. सत्यं किन्तु स्मृतिज्ञानं पूर्वानुभवसंस्कृतेः ।
जातमप्यात्मनिष्ठं तन्नाद्यानुभववेदकम् । *IPK*, 1. iii, 1

suvarṇatā" (*ŚD* VI, 92). "*athāmbudhivīcivat*" (*ŚD* III, 37) and so on, i. e. the Ultimate Śiva is the *Causa Materialis* of the objective world, just as the gold is that of ornaments, clay is that of pots and the water is that of ripples and waves. The same instances are stated in the Upaniṣads and are also reproduced by Bādarāyaṇa in his *Vedānta Sūtras.* At another place he evidently seems to favour *Kalpanā* theory, *Vivartavāda* or *Māyāvāda*, in a different form, as is clear from : "*yoginām-icchayā yadvannānārūpopapattitā, nacāsti sādhanam kiṁcin-mṛdādīcchām vinā prabhoḥ ; tathā bhagavadicchaive tathātvena prajāyate.*" (*Ibid. I*, 44), i. e. the world is not evolved from any extraneous substance but is like a creation of a Yogin evolved from his mere power of Will. Utpaladeva discusses the problem : "How all this is the Ultimate Śiva ?", and at length justifies it in the light of the *Svātantrya* theory invented by him. It is the nature of Śiva, he says, to emanate into the world by His *Svātantrya Śakti*. It is neither transformation (*Pariṇāma*), nor manifestation (*Vivarta*), but the self-dependent power of the Lord (*Svātantrya*) that evolves this world.

Abhinavagupta, the expounder : The following account is given about Abhinavagupta, the great expounder of the *Pratyabhijñā-darśana* in the concluding portions of his two works, the *Tantrāloka* and the *Parātriṁśikā.* Atrigupta, the earlier ancestor of Abhinavagupta, lived in Antarvedī in the reign of king Yaśovarman of Kannauj (A.D. 730-740). After the defeat of Yaśovarman by king Lalitāditya of Kashmir (A.D. 725-761) the latter brought Atrigupta to Kashmir where he settled with his family. Afterwards, for about one hundred and fifty years, we hear nothing about the family. Abhinavagupta's grandfather, Varāhagupta, is known to have been born from this family perhaps in the beginning of the tenth century. The immediate descendent of Varāhagupta was Cakhulaka, the father of Abhinavagupta. The scholarly traditions were invariably maintained by the successive generations of this learned Śaiva Brāhmaṇa family. Both Varāhagupta and Cakhulaka were great scholars. Abhinavagupta also inherited scholarly qualities predominantly from his ancestors, by virtue of which he made himself known as a person of matchless scholarship and a versatile genius. Besides, he was a born *Yogin* (*Yoginībhū*) and a devotee of God Śiva and led a celibate life. According to the tradition, current in old Hindu as well as Muslim families in Kashmir, particularly in the village Bhiruva, one day Abhinavagupta, after fulfilling the mission for which he was born, entered the Bhairva cave in the said village, along with his twelve hundred disciples and thus departed from this world never to be seen again.[30]

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30. K. C. Pandey, *Abhinavagupta*, 20-21.

It may be pointed out here that Abhinavagupta connected with the Pratyabhijñā system of Kashimir was different from his name-sake, the Śākta contemporary of Śaṅkarācārya. The latter belonged to Kāmarūpa in Assam, who is known to have been defeated by Śaṅkarācārya in a discussion (*Śāstrārtha*). He obviously lived in the time of Śaṅkarācārya (A.D.788-820), nearly two centuries before the Kashmirian Abhinavagupta, who flourished towards the end of the tenth century and in the beginning of the eleventh century. According to his own statements regarding the dates of his different works, *Tantrāloka*, *Krama*, *Bhairavastotra* and the *Bṛhatī-vimarśinī*, the period of his literary activity extended over a quarter of a century, from 4090 of the *Saptarṣi* era, i.e. 990-1 to A.D. 1014-15.[31]

Abhinavagupta's works : Dr. K. C. Pandey has enumerated as many as forty-one works of Abhinavagupta. Among his works on the Pratyabhijñā philosophy, his two well-known commentaries on *IPK*, namely *Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī* and *Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti-Vimarśinī*, *Tantrāloka*, *Tantrasāra*, *Paramārthasāra*, *Mālinī-Vijaya-Vārtika*, *Parātriṁśikā-Vivṛti* and *Bhagavad-gītārtha-saṅgraha*, are some of the notables. His reputation in philosophy chiefly rests on the first two works, the two commentaries on *IPK*, one short (*Laghu-vimarśinī*) and the other long (*Bṛhatī-vimarśinī*). The first commentary is less detailed than the second. The *Bṛhatī-vimarśinī* is the commentary on Utpaladeva's own Tīkā on *IPK*, which is not now extant. It elucidates most of the points exhaustively which are obscure in the short commentary. *Tantrāloka*, meaning 'the light of Tantras', is the most voluminous work of Abhinavagupta, in which he has written on all the aspects of the non-dualistic Āgamas. It deals with both ritualistic and philosophical matters. The work consists of thirty-seven long chapters almost entirely published in *KSTS*. The following chapters are important in respect of the metaphysical content of the *Pratyabhijñā Śāstra*. Chapter I gives a brief summary of the whole *Tantrāloka* and Chapter II deals with the Pratyabhijñā system under a different title *Anupāya*, literally meaning 'processless means'. The chapters III, IV and V are devoted to *Śāmbhavopāya*, *Śāktopāya* and *Ānavopāya*, the three different methods of Śaiva Yoga for achieving the final emancipation, according to *Trika* conception. The last chapter gives Abhinavagupta's autobiographical account among other things. The important points discussed in the *Tantrāloka* are the cause of bondage, the way to freedom, the process of manifestation of the universe, the means of realizing the Ultimate Reality, comparison of the Śaiva *Tattvas* from *Puruṣa* to *Pṛthivī* (earth) with the twenty-five *tattvas*

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31. *Ibid.*, 2-3.

of the Sāṅkhya system, and so on. *Tantrasāra*, a small prose work, is the epitome of the voluminous work *Tantrāloka.* In this work, Abhinavagupta gives briefly and in an easy language what the voluminous work *Tantrāloka* deals with comprehensively in an abstruse metrical composition. The *Paramārthasāra* gives the most essential principles of *Trika* system in one hundred Āryā verses : "*Āryā-śatena tad-idaṁ saṅkalpitam śāstra-sāram atigūḍham*". It was first published by L. D. Barnett in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland* (1910, pp. 707-747) together with the English presentation of the principles of the Śaiva School of Kashmir. *Bhagvad-gitārtha-saṅgraha* is the commentary on the *Gītā* according to the Pratyabhijñā point of view. It is edited and published by Pandit Lakshman Joo, the living descendent of the line of teachers of the Pratyabhijñā school and the practising Śaiva Yogi in Kashmir. Abhinavagupta's *Mālinī-Vijaya-Vārttika* is an exposition of the very difficult verses of the *Mālinī-Vijaya-Tantra*, and the *Parātriṁśikā-Vivarṇa* is a commentary on *Parātriṁśikā*, constituting the text of the concluding part of the *Rudra-Yāmala-Tantra.* The latter gives the Śaiva conception of *Parā*, *Paśyantī*, *Madhyamā* and *Vaikharī* of the Grammarian's School.[32]

Abhinavagupta's literary achievements and contribution to Pratyabhijñā system : Abhinavagupta was a great *Śaiva* philosopher and a person of vast learning. He wrote on the Pratyabhijñā Philosophy and several other subjects, such as Dramaturgy, Rhetoric, Esthetics and the philosophy of poetry. He successively worked on three systems which are known as the *Krama*, the *Trika* and the *Kula*, the different systems evolved from Śaivāgamas and Tantras. Abhinavagupta is recognised to be an authority on two subjects, Poetics and the Pratyabhijñā Philosophy. His chief contribution to the former is his two masterly commentaries on *IPK* and the voluminous work *Tantrāloka*, and to the latter his profound commentary on *Dhvanyāloka* and his excellent exposition of Bharata's *Nāṭya-śāstra.* His aim in writing the small commentary called *Vimarśinī*, as he tells in its opening verses, was to explain the meaning of the Pratyabhijñā-Sūtras for the easy grasp of the average people. In the longer commentary, *Vivṛti-Vimarśinī* his object was to elucidate the ideas of Utpaladeva's own exposition of his Sūtras in his now-lost *Tīkā.* He thus faithfully follows the original doctrines of Utpaladeva throughout and did not attempt to add any new theory of his own. The Pratyabhiñā Śāstra is, indeed, known from the work of Abhinavagupta, since without his expositions, the system would not have been valued in its true per-

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32. J. C, Chatterji, *Kashmir Śaivism.*
K. C. Pandey, *Abhinavagupta*, 22.

spective. In fact, it was Abhinavagupta who made the system intelligible, although his ideas are mostly embedded in a mass of polemics.

Later teachers and their works: The later teachers of the system were mostly commentators, such as Kṣemarāja, Yogarāja, Jayaratha, Śivopādhyāya and Bhāskarācārya. Although they lacked originality, yet they continued to make important contributions to the system in the shape of commentaries to the various original works. There are seventeen works to the credit of Kṣemarāja, as enumerated by K. C. Pandey. He flourished in the eleventh century A. D. In the thirty-seventh chapter of *Tantrāloka* Kṣema is included in the list of the names of Abhinavagupta's pupils. *Pratyabhijñā-hṛdaya* (the Secret of Recognition) and *Śiva-Sūtra-Vimarśinī*, the well-known commentary on the *Śiva-Sūtras*, are his most important works. Yogarāja is the commentator of the *Paramārthasāra* of Abhinavagupta. In the concluding lines of the commentary, he states that he was the pupil of Kṣemarāja. He must have, therefore, lived in the second half of the eleventh century. Jayaratha is the author of the *Viveka*, the famous commentary on the *Tantrāloka*. Subhaṭadatta is the first known commentator of Abhinavagupta's *Tantrāloka*. No trace of his commentary (*Vivṛti*) has so for been found. As pointed out by K. C. Pandey, the initiation of Jayaratha is stated to have been performed by king Subhaṭadatta. The former was a younger contemporary of a Kashmirian king Jayaratha (Rājarāja) of A.D. 1200. He, therefore, lived about the close of the twelfth century and the first half of the thirteenth century. Śivopādhyāya has written a commentary on *Vijñāna Bhairava*. He belonged to the eighteenth century. Bhāskarācārya, the author of a simple and lucid commentary, known as *Bhāskarī*, on Abhinavagupta's *Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī*, is separated from his present living descendants by seven generations. He is also the author of the metrical Sanskrit version of *Lallavāk* and a commentary on *Yogavāsiṣṭha* according to the Śaiva point of view. A few fragments of the latter work are said to be in possession of the author's descendents.

Pioneers of the Pratyabhijñā System (Resumé)

	Name	Date
Founder	Somānanda; the author of *Śivadṛṣṭi*,	Towards the close of the 9th century A.D.
Systematiser	Utpaladeva, the author of *Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Sūtras* or *Kārikās*.	About A.D. 900-950

	Lakṣmaṇa, the son and pupil of Utpaladeva; none of his works is extant.	A.D. 950-1000
Expounder	Abhinavagupta, the author of the two commentaries, *Laghvī-Vimarśinī* and *Bṛhatī-Vimarśinī*, on *IPK*, *Tantrāloka*, etc.	A.D. 990-1015
Later teachers	Kśemarāja, Yogarāja, Jayaratha, Śivopādyāya, Bhāskarācārya.	A.D. 1200-1800

CHAPTER IV

ŚIVA : THE ULTIMATE REALITY

Śiva, His Transcendence and Immanence ; Śiva materializes Himself in the concrete form of this universe ; A controversy ; Śiva's diversified creations.

In the opening invocation of *Śivadṛṣṭi*, Somānanda gives the epitome of his philosophy and postulates the theory that the universe is the material form of Śiva and that He materializes Himself in the concrete form of the universe (*tatātman*) by his own inherent power (*nijayā śaktyā*).[1] According to Somānanda, the Ultimate Reality is Śiva, in masculine gender, Who is manifest as the 'essence and identity' of everything. He shines forth in every form of existence as its self (*Ātman*) (*ātmaiva sarvabhāveṣu sphuran-śivaḥ*). He is consciousness resting in itself that abounds in bliss (*nirvṛta-cit*) and is all-pervasive (*vibhuḥ*). He is unrestricted stream of desire, i.e. free will (*aniruddha-icchā-prasaraḥ*) and spontaneous flow of cognition and action (*prasarad-dṛk-kriyaḥ*), viz. He is the triple power : the powers of Will, Cognition and Action.[2]

Śiva's Transcendence and Immanence : Śiva has two aspects, one being His Transcendence (*Parā* or *Anuttarā daśā*, called also *Viśvottīrṇa*) and the other His Immanence (*Aparā daśā* or *Viśvamaya*). He is said to be in the state of Transcendence when He exists in the plenitude of His 'conscious beatitude', i.e. when He is absorbed in the full measure of His bliss and sentience, to the exclusion of all else (*cidāhlāda-mātrānubhava-tallayaḥ*). Then the three powers—Will, Knowledge and Action, being in the most subtle form, remain in a state of perfect union within Him (*su-sūkṣma-śakti-tritaya-sāmarasyena vartate*). *Parā* is, therefore, a state of His non-differentiation (*nirvibhāgaḥ*), i.e. His precosmic state, which

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1. अस्मद्रूपसमाविष्टः स्वात्मनात्मनिवारणे ।
शिवः करोतु निजया नमः शक्त्या ततात्मने ॥ *ŚD* I, 1
Let Śiva who dwells in us, offer his obeisance to Śiva who is extended in the form of the universe (*tatātmane*) through His own power (*nijayā śaktyā*), Śiva who obscures Himself by Himself.

2. आत्मैव सर्वभावेषु स्फुरन्निर्वृतचिद्विभुः ।
अनिरुद्धेच्छाप्रसरः प्रसरद्दृक्क्रियः शिवः ॥ *ŚD* I, 2

is the state of rest of all the powers. This state does not only exist in the Transcendental aspect of Śiva, but can also be experienced by an individual between all the successive cognitions, viz. at the moments of the beginning and the end of any act of knowing, that is to say, 'when the initial tension has not yet been determined in discursive knowledge and when this knowledge resolves itself and is integrated into consciousness.'[3] Śiva never lacks His triple power, neither in the state of non-differentiation (Transcendence) i.e. *Parā*, nor in the state of differentiation (Immanence), i.e. *Aparā*, in which state Śiva undergoes division in the form of the diverse objects of the world. Though in His undivided *Parā* state the three-fold *Śaktis* exist in their primordial form, in His *Aparā* state these are but in their manifested form. Thus Śiva never remains devoid of His *Śaktis*.[4]

In the state of Immanence (*Aparā daśā*), Śiva's powers of Will, Knowledge and Action stream forth from His original state of Transcendence and from them emanate thirty-six *tattvas* (the principles of creation) which transform into diverse limited subjects and objects of the universe. The division of Reality or being into multiplicity and becoming is not determined by extrinsic agent, but is caused by an intrinsic force, *Svātantrya-Śakti* (the sovereignty of the Lord's will), or the self-dependent power of the Lord, viz. absolute liberty and autonomy of consciousness, which creates and dissolves, obscures and retrieves itself ceaselessly in its original plenitude. From this point of view, Reality is vibration (*ghūrṇana*), stir or movement (*spanda*), creative outburst (*ucchalatā*). Every movement we make, of a physical or psychic order, is produced, originally, from a kind of tension, or urge which unfolds inside us. In all our activities, there is an element of 'drive', of 'urge', of an inner conation (*saṁrambha*, *aunmukhya*, *udyoga*, *samudyama*) which, directed towards a given end, contains within itself the image of the things to come. This tension is the most intimate and central activity of consciousness. All forms of knowledge —in short, all our psychic activity—comes from this inner impulse, and not

3. न परं तदवस्थायां व्यवस्थैषा व्यवस्थिता ।
यावत्समग्रज्ञानाग्रज्ञातृस्पर्शदशास्वपि ॥
स्थितैव लक्ष्यते सा च तद्विश्रान्त्या तथा फले । *ŚD* I, 5-6

Gnoli, *Śivadṛṣṭi* by Somānanda, Translation and Commentary, *East and West* VIII (1957) 16-22.

4. एवं न जातु चित्तस्य वियोगस्त्रितयात्मना ॥
शक्त्या निर्वृतचित्त्वस्य तदभागविभागयोः । *ŚD* I, 6-7

from any extrinsic cause. This impulse is the expression of the very nature of consciousness which is the spring of life and all creation.[5]

Somānanda now explains how this triple power proceeds to function in the state of differentiation. When Śiva's sentience (consciousness' begins to tend towards the creation of diversified objects, it shines forth (*vikasati*) and expands (*sphurati*) in the shape of a wonderful manifestation (*camatkāra*, *sphūrti*) or amazing vibration (*jṛmbhā*, *ghūrṇanam*) which is the initial moment (*prathamā tuṭi*) of will.[6] This initial tension towards all kinds of action is perceptible in the locus of the heart, for instance, when one remembers suddenly a thing to be done, or when one receives pleasant or painful news. It can be observed at the moments when one experiences fear unexpectedly, when one sees again unexpectedly a thing not seen before, when one feels the flow of emission, when one utters a speech (or recites a mantra), and when one reads a book quickly and when one runs away. On all these occasions there is a movement or vibration in all the powers (*vilolatā*)[7]. *Vilolatā* has also been explained as *miśrībhāvaḥ* or a mingling. That is to say, the various powers (*Śaktis*) or operations (*vṛttis*) of the consciousness, viz. will, effort, knowledge, action etc. are no longer perceived as distinct from one another but are fused or mingled together.[8]

Somānanda's theory seems to be the result of a close examination of different states of individual consciousness. The will is the first state of conscious activity that precedes every action. It has two moments, an initial moment of tension and the actual will. The Vedic seer also observes, in the hymn of creation (in the *Ṛgveda*), that *tapah* (brooding), i.e. the initial tension of will, is the first conscious activity in the act of creation.[9] Similary, Somānanda also observes that Śiva's will to create

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5. Gnoli, *loc. cit.*

6. यदा तु तस्य चिद्धर्मविभवामोदजृम्भया ॥
विचित्ररचनानानाकार्यसृष्टिप्रवर्तने ।
भवत्युन्मुखिता चित्ता सेच्छायाः प्रथमा तुटिः ॥ *ŚD* I, 7, 8
(आमोदः=चमत्कारः ; जृम्भा=विश्वात्मतया विकसनम्)

7. सा च दृश्या हृदुद्देशे कार्यस्मरणकालतः ।
प्रहर्षावेदसमये दरसंदर्शनक्षणे ॥
एतेष्वेव प्रसङ्गेषु सर्वशक्तिविलोलता । *ŚD* I, 9, 11

8. Gnoli, *loc. cit.*

9. ....तपसस्तन्महिनाजायतैकम् ॥
कामस्तदग्रे समवर्तताधि मनसो रेतः प्रथमं यदासीत् । *Ṛgveda*, X, 129, 3,4

various kinds of diversified objects forms the first process in the act of creation.[10]

The Pūrvapakṣin questions : How does pure Lord perform the impure acts of creation etc., there being no purpose at all for his acts ? Somānanda says that it is the nature of the powers (*śaktis*) of Śiva to perform the acts of creation etc. There is, therefore, no reason to look for the motives which cause Śiva to perform these acts. We cannot say that Śiva exists without the function of His Śaktis, which is impossible and meaningless. Śiva's very existence ceases if we take away *śaktis* (powers) from Him. Thus Śiva becomes all that exists by His own nature (*svarūpa*). The whole is Śiva Himself and is thus 'pure'. Śiva, by His own nature, performs ceaselessly five operations : creation (*sṛṣṭi*), preservation (*sthiti*), reabsorption (*saṁhāra*), grace (*anugraha*) and obscuration (*tirodhāna*).[11]

Somānanda gives instances of how Śiva who is always immune from thickness, gets extended in the concrete form of the universe by processes beginning from the first conscious activity. When a waveless stretch of water becomes violently agitated, we notice, at the beginning, an initial tension, which is a barely imperceptible movement. When the open hand is clenched into a fist, there is first a slight movement (*kampaḥ*). Similarly, when the desire for creation begins to rise in the consciousness, while it is in a state of quiescence, there is what is called a 'stir' (*spanda*).[12] This stir is called by some eminent sages as slight expansion or thickening (*kiñciducchūnatā*),[13] The will is the product of this initial tension. The remaining part—the thicker part - of the tension is the fully developed will. Despite the existence of this tension, i.e. thickening, Śiva is, of course, always immune from thickness (i.e. transformation). The moment the milk falls from the udder of the cow, it undergoes a change. But we cannot say that this is no longer milk. Similarly, from the fact that Śiva turns into this concrete form of the universe, from his state of quiescence, we cannot imply He is no longer Śiva, the subtle all-pervading spirit.[14].

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10. *ŚD* I, 8.
11. पञ्चप्रकारकृत्योक्तिशिवत्वान्निजकर्मणे ॥
    प्रवृत्तस्य निमित्तानामपरेषां क्व मार्गणम् । *ŚD* I, 12-13
12. बोधस्य स्वात्मनिष्ठस्य रचनां प्रति निर्वृतिः । *ŚD* I, 15
13. यदेतदौन्मुख्यं, सैव किंचिदुच्छूनता कथ्यते भट्टप्रद्युम्नेन तत्त्वगर्भे ।
    ŚD Ṭīkā, p. 16
14. *ŚD* I, 18

Somānanda now continues to say how Śiva performs the act of creation of this universe initially from His power of will. Will is the antecedent state of all acts. The fact that Śiva desires to know and act implies an action accompanied with the will. Two moments can be distinguished in the will, the first of which is the tension and the second is the actual will, which is also a form of action. All this creation is the final form of Śiva's power of action. Somānanda says, immediately after the will, comes the faculty of seeing, viz. knowing the product, i.e. the whole universe (*tat-kārya-jñāna-darśana-śaktitā*). This faculty is the power of knowledge (*Jñāna-Śakti*). Later on, this turns into massive or thick conation in its activity or effort (*sthūlaḥ samudyamaḥ*), which is called the power of action (*Kriyā Śakti*). From that the whole world is made. Somānanda boldly repudiates the doctrine of the Vedāntins which maintains that the world is the reflection (*pratibimba*) of the Supreme Spirit or it is an illusion (*māyā* or *bhrānti*).[15] The Sāṅkhya view that the universe develops from the insentient Pradhāna (*Prakṛti*) like a tree from a seed is also refuted. Somānanda holds that the creation is the growth of the sovereignty of Śiva's will, which functions, at first in the subtle form of knowledge (*bodha*), next in the form of action, and finally grows into the gross form of the universe. Thus, at the time of creation, the triple power of Śiva does exist in its state of rest tending to function subsequently (*aunmukhyam*) till its final cosmic form (*nirvṛtiḥ—viśiṣṭa-rūpatā-prāptiḥ*) is attained. The lack of even one power (*śakti*) would render the act of creation impossible. Therefore, the world consisting of animate and inanimate objects is the material form of the triple power of Śiva.[16]

In this world, we find that the same process takes place every time a thing has to be produced, as for example, an earthen pot, not in the creation of the world only. The function of the triple power does not cease to exist every time anything is created. Nor does the first tension (*aunmukhyam*) cease to exist, nor the antecedent state of rest of the triple power, viz. the state of perfect beatitude of Śiva. This is His Transcendental (*Parā*) state which is the ultimate cause of all creative activity,

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15. इच्छाद्यसद्भावे वा अन्यत्र क्वचित् वस्तुतो न स्थौल्यं चिदात्मनः
प्रतिबिम्बकल्पैर्भावैरनाधिक्यात् । नापि तदात्मताप्रथा भ्रान्तिरिति ।
ŚD–Ṭīkā, p. 16

16. यदेकतरनिर्याणे कार्यं जातु न जायते ।
तस्मात् सर्वपदार्थनां सामरस्यमवस्थितम् ॥ ŚD I, 23
सर्वपदार्थानामुत्पत्तौ शक्तिमदात्मकं स्थितमेव । ŚD p. 18, fn. 6

from the first tension to the actual creation. If only one of these three powers were absent, the object would not be produced. For this reason, every time a thing is produced, this state of union of the triple power is present. In other words, the production of a thing presupposes the co-operation of these three powers. All the three powers are present not only at the moment in which an object, say an earthen pot, is about to be produced, but also in every act of knowledge.[17] The very notion of perceiving an object, say a pot, implies an action, viz. act of knowing, which is indicated by the concept: 'I perceive the pot' or 'he perceives the pot'. The act of knowing is not possible for one who is deprived of will, and if there were no initial tension (*anunmukhābhāvaḥ*). Without this tension, the antecedent state of triple power, it would not be possible for one to avert from that which he hates (*dveṣye*). Nor, finally can one know without conciousness (*Citta*).[18]

A controversy : Here the Pūrvapakṣin tries to refute the point of view of Somānanda. He says: "Without the mental substance (*Citta* and *Buddhi*), there can be no knowledge and the mind is an offspring of matter (*Prakṛti*). Śiva cannot be indentified with *Prakrti*." Somānanda replies that, in fact, the mind appears only in the stage of differentiation (*aparasthitau*). Knowledge, subtle (*sūkṣmam*), all-pervasive (*sarva-dikkam*), intellective (*bodhamayam*) is, on the other hand, an eternal accompaniment of Śiva inborn in Him.[19] We are not accepting the point of view of Nyāya and those schools who maintain that knowledge is produced from *Prakṛti* (matter), when they assert that knowledge is a quality of the self. In our view, knowledge is the power of the Supreme Self. It is generally held by Sāṅkhya and other Indian schools that the faculties of mind (*Citta*) and reason (*Buddhi*) are the offshoots of *Prakṛti*, which, according to the Sāṅkhya, is an insentient principle. But, according to Śaivas, these

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17. न केवलं घटादिकरणकाले सर्वशक्तिसंभवः, यावत् ग्रहणकाले ऽपीत्याह ....

    ŚD Ṭīkā, p. 19

18. तदौन्मुख्याभावतस्तस्य प्रमातुर्वेदनस्य वा निवृत्तिः नहि औन्मुख्यरूपां तत्कर्मनिर्वृतिं विना द्वेष्ये प्रवर्तते ।

    ŚD Ṭīkā, p. 19

19. अपरावस्थायामभेदाख्यातावेकरसायां पुर्यष्टक प्रमातॄणां सा बुद्धिः।

    ŚD Ṭīkā, p. 21

two faculties, though being the principles of limitation and the offshoots of *Prakṛti*, are identical with the triple power (*śakti*) of Śiva in his immanent state (*aparāvasthāyām*).[20] The same Śiva who, in His subtle and pure form, is all-pervasive (*sarva-dikkam*), unaffected by the limitations of time and space (*dikkāla-akhaṇḍitam*), functions in His *Aparā* state, i.e. the state of immanence, in the form of the faculties of mind (*Citta*) and reason (*Buddhi*), which are the principles of limitation. *Cittam* or *Buddhi*, which is supposed by the Sāṅkhya to have been evolved from insentient *Prakṛti*, is unable to perform the act of knowing by itself. Knowledge, i.e. the power of knowing, is an innate power of Śiva. Even according to Naiyāyikas, the Indian logicians, knowledge stands in *Samavāya* relation with *Ātman*, i.e. knowledge is inherent quality of Ātman, and Ātman is identical with Śiva.[21] Hence the faculties of mind (*Citta* and *Buddhi*) are the powers of Ātman. For the same reason, *Icchā* (will) which, according to Naiyāyikas, is '*manaḥ-sankalpa-rūpā*', viz. a process of mind (*antaḥ-karaṇa*) is but an active power (*śákti*) of Śiva.[22]

According to the order stated above, the Lord sometimes creates by his mere pure power (*śakti-mātṛke*), the conscious beatitude (*cit-nirvṛti-rūpa-śakti-dvayaḥ* i.e. *cit* and *ānanda*), sometimes assumes different forms by His will (*Icchā-śakti*) and sometimes by His power of knowledge (*Jñāna-śakti*).[23] Sometimes, by the preponderance of His power of knowledge, He appears as *Sadāśiva*; sometimes, by absorbing Himself

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20. सा बुद्धिर्यत् पुनः सूक्ष्मं सर्वदिक्कं व्यवस्थितम् ।
    ज्ञानं बोधमयं तस्य शिवस्य सहजं सदा ॥
    ŚD I, 27

    ......पूर्णतायां परावस्थस्य अत एव सूक्ष्ममभिन्नं वेद्यतामनुपयातमत एव सर्वदिक्कं दिक्कालाखण्डितं ज्ञानं बोधमात्रमबोध्यरूपं, तत्तस्य शिवस्य सहजं (स्वरूपप्रत्यवमर्शस्वभावं, नान्यत्) सदा......
    Ibid., Ṭikā P. 21-22

21. ज्ञानं हि तेषामात्मसमवेतमिष्टं शिवश्चात्मरूप इत्युक्तं न्यायादिभिरिति *ŚD* Ṭikā, P. 22

22. इच्छा चितेः प्रत्यगात्माश्रिता भेदमय्येव उक्ता यान्यैर्मनः संकल्परूपा,...... *Ibid.*

23. तदेवं प्रसृतो देवः कदाचिच्छक्तिमात्रके ॥
    बिभर्ति रूपमिच्छातः कदाचिज्ज्ञानशक्तितः । *ŚD* I, 29-30

in the power of action, He appears as *Īśvara.* Sometimes, by experiencing massiveness (*sthūla-vedanāt*), He manifests Himself in the forms of the pure creations called *Vidyās*, *Vidyeśvaras*, *Mantras* and *Mantreśvaras.*[24] Sometimes, He diverts Himself in the sport of hiding Himself; He assumes the form of *Māyā*[25] and of thirty-six evolved *Tattvas*, the orders of Reality (principles of creation), and takes over the nature of each of them. He thus performs the respective functions of these *Tattvas* from Śiva, the highest *tattva*, to the lowest *tattva*, the principle of solidity, the compact and solid earth, manifesting insentience (*jaḍābhāsam*).[26] In the same way, He brings forth the various bodies of creatures (*nānā-śarīrāṇi*) and the worlds (*bhuvanāni*). Thus he assumes the forms of the creatures of three orders, the high, the intermediate and the low, viz. gods, men and animals. The bodies which He assumes suit the respective places (worlds) ; similarly, the 'mental habitus' or feelings (*bhāvanāḥ*) suit the bodies. Thus, He appears in one or the other form.[27]

In His sportiveness, the Lord (*Maheśvara*) takes on the bodies abiding in the depths (gulfs) of the oceans of hell, experiencing there the painful results of their misdeeds.[28] Just as a king of the whole world, in his glory and the joyous intoxication (*prabhāvāmoda-bhāvitaḥ*) of his sovereignty, plays the part of a simple soldier, imitating his actions, similarly, the Lord, in His bliss, amuses Himself by assuming the multiple forms of the world.[29]

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24. सदाशिवत्वमुद्रेकात्कदाचिदैश्वरीं स्थितिम् ॥
... ... *ŚD* I, 30-31

25. मायायां हि भेद उल्लसितोऽत्र तु तदुल्लास एवेति ।
यदुक्तमागमे—'मायोपरि महामाया' ॥ *ŚD* Tikā P. 25, fn. 1

26. *Jaḍābhāsa* ; An objective limited insentient manifestation ordinarily called *Jaḍābhāsa*, a jar, for instance.
Ref. *ŚD* I, 32-33.

27. तथा नानाशरीराणि भुवनानि तथा तथा ।
विसृज्य रूपं गृह्णाति प्रोत्कृष्टाधममध्यमम् ॥ *ŚD* I, 34

28. क्रीडया दुःखवेद्यानि कर्मकारीणि तत्फलैः ।
संभत्स्यमानानि तथा नरकार्णवगह्वरे ॥
निवासीनि शरीराणि गृह्णाति परमेश्वरः । *ŚD* I, 36-37

29. यथा नृपः सार्वभौमः प्रभावामोदभावितः ॥
क्रीडन्करोति पादातधर्मांस्तद्धर्मधर्मतः ।
तथा प्रभुः प्रमोदात्मा क्रीडत्येवं तथा तथा ॥ *ŚD* I, 37-38

In conclusion, Somānanda summarises his doctrine as follows. Śiva whose inherent nature is pure knowledge and conscious beatitude (*bodha-mayaḥ para-nirvṛtiḥ*), performs the act of creation from His Transcendental state which first changes into a state of tension. Then the tension turns into will, knowledge and action. Subsequently, from his triple power, He materializes Himself in the form of different living beings (*bhūtāni*), assuming bodies which exhibit supreme power (*śākta-śarīrādi*), and those of other creations living in different planes and even in the hell (*nārakāntam*).[30] He manifests Himself in the forms of all things (*padārthatvena*), from that form which is pure consciousness to the earth. Thus the Lord appears in the form of everything that exists.

Sometimes ignoring His benign nature (Śivahood), he takes the form of a fettered being and is then called *Paśvātman*, the limited perceiver affected by three impurities (*malas*, viz., *Āṇava*, *Māyīya* and *Kārma*). Sometimes remaining unaffected by these impurities, He remains in His tranquil or quiescent (*śānta*) form. At other times, He appears in the form of an absolute *Īśvara* ; or yet again, in the form of the sole Lord *Śambhu*, sometimes as an ignorant being and sometimes existing without divisions (*niṣkala*). Sometimes sunk in sleep (or in the state of dissolution) and free from mortal coils, body etc. (the result of *Māyā*), He appears in the form of *Pralayākala*, viz. the creation affected by two impurities *Āṇava* and *Kārma* only. At other times, conscious of His own self, and losing his freedom (*vikalavat*), as it were, He appears in the form of *Vijñānākala*, viz. the creation unaffected by impurity called *Kārma-mala*. In this state he is similar in other respects to *Pralayākala* (*pralayākala-vāt-ca-grāhya rahitaḥ*).[31] All this creation is evolved not from any extraneous (material) cause, but is manifested solely by the benign will of the Lord, just as various objects (houses, pots etc.) are created by the mere will of Yogīs without any extrinsic means, such as substances like clay etc.[32] By virtue of the will of the Lord, various things (*bhāvāḥ*) appear just like to a person who is under the influence of love, grief, fear etc.[33] Such objects

30. *ŚD* I, 39-40.
31. *ŚD* I, 41-43.
32. योगिनामिच्छया यद्वन्नानारूपोपपत्तिता ।
    न चास्ति साधनं किंचिन्मृदादीच्छां विना प्रभोः ॥
    तथा भगवदिच्छैव तथात्वेन प्रजायते । *ŚD* I, 44-45
33. *ŚD* I, 45 ; See also Ṭikā :
    कामशोकभयादियोगाच्च ते ते भावाः पुरः स्फुरन्तो दृश्यन्ते ।

as we see in the world are not unreal or of illusive nature (*mithyā-svarūpam*), as some Vedāntins think, but are real, as in everything the essense of Śiva (Śivahood) is ever present in all its forms, such as in His transcendental state when he is formless (*nīrūpatā*) or when He is in the state of rest (*nirvṛtir*) having tension for creation, when His triple power—*Icchā*, *Jñāna* and *Kriyā*—is in operation (*śakti-tritaya-yogitā*) and when He is in the form of consciousness (*sa-cittvam*). Since Śiva manifests Himself in (the forms of) all things, the whole, in all its multiplicity, is, therefore, real. The Reality, Śiva, is thus eternal, infinite and identical with all the objects manifested in various forms.[34]

34. एवं सर्वपदार्थानां समैव शिवता स्थिता ।
एवं भेदात्मकं नित्यं शिवतत्त्वमनन्तकम् ।
तथा तस्य व्यवस्थानान्नानारूपेऽपि सत्यता ॥ *ŚD* I, 48-49

CHAPTER V

PAŚYANTĪ VĀK—THE TRANSCENDENTAL WORD

Śabda-parabrahma-vādin's doctrine; A controversy with the Grammarians; Somānanda's point of view; Scientific value of the doctrine.

The doctrine according to which the world originates from the eternal Word (*Parā-vāk* or Śabda-*Parabrahman*) is as old as the Paṇiniyan school of Grammar, which arose about the fifth century B.C. The idea originated from a discussion arising about the original eternal connection of the 'word' with its 'sense', i.e. the thing signified. Even before the Paṇiniyan school, the conception that Goddess *Vāk* is the Ultimate Creator of this universe existed in the *Ṛgveda* X, 125, as is evident from its verse 8 :

"*Aham eve vāta iva pra vāmyārabhamāṇā bhuvanāni viśvā.*"

In *Pūrva-mīmāṁsā Sūtra* I, i, 5, occurs the earliest reference to the original eternal connection of the word with the thing signified. Bādarāyaṇa, in *Brahma Sūtra* I, iii, 28 -"*śabda iti cennātaḥ prabhavāt pratyakṣanumānābhyām*", upholds the theory of the Grammarians that the world originates from the eternal Word. The doctrine is supported by the proofs (*pramāṇas*) known as *Pratyakṣa* and *Anumāna*, i.e. perception, and inference, and the textual authority from the *śruti* and the *smṛti* :—
"*katham śabda-prabhavatvam devādeḥ pratyakṣānumānābhyām śruti-smṛtibhyām.*" The following *Śruti* and *Smṛti* are quoted :—

"*eta iti vai prajāpatir devān asṛjata.*" (*Śruti*)
"*vedaśabdebhyaḥ evādau.*" (*Smṛti*)

Śaṅkarācārya, in his *Bhāṣya* (commentary) on *Brahma Sūtra* I, iii, 28, discussing the theory of the Grammarians arrives at the conclusion that 'the theory according to which the individual gods and so on originate from the eternal Word is unobjectionable.'[1] This doctrine is reviewed by Mādhavācārya in his *Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha* in which it is included as one of the systems of philosophy prevailing in southern India in the fourteenth century A.D.

It may be pointed out here that 'The Gospel according to St. John', also gives the doctrine that the world originates from God Who is co-existent with the original eternal Word : "In the beginning was the

1. Thibaut, *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya*, I, 204, 210-11.

Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God......All things were made by him ; and without him was not any thing made that was made."[2] This wonderful parallelism between the western and the eastern philosophico-religious doctrines shows that the westerners seem to have imbibed such thoughts from the eastern fount.

The Grammarian's doctrine :—The *Śabda-brahma-vādins* postulate that before manifestation all knowledge exists in *Parā Vāk*, the Transcendental Word, which manifests in its first stage as *Paśyantī* (vision). Then it develops into *Madhyamā* and finally flows out as *Vaikharī*. These are the successive stages of speech (*Vāk*) manifesting knowledge. Similar stages are also visualised by the school in the evolution of this creation or manifested universe, which is *vācātmaka*, *viz.* which forms the substance of speech and sense. The doctrine expressly states that the universe, originally existing in *Parā Vāk*—the Transcendental Word, passes from *Paśyantī* to *Madhyamā* and finally becomes manifest as *Vaikharī*.

The Śaivas' reaction to the doctrine :—The Grammarians hold that *Parā Vāk*, the Transcendental Word, is the origin of this material universe. But according to the *Śaiva* point of view, *Parā* is a distinctive name of the Ultimate Reality with the *vimarśa* aspect emphasised. It is called *Śabdana* not in its gross form in which we hear it but in the most subtle one, as the consciousness within. The Śaivas' conception of *Parā*, *Paśyantī*, *Madhyamā* and *Vaikharī* is best explained in the *Parā-trimśika Vivaraṇa*, which clearly explains the position of the Śaivas with regard to the doctrine. The words are the symbols of the physical phenomena. The four stages in the manifestation of the gross speech from *Parā* are supposed to correspond with the similar four stages in the creation of the physical world from *Vimarśa* aspect of the Ultimate Reality (*Sadāśiva Tattva*).

The Grammarian's system is enunciated by Somānanda in *Śivadṛṣṭi* II. According to it, *Paśyantī Vāk* is the Supreme Cause of this universe. It it *Parabrahman*, the absolute Reality. The Grammarians call it *Śabda-para-brahman*, the beginningless, indestructible sound denoted by letters, the *Parā* speech, since even the lord's intelligence (*cittā*) cannot be manifest without recourse to sound.[3] It is this *Paśyantī* which produces reflection (*Sā hi pratyavamarśinī*). *Paśyantī* is Ātman (Self) that pervades

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2. *New Testament*, The Gospel according to St. John. I, 1-3 (Cambridge, p. 135).
3. इत्याहुस्ते परं ब्रह्म यदनादि तथाक्षयम् ।
तदक्षरं शब्दरूपं सा पश्यन्ती परा हि वाक् ॥ *ŚD* II, 2.
वाग्रूपतां विना परब्रह्माख्यश्चित्प्रकाशोऽपि न प्रकाशेत । Commentary.

in all living beings (*sarva-deha-vyāpakatvena vartate*), the subject perceiving the object from within (*antaḥpaśyadavasthā*). It is pure formless consciousness and is not the object of perception.[4] It is omnicient (*sarvajña*) and the highest Being (*Paramātmā*). By performing deep meditation on *Paśyantī*, one attains the highest state of intuition in which he sees the boundless universe before him.[5] It is the highest object, as it dispels ignorance (*avidyā upaśamāt paramārtho'sau*). It needs no sense organs for its function, and does not depend on space and time.[6] It exists in all spaces and times, *viz.* in the form of this world order as well as in the state of its dissolution. It is formless, the supreme Reality (*brahma-tattvam*) and the highest object and end (*Parākāṣṭhā paramārthas tad eva saḥ*). With a desire to reveal objects, *Paśyantī* exists first in the form of psyche or knowledge resting in the mind. In the next stage, it is called *Madhyamā* according to the modifications of sound into *Bindu*, *Nāda* and *Marut*.[7] The same *Paśyantī* (sound) reaching the cavity of the mouth and passing through the various parts of the throat, larynx etc. is called *Vaikharī*, the expressed speech. It thus assumes the form of objects and becomes perceptible by senses.[8] With a view to establish the origin of objects from *Paśyantī*, these 'simple' grammarians say that the imperishable beginningless *Śabda-parabrahman* is transformed into objects. They say that there exists no experience of any kind that is not expressed by sound. He who is profoundly devoted to *Śabda-Parabrahman* attains the supreme *Brahman*.[9] *Paśyantī* is indivisible and transcends the order of time and space.[10] Thus, the Grammarians enunciate their doctrine.

Somānanda argues against this doctrine as follows :—In the first place the speech resorts in the gross active organ, namely the tongue. The 'simple' grammarians can neither call it *Ātman* nor *Brahman*. As it is similar to other organs, why should the organs like hand etc. be not also accepted as *Brahman* ?[11] If the Grammarian says that speech, being of

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4. स एवात्मा सर्वदेहव्यापकत्वेन वर्तते ।
   अन्तःपश्यदवस्थैव चिद्रूपत्वमरूपकम् ॥ *Ibid.*, 3.
5. *Ibid.*, 4 *a*.
6. *Ibid.*, 4 *b*.
7. आस्ते विज्ञानरूपत्वे स शब्दोऽर्थविवक्षया ।
   मध्यमा कथ्यते सैव बिन्दुनादमरुत्क्रमात् ॥ *Ibid.*, 6.
8. *Ibid.*, 7.
9. *Ibid.*, 10.
10. *Ibid.*, 11.
11. *Ibid.*, 13.

subtle form, can be accepted as Brahman, then, Somānanda contends, all the organs, hands etc. and objects like pots etc. are ultimately *Brahman*. If the Grammarian says, the speech is internal and comes from the heart etc., as such it is the absolute Reality; Somānanda replies, then the vital airs *prāṇa* etc. which occupy the heart, should also be accepted as the Reality.[12] Internal reflection is implicit, in fact, in all kinds of activities. The grammarian objects, the speech is directly related to manifestation of *Tattvas* (viz. objects) and is the prime substratum of reflection, which is a form of knowladge. The organs like feet etc. do not perform the function of reflection. It is this nature of reflection that distinguishes *Paśyantī* from the functions of other organs. On this contention of the Grammarian, Somānanda argues as follows:

Paśyantī signifies the function of seeing which is connected with the present time and is attributed to a speaker. The root '*dṛś*' (to see) is *sakarmaka*, i.e. it implies the existence of an object—whether real or unreal-as signified by '*idam*'.[13] *Paśyantī* cannot be held as real as it sees the illusive or unreal objects of the world, and thus contradicts the grammarians' doctrine according to which *Paśyantī* is real. It cannot also be accepted as unreal, then, how can it be called real? If owing to the beginningless Nescience (*avidyā*), seeing of unreal objects be attributed to it, then also it cannot be held as real. It can be but *mithyā*, i.e. unreal, or *anirvacanīyā*, i.e. indescribable as real or unreal. It is not also possible to identify real and unreal. It is, therefore, impossible to declare that *Paśyantī* is *Brahman*, if the former is to be held as unreal. If the Grammarians declare that *Paśyantī* being creator, is real in itself, but creates unreal objects, then it involves *Satkārya-vāda*, i.e. according to it the Cause (*Paśyantī*), which is not different from the effect (objects), will have to be asserted as unreal, the latter being unreal.[14]

Somānanda now questions another view-point of the Grammarians that *Paśyantī* creates objects already known before creation. It is questioned, who saw those objects, then having no form? If the Grammarians say that *Paśyantī* created objects not known before creation, it is contended that without knowing, it is not possible to create objects. Besides, the purposeless creation is meaningless, since the sport being the only motive for the Lord's creation is not accepted by the Grammarians.[15] It is further contended that neither, after having seen, it created, nor,

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12. *Ibid.*, 14.
13. *Ibid.*, 21.
14. *Ibid.*, 24-25*a* Commentary.
15. *Ibid.*, 25*b*-26*a* Commentary.

having created, it saw ; thus it cannot be called *Paśyantī*.[16] Moreover, if we accept the reality of diverse objects, then dualism will result. On the other hand, *Paśyantī* will have to be admitted as of illusive nature, but in that case, we cannot help its impurity (*malinatā*).[17] Since the Grammarians do not admit the Lord's sport as the only motive for creation, it remains to be explained how *Paśyantī* then creates objects, whether real or unreal.[18] If they say that *Paśyantī* created without knowing, then we may ask whether the absence of knowledge (i.e. insentience) is the characteristic of *Paśyantī* or of any other thing. In the former case, impurity will attach to *Paśyantī* and in the latter case, the question arises again to what other thing can insentience (*avidyā*) be attributed. In non-dualistic systems no second reality is asserted. In case insentience (*avidyā*) be admitted to be self-dependent (*svatantra*) and not an attribute of a different thing, it cannot then be averted for the reason that it has an independent existence.[19] In this case, again, question may be put, 'Who else can avert it or apply it ?', and then it cannot be independent at all. And to declare it independent in its application and dependent on another agent for getting it averted will still denote its lack of independence.[20] If the Pūrvapakṣin says that *avidyā* (insentience) is inexplicable as real or unreal, unlike a substantial thing (*vastu*), then, being insubstantial (*avastu*) in essence, another question arises, whether *Paśyantī*, with *avidyā* as its attribute, has ever been seen (*dṛṣṭā*) or not ? If it is admitted that *Paśyantī* has not been seen, then, in that case, *Paśyantī* is nullified,[21] and in case it is admitted that it has been seen, then it will also have to be admitted as an object and so an effect, i.e. a thing created (*janya*) but not a cause.[22] If, on the other hand, Pūrvapakṣin holds it indescribable as having been seen or unseen, then how did he come to know of its nature ? And, again, if its nature is admitted as unknown, how is *avidyā* (insentience) attributed to it as its characteristic ?[23]

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16. तानि दृष्ट्वानुसृजति सृष्ट्वा वानुप्रपश्यति ॥ *Ibid.*, 26b.
 पश्यन्तीत्वमेव न युक्तम् । Commentary.

17. *Ibid.*, 27.

18. पुनरपि च असत्यानर्थान् सत्यान् वा पश्यन्ती क्रीडाद्यभावेऽपि केन प्रयोजनप्रकारेण सृजतीति विमृश्यताम् । *Ibid.*, 28 Commentary, 52.

19. *Ibid.*, 29-30.

20. *Ibid.*, Commentary, 53.

21. ...तदवस्तुभूता सा पश्यन्त्या दृष्टा न वा । यदि न दृष्टा, तर्हि पश्यन्ती जाड्यमायाति सर्वदर्शनाभावादपश्यन्ती स्याद् इति । *Ibid.*, 31 Commentary.

22. *Ibid.*

23. अवाच्यत्वेन भवतां तस्या रूपं कुतो गतम् ।
 अलक्षितस्वरूपाया अविद्यात्वं कथं स्थितम् ॥ *Ibid.*, 32.

If the Pūrvapakṣin says, that it is seen not actually but inferentially with the idea of plurality (*bheda-buddhi*), then, in that case, it can be taken as seen, and not as unseen. Moreover, the Grammarians do not accept inference as perfect knowledge and the *Paśyantī* to which is attributed the power of creating objects cannot lack perfect knowledge or be deficient in that is indispensable for establishing this perceptible world. "*nahi vastu-vyavasthāpane śaktatāyām pratyakṣāt nyūnatā tasya syāt.*"[24]

The Śaiva puts forth another point, whether *Paśyantī* is accepted as real or unreal, its connection with *Madhyamā* is not possible, for, in either of the cases, it will involve the knowledge of the world of diverse nature (*vidyā*), hence its plurality, which is against the Grammarians' tenet. If its nature is accepted as *avidyā* i.e. the lack of knowledge, then, in that case, it will be *Śūnya* (viz. null and void), i.e. it is nothing but of an illusive nature, contrary to reality.[25]

The Śaiva raises another objection : *Paśyantī*, as the term signifies, is a manifestation related to sight and not to sound. If, for the purposes of discussion, it is supposed to be like an organ of a body, such as hand etc. which are not real, being mere modifications of the earth, then *Vāk*, being a modification of the air, is also not an ultimately real entity (*paramārtha*). Nor can the sound be attributed to *Paśyantī* and *Madhyamā*, as it characterises an ocean.[26]

In connection with the description of *Madhyamā*, the Grammarians state that it (*Madhyamā*) dispels ignorance (*avidyā*) concerning objects, since it comprehends them as manifested in diverse forms and hence in their unreal characteristics. Madyamā is said to be connected with *Buddhi*, an internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) as it assumes the form of objects in thought (*saṅkalpa*). It is *Paśyantī* that transforms itself into *Madhyamā*, there being no other cause, so the latter is an effect (*janya*) evolved from its cause *Paśyantī*. The Śaiva Pūrvapakṣin questions here, how is *Madhyamā*, produced from *Paśyantī*, admitted as pure being, supposed to be of a different form ? Neither can efficient cause (*Nimitta kāraṇa*) nor inherent cause (*Samavāya Kāraṇa*) be attributed to *Paśyantī* to produce *Madhyamā*. If *Paśyantī* is supposed to be the efficient cause of *Madhyamā*, then it involves dualism and if the former is assumed to be the inherent cause of the latter, then both of them have got one and the same existence, or, in other words, are identical. If identical relation be supposed to exist between *Paśyantī* and *Madhyamā*, the former will involve absence of real knowledge,

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24. *Ibid.*, 33 Commentary.
25. *Ibid.*, 34-35.
26. *Ibid.*, 36.

it being a mere illusion like *Madhyamā* which is directly related to the illusive world. Thus also *Paśyantī* lacks pure character. In case it is supposed to be pure (*Śuddha*), it cannot manifest plurality in the shape of diverse objects, but its own pure nature. *Madhyamā* too, being the product of *Paśyantī*, has got the same characteristics. So there being no difference between the two, the external world will become deaf and blind.[27] The functions of the mind together with sense organs which have the power of differentiating objects from one another will also cease to exist, serving no purpose and being contrary to their identity.[28]

Continuing the argument the Śaiva questions the Grammarian again, does *Paśyantī* exist within the body, in the form of '*aham*' (I) or outside everywhere as '*idam*' (This)? In the former case, *Paśyantī* adopts limitation, contrary to its all-pervading characteristic, and in the latter case, i.e. if it is admitted to exist externally as *idam*, it is no use to give different names to one and the same thing and thus call it *Madhyamā* and also *Vaikharī*.—"*kim madhyamā-vaikharīrūpa-vāk-prabhedena*?" One of the two terms is then superfluous.[29] Even though *Paśyantī* may be admitted as a lasting entity and being dependent upon *Prāṇa* and *Apāna*, *Bindu*, and *Nāda*, etc., it may be able to proceed to the acts of creation and destruction, though we cannot declare it all-pervading and one (*advayā*). Thus it lacks the lordliness:—"*Paśyantī anuvartamānā prāṇāpānarūpa-bindu-nāda-sāpekṣā cet sarga-saṁhārayoḥ prasaret, tarhi tathā'pi na vyāpikā nāpi advayā syāt; etad anīśvaratvam.*"[30]

The Śaiva questions again, does *Paśyantī* exist plurally in different bodies or singly in all bodies? In the former case, the plurality of *Paśyantī* and hence dualism will result; in the latter case, the same sound uttered by one person will be uttered by all, even by those who remain silent.[31] If it is supposed to become plural due to its connection with different bodies, it can appear plurally only, if it is reflected in these bodies like one coloured object reflected in differet pieces of marble or glass and appearing as so many, but in such a case reflected shapes have got

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27. अन्धमूकं जगद्बाह्यं सर्वमेव भविष्यति । *Ibid.*, 40.
28. चक्षुरादि इन्द्रियमादिः प्रवर्तको यस्यास्तस्या मनोवृत्तेः
सर्वस्याश्चक्षुरादिसहिताया भिन्नार्थविषयाया विलोपिता
अनुपयोगिता च प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धापि भविष्यति । *Ibid.*, 40 Commentary.
29. *Ibid.*, 41*b*-42*a* Commentary.
30. *Ibid.*, 42*b* Commentary.
31. *Ibid.*, 43.

no reality.[32] It is wrong to say that *Paśyantī* is, by nature, devoid of divisions (*avibhāgā tu Paśyantī sarvataḥ saṁhṛta-kramā*), since *Paśyantī* implies the act of manifesting the world consisting of diverse objects.[33] The Śaiva questions here, does *Paśyantī* see or manifest things in the diversity of its own form in connection with different times and places? It can do so only, if it is of illusive nature, since a single object appears as varied due to illusion and not in reality. Moreover, it is not possible for *Paśyantī* to be without division as its very nature implies it.[34] There is another objection : How can *Paśyantī*-experience connected with a particular time and place be one and the same for all times and places? Experience of a person at different times and places are varied. Thus *Paśyantī* whose characteristic (or function) is 'seeing' or 'manifesting' diverse objects must be of diversified nature. In such a state, common knowledge (*sādhāraṇam jñānam*) or indeterminate knowledge cannot be attributed to *Paśyantī*. In case *Paśyantī* be admitted to be undiversified in nature, then, the function of seeing or manifesting of diverse objects cannot be attributed to it. Thus the meaning of the term *Paśyantī* will have to be restricted to a specific sense.[35]

Somānanda argues further regarding the last point raised above. Is the definition of *Paśyantī* restricted to itself (*ātmani*) or to a different entity (*paratra*)? In the former case it implies gradation (*Sakramatvam*), i.e. plurality, and in the latter case it implies its connection with another object and hence dualism will result ; or it may be admitted that formerly it was diverse (*sakramā*) and it became non-diverse (*akramā*) later, in which state there arises no dualism. So we can say that *Paśyantī* implies both diversity and non-diversity (*sakramatvam* and *akramatvam*).[36]

The Grammarian objects to the last point arrived at by the Śaiva Pūrvapakṣin. He says that *Paśyantī* sees or manifests itself by itself without undergoing division, The Śaiva rejoins, *Paśyantī* cannot imply non-duality, since 'seeing' (*Paśyantī*) depends upon the organs of a body. Thus we cannot help attributing insentience also to *Paśyantī*.[37] To this point the Grammarian objects again. He says that just as we say that Devadatta killed himself by himself (committed suicide) so we can also say that *Paśyantī* sees or manifests itself by itself, i.e. in an identical relation.

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32. *Ibid.*, 44*a* Commentary.
33. *Ibid.*, 44*b*-45 Commentary.
34. *Ibid.*, 46-47*a*.
35. *Ibid.*, 48-49.
36. *Ibid.*, 50-51.
37. *Ibid.*, 52.

To this point the Śaiva replies that in the former case the actual division (*bheda-bhāva*), i.e. the plurality, is attributed to Devadatta in relation to the limbs of his body, viz. his hands etc. acting as instruments, his head as object and the self associated with his mind and limbs as subject (*Kartā*). Thus in this case the plurality is evident. Moreover, according to the Grammarians, *Paśyantī* is formless, so the simile of Devadatta killing himself by himself cannot apply in this case and therefore *Paśyantī* cannot become divided (*bhedavatī*) in relation to such like limbs.[38]

The argument continues. The Śaiva Pūrvapakṣin questions, does *Paśyantī* see *Ātman* (Self) that is unseen, or which is already seen, or which is both seen as well as unseen ? The third alternative is impossible being self-contradictory. In case of the first alternative, i.e. in case *Paśyantī* sees what is unseen, it must lack manifestation, but since it is admitted as illuminator (*prakāśa-rūpā*), it is contrary to that. In case of the second alternative, i.e. *Paśyantī* sees what is seen, seeing of a thing which is already seen is not proper, nor can we say that *Paśyantī* presents itself in ever new forms requiring to be seen every time.[39] Another objection may also be raised, does *Paśyantī* see the illuminating sentient *Ātman* or unilluminating insentient *Ātman* ? If the Grammarian says that it sees insentient *Ātman*, then, in that case, *Paśyantī* also must be insentient (*jaḍā*) in nature ; and if it is said to see sentient *Ātman*, then it, too, being sentient (*ajaḍā*), must likewise be seen by another sentient being leading to a baseless *regressus ad infinitum* (*anavasthā*) :—

> "*Paśyantaṁ sā kimātmānam paśyantī jaḍam eva vā,*
> *jaḍe jaḍatvam evāsyāḥ paśyato hyanavasthatā.*"[40]

The Grammarian, coming nearer and nearer to the correct view, says that *Paśyantī* sees or manifests somewhat subtle self of its own by assuming a different form of this phenomenal world. To this point the Śaiva replies that this view accords with the Śaiva doctrine, since the relations of *Kriyā* (Action), *Kartā* (Subject), *Karma* (Object), *Kāla* (Time) etc. all resort to self, and as such have got no independent existence.[41]

Now follows the discussion relating to the supposed identity of *Paśyantī* and *Sphoṭa*, which, according to the Grammarians, is a supersensuous entity manifested by letters of words, and is the manifestor of what is manifested. Both *Paśyantī* and *Sphoṭa* are admitted by the

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38. *Ibid.*, 53–54.
39. *Ibid.*, 55.
40. *Ibid.*, 56.
41. *Ibid.*, 57 Commentary.

Grammarians as eternal (*nitya*) and convey one and the same significance expressed by two different terms. Here the objector puts the question: Do *Paśyantī* and *Sphoṭa* imply one and the same entity or two different entities? *Sphoṭa* manifests objects in some relation with the phenomenal world and hence is of unreal nature (*asatyārthatvam*); on the other hand, the nature of *Paśyantī* is pure *Cit* (Consciousness) and it is therefore the illuminating principle. To hold *Sphoṭa* and *Paśyantī* as identical will render the latter impure and unreal (*mithyā*). In case *Sphoṭa* and *Paśyantī* are admitted as two different entities, it will involve dualism which is contrary to the monistic doctrine professed by the Grammarians. It cannot be admitted that *Sphoṭa*, being itself a real entity (*kūṭastha nitya*), conveys the sense of the objects signified by unreal words. In the case of the real *Paśyantī* also, the sense of the objects cannot be conveyed by unreal words. In the former case *Sphoṭa* must be the manifestor of unreal objects and in the latter case *Paśyantī* cannot be real Ātman, as it will also be rendered unreal by the application of unreal words.[42]

The Śaiva says *Paśyantī* cannot be established by any reasoning (*pramāṇa*) as it is stated to be imperceptible by senses, and hence it is beyond the range of perception (*pratyakṣa pramāṇa*). Inference (*anumāna*) is declared as faulty by the Grammarians and the verbal evidence of trustworthy persons (*āptavacana*) is not also admitted by them, as it is not realised by personal experience.[43] The Grammarians hold that *Paśyantī* is the object of realization by observation and Yogic *Samādhi*, for, as they declare, 'He who realizes all-illuminating *Paśyantī* himself becomes the Supreme Lord': "*Yo hi paśyati paśyantīm sa devaḥ paramo mataḥ.*"[44] This statement disqualifies *Paśyantī* as the Supreme Illuminator, since it is stated to be an object of devotion and not a subject of philosophical reasoning (*darśana*) or a metaphysical reality. If the Grammarians say that the existence of *Paśyantī* (that which manifests or illuminates) is established by its own exalted illuminating power (*pratibhā*), still it has neither any motive nor purpose to illuminate other objects but its own self. It is declared by them that *Paśyantī* should be perceived (*Paśyantīm paśya*), it thus signifies that *Paśyantī* should be perceived at some particular time but not always. From this it is evident that *Paśyantī* is not a permanent illuminating entity but transitory :—

> "*tataśca tasyā vicchinnam darśanam syāt, na sadā prakāśamānatā na caitat tatkāla-pratīkṣaṇam matam.*"[45]

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42. *Ibid.*, 58-61*a* Commentary.
43. *Ibid.*, 62 Commentary.
44. *Ibid.*, 63-64*a*.
45. *Ibid.*, 64 Commentary.

The Śaiva Pūrvapakṣin further states, since *Paśyantī* is self-illuminating, it is meaningless to say that one should percieve it; then, it is an object, like other objects, included in the phenomenal world, as such it has got an impure nature :—"*vivarta-bhūmyāliṅganāt aśuddhatāpannaḥ.*"[46] According to this view, everything else other than *Paśyantī*, i.e. the whole world comprising perceivers and objects of perception, is unreal. Everything being unreal, how is *Paśyantī* to be establisded as real, by what proof, which should be real (*tasya satyatā iṣṭā*)? If the Grammarians say that the proof offered for establishing *Paśyantī* is 'real', an objection may still be raised : then, we have to assert existence of two real entities, *Paśyantī* and the proof (*pramāṇa*). In case the proof offered is admitted to be unreal then *Paśyantī* cannot also be real.[47]

The Śaiva continues his argument against the Grammarian. The learned Bhartṛhari states in his *Śabda-dhātu-samīkṣā*, that it is impossible to attain perfect knowledge (*samyagjñānam*) by *Paśyantī*, as it is characterised by the limitations of time and place, and as such manifests only limited knowledge :—

"*dikkālādi-lakṣaṇena vyāpakatvam vihanyate,*
avaśyam vyāpako yo hi sarvadikṣu sa vartate."[48]

Thus *Paśyantī* lacks the all-pervading nature (*vyāpakatva*) which implies what is beyond the limitations of time and place, and it cannot be beyond the limitations of time and place, since its self-manifesting power (*svānubhūti*) illumines in the present time.[49]

Some logicians (Naiyāyikas) hold that the conjunction of time and place is necessary for a word, which is therefore implicit in *Sphoṭa*; for this reason a school of Grammarians maintains the doctrine that *Paśyantī*, and not *Sphoṭa*, is the so-called *Śabda-Parabrahman* the Supreme Cause, which is admitted by them as beginningless and endless (*ananta*). In support of this doctrine, they do not give any satisfactory proof. If *Paśyantī* be at all admitted as beginningless, endless, eternal (*nitya*) and all-pervading (*vyāpaka*), then we do not have any difference between the words uttered by a trustworthy person and those uttered by an untrustworthy person and there cannot be any distinction between a truth and a lie (*āptānāptabhāṣitatve viśeṣo nāsti śabdagaḥ*).[50]

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46 *Ibid.*, 66-67*a* Commentary.

47. *Ibid.*, 68-69*a*.

48. *Ibid.*, 73*a*, quoted in the commentary, *ŚD* 86.

49. *Ibid.*, 73*b*.

50. *Ibid.*, 76-77.

Somānanda continues the argument and strongly denounces the doctrine of the Grammarians. The principle of Sound, stated by them to be beginningless, endless and eternal is ultimately an object, since by coming in contact (*miśratvena*) with the organ of speech, it undergoes a limitation. This proves ignorance, on the part of the Grammarians, of the knowledge of the principal doctrines of other schools (*darśanas*). Moreover, as *Paśyantī Vāk* is admitted by them to be expressed by the *Vāk Indriya* (organ of speech), so it is an object no less than an object held in hand.[51]

Somānanda's Point of view: With regard to the above doctrine, Somānanda gives his own point of view as follows :—*Paśyantī* signifies an act of 'seeing' or 'manifesting'. One can observe in it two distinct moments or processes (*bhāgau*).[52] The first process (*bhāga*) takes place before the second, viz. the actual act of 'seeing' or 'manifestation'. The former remains unseen in the form of *Vimarśa*, i.e. the reflection before the actual action.[53] For example, a potter proceeding to make a particular pot begins first to reflect about his act. His reflection (*vimarśa*) takes the form of 'will' (*Icchā*), a subtle process going on in his mind unseen.[54] It is, so to say, a conversation of the potter's soul with itself. The 'will' (*Icchā*) arising before an actual act, say pot-making, is stated to be a subtle blooming (*Ullāsa*) of consciousness (*Citta*) that gradually turns into the functions of the powers of knowledge and action.[55]

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51. शब्दस्य विषयाख्यस्य मिश्रत्वेनेन्द्रियस्य तु ।
सर्वदर्शनविज्ञानशून्यता पदवेदिनाम् ॥
यस्मादनादिनिधनं शब्दतत्त्वं परा हि वाक् ।
पश्यन्त्या वर्ण्यमानत्वे हस्ते ग्राह्यैकता पतेत् ॥
Ibid., 81-82.

52. पश्यन्ती हि क्रिया तस्या भागौ पूर्वापरौ स्थितौ ।
Ibid., 83*a*.

53. न तद् द्रष्टव्यमित्येतद्विमर्शः पूर्वतो भवेत् ।
Ibid., 83*b*.

54. यथा कर्तुः कुलालादेर्घटः कार्य इतीदृशः ।
विमर्श इच्छारूपेण तद्वदत्रापि संस्थितम् ॥
Ibid., 84

55. सा स्थिता पूर्वतस्तस्या इच्छायाः प्रसरः कथम् ।
यावन्न सूक्ष्म उल्लासश्रितः कार्योन्मुखः स्थितः ॥
Ibid., 85.
तस्या अपि चितो निवृत्यौन्मुख्येच्छाज्ञानक्रियाक्रमव्यवस्थाया यत्सामर्थ्यमेकीभावः ··· (Commentary)

Similarly the three powers of will, knowledge and action are also indispensable for the act of creation of this world. In the Śaiva Darśana all these three powers are stated to be eternally existing in the Supreme Being called Śiva who proceeds to perform the act of creation from his first subtle power, *icchā* (will).[56] The doctrine of the Grammarians, according to which *Paśyantī* is the Supreme Cause of the universe, says Somānanda, is acceptable to us if they attribute to it the powers of will, knowledge and action in subtle forms before it is materialized in the form of the actual creation. In this case it is identical with our Śiva. *Vāk*, i.e. the sound produced by the air, cannot be asserted as *Śabda-Parabrahman*, the supreme principle of creation, for, then, the other great elements like the fire etc., and even the objects like pots etc., will have also to be accepted as Brahman like the *Śabda-Parabrahman*.[57]

Somānanda maintains that all objects are the material form (*rūpa*) of Lord Śiva, but *Vāk*, the organ of speech cannot be admitted to be His highest state (*Parā daśā*). Śiva is the supreme mover of the function (*vyāpāraḥ*) of the air in the mouth, larynx etc., which manifests itself in the form of sound (*Śabdāvirbhāvahetū rutam*). Thus both the subtle sound (*bindu*) and the loud sound (*nāda*) are in essence Śiva, but not the organ of speech (*Vāk*). It is so declared in the *pañca-tattvadīkṣāvidhi*. Hence Śiva and not *Paśyantī* (in the sense of the mere organ of speech) is the Supreme Being.[58]

The later Śaiva philosophers seem to have accepted the Grammarian's doctrine of *Paśyantī* as the Supreme Cause, of course, interpreting *Paśyantī* not in the narrow sense in which the Grammarians understand it. This doctrine has not only been a great force among the Śaiva writers but even among the well known Vedāntists like Śaṅkarācārya. They seem to be so much influenced by this doctrine that they modify their tenets in its direction. Thus, the later writers on the Pratyabhijñā System consider *Paśyantī*

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56. तस्या अपि सामरस्ये व्यवस्थावान् स्थितः शिवः ।
एवं भवप्रक्रियाया अपि सूक्ष्मतरा स्थितिः ॥
Ibid., 86.

57. स्थिता सा न पुनः सत्या वाचो वायुगमात्मनः ।
इष्यते ब्रह्मरूपत्वं घटादेरपि कथ्यताम् ॥
Ibid., 87

58. ... नादरूपादिशब्दस्यास्ति शिवात्मता ॥
तस्यापि कथिता पञ्चतत्त्वदीक्षाविधौ क्वचित् ।
न वाच इष्यते ... ॥
Ibid., 89-90.

as a great power of the Lord which materializes in the shape of the universe. It is the Supreme Lord, Śiva, who manifests Himself in the form of *Paśyantī* as is stated in the *Stava Cintāmaṇi* of Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa :

> "*sugirā citta-hāriṇyā paśyantyā dṛśyamānayā,*
> *jayatyullāsitānanda-mahimā parameśvaraḥ.*" (*Śl.* 1)

Scientific Value of the Doctrine : In the end, it will be interesting to examine the Grammarians' doctrine according to a scientific standard. It has a great value even for the moderners. The Ultimate Cause has two aspects, viz. Being and Becoming, static and dynamic states or transcendental and immanent states of the Reality, called *Śuddha* and *Māyā-śabala* in the Vedānta system and *Viśvottirṇa* and *Viśvamaya* in the Śaiva Darśana and *Para* and *Apara* in both the systems. *Śuddha Cit* (pure consciousness) comprises the Being aspect of the Supreme Cause which is endowed with the powers of will, cognition and action (*Icchā*, *Jñāna* and *Kriyā*) in their subtle states, all of which are, of course, inclusive. This state is called by the psychologists as super-conscious state and *Parā* by our ancients The Becoming aspect of the Supreme Cause exists initially in subtle form in *parā* state and passes through the next three stages, *Paśyantī* *Madhyamā* and *Vaikharī* corresponding to the similar four stages through which the sound (*Śabda*) also passes. *Paśyantī* is the thought in its potential and non-crystallized form. It is the demarcation line between what the psychologists call super-conscious and the conscious regions. In the Upaniṣads this is known as *Prajñā* (*Kaṭhavallī Upaniṣad*). In *Madhyamā* state there is complete mental form before it is expressed in terms of sound. The *Vaikharī* state comes last. It is the state of manifestation or crystallisation, the conscious state, when the expression in actual sound follows.

All these states are noticeable in the formation of objects. Take, for instance, the example of the formation of water from steam. When water is heated, the first form of the vapours is unnoticeable and so it may be called its *Parā* state corresponding to the super-conscious state. Then the vapours actually begin to appear, which are visible, This stage is the same as *Paśyantī*, the state of '*bhāsa*' or manifestation corresponding to the intermediate state between the super-conscious and conscious states. The third state is the cloud, that is, so to say, its state of *Madhyamā*, corresponding to pre-conscious state. And the final stage of it is the rain which is its *Vaikharī* state, corresponding to the actual conscious state.

The first and the last states (*purvāparau bhāgau*), the preceding and the following stages of *Paśyantī* may, in brief, be distinguished as follows :— The first is the super-conscious state, i.e. its invisible state, the real store

house of knowledge which is the infinite, eternal, indestructible and ever-lasting Being co-existent with the Supreme Cause (God). The other state of *paśyantī* is the state of consciousness, the visible form, which is projected or is thrown out forward from its invisible state through the said four stages. The creation also passes through similar four stages from its invisible state to its visible form of this world.

CHAPTER VI

THE VIEWS OF ALIEN SCHOOLS REFUTED

Controversies with Śāktas, dualistic Śaivas and other schools.

Refutation of the Śākta view : Somānanda argues against the point of view of the Śāktas as follows : The Śāktas propitiate the highest state of *Śakti* (*Śakteḥ parāvasthā*) as the Supreme Being. They hold the *Śakti–Tattva* loftier than Śiva. In reality, the former (*Śakti*) is quality (*dharma*) of *Śiva* who is self-dependent (*svatantra*) and possesser of *Śakti* (*dharmī*)[1]. Their doctrine is considered objectionable by the Śaivas. Somānanda says, if the term *Śakti* denoting a mere quality, which is in the feminine gender, implies the Ultimate Being, why should the latter be not named by the term '*Parama Śiva*' in the masculine gender ?[2] The *Śakti-Tattva* is evolved from Śiva and never exists separate from Him. Likewise Śiva also never exists separate from Śakti, i.e. His power. Śiva associated with His Śakti only is potent to create objects by His will. In the Śaiva Darśana the separation of Śakti from Śiva, the *Śaktiman* (the possessor of *Śakti*), has not been declared.[3] The Śāktas, contrary to the Śaivas' point of view, hold that Śakti is separate from Śiva and makes various objects itself quite independently. They further assume that Śakti has a certain capability (*sāmarthya*) of making objects. It may be questioned, why should we not assume another *sāmarthya* (capability) by which the former *sāmarthya* can be capable of making objects, and thus assume a series of *sāmarthyas*, one preceding the other, which would lead to a baseless *regressus ad infinitum*.[4] In case *Śakti* and *Śakta* (*Śiva*) are assumed as different entities, it is questionable whether the former or the latter creates objects,

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1. यैः शक्तेः परत्वं गीयते तैस्तया धर्मभूतया धर्मी स्वाश्रयः
   स्वतन्त्रो वास्तवाभेदयुक्त्या देवः शिवः प्रकाशितः । *ŚD*, III, 1, Commentary.
2. अनिमित्तमेवं तु विशेषात्मनि स्त्रीलिङ्गे किमित्यभिनिवेशः । *Ibid.*
3. न शिवः शक्तिरहितो न शक्तिर्व्यतिरेकिणी ॥
   शिवः शक्तस्तथा भावानिच्छया कर्तुमीहते ।
   शक्तिशक्तिमतोर्भेदः शैवे जातु न वर्ण्यते ॥ *Ibid.*, 2-3.
4. शक्तेरेव स्वतन्त्रत्वात्कर्तुं भावान् विचित्रकान् ।
   सामर्थ्यं यदि कल्प्येत तन्नामानन्त्यमेव वा ॥ *Ibid.*, 4.

there being no other entity. The correct position, according to Somānanda, is that Śakti and Śakta (or *Śaktimān*), i.e. Śiva, are not separate and independent entities. Śiva, according to Śaiva Darśana, is endowed with the power of action (*Kriyā-śakti*). He never remains devoid of this power. If we suppose Śiva and Śakti as two independent existences, they must, then, be distinguished from each other by a certain distinctive characteristic (*svabhāva*), of which there is none, but, on the other hand, we find one characteristic common to both Śakti and Śaktimān (*Śakti-garbham śaktimat-svarūpam*) that is the power of knowledge (*Jñāna-śakti*) owing to which one cannot be dissociated from the other. Cold cannot be dissociated from snow and heat from fire. The knowledge (*Jñāna*) of heat and fire, the common characteristic in both, does not allow one to exist apart from the other. Thus, fire implies the 'knowledge' of heat and the heat the 'knowledge' of fire. *Jñānam* (Knowledge) is used here in a specific sense of 'cognition'. The perceptions of heat and cold are distinct cognitions no doubt, but they depend upon some knowing agent. Hence fire and snow as agents of heat and cold do not stand in relation to insentient beings, such as stones etc., but in relation to the beings possessing sentience (knowledge), which is therefore a common characteristic in all things and their powers.[5] The highest Being should, therefore, be both *śaktimān* (possesser of power of action) and should possess *Jñānam* (Knowledge).

Refutation of dualistic Śaiva view : *Pūrvapakṣa* (Prima facie view)—The dualistic Śaivas say that the Ultimate Principle *Śiva-tattva* is *vikārī*, viz. undergoes modification and change, for it assumes numerous and diverse forms, as gold is turned into various ornaments. Being ever-changing it must be accepted as insentient (*Jaḍa*).[6] It consists of parts

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5. *ŚD* III, 6. Commentary and foot-notes, p. 100.
शक्तिः शक्तत्वं शक्तस्य धर्मः, नच धर्मो धर्मिणो भिद्यते तथा हिमवह्न्योः शीतोष्णस्पर्शौ न पृथगुपलभ्येते ।

6. स्वनिष्ठे शिवता देवे पृथिव्यादावपीदृशम् ।
पिण्डे वा कटिकायां वा किं सुवर्णत्वमिष्यते ॥ *ŚD* III, 18.
एवं सुवर्णवत् परमेश्वर एव पूर्वोक्तेच्छादिशक्तिमान् तथा तत्त्वभुवनकार्यकरणादि-प्रकारवैचित्र्येण सर्वैंपदार्थैर् इत्थंभूतलक्षणैः स्थितोऽतः शिवात्मकमेव सर्वं न तु शक्त्यात्मकम् । *ŚD* III, 18-20, Commentary.
इत्युक्तेऽत्र समाक्षेपः पक्षस्यास्य विधीयते ।
आदौ तावद्विकारित्वं शिवतत्त्वस्य जायते ॥
नानाविकाररूपेण जडतैवमवस्थिता । *ŚD* III, 21-22.

and is dependent upon others.[7] As it undergoes transformation like that of milk into curds, so it can be admitted as pure (*śuddha*) and impure (*aśuddha*) as well as *Para* (highest) and *Apara* (lowest). It is subject to diminution and destruction.[8] Moreover, some purpose or a motive must be sought for the creation of the universe from Śiva.[9] The instrumental and material causes of the universe are one and the same principle, Śiva, and the same assumes the form of the objects of the world, like earth, fire, etc., and Himself becomes the perceiver. On examination, *Śiva-Tattva* and *Paśyantī* are found identical.[10] When once a desired object is achieved, some reason must be stated for the recurrence of the same desire.[11] Admitting that all this is Śiva, the Śaiva expressions (*vākyāni*) declaring the world unreal are contradictory.[12] *Uttara-pakṣa* (Counter-criticism of the Prima Facie view) is given by Somānanda as follows : – With the desire to create the universe, the Supreme Being (*Cidātman*) changes Himself into gross and subtle forms, as milk changes into curd or as *Māyā Prakṛti* of the *Sāṅkhya* transforms itself into effects. In this way, like a Yogin, Śiva manifests Himself in the form of the world in its entirety (*sarvabhāvatvam*) and in diverse forms (*anekātmakatvam*).[13] The Lord does not undergo a modification or division into parts by creating Himself in the forms of superior, mediocre and inferior beings, like ocean by ripples and waves ; just as a Yogin does nor get himself divided into various bodies of soldiers etc. created by him, by his power of *tapas*.[14] When the water changes into waves, it is given a different name, viz. waves (vīci), though they are not different from water, which is not annihilated in that state.[15] The objector says that, in the latter state, the waves are distinct from the calm water by its disturbed state. To this objection, Somānanda says that it is all the same water, whether in the form of the calm river or in the form of the waves in the disturbed state.[16] So ultimately there exists the Supreme Reality Śiva, the *Cidātman* (the Conscious Being) ; in Him there is absolutely no insentience (*jaḍatva*) though the lower *Tattvas* like the

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7. तथा सावयवत्वं च पराधीनत्वमेव च । *Ibid.*, 22
8. क्षीरवत्परिणामित्वे... ... ... *Ibid.*, 23.
9. शिव भट्टारकस्यैव च विश्वात्मनावस्थानप्रवृत्तौ निमित्तं विचार्यं तस्य कर्माद्यविषयत्वात् । *Ibid.*, 25, Commentary.
10. *Ibid.*, 29-30.
11. *Ibid.*, 31.
12. *Ibid.*, 32.
13. *Ibid.*, 35.
14. *Ibid.*, 36-37.
15. *Ibid.*, 38.
16. *Ibid.*, 39.

earth etc. do appear insentient to us on superficial observation.[17] But, if we examine the nature of things with deep observation, we shall know that ultimately there is nothing insentient, nor is there anything divided, in essence, into parts (*avayavaḥ*).[18] As the act of creation takes place merely by Śiva's will, so the world does not need any extrinsic causes for its existence, as do insentient things like milk etc. depend upon the causes like cow etc. Thus also there is no room for attributing either perfection or imperfection to Śiva, being of imperishable nature.[19] Crest ornaments and statues made of gold are not different in substance from gold.[20] The affairs of the world are not unreal, being supposed to be the result of the illusive principle (*avidyā*), but they are real, since it is the Lord who exists in the form of the world and conducts its affairs.[21] The objection is raised that when ornaments are made of gold, the identity of the original form of the metal (lump of gold) is annihilated, so when the world evolves from Śiva (the Supreme Cause), the latter is reduced to nothing; as such the fault of non-eternity (*anityatā*) can be attributed to Śiva on the basis of *Satkāryavāda*, according to which the cause is destroyed when the effect evolves from it.[22] Somānanda says, this fault cannot be ascribed to the Supreme Cause Śiva who exists before the creation as well as when He manifests Himself in the form of the world (effects).[23] According to *Svātantrya-vāda* which Utpaladeva propounds, it is the Lord *Cidātman* (Śiva) who, like a Yogin, manifests externally all the objects of the world resting within Himself, by His free will, without any extrinsic (material) cause :

> "*cidātmaiva hi devo'ntaḥ sthitam-icchāvaśād bahiḥ,*
> *yogīva nirupādānam artha-jātam prakāśayet.*"[24]

Thus the Lord is not destroyed in any state.

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17. *Ibid.*, 40.
18. *Ibid.*, 41.
19. *Ibid.*, 42-43,
20. पतद्ग्रहादिके हेम्नि हेमत्वं मुकुटादिके ॥
    स्थितमेव न हेम्नोऽस्य काचिदस्ति विभेदिता । *Ibid.*, 44-45.
21. *Ibid.*, 48.
22. *Ibid.*, 49-50, Commentary.
    यच्च भावानां नाशित्वात्तदात्मनः शिवतत्त्वस्य नाशित्वं चोद्यत्वेन स्मृतं तत्सत्कार्यवाद-समर्थनात् निर्णेष्यते ।... ... ...
23. पुरा शान्तस्वरूपत्वं पश्चात्ताद्दगवस्थितिः ।
    शान्ते शिवत्वं स्थूलेऽपि शिवत्वं यत्रवर्णितम् ॥ *Ibid.*, 55.
24. *IPK* I, V. 7.

The Pūrvapakṣin objects again as follows :—The Lord has no motive for the subsistence of the world. If the Śaivas assume that Śiva quitted his *Śiva-svarūpa* (pure form) and adopted *Śākta-svarūpa* in the form of the world, some motive must be stated. For what purpose did he quit His pure form (*Śivatā*)? The Uttarapakṣin says, there arises no question of quitting one form and adopting the other, for His characteristics exist in both the forms. The Pūrvapakṣin asks, what is the quiescent form of the Lord (i.e. His *śāntatā*) in both the states, viz. the state of His non-differentiation and the state of His differentiation (in the form of creation)? He demands also the explanation regarding the statement that it is the inherent nature of the Lord that His *Śaktis* (powers) operate in the world. The Uttarapakṣin replies, the Lord's quiescent state (*śānta-svarūpa*) is a real thing (*vastu*), as it implies the capacity of creating the world (*bhavana-kartṛtā*) and hence the Lord's triple Śakti resort in it (*śakti-tritaya samgamaḥ*).[25] As there is no difference between the two kinds of fires, one lying inactive (at rest) in the form of red hot coals (*aṅgāra-rūpe*) and the other in action, burning in flames (*jvālādike*), there being one and the same fire in both, so one and the same Śiva resides in both the states, viz. the state of non-differentiation or quiescence (*śāntatā*) and the state of differentiation (*bhavanakartṛtā*).[26] The Pūrvapakṣin questions here, in the state of non-differentiation, the triple power of Śiva, i.e. *Kriya* (Action), *Jñāna* (Knowledge) and *Icchā* (Desire) do not exist, how should we know that Śiva exists then ? The Uttarapakṣin replies, when it is said that 'He was and existed then,' it implies His 'being' and 'existing' before creation. Moreover, *Kriyā* is the very nature of *Kartā* (*Kartṛ-svarūpa bhūtā*) and the latter is the independent spirit (*svatantraḥ, cetanaḥ*). From Him follow all actions by will. The will 'to be' and 'to exist' existed then, so the Lord cannot be said to exist without will (*Icchā*) or knowledge (*Jñāna*), and without knowing (*Jñāna*) no action (*Kriyā*), not even the action of 'being' and 'existing,' is possible. Hence without

25. *ŚD* III, 53-56, Commentary.
शान्तमपि हि तव वस्तु, वस्तु च सत्तामयं, सत्ता भवत्ता भवनकर्तृता, स्वातन्त्र्यात्मकं च कर्तृत्वं चिद्रूपस्येच्छादिशक्तिमत इति सर्वं वस्तु शिवः ।

26. अङ्गाररूपे किं वह्नौ वह्निता न क्रियात्मके ।
ज्वालादिकेऽथ सावस्था न क्रिया ज्ञानरूपिणी ॥ *ŚD* III, 57.
... ...
'शान्तेऽपि शिवत्वं स्थूलेऽपि शिवत्वं तेन नात्र निमित्तकलना' । *Ibid.*, *Fn*. 2. p. 120
अथ सक्रिये शक्तिसंभवात् शिवतास्तु शान्तता तु निष्क्रिया... ...तेन न शिवः नैवं शक्यते वक्तुं कदाचन... ... ... *ibid.*, 57-59, Commentary.

the power of will (*Icchā śakti*) nothing can be said to come into existence.[27] Thus *Śivatā* which is characterised by *Icchā-Śakti* (power of will) etc. exists equally in all objects say in a pot, in Himālaya, in the world, and so on.[28] On this point the Pūrvapakṣin objects, in the objects of various kinds there exists diversity, how can it be attributed to one Śiva, the Absolute Consciousness (*Cidrūpa*) ? The Uttarapakṣin replies, it is the nature of Śiva to appear in diverse forms and the diversity is thus inherent in Śiva. A pot is so called not because of its capacity of water being carried in it (*jalāharaṇa śakti*), but even without this idea we call it a pot. Thus neither in His quiescent state, viz. the state of His non-differentiation (*Śanta-svarūpa*), nor in the state of His differentiation or creation (*kṣubdha svarūpa* or *jagadrūpa*), can we assert inexistence of Śiva.

As regards the objections that bondage and release do not differ from each other when Śiva exists equally in everything. Somānanda explains :— the all-pervading Lord is not known by all owing to delusion (*vimohitā*) ; we are ignorant of our self-dependent Self which is no other than Śiva and hence the idea of bondage and release is the mere result of our innate ignorance. They are not, in essence, real but are mere manifestations :—

"*pratīti-mātram evātra tāvatā bandha-mokṣatā.*"[29]

When the world is viewed in the form of diversity (*bheda-bhāva*), we are under bondage and when as the manifestation of one Lord Śiva (*abheda-bhāva*), we are in the state of release.[30] Whether the world of objects be viewed differently as multiplicity or unity, the doctrine that all this is Śiva's *svarūpa* (materialized form) is not contradicted in any way.[31] The Vedas (*Upaniṣads*) declare, Somānanda says, that this diversity is unreal—

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27. स्थूलक्रियाविरहे शान्तावस्थायामपि यदि शिवः स्थितोऽभ्युपगम्यते तदस्ति स्थित इत्येषा भावस्थानादिरूपा क्रिया किं न भवति, भवत्येव। क्रिया च कर्तृस्वरूपभूता, कर्ता च स्वतन्त्रः चेतन एव, स्वेच्छातः प्रवृत्तिः स्वातन्त्र्यं यतः, यतोऽस्ति स्थित इत्यत्र बुभूषातिष्ठासालक्षणेच्छास्त्येव। ... ...तस्मात् ज्ञातव्यं यदुत नेच्छादिशक्तिरहिता काचन स्थितिः कस्यचित्। *Ibid.*
28. इच्छादिशक्तिमत्ता च शिवता, घटोऽस्ति, हिमालयोस्ति, जगदस्तीति च यथा नाधिक्यं शिवतायाः करोति... ... ... *Ibid.*
29. *ŚD* III, 70.
"अज्ञानलक्षणा सा च संसारो बन्ध उच्यते" *Ibid.*, 69, Commentary.
30. शिवाभेदप्रतीतिमात्रं मोक्षस्तदप्रीतिस्तु बन्ध इति... ... ... *Ibid.*, 70, Commentary.
31. यतो भावानां सर्वेषामेव शिवरूपत्वे स्थिते बहुत्वमेकत्वं वा। ... ... (न विरोधावहम् इति, तथात्वकथने न कोऽपिदोषः।) *Ibid.*, 71. Commentary, *Fn.* 3.

'*Neha nānāsti kiñcana*'- and that it appears due to *bhrānti* (illusion), which is wrong, according to the Śaiva point of view. To hold the real view of the diversity of objects is not contradictory to the Śaiva doctrine, but, according to the Vadānta, plurality, being due to *bhrānti*, is contrary to the real view.[32] The Śaivas hold that it is the will of Śiva to manifest Himself in diversity.[33] The aim of the Śaivas in declaring the world as manifestation of One Śiva, is to establish all-equality in the diversity and the doctrine that the essence of things is one Śiva. Though the ultimate Cause is Śiva, yet His manifoldness in the forms of the efficient cause (*Nimitta-kāraṇa*), inherent cause (*Samavāyi-kāraṇa*) and non-inherent cause (*Asamavāyi-kāraṇa*) of this world is not, in any way, inconsistent with the Śaiva doctrine of Monism (*advaita*).[34] It may be stated here that, in Śaiva Darśana, the earth etc. are not assumed (*kalpita*) as the form of Śiva. *Kalpanā* means assuming a different view of a thing in place of its real view. It is incorrect to say that the earth etc. are only assumed (*kalpita*) as Śiva, but the Śaivas hold that they are in reality Śiva.[35] Do we ever say that the lump of the precious metal in a crucible (*kaṭaka*) only is gold and the ornaments, rings etc. made of it are only assumed (*kalpita*) as gold? In these two forms of the metal we do not see any difference and call it gold without any distinction. Per chance we may assume in our imagination a red thing shown in a picture or a red Aśoka flower as fire, but we do not form such assumption (*kalpanā*) in the Śaiva doctrine and only assume the existence of Śiva in the objects like earth, and so on. Somānanda says that those who do not make any difference between an assumption (*kalpanā*) and the real form (*kḷpti*) of Śiva are, indeed, ignorant:—

kḷpti-kalpanayorbhedaṁ ye na jānanti naumi tān."[36]

Śiva Tattva, when realized, is not the same as the *Paśyantī* of Grammarians, which lacks the characteristics of the Supreme Spirit. Even the *Sadākhya* and *Īśvara Tattvas* are not equivalent to the Grammarians' *Paśyantī*, because in these two states of Śiva the perceiver

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32. वेदप्रक्रियायां हि संकोचतारतम्यकथनात् 'नेह नानास्ति किंचन' इत्यादिवाक्यैरसत्येषु भेदेषु सत्यबुद्धिर्भ्रान्तिरेवोक्ता । अयं भावः—अस्मन्मते सर्वथा शिवैकरूपत्वं प्रतिपादनीयं तच्च भावानामेकत्वमस्तु अनेकत्वं वास्तु न केनापि खण्ड्यत इति । *Ibid.*, *Fn.* 2.

33. तथा तथा शिवावस्था स्वेच्छातः स तदात्मकः । *Ibid.*, 72.

34. निमित्तसमवाय्यादिवैचित्र्यं तद्विचित्रता ।
कारणस्यैकरूपत्वे न दोषस्त्रितयात्मता ॥ *Ibid.*, 80.

35. *Ibid.*, 82-83.

36. *Ibid.*, 84-85.

(*pramātā*) perceives objects not different from his self (*ātmāvibhedena*).[37] The Pūrvapakṣin questions here : Should we, then, presume that Śiva remains inactive and insentient (*praśānta*) in the state of non-differentiation, i.e. before the beginning and after the end of creation, in which state *jñāna* and *kriyā* cease to function ? Somānanda rejoins that such suppositions cannot be made, since in the state of non-differentiation, Śiva's triple power, Will (*Icchā*), Knowledge (*Jñāna*) and Action (*Kriyā*), do not cease to exist. In fact, in the intervals between the preceding creation and the succeeding creation, i.e. when Śiva is in the state of His quiescence (*praśāntatā*), He is never devoid of the triple Śakti. This is the reason that after some desire is fulfilled, the same desire is present over again and again. Thus Śiva never remains without His powers, Will (*Icchā*) etc. When once an action is performed, there arises the desire (*Icchā*) again to perform the same act,[38] the reason being that Śiva-Śakti (representing *Jñāna* and *Kriyā*) is endless and eternal and ever active by nature (*sarat prakṛtiḥ*).[39]

Concluding, the objector again questions, how *Icchā* on the part of the Lord "Who is self-dependent" (*svatantra*) be accounted for ? The Uttarapakṣin states that the motive of the Lord's *Icchā* is His innate bliss (*ānanda*) which is the chief cause (*nimitta*) of His manifesting Himself in the form of the universe.[40] Some Śaiva expressions (*vākyāni*), emphasising the transitoriness and emptiness (*tucchatā*) of the world, are meant to create an indifferent attitude towards the worldly attachments and to lead the seekers of truth towards realization of the Ultimate Reality (*Śiva*). As the Lord is one in diverse manifestations, we have no reason to assert the plurality of one sentient principle (*nānācittvam*), for, according to the monistic Śaiva school, one Śiva (*cid-rūpa*) manifests Himself in numerous forms by *Māyā-Śakti*. This accounts for the

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37. सादाख्येश्वरदशयोरपि न पश्यन्त्या समानता, सर्वमहमित्येवमात्माविभेदेनात्मविश्रान्तानि सत्यान्येव वस्तूनि तथा पश्यति प्रमाता । *Ibid*., 86-87, Commentary.

38. यत् यस्मात् क्रियाफलसंपत्तेः समनन्तरमेष प्रसरति अपरेच्छैव सुस्फुटपरसवित्क्रियार्था, न तु तदा शून्यता । पुनरपि तत्क्रियाफलसमवाप्तौ तदनन्तरमेवान्या तथाविधेच्छैव प्रवर्तते । ... ...न कदाचन चिद्रूपस्यान्तराललक्षणं कैवल्यं शक्तिशून्यकं रूपमस्ति । *Ibid*., 88, Commentary.

39. यतोऽस्ति शिवशक्तीनां ताश्च नित्यमवस्थिताः ।
सरन्त्येव स्वभावेन तत्सरत्प्रकृतिः शिवः ।। *Ibid*., 93-94, and Commentary.

40. ईश्वरस्य स्वतन्त्रस्य केनेच्छा वा विकल्प्यते ।
विभावामोदबाहुल्यमथवोक्ता निमित्तता । *Ibid*., 94-95.

manifestation of Śiva in numerous forms, of gods, men, animals, insects and so on. Pātañjali, the founder of Yoga Darśana, and Kaṇāda, the originator of the Vaiśeṣika system, do not admit the unity of the Supreme Spirit. If we believe in their doctrines of plurality, then, even in one body there is multiplicity in the form of infinite number of atoms, but all these living atoms as well as insignificant creations, like insects, are in reality the manifestations of one Śiva.[41]

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41. एकस्मिन्नेव देहे तु विभेदात्परमाणुगात् ।
एकत्वाच्छिवरूपस्य दोषोऽयं भेदवादिनाम् । *Ibid.*, 96 and ff.

CHAPTER VII

ŚAIVA MONISM—SARVA-ŚIVATĀ

Śiva-Śakti doctrine: *Sarva-Śivatā*; *sarva-samatā* (Equality of the world phenomena): Somānanda's criticism of the theories of other schools; Goal of Śiva-realization.

Śiva-Śakti doctrine (*sarva-śivatā*): According to Somānanda's system, all this world is ultimately Śiva (*Śivātmaka*). Nothing is devoid of the power (*Śakti*) of Śiva.[1] The Pūrvapakṣin raises the following objections against the doctrine. The prima facie view :— The doctrine is incongruous as it leads to the fault of *sarva-svātantrya*, i.e. the existence of the same power (*Śakti*) in all things.[2] We find that objects possess different degrees of Śakti ; some have more and others less Śakti ; objects possessing superior Śakti rule over those having inferior Śakti. But practically all objects possess certain limited Śakti, for, otherwise, it could be as natural to obtain oil from grains of sand as from oil seeds.[3] The Śaiva Uttarapakṣin rejoins : All things are verily endowed with Śakti (*Śaktimāna*) but specific powers (*Śakti*) depend upon specific conditions. Limitation in the Śakti of things is caused by *Māyā-Śakti*. The same principle causes diversity and variety in objects. Thus oil can only be derived from oil seeds and not from grains of sand. So also different objects have different limited Śaktis. It is because of the presence of Śakti (*Śaktimattā-lakṣaṇatvāt*) that things are *sat* (existent). *Sattā* is the highest reality (*paramārtha*) which is the chief characteristic of the Supreme Spirit, Śiva.[4] The *Sattā* of insentient objects like the earth or stones, lies in

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1. अथेदानीं प्रवक्तव्यं यथा सर्वं शिवात्मकम् ।
नाशक्तो विद्यते कश्चिच्छक्तं वस्त्वेव .... ॥ *ŚD*, IV, 1.
2. तेऽपि नो । इष्यन्ते बहवः शक्ताः सर्वस्वातन्त्र्यमापतेत् । *Ibid.*, 2.
3. अथैकस्याधिका शक्तिर्न्यूनशक्तिनिबन्धिनी ।
स्वकार्यविषये सर्वः शक्त एव निबन्धनम् ॥ *Ibid.*, 2-3.
अथैकस्याधिका शक्तिर्यस्मादन्यशक्तिम् असौ निबध्नाति नियमयति, ततश्च तस्य न्यूना । ... ...नियन्नं हि शक्तस्यैव, न तु तैलदानशक्तिः सिकतासु शक्यक्रिया । तदेवं यदि सर्वशक्तित्वम् इष्यते ।... ... ... *Ibid.*, Commentary.
4. ... ...
यत्सत्तत्परमार्थो हि परमार्थस्ततः शिवः ॥ *Ibid.*, 5-6.

their manifestation (*sphūrad-rūpatā hi sattā, sphurad-rūpata ca prakāśamānatā*). In reality, nothing is insentient at all.[5] According to this view, even the illusive silver (*rajata*) and snake (*sarpa*) perceived erroneously in place of a piece of mother-of-pearl and rope respectively are also real objects (*paramārtha*), since these illusive objects also possess the Śakti of manifestation of *Cittā* (*cidvyakti* or *prakāśamānatā*). The Śaivas do not make any distinction between the absolute real (*paramārtha-satya*) and the worldly real (*vyavahāra-satya*), for, according to their doctrine, manifestation (*prakāśamānatā*) characterises *sattā* (Reality) irrespective of the distinction between real perception, as that of a real piece of mother-of-pearl (*śukti*), and imperfect perception, as that of unreal silver (*rajata*), which affects only the affairs of the practical world (*loka-vyavahāra*).[6] The following example will make it clear. The business of the world is conducted by the use of shells and coins (*kūṭa-dīnāraiḥ*) whose value is fixed by convention, and sanction of kings, without which, in reality, they have no such value.[7] Somānanda concludes the doctrine declaring that the manifold world consisting of objects of real and illusive standard possesses the characterstics of Śiva, i. e. His manifestation (*prakāśamānatā*), reality (*satya-rūpatā*) and power (*śaktimattā*). Wordly real and illusive objects do not counter the doctrine of *sarva-śivatā*. With regard to illusive objects, it is evident that one ultimate object is perceived in different forms at different moments of time. For instance, we happen to see erroneously, at any moment, a piece of precious metal (silver) which we percieve a moment later to be a piece of mother of pearl. Our conception (*vikalpa*) changes, viz. our conception of silver changes into that of a piece of mother of pearl at two different moments.

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5. जडस्य सत्तैव कथं चिद्व्यक्तिं बिना सिद्धा। स्फुरद्रूपता हि सत्ता। स्फुरद्रूपता च प्रकाशमानता।
ततश्च जडता तावन्नास्ति। *Ibid.*, Commentary.

6. मिथ्याज्ञानविकल्प्यानां सत्त्वं चिद्व्यक्तिशक्तिता।
विद्यते तत्तदत्रापि शिवत्वं केन वार्यते ॥
... ...
व्यवहाराय सत्यत्वं न च वा व्यवहारगम्। *Ibid.*, 7-9.
मिथ्याज्ञानविकल्पनीयानां रजतसर्पादीनां घटादीनामिव चिद्व्यक्तिशक्तता प्रकाशमानता ना...
विद्यते, तदेव सत्त्वं परमार्थत्वमतोऽपि तच्छिवत्वम्। अनिवार्यं च एतदिष्यत एव एषु
सत्यत्वं... ... ... *Ibid.*, Commentary.

7. तथा च देशे क्वचन राजाज्ञा जायते कथा।
व्यवहारस्तु दीनारैरेतैरव्यवहारगैः ॥
प्रवर्तते तथाभूतैरन्यत्रापि तथान्यथा। *Ibid.*, 10-11. see also Commentary.

Similarly, there arises no contradiction in the doctrine in instances like milk changing into curd, or grass eaten by a cow transforming into milk. These examples show that different manifestations occur at different times. In the former instance, the manifestation of milk is followed by that of curd just as the manifestation of a piece of silver by that of a piece of mother of pearl. In the practical view of the world (*loka-vyavahāra*), these objects (called manifestations), viz. milk and curd, a piece of silver and mother of pearl, etc. belong to different orders (grades) of reality in relation to different moments of time.[8] The ultimate view of all manifestations, says Somānanda, is *satya-rūpatā* or real manifestation of Śiva.[9] Let us take the case of poison which, it is known, does not affect the body of the bird *garuḍa*. If the characteristics of poison were real, its effects should have been unalterable in all conditions and cases, but the poison is poison only under certain specific conditions.[10] Similarly, a real thing and an illusion (*vikalpa*) differ only because of certain specific conditions ; but, *sarva-śivatā*, i.e. 'everything is, in essence. Śiva', is not so contradicted. The highest state of *sarva-śivatā* is evident in the manifold world, since it is evolved from one existent or real Cause (*sataḥ*).[11] One has to assert that, before creation, this *sattā* (certain existent principle) did exist in the form of the seed (*aṅkura-rūpam*), since from *asat* (nonexistent) *sat* (existent) cannot evolve. Prior to creation this *sat* (existent cause) must be admitted to be of the same nature as that of the effect that evolves from it (*tādṛk-śakti-rūpa-svarūpakaḥ*).[12]

Somānanda concludes the topic, saying that the Lord (*Śiva*) fashions by Himself His own self in the form of diverse objects :

> "*tasmāt sa eva bhagavān svayam eva prakalpate,*
> *tathā tathā bhāva-rūpaiḥ sann eva parameśvaraḥ.*"[13]

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8. *Ibid.*, 19-22. Commentary.
9. तथा सर्वविकल्पानां सत्यरूपत्वदर्शनात् । *Ibid*,, 27.
10. गरुडादिशरीरेषु विषभूतापहारतः । *Ibid.*
11. इतोऽपि सर्वशिवता सत उत्पत्तियोगतः । *Ibid.*, 33.
12. स एवास्ते पुरा तादृक्शक्तिरूपस्वरूपकः ।
    स एव कार्यरूपेण भगवानवकल्पते ।। *Ibid.*, 34.
    ... ...तदेव च प्रागपि सदङ्कुररूपं स्यात्, यदि सत्तासतत्त्वोऽङ्कुरः शक्तिरूपः पूर्वमास्ते पुनरङ्कुरात्मककार्यरूपेण भवति ।
    Ibid., Commentary.

13. *Ibid.*, 47.

The ultimate cause of all objects being Śiva, things are also stated to be indestructible:

> "*naivam yato hi bhāvānām vināśe 'smāsu neṣṭatā,*
> *aṁśābhivyaktitā nāśo vināśaḥ sarvalopitā.*"[14]

Somānanda does not admit destruction to mean total annihilation (*sarvalopitā*) but partial manifestation (*aṁśābhivyaktitā*). What we commanly mean by *vināśitā* (destruction) is that our senses are incapable of seeing the thing that is now changed from that form into a different form as the original lump of gold is changed into ornaments.[15] In that changed state the original thing remains hidden from us, or, in the philosophical language, our senses are incapable of perceiving it:

> "*abhivyakter vināśitve tathāpyānantyam āpatet,*
> *indriyāṇām asāmarthya-mātram atra vināśitā,*
> *asāvevānabhivyaktiḥ sa pracchannas tadā sthitah.*"[16]

According to this doctrine, though objects are stated to undergo destruction in the sense of changing from one form to another, yet the *Śiva Tattva* accompanying them in their every form is never destroyed:

> "*tasmād bhāvavināse 'pi śiva-tattvāvināśitā.*[17]

In the end of the Canto (*Āhnika*) IV of *Śivadṛṣṭi*, Somānanda says that *sarva-śivatā*, viz. 'this all is Śiva, the absolute Reality', is realized by the particular experience of 'Recognition' (*pratyabhijñānāt*) in which the 'perception' of the aspect present and the 'remembrance' of all the aspects of Śiva already perceived or experienced before (*pūrvānubhūta*) take place simultaneously (*dṛṣṭasmaraṇayor aikyam*). This is the only place where the term '*pratyabhijñā*' is used by Somānanda for the particular method of spiritual realization.[18]

Somānanda emphasizes the Śaiva monism in the following words:—

> "*tasmāj jñeyaṁ samagraikyavastu śaivaṁ vyavasthitam.*"
> "*tasmād aikyam iha spaṣṭam saṁsāre samavasthitam.*"[19]

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14. *Ibid.*, 56.

... ...भावा न विनाशिनोऽस्माभिरिष्यन्ते इति यावत् *Ibid.*, Commentary.

15. अस्मद्दर्शने हि मौलेः कटकोत्पादकाले अशस्य हेममात्रस्याभिव्यक्तिः प्राक्तनस्य मौलिपरिणामक्षणस्येति नाश उच्यते न तु सर्वांशादर्शनम् । *Ibid.*, Commentary.
16. *Ibid.*, 57-58.
17. *Ibid.*, 60.
18. *Ibid.*, 118-20.
19. *Ibid.*, 118 and 122.

Sarva-samatā (Equality of the world phenomena): In the book V of *Śivadṛṣṭi*, Somānanda demonstrates the doctrine of '*Sarva-samatā*', according to which there exists an identity in the nature of the subjective and the objective phenomena of the world. This doctrine is not entirely new. It has already been taught by Somānanda throughout his work. But, in this chapter, he explicitly teaches that all things are brought into identical relation by one principle, Śiva. It is the common thread that runs through the chain of diverse objects. It is this principle that maintains system and order among the multiplicity of things in the universe. Without it this cosmos would be in a state of chaos. The relation of unity in diversity existing in all objects because of one underlying reality (*tattvam ekakam*) cannot, therefore, be rejected :

> "*atha cet sarvabhāvānām na vinā tattvam ekakam,*
> *samanvayo 'sti tad idam katham aikyaṁ vibheditam.*"[20]

It is the Lord Śiva that is the principle of equality (*samatā*) and unity (*eka-rūpatā*) among diverse things :

> "*yathā sarveṣu bhāveṣu samatāsty eka-rūpatā.*"[21]

Though things are diverse, yet they are, in essence, one, as they possess all the characteristics of Śiva, viz. the Śaktis, *Icchā* (Will), *Jñāna* (Knowledge) and *Kriyā* (Activity), by virtue of which they are said to be all-pervading (*Vyāpakāḥ*) and ultimately formless (*amūrtāḥ*) and being capable of performing their functions :

> *icchāvantaḥ sarva eva vyāpakāś ca samastakāḥ*
> *amūrtāś ca tathā sarve sarve jñānakriyātmakaḥ*
> *prabhavaś ca tathā sarve icchāmarṣās tathākhilaḥ.*[22]

Although, in the generally known inanimate objects, *Icchā*, *Jñāna*, and *Kriyā-Śaktis* do not appear at all, yet they are not entirely lacking in them, however little they might be. Do we not find the characteristics of fire in an insignificant candle flame?

> "*ghaṭādīnāṁ samastānām icchāder alpatāsti cet,*
> *anyatra dehe sarpādau dīpādau nāgnitālpake*"[23]

Somānanda goes even to the length of saying that an object (*ghaṭa*) exists only 'as it knows its own self' :

> "*tasmād ghaṭaḥ svam ātmānam avagacchann avasthitaḥ.*"[24]

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20. *ŚD*, V, 1,
21. *Ibid.*, 2.
22. *Ibid.*, 4-5.
23. *Ibid.*, 7.
24. *Ibid.*, 34.

The *ghaṭa* performs its function, as it knows itself to be the actor (*Kartā*):

"*jānan kartāram ātmānaṁ ghaṭaḥ kuryāt svakāṁ kriyām.*"[25]

It is Śiva, knowing His self to be in the form of objects, who ultimately exists:

"*nānābhāvaiḥ svam ātmānaṁ jānann āste svayaṁ śivaḥ.*"[26]

All things are thus stated to be all-knowing (*sarvajñāḥ*) since they are pervaded by the Omniscient Self of all:

"*sarve sarvātmabhāvena sarvajñā vā vyavasthitāḥ.*"[27]

In the following memorable lines, Somānanda says that "Object *ghaṭa* knows by my Ātman that pervades in it; I know by the Ātman of object *ghaṭaḥ*; I know by the Ātman of *Sadā-śiva*; He (*Sadāśiva*) knows by my Self (*Ātman*); *Yajñadatta* (an individual) exists as *Ātman* of Śiva and Śiva exists as *Ātman* of *Yajñadatta* and so on":

"*Madātmanā ghaṭo vetti vedmy ahaṁ vā ghaṭātmanā,*
Sadāśivātmanā vedmi sa vā vetti madātmanā,
Śivātmanā yajñadatto yajñadattātmana śivaḥ."[28]

Somānanda concludes the topic stating that the identity of all subjects and objects (*sarva-samatā*), being thus established, he had proved Śiva to be all-pervading:

"*evam sarveṣu bhāveṣu sarvasāmye vyavasthite,*
tena sarva-gataṁ sarvaṁ Śiva-rūpaṁ nirūpitam."[29]

Somānanda's criticism of the theories of other schools: In the sixth book (Āhnika) of *Śivadṛṣṭi*, Somānanda criticises the rival theories expounded in numerous other systems, as we have already referred to in Chapter III of this book. Somānanda makes only a passing reference about them and does not refute them logically one by one. He mentions some of the theories which are even in conformity with the *Śaiva Darśana*; but he seems to disagree with all of them as he finds faults with everyone and shows their unsoundness: Somānanda particularly opposes the doctrines of the various schools of *Vedāntins*, such as *Brahman* is the material cause (*Upādāna-kāraṇa*) of this universe; the world is mere illusion (*bhrānti-rūpa*) and not real (*viśvam na satya-rūpatvam*); *Brahman* becomes multiple in different bodies

25. *Ibid.*, 16.
26. *Ibid.*, 109.
27. *Ibid.*, 104.
28. *Ibid.*, 105-106.
29. *Ibid.*, 110.

(*dehe deke pṛthaktve*) ; individual soul is the reflection of Brahman (*pratibimbatayā ātmānam gṛhṇāti*) ; *Brahman* remains ignorant until he obtains realization (*aprabuddhatvam paścāt brahma prabuddhyate*) and so on.[30]

Goal of Śiva-realization : In the seventh book (*āhnika*) of *Śivadṛṣṭi*, Somānanda says, whether Śiva is realized or not, there is not the cessation of His nature. Whether fire is known or not known, it will not cease to give light and heat ; if a piece of gold remains unknown, it will not change into a piece of stone :

> "*atha sthite sarva-dikke śiva-tattve'dhunocyate,*
> *tasmiñ jñāte'thavā-jñāte śivatvam-anivāritam.*"
> "*vahnir jñāto 'thavājñataḥ prakāśam janayen na kim,*
> *ajñātaṁ na suvarṇaṁ kiṁ tadā kim upalam bhavet.*"[31]

But if the nature of fire is known that it gives light, proper use of it can be made for lighting our houses :

> "*vahnir yadyapi vijñātaḥ prakāśādi karotyasau,*
> *tathāpi yojito yuktyā prakāśam adhikaṁ gṛhe.*"[32]

Similarly, knowing the value and the quality of gold, we can make proper use of it. Thus, if one knows the nature of *Śiva-ātman*, he can make proper use of his powers– *icchā*, *jñāna* and *kriyā* to achieve the highest object in his life. Somānanda says that the knower of Śiva ultimately becomes Śiva himself : '*bhavati śiva-mayātmā sarva-bhāvena sarvaḥ*'.[33] The Vedānta also declares the same end of self-realization, '*Brahma-vid brahmaiva bhavati*'. In that state of the supreme realization one becomes one with Śiva and feels that in all glooms and gleams he is but Śiva, the

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30. येऽन्ये वेदान्तविद्वांस आत्मब्रह्मैव विश्वताम् ।
यात्युपादानरूपत्वात्तथान्ये भ्रान्तिरूपताम् ॥
विश्वं न सत्यरूपत्वं तथान्ये त्वात्मवादिनः ।
... ...ये स्फुलिंगात्मवादिनः ॥
प्रतिबिम्बतया चान्ये ये वा सर्गमुखे स्वयम् ।
... ...
इत्यूचुर्येऽप्रबुद्धत्वं पश्चाद्ब्रह्म प्रबुध्यते ॥
देहे देहे पृथक्त्वे तु तया भेदो भवात्मकः ।
जलधारांशुमन्न्यायो येषां वा समवस्थितः ॥ *ŚD* VI, 8-13.
31. *ŚD*, VII, 1–2.
32. *Ibid.*, 10-11.
33. *Ibid.*, 106.

absolute bliss : '*sukhe duḥkhe vimohe ca sthito 'ham paramaḥ śivaḥ*'.[34] Having known Śiva, he does not need performing any kind of worship to please the gods, as he knows that worshipper, worship and the object of worship is none but Śiva, his own self :

> "*pūjakaḥ pūjanam pūjyam iti sarvam śivaḥ sthitaḥ.*"
> "*śivam yāmi śivo yāmi śivena śiva-śādhanaḥ.*"
> "*śivo 'smīti mano-hlādo jala-snānaṁ param matam......*"[35]

He becomes aware of the fact that he is perfectly free and not bound by fetters. The question of being bound or becoming free arises only in the case of one who is affected by impurities (*malas*) or lacks the knowledge of self :

> "*na me bandho na me mokṣas tau malatvena saṁsthitau.*"[36]

This is, in brief, the idea of Somānanda's philosophy as taught in his *Śivadṛṣṭi*.[37]

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34. *Ibid.*, 105.
35. *Ibid.*, 94, 98, 89.
36. *Ibid.*, 87.
37. Ref. *ŚD*, Chapters V, VI, VII and VIII.

CHAPTER VIII

ORIGIN AND PURPOSE OF PRATYABHIJÑĀ

The origin and meaning of the term ; The purpose of Pratyabhijñā.

The origin and meaning of the term : We find the term *Pratyabhijñā* used, for the first time, in the special philosophic sense by the Buddhists. According to them, the special feature of knowledge (*Saññā*, the Pāli form for the *Skt. Sajñā* meaning 'conceptual knowledge') is the recognising (*Paccabhiññā*, the Pāli form for *Pratyabhijñā*) by means of a sign (*abhiññānena*, the Pāli form for *abhijñānena*). According to another explanation, a recognition takes place by the inclusion of the totality of the aspects of a thing, *i.e.*, perceiving some of its aspects that serve the purpose of a sign and recalls the images of all the aspects of it cognised before.[1]

The idea of recognition, involving the two-fold function of simultaneously perceiving some of the aspects of a thing and remembering all of its aspects in their totality as cognised before, is, for the first time, conceived by Somānanda in his *Śivadṛṣṭi*, IV, 118-120, in which he uses the term *Pratyabhijñā* in a specific philosophic sense, for the realization of the Supreme Reality (Śiva) as immanent in this world consisting of multiple objects, sentient and insentient, by means of the processes of 'perception' or direct experience (*dṛṣṭa*) of one of His aspects, viz., His *Prakāśamānatā* (omnipresence), and 'remembrance' (*smaraṇa*) of His other aspects, viz., *Śarvajñatā* (omniscience), *sarvaśaktimānatā* (omnipotence) etc. as known already from scriptures.[2]

In our everyday experience, we find that an act of recognition involves simultaneous processes of perception and remembrance.[3] For

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1. Dasgupta, '*The History of Indian Philhsophy*', I, 98.
2. तस्माज्ज्ञेयं समग्रैक्यवस्तु शैवं व्यवस्थितम् ।
   तथा स्मरणयोगाच्च स्मर्यते किं तथाविधम् ।।
   यादृग्दृष्टं दृष्टता स्यादथवा ज्ञानमेव तत् ।
   दृष्टस्मरणयोरैक्ये स्थिते तदुपपद्यते ।।
   तथा सा प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्स एवायमिति स्थितिः ।... ŚD, IV 118-120.
3. The experiences of direct perception (*dṛṣṭa*) and remembrance (*smaraṇa*) are unified in the experience of 'recognition'.

instance, when we find a piece of sweetmeat, our mouth waters by merely perceiving its pleasant colour and shape, although from the perception of sight alone, we do not cognise its sweet taste as well. The remembrance of the previously experienced sweet taste accompanies the present perception of its pleasant shape and colour Thus our mouth waters at its mere sight, as we 'recognise' it by partly perceiving some of its characteristics (viz. its shape and colour) and remembering its other characteristics (taste, smell, etc.), experienced before.

We have noticed above that recognition of a thing requires the previous cognition (*anubhava*) of all of its characteristics in their totality which are only partly experienced (perceived) in the present cognition and are partly remembered. The recognition of Śiva as Supreme Reality immanent in this world and as our being or essence (Selt) likewise means that we perceive directly only one of His characteristics, His manifestation (*prakāśamānatā*) or omnipresence (*sarvavyāpakatva*) which recalls to our memory His other characteristics, the sovereignty of His will (*Sarva-svātantrya*), His powers of cognition and action (*Jñātṛtva-Śakti* and *Kartṛtva-Śakti*), etc. All these characteristics of Śiva are already cognised before (*anubhūtapūrvaḥ*) in their totality in our ever-existent Transcendental Self, but they remain partly hidden from awareness in the present cognition owing to the veiling power of the individual self and become manifest in their totality again in the particular state of realization known in the system as *Pratyabhijñā*.

Utpaladeva uses the term *Pratyabhijñā* in the sense of revealing the powers of Self, the powers of cognition and action (*Dṛkkriyātmikā-śakti*).[4] Abhinavagupta explains the term *Pratyabhijñā* as follows :

"*Tasya mahésvarasya pratyabhijñā pratīpam ātmābhimukhena jñānam prakaśaḥ pratyabhijñā.*"

Prati (*pratīpam*) is explained as backward, indirectly or in the inverted order, viz., 'that which was already known before and is now remembered'; *ābhi* (*ābhimukhena*) means 'that which is cognised now', and *jñānam* implies '*prakāśaḥ*' (light of consciousness or awareness). Thus *Pratyabhijñā* means 'Maheśvara becoming manifest now as it was ever

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स्मरणानुभवारूढा सामानाधिकरण्यधीः ।
संस्कारेन्द्रियजन्या च प्रत्यभिज्ञा प्रकीर्तिता ॥

IPV I, p. 20 fn.

4. शक्त्याविष्करणेनेयं प्रत्यभिज्ञोपदर्श्यते । *IPK* I, 3.

before'. In other words, *Pratyabhijñā* means 'cognition (*jñāna*) as facing oneself (*ābhi-mukhyena*) of what was forgotten'; *prati* (*pratīpam*) implies 'that it is not that the consciousness of the Self has never before been a fact of experience'. Thus the system holds that the means to the realization of the Ultimate Reality (*Maheśvara*) is not knowledge or cognition (*jñāna*) (of the unknown) but recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) (of the already known); i.e., it is related not to the unknown but to the known. It is the new way (*navaḥ margaḥ*) to the realization of the Ultimate Reality, Maheśvara. The Self, being ever manifest, is not unknown before (*nānānubhūta-pūrvaḥ*). His cognition is veiled by His own deluding power (*moha-vaśāt*). He becomes manifest again by revealing his higher powers of cognition and action (*dṛkkriyātmikāyā śaktyāviṣkaraṇena*).[5] *Pratyabhijñā* is the mere removal of the veil of obscuration (*mohāpasāraṇa-mātram etat*). It is the process of ascertaining the Self by experiencing the present cognition (viz., perception) and the previous cognition revived now in the form of remembrance of the same, as one recognises a particular person Caitra, when he is seen face to face (in the present perception) (*bhāsamānaḥ*) as well as is remembered as the same person who was already seen before (in the past perception) (*bhātaḥ*). We express the experience of recognition in the words: "*sa evāyam caitra iti*" (He is the same Caitra who was already seen before).[6]

Abhinavagupta gives another explanation of *Pratyabhıjñā* when he says that the Lord as possessed of infinite power (*pūrṇa-śakti-svabhāva*) is known from the Purāṇas, Siddhāntas and Āgamas as well as from reasoning, inference and so on. When we ascertain His nature (characterstics) in our own Self which is a fact of everybody's direct experience, we are said to recognise Him. This state is achieved when one verily

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5. प्रतीपम् इति—स्वात्मावभासो हि न अननुभूतपूर्वोऽविछिन्नप्रकाश-
त्वात् तस्य, स तु तच्छक्त्यैव (मायां शक्त्या स्वातन्त्र्यरूपया)
विच्छिन्न इव विकल्पित इव लक्ष्यते । *IPV* I, 20.
अथवा प्रतीपं ज्ञातस्यापि विस्मृतस्येव छादितस्येव पुनः
आभिमुख्येन, न तु स्मर्यमानतया अपि तु स्फुटत्वेन
ज्ञानं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम्.. *Ibid.*, fn. 44.

6. प्रत्यभिज्ञा च—भातभासमानरूपानुसंधानात्मिका, स एवायं
चैत्र इति प्रतिसंधानेन अभिमुखीभूते वस्तुनि ज्ञानम् । *IPV* I, p. 20.

knows that 'I am that Maheśvara, the omnipotent and omniscient Lord'.[7]

The purpose of Pratyabhijñā: The opening verse of the *Praytabhijñā Kārikā* gives the purpose of the doctrine of 'Self-recognition'. The teacher says, 'Having somehow obtained myself the Lord's gift of the highest knowledge and wishing to render service to humanity (*janasya*) (afflicted by want of various desired objects), I am establishing the doctrine of "Self-recognition" as a means of attaining all kinds of wealth (*samasta sampat*), viz., both lower and higher spiritual powers (*siddhis*) and the glories of liberated life'.[8] The Pūrvapakṣin puts a question. Self (*Ātman*) is already a fact of everybody's experience as endowed with powers of cognition and action and sovereignty of will (*svātantrya-śakti*), what is then the use of establishing the doctrine of "Self-recognition". The teacher answers, though the powers of Self are already known, yet they are only superficially experienced ; their essential nature is hidden from awareness owing to innate fogetfulness (*moha*). The purpose of Pratyabhijñā is, therefore, to reveal the profounder faculties of Self, to bring into awareness the extraordinary or higher powers of comprehension and action. Pratyabhijñā makes us aware of a profounder faculty within us which ordinarily remains hidden.[9]

Abhinavagupta brings out traditionally the four adjuncts of the Pratyabhijñā Śāstra (*anubandha-catuṣṭaya*) from the opening verse of the Kārikā. Its *Adhikārī* (a deserving student) is one who, by serving his Guru, becomes a worthy recepient of this transcendental knowledge. Its *Sambandha*—this *śāstra* is traditionally declared to have been handed down from succession of gurus (*guru-paramparā*). Its subject matter (*Viṣaya*)

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7. इहापि प्रसिद्धपुराणसिद्धान्तागमानुमानादिविदितपूर्णं-
शक्तिस्वभावे ईश्वरे सति स्वात्मन्याभिमुखीभूते तत्प्रति-
संधानेन ज्ञानम् उदेति, नूनं स एव ईश्वरोऽहम् इति ॥ *Ibid.*, 21.
8. कथंचिदासाद्य महेश्वरस्य दास्यं जनस्याप्युपकारमिच्छन् ।
समस्तसम्पत् समवाप्तिहेतुं तत्प्रत्यभिज्ञामुपपादयामि ॥ *IPK* I, i, 1.
9. कर्तरि ज्ञातरि स्वात्मन्यादिसिद्धेमहेश्वरे ।
अजडात्मा निषेधं वा सिद्धिं वा विदधीत कः । *Ibid.*, 2.
किन्तु मोहवशादस्मिन् दृष्टेऽप्यनुपलक्षिते ।
शक्त्याविष्करणेनेयं प्रत्यभिज्ञोपदर्श्यते । *Ibid.*, 3.
शक्त्याविष्करणेन—असाधारण-प्रभावाभिज्ञापनख्यापनेन । *Pvr.*

is the spiritual knowledge which leads to Self-realization or recognition. And the purpose (*Prayojana*) of this śāstra is to make one's life felicitous and to attain the highest beatitude, which is the ultimate end or the summum bonum of the system.[10] The state of perfect bliss achieved by Self-realization is emphasized by Utpaladeva in the closing verse of the *Pratyabhijñā Kārikā.* He says, as a gallant standing before a damsel is disdained like all other men, so long as he is unrecognised (to be the same person whom she loved for his qualities which she had heard about and admired), though he humbles himself before her with all manner of importunities (and she attains joy only after he is recognised); in a like manner the personal Self of mankind, though it is the universal soul, in which there is no perfection unrealized, attains its own glorious nature only when it recognises itself.[11] This state is best described by Somānanda in *Śivadṛṣṭi.* He says that when once the nature of Śiva that resides in all things has been known with tenacious 'recognition', whether by reasoning or by instruction of a spiritual teacher (*guru*), there is no further need of doing anything ; and when he knows Śiva, the highest desired object is achieved.[12]

Pratyabhijñā was considered as a new path (*navaḥ mārgaḥ*) for the achievement of spiritual goal, which does not require any kind of orthodox method such as rituals or Yogic practices. The Self-recognition was believed to be itself the means and the end, and to suffice for the attain-

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10. एवमनेन श्लोकेन अभिधेयं, प्रयोजनं, तत्प्रयोजनं, तत्प्रयोजनम् , अधिकारिनिरूपणं, गुरुपर्वक्रमः, संबन्ध-इति दर्शितम् । *IPV*, 1. p. 23.
अभिधेयमुपायम्, प्रयोजनमुपायज्ञानम्, तत्प्रयोजनं
प्रत्यभिज्ञानम् , तत्प्रयोजनं पारमैश्वर्यावाप्तिः । अधिकारी यः कश्चित्
शक्तिपातपवित्रहृदयो जनः । श्रीकण्ठनाथात् प्रभृति गुरुसंबन्धः
(गुरुपर्वक्रमः) इति । संबन्धः प्रतिपाद्यप्रतिपादकभावः । *Ibid.*, fn. 50.

11. तैस्तैरप्युपयाचितैरुपनतस्तन्व्याः स्थितोऽप्यन्तिके ।
कान्तो लोकसमान एवमपरिज्ञातो न रन्तुं यथा ।
लोकस्यैष तथानवेक्षितगुणः स्वात्मापिविश्वेश्वरो ।
नैवालं निजवैभवाय तदियं तत्प्रत्यभिज्ञोदिता ।। *IPV IV*, ii, 2.

12. एकवारं प्रमाणेन शास्त्राद्वा गुरुवाक्यतः ।
ज्ञाते शिवत्वे सर्वस्थे प्रतिपत्त्या दृढात्मना ।।
करणेन नास्ति कृत्यं क्वापि भावनयापि वा ।
सकृज्ज्ञाते सुवर्णे किं भावनाकरणादिना । *ŚD VII*, 5. 6. See *IPV* II, p. 272.

ment of perfection. The ancient Śaivaists followed the triple method of Śaiva Yoga, called *Śāmbhavopāya*, *śāktopāya* and *ānavopāya*, colllectively called *Trika* system. The proper exposition of these three methods is given by Abhinavagupta in his *Tantrāloka*, III, IV and V.[13] We understand that the followers of these three mystic practices (*upāyas*) did actually attain the position of *bhairavas* possessing higher powers than those of ordinary human beings. *Pratyabhijñā* was, later on, treated as another path called *Anupāya-mārga*, i.e. one which needs no performance of any kind, as it prescribes intuitive knowledge alone necessary for spiritual life, without recourse to any of the orthodox methods like the former three *Upāyas*.[14] The *Pratyabhijñā* or *Anupāya-mārga* is said to lead to the same goal, being an easy path (*sugaṭaḥ mārgaḥ*), revealing in oneself the 'divine *śakti*' by which one attains supernatural powers and miraculous achievements (*siddhis*).[15] The system of *Anupāya* is also best described by Abhinavagupta in his *Tantrāloka*, Book II, and *Paramarthasāra*.

The Śaivas believe that it is delusion (*Moha*) that hides the real nature of the Self, i.e. its infinite powers of knowledge and action, which are manifested by the process of recognition. Abhinavagupta says that though the Self is not unrealized before (*nānānubhūtapurvaḥ*), yet the cognitive experience of *Śivatā*, viz., that all this cosmos is the manifestation of Śiva, one's own Self (*Svātmāvabhāsaḥ*), is veiled from perception or is concealed (*vicchinnaḥ*) by his own deluding power (*māyāśaktyā svātantrya-rūpayā*) or that it is conceived under limitation (*mitatayā*

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13. अभेदोपायमत्रोक्तं शाम्भवं शाक्तमुच्यते ।
भेदाभेदात्मकोपायं भेदोपायं तदानवम् ॥ see *Tantrāloka* I, 168-170
उच्चारकरणध्यानवर्णस्थानप्रकल्पनैः,
यो भवेत् स समावेशः सम्यगानव उच्यते ॥
उच्चाररहितं वस्तु चेतसैव विचिन्तयन् ।
यं समावेशमाप्नोति शाक्तः सोऽत्राभिधीयते ॥
अकिंचिच्चिन्तकस्यैव गुरुणा प्रतिबोधतः ।
जायते यः समावेशः शाम्भवोऽसावुदाहृतः ।
Mālinī-vijayottara-tantra II, 21-23.

14. ततोपि परमं ज्ञानं उपायादि विवर्जितम् ।
आनन्दशक्तिविश्रान्तं अनुत्तरमिहोच्यते ॥ *Tantrātoka* I.

15. इति प्रकटितो मया सुघट एष मार्गो नवो ... *IPK* IV, 1.
जनस्यायत्नसिद्धयर्थम् उदयाकरसूनना ।
ईश्वरप्रत्यभिज्ञेयमुत्पलेनोपपादिता । *Ibid.*, 3.

vikalpitaḥ) by *Māyā-śakti* (the power of limitation) of Śiva which is, however, dispelled by His discerning power (*Dṛkkriyātmikā-Śakti*).[16]

Thus, from the various explanations of the term given above, it is evident that the doctrine of Pratyabhijñā leads a person to recognise the identity in nature of the individual soul (Self) and the Supreme Being (Reality) which is immanent in the cosmos. The Upaniṣads also teach the same idea that this animate and inanimate world is the concrete form of the Supreme Being (*Brahman*), as in *Īsāvāsyopaniṣat*, we read, '*Īśāvāsyam idam sarvam yat kiñ ca jāgatyañ jagat*' (Whatever is moving in this world is pervaded by the Lord), and in *Kenopaniṣat*, Brahman is described as '*Śrotrasya Śrotram manaso mano yat....*' (He is the power of hearing in the ears, the power of thought in the mind, the power of speech in the vocal organ, the power of vital airs in the body, the power of seeing in the eyes, etc.). In the *Ṛgveda* also we learn '*sahasra śirṣā puruṣaḥ*' etc. ('This all is Puruṣa, the Primal Being, immanent in infinite number of beings,' etc.). There are numerous expressions in the Vedas and Upaniṣads which declare the knowledge of the Lord's immanence in the world as the highest knowledge (*jñānam*). The conception of the world as a concrete form of Brahman (Reality) was, later on, changed and it was declared as illusive and dream-like (*mithyā*) by Śaṅkarācārya. According to him, *Māyā*, which originally denotes the wonderous power of the Lord by which He creates this world of diverse nature and which accounts for its indescribable character, stood for the principle of Nescience or superimposition (*adhyāsa*), the removal of which constitutes the highest knowledge. According to the well known example (oft-quoted in the Śaṅkara's system of Vedānta) that the illusive snake vanishes when the real rope is perceived, the world illusion (*bhrānti* or *Māyā*) vanishes when the Nescience (*ajñāna*) is dispelled. We, however, never actually reach that stage of negation of the universe. The object and purpose of the Pratyabhijñā system is to recognise the supernatural powers of Self in this world while it continues to exist as manifestation of real Brahman (Maheśvara), when delusion (*moha*) is dispelled. In this state of realization we are said to manifest higher powers of knowledge and action. Utpaladeva says not only that one Supreme Being is the Self of

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16. स तु तच्छक्त्यैव विच्छिन्न इव विकल्पित इव लक्ष्यते । *IPV* I, 20.
तच्छक्त्यैव मायाशक्त्या स्वातन्त्र्यरूपया, ममायं स्वात्मावभास-
इति मिततया विकल्पित इव ... स्फुरति ।। *Ibid.*, fn. 45.

all living beings, but this world also is one's own creation.[17] Thus, fully knowing one's Self and its highest potential powers of Cognition and Action, one thinks and acts aright and accomplishes all his desired objects in life.[18]

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17. स्वात्मैव सर्वजन्तूनामेक एव महेश्वरः ।
... सर्वो ममायं विभव इत्येवं परिजानतः । *IPK* IV, I, 12.

18. एवमात्मानमेतस्य सम्यग्ज्ञानक्रिये तथा,
जानन्यथेप्सितान्पश्यञ्जानाति च करोति च ॥ *Ibid.*, 15.

CHAPTER IX

MAHEŚVARA (THE ULTIMATE REALITY) AND HIS POWERS

Maheśvara ; Powers of *Maheśvara* ; The three forms of *Jñātṛtva-Śakti* ; *Māyā-vimohinī-Śakti* and *Dṛkkriyātmikā-Śakti* ; *Kartṛtva-Śakti* ; its different forms ; Cognitive and Active powers in relation to insentients.

Maheśvara : The Ultimate Reality, in the system, is named Maheśvara, the great Lord, in the masculine gender. He is variously called *Parama Śiva*, *Ātman*, *Caitanya*, *Anuttara*, etc. Abhinavagupta describes Him as One Absolute Being (*Pūrṇa*), unity of *Śiva* and *Śakti* (the Lord and His power), who, in His transcendental state, called Anuttara, is free from the idea of subject 'I' (*aham*) and the object 'this' (*idam*), viz., spirit and matter undifferentiated, who, by the sovereignty of His will, manifests Himself first as pure ego 'I' and then, dividing Himself in the form of thirty-six tattvas (principles of creation), appears in the form of this cosmos, that is His immanent state. Thus He assumes two states, one in which he remains self-contained without any manifestation and the other in which he makes creation through the play of his powers.[1] In His transcendental state, He is purely subjective. In that pure state no objectivity can be attributed to Him. He is self-conscious (*ajaḍātmā*) and beyond Him there is no other knower. He is the intelligent cause of the world, contrary to the Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya view that the Supreme Cause is non-intelligent. Neither the *Jaḍātmavādins*, like Vaiśeṣika and *Sāṅkhya*, according to whom Self is really insentient, can prove or disprove its existence, nor the *Ajaḍātmavādins*, according to whom the Self is sentient, because it is a fact of everybody's experience and hence is eternal and self-shining.[2] He is the illuminator of insentient objects and

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1. निराशंसात्पूर्णादहमिति पुरा भासयति यद्-
   द्विशाखामाशास्ते तदनु च विभङ्क्तुं निजकलाम् ।
   स्वरूपादुन्मेषप्रसरणनिमेषस्थितिजुषस्-
   तदद्वैतं वन्दे परमशिवशक्त्यात्म निखिलम् ॥ *IPV* I. p. 1.
2. अजडात्मा निषेधं वा सिद्धिं वा विदधीत कः । *IPK*, I, 2.
   यस्य तु वैशेषिकादेर्जड आत्मा स सिद्धिं करोतु ईश्वरविषयाम् ; अन्यस्तु सांख्यादिर्निषेधं ; सांख्योऽपि विषयावभासनरूपं ज्ञानं बुद्धिधर्ममिच्छन् आत्मानं वस्तुतो जडमेव उपैति ; न च

the insentient states of sentient beings.[3] Without being interrupted even in deed sleep (*suṣupti*), Self is luminous in that state.[4] He is the spectator of the *suṣupti* state 'wherein one sees nothing, hears nothing and understands nothing that is *Bhūmā*, the Absolute', that is the chief state of His conscious beatitude and bliss (*mukhyam ānanda-mayaṁ rūpam*).[5] Since it shines even to one in deep sleep, so he remembers that he saw nothing, heard nothing and thought nothing in that state.

Powers of Maheśvara: *Kartṛtva-Śakti* (the power of Action) and *Jñātṛtva-Śakti* (the power of Cognition) are the two powers of Maheśvara, since He is stated to be self-active and cognitive.[6] *Kartṛtva Śakti* has been given the first place in the text, since it represents the Lord's creative power in the wider sense, which includes His absolute 'Freedom' (*Svātantrya-Śakti*). *Jñātṛtva-Śakti* is another aspect of the same. Maheśvara is self-dependent or free (*svatantra*) in His actions and by His self-dependent power (*Svātantrya-Śakti*) He assumes plurality from His state of unity and from plurality resumes the state of unity.[7] Action is, in reality, an offshoot of knowledge. So *Kartā* and *Jñata* (in the text) or in the reverse order *Jñata* and *Karta* mean the same thing as 'the One who is omnipotent and omniscient and is perfectly free in all actions'. Freedom constitutes the essential nature of the consciouness (*saṁvid*).[8] *Jñātṛtva* and *Kartṛtva* being the primary powers of the ultimate, all other powers are subordinate to them. *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣat* also mentions *Jñāna* and *Kriyā* as the two powers of the Lord (the Supreme Being).[9] A person is

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जडात्मा स्वात्मन्यपि...किंचित् साधयितुं निषेद्धुं वा प्रभविष्णुः पाषाण इव ; न च अजडात्मनोऽपि एतत् उचितं ।......प्रकाश एव च आत्मा । *IVP* I, p. 34.

अजडात्मा — अजडात्मवादी (जडात्मवादिनः, वैशेषिकादेः सांख्यबौद्धादेर्जडः आत्मा, तान् विहाय) । See *Bhāskari* I, p. 55.

3. मदात्मना घटो वेत्ति वेद्म्यहं वा घटात्मना । *ŚD V*, 105.

4. विच्छेदशून्यः, सुषुप्तमपि प्रति प्रकाशत एव । *IVP* I, p. 31.

5. तदेव अस्य पारमेश्वर्यं मुख्यमानन्दमयं रूपम्; [यत्र नान्यत् पश्यति नान्यत् शृणोति नान्यद्विजानाति स भूमा (*Chāndogya Up.* 7,24.)] *Ibid.*

6. कर्तरि ज्ञातरि स्वात्मन्यादिसिद्धे महेश्वरे । *IPK* I, i, 2.

7. स चायं स्वतन्त्रः, स्वातन्त्र्यं च अस्य अभेदे भेदनं, भेदिते च अन्तरानुसंधानेन अभेदनम्—इति । *IPV* I, p. 31.

8. तेन सर्वक्रियास्वतन्त्रे सर्वशक्तिके—इति यावद् उक्तं, भवेत् तावदेव 'कर्तरि ज्ञातरि' इति । इयमेव च संवित्स्वभावता । *Ibid.*, p. 32.

9. परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते, स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च ।

Śvetāśvatara Up. 6,8.

said to be *Īśa* or *Īśvara*, the lord possessed of *Jñātṛtva* and *Kartṛtva śaktis* in a limited degree, just like a ruler, because of his having control over only a part of the world.[10] Maheśvara is endowed with numerous powers all of which are denoted by one technical term, the Lord's *Svātantrya śakti*—'Transcendental power' or 'Self-dependent power'. By virtue of this power, the Lord is independent and self-sufficient in all His actions (*sarva-kriyā-svatantraḥ*).

The three forms of Jñātṛtva-Śakti : *Jñātṛtva-Śakti* (Cognitive power) of Maheśvara (Self) assumes three distinct forms, viz, *Smaraṇa-Śakti* (Power of Remembrance), *Jñāna-Śakti* (Power of Knowledge) and *Apohana-Śakti* (Power of Differentiation).[11] *Bhagavad-Gīta* also mentions the powers of Remembrance, Knowledge and Differentiation as belonging to the Self.[12] The power of Remembrance (*Smaraṇa-śakti*) is that power by virtue of which *Ātman*, who experiences the perception of an object in one state, remembers the same in another state. In the latter state the Self is rememberer (*smartā*). In the absence of remembrance also the Self still exists possessing the power of Remembrance as one of his powers. The power of Knowledge (*Jñāna-Śakti*) functions in making objects manifest externally in the form of their perceptions which, in their real nature, exist within the Self, from which they are projected outward in a concrete form. By virtue of this power the Self takes out for separate manifestation only certain things from the unlimited mass which lies merged in it (*kañcid eva arthaṁ svarūpād unmagnam ābhāsayati*). The real nature of objects, according to the system, is *Prakāśaḥ* (manifestion) (*prakāśa eva arthānāṁ svarūpam*) which is innate to *Jñāna-śakti*. The power of Differentiation (*Apohana-śakti*) is that power of the Self which enables Him to manifest one object, say a jar (*ghaṭa*), as different from any other object, non-jar (*aghaṭa*).[13] All human transactions are carried on by the Self with his powers of Knowledge, Remembrance and Differentiation.[14]

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10. तदयं प्रमाता ज्ञानक्रियाशक्तियोगाद् ईश्वरः...यो यावति ज्ञाता कर्ता च स तावति ईश्वरो राजेव, अनीश्वरस्य ज्ञातृत्वकर्तृत्वे स्वभावविरुद्धे यतः, आत्मा च विश्वत्र ज्ञाता कर्ता च-इति *IPV* I, p. 43-44.

11. ...एकश्चिद्वपुर्ज्ञानस्मृत्यपोहनशक्तिमान् । *IPK* I, iii, 7.

12. मत्तः स्मृतिर्ज्ञानमपोहनं च । *Bh. G*, 15, 15.

13. *IVP* I, iii, pp. 107-110.

14. अनेन शक्तित्रयेण विश्वे व्यवहाराः । *IPV* I, iii, p. 110

Māyā-vimohinī Śakti and Dṛk-kriyātmikā-Śakti : *Māyā-vimohini-śakti*[15] is the deluding or obscuring power of the Lord. It causes diverse manifestations. Abhinavagupta states seven different varieties of manifestations. *Jaḍābhāsa* (the earth) is the first, *Parama Śiva* the last and the manifestations of different kinds of Jīvas are the intermediate varieties.[16] *Dṛk-kriyātmikā Śakti* is the discerning power of the Lord. It removes the veil of delusion (*kevalam moha-mātram apasārayati*).[17] The deluding power functions in hiding the real nature of the Lord and His discerning power in revealing it. The fact is that the real characteristics of the Self, viz. its profounder faculties or deeper powers of Cognition and Action are imperceptible due to its *Vimohinī-Śakti*, which become perceptible when *Dṛk-kriyātmikā-Śakti* comes into operation. According to Śaṅkara's school of Vedānta, *Māyā* is not a power (*śakti*) of the Lord (*Brahman*) but it is a false attribution, a fictitious apperception or illusion based on ignorance (*avidyā*). *Māyā* is said to vanish when the knowledge (*vidyā* or *Jñāna*) of real Brahman is achieved. The world being the result of this fictitious principle should vanish by the knowledge of real Brahman, but it continues to exist in the same form as before. *Māyā*, according to the Śaivas, is a real power of *Maheśvara* (*Brahman*), by which the Lord manifests (or creates) the world in the concrete form comprising limited manifestations. The discerning power of the Lord does not cause the world to disappear, but is an aid to perceiving in it the very nature of the Lord. All the affairs of the world are accomplished by the *Māyā-Śakti* of the Lord.

Kartṛtva-Śakti, its different forms : *Kartṛtva-Śakti* (the power of action) assigned to the Ultimate Reality as one of its powers denotes only an impulse or tendency or capacity. It implies pure action which is not an object of determinate knowledge and, therefore, objective and created ; otherwise it cannot be an attribute of the Ultimate Reality. In

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15. *Māyā-Śakti* is conceived both as the power of obscuration, in which aspect it is referred to as *Moha*, and as the primary cause of all the limited manifestations, in which aspect it is called in Tantras as *Parāniśā*. (*Abhinavagupta*, by Pandey, p. 245).

मोहयति अनेन शक्तिविशेषेण इति वा मोहो मायाशक्तिः । *IVP* I, p. 35, fn. 67.

आद्यो भेदाभासो यो विभागमनुपेयिवान् , गर्भीकृतानन्तभाविविभासा सा परानिशा ।

Tantrāloka VI, 116.

16. तदमी सप्त-प्रकाराः, तत्र प्रथमः प्रकारो जडोल्लासः,
अन्त्यः परमशिवात्मा, मध्यमा जीवाभासाः,
सैव भगवतो माया विमोहिनी नाम शक्तिः । *IPV* I, p, 37.

17. न कारकव्यापारो भगवति, नापि ज्ञापकव्यापारोऽयम्, अपितु मोहापसारणमात्रमेतत् ।
Ibid., p. 38

the Transcendental state of Maheśvara, His *Kartṛtva-Śakti* remains above the state of objectivity. The same is called *Kriyā-Śakti* when it comes down to the state of objectivity. In that state *Kartṛtva-Śakti* assumes in itself the three universal laws of Division (*bhedābheda*), Perception (*māna tat phala meya*) and Causation (*kārya kāraṇa*) and functions in the relations of plurality and unity, the relations of subject (perceiver) and object (perceived) and the relations of cause and effect, corresponding to these three laws. *Kāla-Śakti* (the power of time) is subordinate to the *Kriyā-Śakti* (power of action) and is indispensable for the actual division of unity into plurality. It is the foundation of this diverse universe. By the operation of the three laws of Division, Perception and Causation, the Lord's *Kartṛtva-Śakti* finally becomes *Nirmāṇa-Śakti* (the constituent power) that divides into thirty-six principles of creation (*tattvas*) constituting the whole universe. Thus, the whole creation is the result of *Kriyā-Śakti*.[18]

An elaborate exposition of all these powers comprises the first two parts, *Jñānādhikāra* and *Kriyādhikāra* of *Pratyabhijñā Kārikā*.

Cognitive and Active powers in relation to insentients: The Pratyabhijñā school upholds the doctrine that Maheśvara (the Ultimate Reality) is the Self of all (*sarvasya svātmā maheśvaraḥ*). As far as sentient beings are concerned, this doctrine needs no proof for, says the teacher, 'which sensible person can prove or disprove the existence of Maheśvara when He is ever manifest in one's own Self as active and cognitive being (*Kartā* and *Jñātā*).[19] The Self is, in essence, infinite light or knowledge (*anavacchinna prakāśaḥ*) which is a fact of everybody's experience, the question is how insentients also possess the essential nature of the sentient beings. In Pratyabhijñā, Pūrvapakṣin questions, in this world comprising multiple objects of experience, sentient and insentient, it is only sentients who possess powers of knowledge and action; insentients do not either possess the power of knowledge, or the power of action. How is it then possible to establish that Maheśvara is the Self of all? The teacher says, the existence of insentient objects depends entirely upon sentient beings who are endowed with the powers of knowledge and action. These two powers are the very life (*jīvanam*) of the sentient beings (*jīvatām*). The life of the insentients is not apart from the sentients. Hence knowledge and action are the life or essence of both sentients and insentients.[20] The commentator (Abhinavagupta)

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18. *IPK* II, i-iv.
19. *IPK* I, i, 1.
20. तथाहि जडभूतानां प्रतिष्ठा जीवदाश्रया ।
ज्ञानं क्रिया च भूतानां जीवतां जीवनं मतम् ॥ *IPK* I, i, 4.

says that insentient objects are also essentially of the nature of sentience (consciousness), yet they are reduced to the state of insentiency by the power of the Lord, called *Māyā-Śakti*. They, therefore, have their being only as related to and dependent upon sentient subject. Hence, insentient objects do not have an independent existence.[21] On the other hand, the subject is characterised by life which consists of the act of living in the form of knowing and doing, for he is said to be living who knows and acts (*yo hi jānāti ca karoti ca sa jīvati*). Therefore, the individual subject is to be looked upon as Lord (Maheśvara) because he possesses the powers of Knowledge and Action. The Lordliness (*Māheśvarya*) is essentially the possession of these two powers in respect of all objects.[22] Pūrvapakṣin questions on this point, how do you establish the existence of powers of Knowledge and Action in an individual subject due to which he can be said to possess Lordliness (*Māheśvarya*)? The teacher states, out of these two powers, the power of Knowledge is self-established, and the power of Action is also self-established, as it is perceptible to other perceivers when it is associated with a particular body. From that (action) the presence of the power of knowledge in others is also inferred (guessed).[23] From this fact, it is proved that knowledge and action are interdependent and none of them has an independent and exclusive existence. Even a body is nothing but the concretised form of *Kriyā-Śakti*.

Abhinavagupta says that insentient objects stand as *prameya* (object) in relation to *Pramātā* (Subject), the perceivers. So he declares unhesitatingly, 'insentient objects are not separate from sentient beings' (*tato jaḍā nāma na pṛthak santi*). Insentient is nothing independent of the light of consciousness (*na ca bhārūpānupāhitam jaḍam nāma kiñcit*). Ātman, sentient self, only is endowed with life which comprises the powers of

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21. तेषां 'जडभूतानां' चिन्मयत्वेऽपि मायाख्यया ईश्वरशक्त्या जाड्यं प्रापितानां 'जीवन्तं' प्रमातारमाश्रित्य 'प्रतिष्ठा' तत्प्रमात्राभिमुख्येन अवस्थानं, ततो जडा नाम न पृथक् सन्ति ॥ *IPV* I, p. 41-42

22. इच्छा-ज्ञान-क्रियापूर्वा यस्मात्सर्वाः प्रवृत्तयः ।
सर्वेऽपि जन्तवस्तस्मादीश्वरा इति निश्चिताः ॥ *Ibid* . 43, fn. 79.

23. तत्र ज्ञानं स्वतः सिद्धं क्रिया कायाश्रिता सती ।
परैरप्युपलक्ष्येत तयान्यज्ञानमूह्यते ॥ *IPK* I. i, 5.

'तत्र'-तयोर्ज्ञानक्रिययोर्मध्ये,...स्वात्मनि ज्ञानं स्वप्रकाशं, क्रियाप्यान्तरी संवेदनादव्यतिरिक्ता विमर्शरूपा स्वप्रकाशा, सैव शरीरपर्यन्तीभूता बाह्यदर्शनस्पर्शनादिगम्या, परप्रमातरि तु कायपर्यन्तीभूता व्यापारव्याहाररूपा दर्शनादिप्रमाणगम्या । *IPV* I, p. 45, fn. 81.

knowing and acting (*yo hi jānāti ca karoti sa jīvati*). He is the subject the essential nature of which is knowing (*Jñāna*) and illuminating (*Prakāśa*). Without the light of the subject the whole world becomes dead and dark (*tad aprakāśe hi viśvam andha-tamasam syāt*). The universe will be in a state of chaos if the conscious Self, the illuminating principle, is eliminated from it. All knowledge is based on self-luminous self-consciousness (*prakāśa aham-parāmarśa-parinişṭhitam eva idam jñānam*). In an experience of cognition, there is a tension or stir (*saṁrambha* or *spanda*) that changes ego (*aham*), subject, into non-ego, object, (*tatra jānāmi ityantaḥ saṁrambha-yogo-'pi bhāti*). This *saṁrambha* is also technically called "*Vimarśa*". It is the same as power of action (*sa ca saṁrambho vimarśaḥ kriyā-śaktir-ucyate*). Like power of Knowledge (*Jñāna-Śakti*), internal power of Action (*āntarīya-kriyā-śakti*) is also self-luminous and self-existent (*āntarīya kriyā śaktir jñāna-vadeva svataḥ siddhā svaprakāsā*). Hence the subject, in which *Jñāna-Śakti* predominates and the object, wherein predominates *Kriyā-Śakti*, both possess the essential nature of Self, i.e., self-luminousness and self-existence.

Śaṅkarācārya's view with regard to the existence of object is quite contrary to that of the Pratyabhijñā system. According to his system the only reality is subject and the existence of object is fictitious. This view supposes subject and object to be opposed to each other as are darkness and light. The appearance of object is explained as superimposition (*adhyāsa*) which is defined as 'the apparent presentation, in the form of remembrance, to consciousness of something previously observed, in some other thing' (*smṛti-rūpaḥ paratra pūrva-dṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ*). The problem of the existence of object (non-ego) in the system is thus disposed of by holding the view that it is the apparent illusion caused by *Avidyā* (Nescience) in place of the only reality, the Self, Subject, or Ego. The Pratyabhijñā school upholds the doctrine of the Vedāntins that Maheśvara (Brahman) is the Self of all, but rejects their unrealistic view of the world. For the Vedāntins who hold the world as dreamlike and illusive, it is easy to say that the Self of all animate and inanimate beings is Brahman, since That is the only reality, the substratum of this illusive world. The approach of Pratyabhijñā philosophers to the problem of the existence of object (non-ego) is realistic. In their view the world with all animate and inanimate objects is real. Insentience is ascribed to the sentient Self (*aham*) when it extends or concretises itself into the form of objects by its own power of *Vimarśa* or *Kriyā–Śakti*. The Self comes down to the state of objectivity (*idantā*) when it ignores (i.e. discards) its own pure nature and adopts limiting conditions by *Māyā-vimohinī-śakti* (*idantā hi ajñānatvam*).

The Pratyabhijñā philosophers are of the view that, in reality, there is one perceiver who is self-existent.[24] From Him the whole creation beginning from *Sadā-śiva* upto an insignificant insect imbibes the powers of knowledge and action.[25] In this connection Bhāskarācārya, the commentator of Abhinavagupta's work (*IPV*), states that everything is ultimately Self whose nature is consciousness. He argues, not only that there is consciousness in trees, but also that when water finds its own level, it is also conscious activity.[26] The substance of this argument is that diverse objects are the various forms of one *Ātman* corresponding to the view expressed by Somānanda : 'The jar knows by my *Ātman* (Self). I also know by the *Ātman* of the jar. I know by the *Ātman* of *Sadā-śiva*. He also knows by my *Ātman*. Śiva alone exists knowing Himself through the multiplicity of objects." etc.[27] Utpaladeva, like his *guru* (teacher) Somānanda,[28] emphasises the doctrine of Monism when he says that the essential characteristics of One Ultimate Being—His *Jñāna-Śakti* and *Kriyā-Śakti*—pervade throughout this universe comprising animate and inanimate objects.

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24. How can the Ultimate be said to be one if it contains within all the limited manifestations? That alone can be said to be truly existent which exists independent of others. (*Abhinavagupta*, by Pandey).

25. परमार्थत एकः प्रमाता, स एव च अस्ति,......ततश्च भगवान् सदाशिवो जानाति इत्यतः प्रभृति क्रिमिरपि जानाति इत्यन्तम् एक एव प्रमाता । *IPV* I, i, p. 47.

26. बाह्यदृष्टयापि जडानां ज्ञानक्रियारूपा चेतनता विद्यत एव, तथाहि, वृक्षास्तावत् स्फुटं तद्युक्ताः, अन्यथा तेषां स्वं प्रति रसाकर्षणं योग्यदेशे मूलप्रसारणमारोहणम् च न युज्यते। ततः तदङ्गिभूता भूरपि चेतनैव...जलस्य नियमेन निम्नदेशगमनरूपा क्रिया ज्ञानपूर्विकैवानुमीयते... तेजसश्च ऊर्ध्वज्वलनरूपा वायोश्च तिर्यग्गमन स्वभावा क्रिया तादृश्येवेति, तयोरपि स्फुटा चेतनता ।
Bhāskarī I, p. 65.

27. मदात्मना घटो वेत्ति वेद्म्यहं वा घटात्मना ।
सदाशिवात्मना वेद्मि स वा वेत्ति मदात्मना ॥
नानाभावैः स्वमात्मानं जानन्नास्ते स्वयं शिवः । *ŚD*, 105-106, 109.

28. 'एवं सर्वपदार्थानां समैव शिवता स्थिता' । *ŚD* I, 48.

CHAPTER X

PERMANENCE OF SELF (ĀTMAN) REFUTED
(SAUGATA VIEW)

Prima Facie (*Pūrvapakṣa*).

According to the Pratyabhijñā school, the Self whose essential nature is consciousness, is permanent. This doctrine is contradicted by the Buddhist Saugatas or Sautrāntikas. Their argument against this doctrine which is based on their theory of general momentariness (*Kṣaṇika-vāda*), is summed up and partly refuted in the following prima facie :—

Prima Facie (Pūrvapakṣa) : The Saugata opponent refutes the existence of a permanent Self. He says : It is not right to say that there exists a permanent self-luminous Self, for no such Self is experienced. We only experience various cognitions; such as perceptions, doubts, recognitions, remembrances, conjectures, fancies and so on, associated with different times and objects and assuming different forms.[1] These cognitions are of two kinds, one being indeterminate cognition (*avikalpakam jñānam*) and the other determinate (*vikalpakam*).[2] Indeterminate cognition is that which is self-confined, i.e., in which the characteristics of the object are not cognised as common to anything else (*svalakṣaṇābhāsam jñānam*). It manifests the distinctive characteristics of time, place and form (*'lakṣaṇam'—deśa-kālākārarūpam yasya tasya ābhāsaḥ prakāśanam...yasmin*). Its essential nature does not change in spite of the change in the object.[3] It cannot be expressed in language, for, expression is the cause of variety, which is absent here.[4] It is not perceived by the eye; therefore it is something which was known before and is to be remembered now.[5] Determinate cognition is different from

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1. तथाहि घट-प्रकाशो, घट-विकल्पो, घट-प्रत्यभिज्ञा, घट-स्मृतिः, घटोत्प्रेक्षा-इत्यादि-रूपेण ज्ञानान्येव प्रकाशन्ते, भिन्नकालानि भिन्नविषयानि, भिन्नाकाराणि च। *IPV* I, 54.

2. ननु स्वलक्षणाभासं ज्ञानमेकं परं पुनः।
साभिलापं विकल्पाख्यं...... । *IPK* I, ii 1.

3. विषयभेदेऽपि एकजातीयं स्वरूपे। *IPV* I, 54.

4. तद्वैचित्र्ये कारणाभावात्. विकल्पे हि वैचित्र्यकारणम् अभिलापः, स च अत्र नास्ति। *Ibid.*

5. न च चक्षुर्ग्राह्यः, ततोऽसौ प्राच्यः स्मर्तव्यः। *IPV* I, 55.

the former (*param vikalpakam jñānam*). It admits variety in its nature, hence the use of linguistic expression can be made in regard to it (*sābhilāpam*).[6] All determinate knowledge arises from the indeterminate directly or indirectly.[7] Thus there are only two chains of cognitions, indeterminate and determinate, which are not related to (do not belong to) any permanent perceiver (Self), different from them, because none such is experienced.[8]

Here, the Śaivātma-vādin questions the Saugata opponent, how do you account for the presence of I-consciousness which persists in all our different experiences, such as in 'I know, I decide, I remember this' (*aham vedmi. niścinomi, smrāmi idam*)? The nature of this persisting I-consciousness is mere manifestation (*prakāśaḥ* or *bhānam*), since, in all these forms of cognition, the persisting 'I' shines as one and the same. The Saugata says, who says it shines as such? "To shine" is indeterminacy (*bhānam hi avikalpakam*) and in the experiences 'I know, I decide, I remember this', self-consciousness, which is associated with the linguistic expression 'I', denotes a determinate cognition.[9] I-consciousness, being a determinate cognition, either relates to the body (*śarīra-santānaḥ*) as in the expressions : 'I am thin', 'I am fat', etc., or to the mind (*jñāna-santānaḥ*) as in the expressions : 'I feel happy', 'I feel sorry', etc. It is confined to every changing cognition and disappears along with the same. Since I-consciousness does not remain as one and the same in all these cognitions and, being transitory in nature, it cannot be accepted as the permanent Self.[10]

The Śaivatma-vādin raises an objection to the above explanation. He says, at the time of remembrance, when the direct perception ceases to exist, how can there arise memory, which inevitably follows the direct

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6. अपरं तु शब्दारूषणया स्मृतिसंशयोत्प्रेक्षादि-बहुभेदं विकल्पसंज्ञम् । *Pvr.*, 3.
अभिलापेन संजल्पात्मना शब्दनरूपेण सह वर्तते......'बहुधा' भिद्यते । *IPV* I. 55-56.
7. सर्वस्य विकल्पस्य साक्षात्, पारम्पर्येण वा निर्विकल्पकमूलत्वात् । *IPV* I, 55.
8. नापि तद्द्वयं नित्यस्य कस्यचिद्द्रष्टुस् तस्यात्रानवभासतः । *IPK* I, ii, 1-2.
9. अहम्-इति शब्दानुविद्धो विकल्पप्रत्ययः । *IPV* I, 57.
10. अहंप्रतीतिरप्येषा शरीराद्यवसायिनी । *IPK* I, ii, 2.
अहं-प्रतीत्या अहं जानामि, अहं पश्यामि-इत्येवंरूपेण अनुभवेन शरीरसंतानो, ज्ञान-संतानो वा निश्चीयते, न तु ज्ञाता द्रष्टा कश्चित् अन्यो ज्ञाप्यते-इति सौगताः ।
IPV I, 57, fn.

perception (*tad anurodhinī*), if the perceiving Self were not permanent ?[11] It is because the Self (*Ātman*) persists from the former direct perception to the later remembrance as witness (*draṣṭā* or *sākṣī*). The experience of remembrance, in fact, shows that the knowledge of the former direct perception is retained in the permanent perceiving Self, which is revived in the later experience (of remembrance).[12] On this point the Saugata puts a counter-question to the Śaivātma-vādin, even if you admit that there exists a permanent Self whose nature is knowledge (*bodhātmani satyapyātmani*), the direct perception having ceased to exist, how do you account for the remembrance of things, experienced through that perception ?[13] In *smṛti* the former direct perception together with its object ceases to exist. In the absence of the same, *smṛti* should also not arise.[14] In the circumstances, the Saugata himself gives the reason for the rise of memory. He says, it is because remembrance has its object the same thing that was the object of the former direct perception, which has ceased to exist (*asatos'rthānubhavasya viṣayeṇa sā viṣayavatī*). The Saugata rejects the existence of a permanent Self, upon which, according to Śaivātma-vādin, rests remembrance, because the knowledge of the former direct perception is retained in that (Self).

Ātma-vādin questions the point stated by the Saugata (as above), how can remembrance claim to have as its object that same thing that was the object of the former direct perception which is not existing then (in *smṛti*) ?[15] To this question the Saugata replies, it is because the rise of memory is due to the residual traces (*saṁskāra*) of the former direct perception.[16] He, therefore, concludes, as it is so, what is then the use of a permanent Self (whose existence is supposed by the Śaivātma-vādin), which

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11. अथानुभवविध्वंसे स्मृतिस्तदनुरोधिनी ।
कथं भवेन्न नित्यः स्यादात्मा यद्यनुभावकः । *IPK* I, ii, 3.

12. स्मृतिकाले पूर्वानुभवनाशात्कथं......स्मृतिर्जायेत यदि तदापि तदनुभवबोधो नावर्तेत, यश्च अनेककालस्थायी बोधः स एवात्मानुभविता । *Pvr.*, p. 4.

How can there arise memory, if the knowledge of the former direct perception would not turn up in the later experience—remembrance ? The knowledge which lasts in different times — the former and the later time — is the experiencing Self.

13. सत्यप्यात्मनि दृङ्नाशात्तद्द्वारा दृष्टवस्तुषु स्मृति केन । *IPK* I, ii, 4.

14. अर्थाभासनाशात्......सा (स्मृति) निर्विषयैवेति । *Pvr.*, p. 4.

15. कथं सा नष्टस्य अनुभवस्य विषयेण विषयवती इति ? *IPV* I, 63, fn 29.

16. यतो हि पूर्वानुभवसंस्कारात्स्मृतिसंभवः । *IPK* I, ii, 5.

is a superfluous entity and quite useless.[17] Any such supposed entity, other than the residual trace, has, therefore, no meaning and purpose, when all the affairs of the world can take place by the residual traces (*saṁskāras*) only.[18]

The Śaivàtma-vādin objects to this point. He says, the residual trace is a quality (*dharma*) and, therefore, needs a substratum. As such, what is the resort of the residual trace ? That substratum will have to be admitted to be the permanent Self (*Ātman*). To this objection, the Saugata replies, the residual traces, as also the attributes or qualities (*dharmas*) like knowledge (*jñāna*), pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*), desire (*icchā*), etc., are admitted to be different from (the supposed) *Ātman*, as its essential nature remains unaffected by them (the residual traces, etc.). Hence, it follows that, as remembrance can be admitted to take place by the residual traces only without recourse to a permanent Self, so the supposi-tion of a separate rememberer is a mere fancy just like that of perceiver.[19] Since Ātman remains unffected by qualities, as also by the residual traces, according to the Ātma-vādin, so, in the view of the Saugata, it has to play no role in the experience of remembrance, either as remembering agent or one retaining the residual traces of perceptions (*sa tāvat ātmā smṛtau na vyāpriyeta, asmartṛ-rūpāsaṁskṛta-rūpādi-prācya-rūpānapāyat*). For this reason, in the experience denoted by 'I remember', the rememberer also really refers to the cognitions pertaining to the body and the mind, just like the perceiver (*aham smarāmīti yaḥ 'smartā so'pi śarīra-santāno jñāna-santānaśca adhyavasīyate, yathā draṣṭā*).

Having refuted the existence of the permanent Self, the Saugata now refutes its possession of powers of Knowledge and Action. In order to examine first the Ātman's power of Knowledge, he argues as follows : The Saugata questions the Ātman-vādin, if you admit the power of Knowledge to be of the nature of the sentiency (*cit-svarūpa*), should it be taken as unreal (*anitya*) as the Self, as has been proved above ?[20] The same logic, therefore, applies to the power of knowledge as is applied to the Self, who is also admitted to be of the nature of sentiency. Here, the

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17. यद्येवमन्तर्गडुना कोऽर्थः स्यात् स्थायिनात्मना । *Ibid.*

18. सर्वं हि संस्कारेण जगद्व्यवहारकुटुम्बकं कृतकरावलम्बम्-इति । *IPV* I, 64.

19, ततो भिन्नेषु धर्मेषु तत्स्वरूपाविशेषतः ।
संस्कारात् स्मृतिसिद्धौ स्यात्स्मर्ता द्रष्टेव कल्पितः । *IPK* I, ii, 6.

20 ज्ञानं च चित्स्वरूपं चेत् तदनित्यं किमात्मवत् । *IPK* I, ii, 7.

Śaivātma-vādin gets the chance of giving a reason to prove Ātman as a permanent entity. He says that it is 'the time' which characterises a thing as 'this', thus delimits it and makes it transient.[21] The Self, being of sentient nature, is not experienced as 'this'. Hence it is not delimited by the attribute of time.[22] It is, therefore, a permanent entity. So is the power of knowledge (*jñāna*) also a permanent entity being of the nature of sentiency. The Saugata will prove below that there can be no relation between two permanent entities.[23] According to him, there is only the causal relation. Therefore, the position that the Self possesses the power of Knowledge cannot stand. Thus both Ātman and the power of Knowledge will have to be admitted as unreal or transient (*anityam*).

The Saugata now states another alternative as follows: In case the power of knowledge be admitted to be insentient (*jaḍa*) in nature, how can it make the objects manifest?[24] As a prima facie view, the Śaiva explains this new position in the light of the *Pratibimba* theory of the Sāṅkhya school and thus tries to prove that knowledge, though insentient in itself, yet illuminates the external objects. He says, *Buddhi*, being insentient in itself, assumes the sentiency of the Self exactly as it does the form of external objects.[25] According to the Sāṅkhyā theory, *Buddhi*, though lacking its own illuminating power, is yet capable of illuminating objects, because, owing to its crystalline purity, it receives luminousness from the sentient Self (*Caitanyātman*), the primary source. The Saugata objects to this view. He says that this *Pratibimba* theory does not help to establish the Śaiva's point of view, as the reflection of flames in a mirror is not capable of causing fire (*nahi pratibimbita-vahni-puñja ādarśo dāhyam dahet*). Thus, *Buddhi* shall have to be admitted itself as sentient, for that which is insentient cannot have the capacity of making the objects manifest.[26] It is, therefore, clear that this so-called primary source of illuminating power, i.e., the sentient Self (*Caitanyātman*), cannot be separate from *Buddhi* (*atha mukhya prakāśa-rūpam eva tat pratibimba-*

21. इह कालो नाम इदंभावविशिष्टस्य विशेषणताम् अवलम्बमानः तं विशिष्टीकुर्वन् तत्संकोचात् अनित्यं संपादयति । *IPV* I 68.

22. आत्मनश्च चित्स्वभावत्वात् इदम्-इति प्रथनाभावेन विशेष्यत्वं नास्ति । *Ibid.*, 68-69.

23. नच द्वयोर्नित्ययोः कश्चित् संबन्धः । *IPV* I, 69.

24. अथापि जडमेतस्य कथमर्थप्रकाशता । *IPK* I, ii, 7.

25. अथार्थस्य यथा रूपं धत्ते बुद्धिस्तथात्मनः चैतन्यं । *IPK* I, ii, 8.

26. अजडा सैव जाड्ये नार्थप्रकाशता । *Ibid.*

kam, tat tarhi buddher-avyatiriktam iti). We shall have to admit that *Buddhi* itself is primarily illuminator (*cinmayī*) or sentient (*ajaḍa*). It is in vain to suppose the existence of another entity *Puruṣa* as the primary source of illumination (*mukhya prakāśa-rūpaiva buddhir jātā,......tataśca sā buddhireva cinmayī syāt, kim puruṣeṇā*). Besides, according to the Saugata's view, it is not possible for *Buddhi* to receive the reflection of luminousness (sentiency) from a source (the Self) whose existence is not proved. Thus we have arrived at the doctrine of Vijñāna-vādins (*ityapi āyāto vijñāna-vādaḥ*) and Yogācāra,[27] according to which the Ultimate Reality is the principle of *Buddhi*, which is of the nature of sentiency (*vijñāna*), and assumes the form of objects by receiving their reflection (*artha-pratibimbaka-dvāreṇa artha-mayī*). Thus if *Buddhi* itself be admitted to be sentient, it will naturally be permanent. But according to Vijñāna-vādins, it is sentiency alone, whose essential nature is to make the objects manifest. It is of various kinds such as determinate cognitions, remembrances, etc. (*jñāna-mātram eva asti, yo artha-prakāśa-rūpo bodho, yaśca vikalpa-smṛtyādi-rūpaḥ*), which are transitory in nature. All worldly transactions are carried by this *Buddhi* alone.[28]

Having examined the power of knowledge (*Jñāna*), the Saugata now examines the *Ātman*'s power of action (*Kriyā-śakti*). He says action (*kriyā*) also appears only from external objects as body, etc., in their connection with different places, times and forms. For, nothing else is perceived.[29] In the instance: "milk becomes curds" (*dugdham pariṇamati*), we see only a sweet white liquid before, which is seen at the later time as thick sour curds. In other instances of actions, like "He goes", "He sits", "The tree falls", also we see persons or things (which are really the chains of momentary beings) appear associated with different times, places and forms. We do not notice 'action' either by direct perception (*Pratyakṣa pramāṇā*) or by inference (*Anumāna*) which depends upon the former (direct perception). Thus the Saugata thinks that there is no 'positive proof' (*sādhaka pramāṇa*), i.e., not any means of right knowledge, either direct perception or inference, to establish the existence of 'action'. There is rather a 'negative proof' (*bādhaka pramāṇa*) to support the same, i.e., there

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27. विज्ञानवादिनो हि, निराकारस्य ज्ञानस्य अर्थप्रतिबिम्बद्वारेण साकारत्वं वदन्ति—इत्येतदेव योगाचार मतम् । *IPV* I. 78, fn. 47.

28. तावता अर्थव्यवहारसिद्धेः । *Ibid.*, 79.

29. क्रियाप्यर्थस्य कायादेस्तत्तद्देशादिजातता । *IPK* I. ii, 9a.

is also no reason to refute the absence of 'action'.[30] He says that the view that 'action' is one and successive (multiple) and belongs to one agent is not also sound.[31] How can that which is associated with different units of time be single (*katham 'kramikā ekā ca' iti syāt*), because the various moments of action, characterised by the diversity of time, space and form cannot be attributed to one.[32] Thus we cannot suppose 'action' to depend upon one resort (*āśraya*), as we do not notice any resort (*āśraya*) but only different units of time (*tatrāpi tat kṣaṇātirikto na kaścit āśrayo 'nubhūyate*). The Saugata concludes, thus we are unable to attribute power of action also to the Self (*Ātman*).

Having examined the nature of the powers of 'Knowledge and Action', the Saugata now refutes any relation that may be supposed to exist between them and the Self (*Ātman*), so that by attributing these two powers to Him, He may be said to be all-knower and all-doer. He says, only this much is perceived that certain things being existent, other things come into being. There is no other relation than that of cause and effect.[33] The Saugata does not accept any other relation like *Sahayoga, Samavāya, Viśeṣa-viśeṣaṇa-bhāva,* etc., but only the causal relation. That relation cannot exist between '*jñāna* and *kriyā*' and *Ātman*, since the latter cannot be the effect of the former (*na ca jñāna-kriyābhyām saha ātmanaḥ kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvaḥ, ātmanas-tat-kāryatva abhāvat*). The Saugata now argues against the relation between 'Knowledge and Action' and *Ātman* (Self) in general and special terms. He says, as a rule, relationship refers to two things. And that which exists in two must have multiplicity of forms.[34] It is not right to think that one *Ātman* is connected with both in relation (*na ca ekenātmanobhayatra sthitir-yuktā*). An established thing (*siddha*), i.e. anything having independent existence, does not need another.[35]

30- एवं प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्यां तस्या अदृष्टिः,—इति साधकप्रमाणाभाव उक्तः, बाधकमपि आह। *IPV* I, 82-83.

31. न साप्येका क्रमिकैकस्य चोचिता। *IPK* I, ii, 9 b.

32. किं च तथाभूतैर्भिन्नदेशकालाकारैः क्रियाक्षणैराविष्ट आश्रयः कथमेकः स्यात् ? *IPV* I, 83.

33. तत्र तत्र स्थिते तत्तद्भवतीत्येव दृश्यते।
नान्यन्नान्योऽस्ति संबन्धः कार्यकारणभावतः॥ *IPK* I, ii, 10.

34. द्विष्ठस्यानेकरूपत्वात्। *IPK* I, ii, IIa.

35. सिद्धस्यान्यानपेक्षणात्। *Ibid.*, b.

viz.. two established things or things having independent existence (*siddhau*) do not depend upon one another (*na ca dvayoḥ siddhayor-anyonyāpekṣā*). Nor is it related to another by relation of dependence.[36] The Saugata means to say that two things which rest in themselves for their existence, do not have the relation of dependence with one another (*nāpi svātma-mātra-niṣṭhayoḥ pāratantrya sambandhaḥ*). Therefore, the supposition of an actor is a mere fancy just like that of a knower.[37] Hence, a permanent subject, as all-knower and all-actor, does not exist in reality.[38]

The Saugata concludes his argument saying that there neither exists the Self (*Ātman*) supposed to be the eternal Lord, nor can the powers of Knowledge and Action be attributed to Him, by virtue of which He is said to function as the omniscient and omnipotent Ruler of the Universe.

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36. पारतन्त्र्याद्ययोगाच्चे । *Ibid*., c.

37, तेन कर्तापि कल्पितः । *Ibid*., d.

38, ततो यथा ज्ञातृत्वं कल्पितं तथा कर्तृत्वमपीति कथमात्मा सर्वेश्वर इति । *Pvr*, p. 7.

CHAPTER XI

PERMANENCE OF SELF (ĀTMAN) ESTABLISHED

The Saugata opponent's view refuted (*para-darśana-anupapatiḥ*).

The Refutation of the Prima Facie (Uttara-pakṣa): The Śaivātma-vādin refutes as follows the Saugata's reasoning against the doctrine that the Self (*Ātman*) is permanent. He says, I quite agree with certain points stated in the prima facie (*satyam*). It may be admitted that remembrance arises from the residual trace of the former perception, yet, being self-confined (*ātma-niṣṭham*—resting in itself) as every cognitive experience is, it cannot make the former perception known, that is to say, remembrance has no scope to cognise directly the former perception (*tan-nādyānubhava-vedakam*).[1] The Saugata says with regard to this, that because remembrance originates from residual trace, it will have to be admitted that remembrance has the former perception also as its object, viz., it has direct cognition of the former experience. To this point the Śaivātma-vādin says, perception is self-luminous (*dṛk-svābhasaiva*).[2] It cannot be the object of any other experience like remembrance (*nānyena vedyā*), just as the perception of colour cannot be the object of the perception of taste (*rūpa-dṛśeva dṛk rase*).[3] The fact that remembrance originates from residual trace only makes it similar to the former perception (*tat-tulyatvam*)[4] in respect of having the same object, but the former perception does not come within the range of remembrance (*na-tad-gatiḥ*).[5] In remembrance there is, in fact, no direct cognition of the former perception (*na-tad-avagatiḥ*).[6] From this, it is

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1. सत्यं किन्तु स्मृतिज्ञानं पूर्वानुभवसंस्कृतेः ।
   जातमप्यात्मनिष्ठं तन्नाद्यानुभववेदकम् । *IPK* I, iii, 1.
2. सर्वा हि ज्ञप्तिः स्वसंवेदनैकरूपा । *Pvr*, p. 8.
3. रूपज्ञानं न रसज्ञानजात् संस्कारात् जातं । *IPV* I, 96.
   रूपरसज्ञानयोरन्योन्यसंवेदनेऽन्योन्यविषयवेदनमपि स्यात्ततश्चेन्द्रिय-नियमाभावः । *Pvr* p., 8
4. पूर्वानुभवसंस्कारजत्वेन तत्सादृश्यमात्रं । *Ibid.*
5. *IPK*, I, iii, 2.
6. न तु पूर्वानुभवावगतिः, तदभावात् तत्सादृश्यमपि नावसेयम् । *Pvr.*, p. 8.
   As such, 'that cannot make the consciousness of similarity possible (in remembrance).' Pandey, *Bhāskari* III, 33,

clear that though the knowledge of remembrance originates from the residual trace (*saṁskāra*) of the former perception, yet the residual trace cannot make the former perception an object of remembrance, the former being beyond the range of the latter. The words '*tat-tulyatvam-na-tadgatiḥ*' show that the experience of former perception does not recur in remembrance, but the latter has only the similarity or likeness of the former (*tat-sādṛśya-mātram*).

The Saugata now urges the following view against the objection of the Śaivātma-vādin. He says, although remembrance does not have the former perception or its object as its own object, yet, since *smṛti* (remembrance) has knowledge of both, the perception and its object, it must, therefore, be admitted to be resting upon them illusively.[7] The Saugata thinks, it is because that remembrance, being of the nature of determinate knowledge (*vikalpa-rūpa*), cognises the invisible past perception and its object, and, therefore, it must be of illusive nature.[8] Since neither the former perception nor its object is the object of remembrance, yet there is the consciousness of both, it must be due to *smṛti* being illusive in nature.[9] The Śaivātma-vādin refutes the Saugata's view. He says, this view is quite incongruous (*tad-etad-asamañjasam*). If it is thought to be a mere illusion, how can it have the essential nature of remembrance? How can the order of real objects be established on the basis of illusion? Moreover, why should it be supposed to depend upon the residual trace of the former perception?[10]

As to the point said by the Saugata that there is similarity between remembrance and the former perception, since both, the former perception and its object, are determinately cognised by remembrance, and this similarity is due to residual trace, the Śaivātma-vādin states that the use of the word 'similarity' in this connection has no significance.[11] He, therefore,

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7. अथातद्विषयत्वेऽपि स्मृतेस्तदवसायतः, दृष्टालम्बनता भ्रान्त्या... ... ... *IPK* I, iii, 3.

8. यावता स्मृतिर्विकल्परूपत्वात् केवलमप्रकाशमानमेव अनुभवं तद्विषयं च अध्यवस्यति, तत् इयं भ्रान्ति-स्वभावा,... ... ... *IPV* I, 97-98.

9. न तद्दर्शनं नापि तद्विषयः स्मृतेर्विषयः, तथापि तु उभयम् अध्यवसीयते, भ्रमरूपतया स्मृतेः। *IPV* I, 98.

10. स्मृतितैव कथं तावद् भ्रान्तेश्चार्थस्थितिः कथम्।
पूर्वानुभवसंस्कारापेक्षा च किमितीष्यते। *IPK* I, iii, 4.

11. The Śaivātma-vādin argues, the former experience and the object are either 'manifested' in remembrance or they are 'not manifested'; in the former case smṛti cannot be of illusive nature.

argues that if the knowledge of remembrance be supposed to be illusive in its nature and, therefore, lacking sentiency or self-luminosity, it cannot manifest the objects.[12] Even though it be accepted to be self-luminous (sentient—*ajaḍa*), yet its self-luminosity being confined to making manifest itself, it cannot establish the order of external objects.[13] In fact, that part of remembrance which refers to the indeterminate cognition (consciousness) of itself is not illusive in nature, as it is free from contrariety; on the other hand, that part of it which refers to the determinate cognition of object in contradistinction to indeterminate cognition of itself, involves illusiveness.[14] Hence, remembrance is an error in respect of its object and, therefore, non-luminous (*jaḍā*) in relation to that object. Therefore, the Śaivātma-vādin says, that aspect of remembrance which refers to the determinate cognition of the object, being *jaḍa*, will not make the objects manifest and the other aspect of remembrance which pertains to indeterminate cognition of itself, i. e., which is confined to illuminating itself, can also not establish the external objects.

The Śaivātma-vādin arrives now at his own point of view. He says, from the above discussion, it is evident, that even though there be residual trace (*saṁskāra*), yet remembrance cannot originate from it, for, then all kinds of cognitions (*jñānāni*) will be dissociated from one another.[15] The established order of the world depends upon the unification of cognitions of all kinds, which figure in remembrance in association with one another.[16] So remembrance is indispensable for practical life.[17] Even the direct perception of Self 'I' is impossible without remembrance of one's conventional self which depends upon the unification of the conscious-

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12. भ्रान्तित्वे चावसायस्य न जडाद्विषयस्थितिः । *IPK* I, iii, 5 a.

13. ततोऽजाड्ये निजोल्लेखनिष्ठान्नार्थस्थितिस्ततः । *Ibid.*, 5 b.

14. इह स्मृतेः अन्यस्य वा भ्रान्तिबोधस्य स्वसंवेदनांशे
प्रकाशमाने न भ्रान्तिता, तत्र वैपरीत्याभावात् ;
यस्तु तत्र अध्यवसीयते स्वाकारः स विपरीततया
अस्वाकारत्वेन अर्थतया,—इति तत्र अंशे भ्रान्तिता । *IPV* I, 101-2.

15. संस्कारे सत्यपि स्मृतिः न कथंचन घटते, ततश्च परस्परसङ्गतिहीनानि सकलानि ज्ञानानि... ... ... *IPV* I, 103.

16. 'जनस्य' लोकस्य या काचन 'स्थितिः' व्यवहारः सा सर्वज्ञानानां यत् 'अनुसंधानं' एकविषयभावोपपन्न-स्मृतिताप्राप्तिरूपं, तत्र आयत्ता । *IPV* I, 103-104.

17. स्मरणनिबन्धनः सर्वो व्यवहारः । *Ibid.*

ness of the former and the later states of the Self.[18] If we are to believe as the Saugata states that all cognitions are self-luminous but they mutually differ and do not know one another, then they will be like dumb and deaf and hence insentient in relation to one another.[19] So the teacher says that all human transactions take place by means of various kinds of cognitions, because, although they mutually differ and cannot know one another, yet they are unified in one permanent subject, the Self (*samvid*), who is essentially of sentient nature (*cidvapuḥ*), who holds within himself the whole form of this endless universe and who possesses the powers of Cognition, Remembrance and Differentiation. If we deny the existence of a permanent subject, the Self of all, in which different cognitions are unified, then all the transactions of the world will come to an end.[20]

It is, therefore, an established fact that there exists one eternal Supereme Lord (Maheśvara), the Self (*samvid*), that includes the whole objective world within itself, the world comprising sentient and insentient beings. It is, therefore, implied that this *samvid* is not only the Supreme Consciousness but is also Ultimate Substance, Prima Materia of all things.[21] Abhinavagupta explicitly refutes the doctrine of Vijñāna-vādins and some Vedāntins that the Supreme Being is of the nature of consciousness (*cit, vijñāna*) only. The Pratyabhijñā holds that this One great Lord (Maheśvara), who is essentially of sentient nature (*cid-vapuḥ*), *samvid*, contains within Himself the endless objective world (*antaḥ-kṛtānanta-*

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18. प्रथममपि हि प्रत्यक्षज्ञानम् 'अहम्' इति पूर्वापररूपानुसंधानेन स्मरणानुप्राणितेन विना न घटते । *Ibid.*

19. तत् एतानि स्वविषयप्रकाशमात्ररूपाणि परविषये जडान्धानेलमूककल्पानि, न च अन्योन्यस्य प्रकाशरूपाणि । *IPV* I, 105.

20. एवमन्योन्यभिन्नानामपरस्परवेदिनाम् ।
ज्ञानानामनुसंधान-जन्मा नश्येज्जनस्थितिः ॥
न चेदन्तःकृतानन्तविश्वरूपो महेश्वरः ।
स्यादेकश्चिद्वपुर्ज्ञान-स्मृत्यपोहनशक्तिमान् ॥ *IPK* 1, iii, 6-7.

चित्तत्वमेव विश्वरूपमतोऽतिरिक्तस्यानुपपत्तेः । अशेषपदार्थज्ञानानामन्योन्यानुसंधानम् अस्यैव ज्ञानादिकाः शक्तयः :—

'मत्तः स्मृतिर्ज्ञानमपोहनं च' (भ० गी० 15, 15) *Pvr.*, p. 10.

21. अतोऽर्थप्रकाशरूपां संविदम् इच्छता बलादेव अर्थोऽपि तद्रूपान्तर्गत एव अङ्गीकर्तव्यः । *IPV* I, 107.

viśvarūpaḥ). Being of such nature He is the universal substratum, the source of all the material objects. The objects are, as it were, heaped in it *(vedya-rāsiḥ tena krodīkṛtaḥ)*, or are merged in it.[22] He, in whom indwell all the objects, as identical with it, isolates some objects and makes them manifest, emerged, as it were, from the ocean of light *(prakāśa)*, by the sovereignty of His will. This is called His power of Knowledge *(Jñāna-Śakti)*.[23] When the consciousness pertaining to some particular object has once been manifested in the form of its perception and, on some later occasion, it is revived in the form of the idea recalled, His another power comes into play which is called the power of Remembrance *(Smraṇa-Śakti)*.[24] In this process nothing new is manifested, but the things, ever existing in the ocean of consciousness, emerge from it.[25] That power, which isolates the manifestation of some particular object from the Supreme Consciousness, in which all the objects are devoid of any distinction that is caused by their association with time, place and form, and makes it distinct from the rest in the form of a determinate cognition *(vikalpa-rūpa vijñāna)* owing to an impression of some past experience *(vāsanā mātra)* roused by varying nature of His will *(vicitrecchā-prabodhitā)*, is called His power of Differentiation *(Apohana-Śakti)*.[26]

All the worldly transactions are performed by this triad of powers.[27] It is that Self, who directly experiences *(jānāti)*, remembers *(smarti)*

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22. अत एक एव असौ,—इति एकत्वात् सर्वो वेद्यराशिः तेन क्रोडीकृतः,—इत्येतदपि अनिच्छता अङ्गीकार्यम् । *Ibid*

23. अतः स्वरूपान्तर्त्रुडितम् अर्थराशिम् अपरमपि भिन्नाकारम् आत्मनि परिगृह्य, कंचिदेव अर्थं स्वरूपात् उन्मग्नम् आभासयति...सैषा ज्ञानशक्तिः । *IPV* 1, 107-108.

24. तेन क्वचित् आभासे गृहीतपूर्वे यत् संवेदनं बहिर्मुखम् अभूत्, तस्य यत् अन्तर्मुखं चित्स्वरूपत्वं तत् कालान्तरेऽपि अवस्थास्नु स्वात्मगतं तद्विषयविशेषे बहिर्मुखत्वं परामृशति,—इति एषा स्मृतिशक्तिः । *IPV* I, 109.

25. नवं न किंचित् आभासितं स्मृतं वा स्यात् । *Ibid.*
उन्मग्नाभाससंभिन्नं च चित्स्वरूपं बहिर्मुखत्वात् तच्छायानुरागात् नवं नवं ज्ञानमुक्तम् । *IPV* I, 108-109.

26. एष एव परितश्छेदनात् परिच्छद उच्यते, तदवभासनसामर्थ्यम् अपोहनशक्तिः । *IPV* I, 110.

देशकालविशेषावच्छेदशून्यत्वेन विचित्रेच्छाप्रबोधितावभास-भेदवासनामात्रोपपादितविकल्प-रूपविज्ञाना अपोहन-शक्तिः । *Ibid.*, fn. 71.

27. अनेन शक्तित्रयेण विश्वे व्यवहाराः । *Ibid.*

and determinately cognises (*vikalpayati*) through the various limited subjects.[28] And innumerable and varied are the ways in which the powers of Knowledge, Remembrance and Differentiation function.[29] This function of His powers, in variety of ways, is called His *Svātantrya* (self-dependent power) (*tat sāmarthyam svātantryam*).

To sum up the above reasoning, Utpaladeva rejects the Saugata's theory that the Self (*Ātman*) is not a permanent being, on the ground of the phenomenon of remembrance. He says, if we do not admit a permanent Self, the settled order of the world will not be possible. In the state of general momentariness even perception is impossible, since the three notions occurring in this experience, viz., 'I', 'awareness' and the 'object', belonging to three different moments of time, cannot be joined together in one identical relation. The Buddhists have no reason to suppose that these three notions do not involve three successive stages. On the other hand, we are conscious of our identity that we persist in all our changing states of consciousness, and though our ideas are continuously changing with the changing objects, we remain unchanged all the same, and this shows that, in knowing ourselves as pure 'awareness', we are successively connected with the changing objects.[30] The existence of a permanent entity persisting in the changing states of consciousness is established as a matter of our common experience, as it is this persisting entity, the Self, which, in the later state of remembrance, remembers an object which he perceives in the former state. On this point the Pūrvapakṣin states that 'It is the residual trace or impression (*saṁskāra*) that causes remembrance. Therefore, it is unnecessary to assume the existence of another superfluous entity, *Ātman*. By such an assumption, it follows that one impression, say, the impression of sight-perception, should cause the remembrance of a different perception, say, taste-perception and vice-versa. This, evidently, leads us to contradictions, unless we admit the existence of a persisting Self who experiences different states of consciousness.

The Vedānta also establishes the eternity of *Ātman* (the Self) on the basis of the reasoning that it is the perceiving consciousness (*saṁvid*) which

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28. स एव हि तेन तेन वपुषा जानाति, स्मरति विकल्पयति च ।

29. एतासां च ज्ञानादिशक्तीनाम् असंख्यप्रकारो वैचित्र्यविकल्पः । *IPV* I, 111.

30. This argument has been put forth by Prakāśātman in *Pañcapadikā* against the theory of momentariness.

Ref. Dasgupta, *The History of Indian Philosophy*, I, 33.

persists as one and the same in the waking state (*jāgrad-avasthā*), in the dreaming state (*svapna-avasthā*) and in the state of deep sleep (*suṣupti-avasthā*), as witness. That pure consciousness, the *śuddha Puruṣa* of Sāṅkhya, is the witness (*sākṣi*) of the three states. It is continuous; it neither rises nor sets (*nodeti nāstam etyekā*) ; it is self-luminous (*svayam-prabhā*). Not only that it lasts as one and the same in the three states, but it continues to exist as the same for days, months and years, and through eternity. It is of the nature of existence (*sat*), consciousness (*cit*) and bliss (*ānanda*).[31] Upaniṣads attribute numerous and varied powers to the Self, such as powers of Knowledge and Action.[32]

31, शब्दस्पर्शादयो वेद्या वैचित्र्याज्जागरे पृथक् ।
ततो विभक्ता तत्संविदैकरूप्यान्न भिद्यते ।।3।।
तथा स्वप्नेऽत्र वेद्यं तु न स्थिरं जागरे स्थिरम् ।
तद्भेदो ऽतस्तयोः संविदेकरूपा न भिद्यते ।।4।।
सुप्तोत्थितस्य सौषुप्ततमोबोधो भवेत्स्मृतिः ।
सा चावबुद्धविषयाऽवबुद्धं तत्तदा तमः ।।5।।
स बोधो विषयाद्भिन्नो न बोधात् स्वप्नबोधवत् ।
एवं स्थानत्रये ऽप्येका संवित्तद्वद्दिनान्तरे ।।6।।
मासाब्दयुगकल्पेषु गतागम्येष्वनेकधा ।
नोदेति नास्तमेत्येका संविदेषा स्वयंप्रभा ।।7।। *Pañcadaśi*, I, 3-7.

32. परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च । *Śvet. Up.*, 6, 8

CHAPTER XII

POWER OF REMEMBRANCE

Smṛti-śakti-nirūpaṇam.

It has been proved, in the foregoing chapter, on the evidence of the phenomenon of remembrance, that the Self (*Ātman*) is a permanent being, against the contrary view held by the Buddhist Saugatas. Without asserting the existence of one permanent Self, the whole cosmos will be reduced to a state of chaos. There will be no settled order in the universe in the absence of a permanent Self who performs all transactions of the world by his powers of Knowledge, Remembrance and Differentiation.

The power of Knowledge (*Jñāna-Śakti*) precedes the power of Remembrance (*Smaraṇa-Śakti*), and the power of Differentiation (*Apohana-Śakti*) is antecedent to the both and is their very life.[1] Remembrance is already introduced in the text as an evidence in support of the view that *Ātman* (the Self) is a permanent entity, against the contrary view of the Saugata critic. The power of Remembrance (*Smṛti-Śakti*) is, therefore, here first dealt with in a greater detail, according to the order in the text. Remembrance brings the various cognitions in association with one another and is the cause of all determinate knowledge. *Ātman* (the soul) is the substratum of remembrance (*smṛti*) and hence the rememberer (*smartā*). In the former experience (the direct perception), he receives its residual trace (*saṁskāra*) which subsequently causes the phenomenon of remembrance. *Smartā*, the remembering Self, is not the fleeting experience or the phenomenon of remembrance itself, but it is a permanent being behind the experience, who possesses the power of remembrance. Even without experiencing the phenomenon of remembrance, that being exists. He is not only *Smartā* but has also so many other powers and lasts as a permanent being even in the absence of their functions. He is the common substratum or nucleus (*kendra*) of all these powers.

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1. एवं ज्ञानपूर्विका स्मृतिः, तदुभयानुग्राहिणी अपोहनशक्तिः । *IPV* I, 113.
'अनुग्राहिणी'—अन्तरनुप्राणिका । *Ibid.*, fn., 5.

It will now be explained how the Self (soul) functions in the experience of *smṛti*. The soul is free to recall (*vimṛśan sa iti svairī*), in the state of remembrance (*smṛti-kāle*), the knowledge of the object perceived previously. Having perceived an object in the former experience (*pūrvānubhūtārthopalabdhā*), he recalls the same to memory at a later time and determinately knows, 'it is that same object'.[2] The soul exists in all the states, i.e., in past, present and future experiences, as *samvid* (consciousness) that is not limited by time (*akāla-kalita* or *Kāla-vichheda-śunyaḥ*).

If anybody says that *smṛti*, being *vikalpa* (determinate knowledge), cannot make the object manifest in its real nature, because *vikalpas* do not even touch the objects (in reality) (*arthāsamsparṣino hi vikalpāḥ*). The direct experience which cognises the object in the past perception, becomes a matter of past time at the later time of remembrance. The subsequent remembrance cannot, therefore, make the former perception manifest, because one cognitive experience cannot be known by another (*jñānasya jñānāntareṇa asamvedyatvāt*) and because the former cognitive experience (direct perception) ceases to exist at the time of the later remembrance (*asattvācca*). Thus the knowledge, 'I remember this', is mere illusion, since there is no manifestation of the object in remembrance.[3] The teacher answers this objection as follows: The subject (*Ātman*) knows determinately (*āmṛśan*), by the power of remembrance (*arthāt—smṛtya-śaktyā*), that the object that was made manifest (to him) before, i.e., in the former experience (*pūrvābhasitam*), becomes manifest again (*bhāsayet-ca*), at the subsequent time of remembrance (*sva-kāle—smraṇa-kāle*), either as mere manifestation of itself (*svalakṣaṇam*) or as possessed of the entire group of attributes (*akhilātmanā*).[4] The soul recollects, by his own power of remembrance, at the later time, the former manifestation (*ābhāsa*) of the object previously perceived, either in its indistinct form, or in the distinct form as unification of the manifestations of the object associated with time,

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2. स हि पूर्वानुभूतार्थोपलब्धा परतोऽपि सन् ।
विमृशन्स इति स्वैरी स्मरतीत्यपदिश्यते । *IPK* I, iv, 1.

3. ... ... अर्थस्य प्रकाशनाभावात् 'इदं स्मरामि' इति ज्ञानं भ्रान्तिमात्रमेव-इति पुनरपि आपतितम् । *IPV* I, 121-122.

4. भासयेच्च स्वकालेऽर्थात्पूर्वाभासितमामृशन् ।
स्वलक्षणं घटाभासमात्रेणाथाखिलात्मना । *IPK* I, iv, 2.

place, etc., i.e., the object becomes manifest along with all attributes of time, place etc.[5] By the expression '*svalakṣaṇam*', the teacher means that the manifestation of the object perceived in the past experience reappears, in the later remembrance, as a new manifestation, giving up its indeterminate universal nature identical with the Supreme Consciousness and thus becoming limited (*saṁkucitaḥ*) in that state.[6] It is illogical to say that the knowledge of the later remembrance is different from that of the former perception, for, in that case, we shall not have any rememberer (*smartā*) at all. Hence the expression '*akhilātmanā*' implies that the knowledge of the former perception and that of the later remembrance are unified in the later state. The opponent says, the expression '*svalakṣaṇam*' denotes that, in remembrance, the picture of the object comes by itself without recourse to the perception. Hence, it may be observed that there is a clear difference in the formation of two experiences, the perception and remembrance, as in the former the object is present and in the latter the picture of the object occurs itself without recourse to the perception. The teacher replies this objection as follows: If we say that the object of remembrance, i.e., the past perception, is different from the knowledge of remembrance, then it is not proper for the former to shine (or recur) in *smṛti* (*smṛti-viṣayasya arthasya smṛteḥ bhede, smaryamānasya bhāsanam na ca yuktam*). We must, therefore, admit that there is unification of cognitions, associated with different times, i.e., the time of the former perception and that of the later remembrance (*tena bhinna-kālānām samvidām aikyam*). And, that subject is the knower of these cognitions (*veditā eṣa saḥ*).[7]

Here, the opponent says: If the light of the object externally manifested by the later remembrance is not other than the former perception itself, why should we not simply say that the former experience is the object of remembrance? What is the use of this odd and uncommon expression 'unification of cognitions'[8]? To this objection, the teacher answers: It is not that the former experience (*pūrvaḥ anubhvaḥ*) shines separately (*pṛthak bhāti*) in remembrance (*smṛtau*) as an object

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5. आभासमात्रं हि भावस्य स्वरूपं, प्रत्याभासं प्रमाणस्य व्यापारात् । तदेव आभासान्तरव्यामिश्रणया दीपसहस्रप्रभासंमूर्च्छनवत् स्फुटीभवति । *IPV* I, 124.

6. अत्र अधुना इति गृहीतो य एवाप्याभासः स व्यापकत्वनित्यत्वात्मसामान्यलक्षणतिरस्कारात् संकुचितः स्वलक्षणमुच्यते । *Ibid.*, fn. 63.

7. *IPK* 1, iv, 3,

8. ऐक्येन तु अलौकिकेन कोऽर्थः ? *IPV* I, 131,

(shines in perception) (*arthavat*). It shines as knowledge (*pratyayaḥ*) expressed in words: 'I experienced it before', because it shines only as resorting to the subject, i.e., the knowledge of the past perception is carried to the remembrance as resting in the Self.[9] The Self, experiencing the former perception and retaining in itself the knowledge of the same, appears as persisting in remembrance. In *smṛti* the object does not stand externally as in the perception, but the knowledge of the past perception (of the object) remains as unified with the consciousness that persists from the previous experience to the later. In this manner the knowledge of various cognitions is unified in the lasting consciousness, the permanent Self.[10]

Here the opponent raises a very important point for discussion. He objects to the point that the former experience (direct perception) does not shine apart from the subject in remembrance, as in perception the object shines separately. He says, even in perception, the object (jar) does not shine separately, exactly as perception does in remembrance. But, in reality, both of them do shine separately, according to their individual nature.[11] In both the cases, it is a common point that, in one view, even the object does not shine separately in perception as perception does in remembrance, in another view, they (i.e., the object in perception as well as the perception in remembrance) do shine separately from the subject This view is supported, by the opponent, with the evidence that the Yogins get insight into their own remote past and future experiences, as separate from their consciousness (*samvid*), so they do also the knowledge of others' minds, as is stated in *Yoga Sūtra* III, 19, that 'by concentration (*samyam*) on knowledge or intellect (*pratyaya*), one gets the knowledge of others' minds (*pratyayasya para-citta-jñānam*). Here, *citta* means the 'internal organ', i.e., mind (*antaḥ-karaṇa*), in which the function of knowing is developed. The opponent says, in this sūtra, *samyama* on *pratyaya* does not mean

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9. नैव ह्यनुभवो भाति स्मृतौ पूर्वोऽर्थवत्पृथक् ।
प्रागन्वभूवमहमित्यात्मारोहणभासनात् । *IPK* I, iv, 4;

10. 'पूर्वोऽपि अनुभवो' न भेदेन आभाति,... ... ...
'अहम्'—इत्येवं स्वभावो य 'आत्मा' पूर्वापरसंविदन्तर्मुखस्वभाव: तत्र यत् 'आरोहणं' विश्रम: तेन हेतुना पूर्वसंविद्रूपताया: स्वप्रकाशाया 'भासनात्' तल्लीनस्यापि घटस्य स्वप्रकाशदेशीयत्वेन अवभासनम् । *IPV* I, 131-132.

11. घटोऽपि हि न अनुभवभङ्ग्या भाति-इति, किं न भाति ?
स्वभावेन भाति—इति तु उभयत्रापि समानम् । *IPV* I, 133.

the 'concentration' on 'knowledge' only but on 'knowledge' along with the substratum (*ālambana*) of 'knowledge', i.e., *antaḥ-karaṇa* or *Buddhi* (the internal organ or intellect) which stands as the object (*viṣaya*) of his concentration. It is further supported by the following sūtra : '*na ca* (*śaṅketa*) *sālambanam iti*'. It need not be doubted that *pratyaya* means knowledge together with *ālambana*, i.e., *citta* or mind. The Pūrvapakṣin comes to the conclusion that, as experiences of others become the object of Yogin's knowledge, his own remote past and future experiences may also be the object of his knowledge. The teacher answers this objection as follows : Even in the particular kind of knowledge of a Yogin, the experiences of others do not become manifest as such (i.e., as others' experiences), but they shine as unified with his own Self (*Ātman*), consciousness (*samvid*). Even though supposed to be at the level of objects, the experiences of others are one with the self-consciousness of the Yogin (*sva-samvid-ekamānāḥ*).[12] A Yogin, in no case, has recourse to an object for getting the knowledge of his own remote experiences, past or future, or the knowledge of others' experiences. When a Yogin calls to his mind the knowledge of others' experiences, it is nothing but the part and parcel of his own self-consciousness, although he does not acquire this knowledge as a result of his direct cognition of others' experiences. Similarly, he gets the knowledge of his own remote past or future experiences or other subtleties of his life not apart (*pṛthak*) from his own self-consciousness. This unification of the knowledge of others' experiences with the Yogin's self-consciousness (*Samvid*), as if it is his own personal knowledge, shines as *prakāśa* or *bhānam* (effulgence) of his Self (soul).[13] *IPK* I, iv, 5, alludes, in its first three pādas, to the experience of a Yogin of a lower class, in whom the consciousness of distinction between himself and others has not ceased (*avigalita-sva-para-vibhāgo yogī*). Such Yogins acquire the knowledge of others' experiences as indeterminate knowledge unified in their own self-consciousness, which, as a matter of fact, is the determinate knowledge of others' experiences acquired by them through the residual traces (*saṁskāra*) manifested by their bodies and vital airs.[14] The fourth

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12. योगिनामपि भासन्ते न दृशो दर्शनान्तरे ।
स्वसंविदेकमानास्ता भान्ति मेयपदेऽपि वा । *IPK* I, iv, 5.

13. तत्र घट-सुखादिः इदन्तया भाति, तद्गतस्तु प्रकाशोऽहम्-इत्येव स्वप्रकाशतया प्रकाशते ।
IPV I, 136.

14. प्रमात्रीकृतपरदेहप्राणादिसमवभाससंस्कारात् तु तन्निष्ठाम् इदन्तां प्रकाशभागेऽपि मन्यमान इदं परज्ञानम् इति अभिमन्यते अविगलितस्वपरविभागो योगी । *IPV* I, 136-137.

pāda of the *Kārikā* refers to the experience of a Yogin of the highest class, who attains the supreme state of realization and looks at the whole objective world as identical with his own Self. In that state, he does not make any distinction between himself and others, who appear to him as his own creation. Such Yogin does not manifest the determinate knowledge of things at all.[15] In all cases, viz., in the case of ordinary men as well as Yogins, the knowledge of the former experiences (perceptions) is unified in their soul, the lasting consciousness, not that the former experiences play the role of object in remembrance and, hence, stand apart from the rememberer (the Self).[16] As a matter of fact, the Self is the knower of different cognitions or experiences and has the power of recalling the knowledge of remote experiences, past as well as future, of itself as well as others.

It may be admitted, the opponent says, that, in certain exceptional cases, like Yogins, the former experience (perception) does not shine apart from the subject in remembrance, as it is resting on his self-consciousness (*aham-bhāva*), but in the case of common people, the cognitions are not unified in their self-consciousness, they resort to the objects perceived externally as "this". To this objection the teacher replies: The particular experience in which one remembers, "I had that perception before", in which the former perception appears apart from remembrance (*bhedataḥ*) as its object, is only an analysis of the remembrance, 'it was seen by me before." He remembers that this is the same experience that he had before. It is the experience of common people that a person remembers that he had the knowledge of the past perception just as (*evam*) he remembers it now (on the later occasion) (*sā dṛk me evam āsīt iti api smaryate*). This later knowledge, i.e., the knowledge of the later experience (remembrance), is a different exposition (*vyākaraṇam*) of the past knowledge, i.e., the knowledge of the former experience (perception), as is denoted by the words: '*mayā dṛṣṭam iti*' (the object was seen by me before) (*tad asya 'mayā dṛṣṭam' iti smṛteḥ bedataḥ vyākaranam eva*).[17] This shows that the knowledge of the former perception is one

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15. प्राप्तप्रकर्षस्तु सर्वम् आत्मत्वेन पश्यन् स्वसृष्टमेव स्वपरविभागं पश्यति इति ज्ञानस्य न योगिज्ञानेन प्रकाश्यता। *Ibid.*

16. न तु एतन्निदर्शनेऽनुभवस्मृत्योर्ग्राह्यग्राहक भावः इति। *Ibid.*, fn. 121.

17. स्मर्यते यद्दृगासीन्मे सैवमित्यपि भेदतः।
तद्व्याकरणमेवास्या मयादृष्टमिति स्मृतेः॥ *IPK* I, iv, 6,

with the knowledge of the later remembrance, i.e., they are unified in self-consciousness.

Another objection is raised by the opponent ; he says, if one looks at things indeterminately without taking special notice of anything particular determinately (*nirvikalpena yāvat parāmṛṣṭam vinā*), there is no remembrance of anything possible, just as when one looks at trees, plants, grass and leaves on the way while going to some place. So long as there is no determinate perception of anything, i.e., so long as the indeterminate knowledge of a thing does not shine as 'this' (object), there can be no remembrance of it. The opponent wants to lay stress again on the point that the former perception is separate from remembrance and, as such, it has to be accepted as the object of the latter. The teacher replies to this objection as follows : Whether one takes the form of determinate knowledge (experience) to be as expressed : 'I see this" or "this is the jar", it is one with the knowing subject (*pramata*), the self-consciousness, resting in it as indeterminate knowledge (*nirvikalpakam anubhavanam*).[18] The teacher means to say that whether the knowledge be determinate or indeterminate, it is ultimately indeterminate being unified in the knower. The determinate knowledge of the former experience (perception), as a matter of fact, rests on the knowing subject in the form of indeterminate knowledge, and, in the later state (remembrance), it is revived again as determinate knowledge. All cognitions are, therefore, inseparable from the Self and are invariably dependent upon it.[19]

To sum up the dissertation, the teacher says, the perceiver (subject) experiences various cognitions in the orders denoted by the expressions : "is seen by me" (or 'I see'), "was seen by me" (or 'I saw'), "this" and "that". They fall into two categories, as knowers (*grāhaka*) and the known (*grāhya*). Both of them shine in the subject, in their essential nature.[20] The teacher means to say that all objects are manifested by the Supreme Self in two

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18, या च पश्याम्यहमिमं घटोऽयमिति वाऽवसा ।
मन्यते समवेतं साप्यवसातरि दर्शनम् ॥ *IPK* I, iv, 7.

19, अत एव आत्मनोऽमी विकल्पाद्याः शक्तिविशेषाः
तद्विश्रान्तशरीरत्वात् इति दर्शितम् ॥ *IPV* I, 145.

20, तन्मया दृश्यते दृष्टोऽयं स इत्यामृशत्यपि ।
ग्राह्यग्राहकताभिन्नावर्थौ भातः प्रमातरि ॥ *IPK* I, iv, 8,

main divisions, the limited perceivers (*grāhaka*) and the objects perceived (*grāhya*), which are ultimately identical (*abhinnau*) with Him.

Abhinavagupta divides all cognitions into twenty-two categories (*dvā-viṁśatiḥ-saṁvedana-bhedāḥ*), according to the differences in the various experiences of the perceiver (*Pramāta*). A perception (*anubhava*) is of two forms. (1) Sometimes it is preceded by self-consciousness, which remains predominant in it (*svātma-parāmarśa-pūrvakam*). In this case the stress is on the subject as denoted by "*mayā-dṛśyate*"; it is still at the level of indeterminate knowledge (*yatra asya abhisaṁdhi-pradhānatā*). (2) Sometimes the subject perceives the object primarily (*kadācit anubhavanīyam eva pradhānatayā parāmṛśati*). In this case stress is laid on the object as in "this". It assumes the form of the determinate knowledge of the object (*arthānubhavaḥ*). In this case also there is the light of self-consciousness (*tatrāpi ca prakāśa-parāmarśo'styeva*). Remembrance consists of two experiences, the past perception (*pūrvānubhavaḥ*) as denoted by "*dṛṣṭa iti*" and the later experience denoted by "*sa iti*" (*dṛṣṭa iti sa iti ca ubhaya-parāmarśa-mayī smṛtiḥ*). As every perception is of two forms, so remembrance consisting of two experiences (*anubhavas*) falls into four categories (*iti catvāraḥ smaraṇa-bhedāh*). Recognition is the unification of the two experiences: remembrance (*smaraṇa*) and perception (*anubhava*) (*pratyabhijñānam api etad ubhaya-melanātmakam ; smaraṇa-anubhavayor-melanātmakam*). Recognition, therefore, falls into eight categories, since the four categories of remembrance will multiply into eight because of the two different forms of perception (*smṛtānubhūta-melanātmakena pratyabhijñānena aṣṭatvam*). These eight categories are further multiplied by two, since each of them has two forms according as the former or the later experience predominates.[21] Thus recognition has sixteen forms. Adding up the two forms of perception, the four forms of remembrance and the sixteen forms of recognition, there are twenty-two forms of cognition (*tad ete dvā-vimśatiḥ samvedana-bhedāḥ*).[22]

In these twenty-two forms of cognition, the objects are not outside the light of the subject, otherwise they will not be manifested. They are also separate from the subject. Thus, there are limited perceivers (*grāhakas*) as well as objects (*grāhyas*), all of them being included into the 'category of objects' (*artha-rāśiḥ*). They are separate from one

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21. पूर्वापरविश्रान्तिकृतात् प्रत्येकं द्विधाभेदाच्च षोडशधा । *IPV* I, 148.

22. *IPV* I, 147-48.

another and also separate from the real subject, the Supreme Being. The limited perceiver (*grāhaka*) is called *Māyā-pramātā*, because its essential characteristic is the limited light that shines (functions) through body and mind. All these pairs of limited perceivers and the objects perceived are manifested by the Supreme Lord (*Parameśvara*) as separate from Him, though not altogether different from His self-luminous nature, just like reflections on a clean surface of a mirror (*vimala-makurasthānīye*). This emanation of the objective world, consisting of limited subjects and objects, constitutes His powers of perception and remembrance.[23]

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23. एवं सममेव स्वात्मनि विमलमकुरस्थानीये यत् युगलकं स्वस्मात् प्रकाशरूपात् अव्यतिरिक्तम् अवभासयति परमेश्वरः तदेव एतत् भगवतो ज्ञानकर्तृत्वं, स्मरणकर्तृत्वं ।

IPV I, 149,

CHAPTER XIII

POWER OF KNOWLEDGE

Jñāna-śakti-nirūpanam.

In Pratyabhijñā, the power of Knowledge (*Jñāna-Śakti*) means the faculty of cognition, comprehension, sentiency, conscious activity and the light of the Self (*Prakāśa*). The power of perception (*anubhava*) is a form of power of knowledge (*jñāna-śakti rūpaḥ*). On this power depends the power of Remembrance (*Smaraṇa-Śakti*), the nature and function of which is discussed above. The power of Knowledge (*Jñāna-Śakti*) is explained in the system as follows :—

In this context, the teacher lays down the doctrine that all the objects directly perceptible to the perceiving subjects (*Pramātā*) exist in their real nature within the Self (*Ātman*) and are projected outward as manifestations (*ābhāsāḥ*). The power of knowledge (*Jñāna-Śakti*) functions in making objects manifest externally in the form of their perceptions, which, in reality, indwell in self-consciousness. By virtue of this power, the Self takes out for separate manifestation only certain things from the unlimited mass which lies merged in it (*svarūpād-unmagnam-ābhāsayati*), that is to say, it isolates some objects and manifests them externally, emerged, as it were, from the ocean of light (*prakāśa*) of consciousness.[1] This doctrine is supported in the system by the following reasoning.

It has already been stated that perception (*anubhava*) is the very life of remembrance, determinate knowledge, etc. (*smaraṇa-vikalpādīnām anubhava eva jīvitam*). The teacher, therefore, explains the nature of perception. He says, the external manifestation of the objects, which are directly perceptible, as separate from the perceiver, can only be possible on the ground that they exist within the Self (*antaḥ-sthitavatām eva*).[2] In support of this view the teacher says, if the object were lacking the light of the subject, it

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1. The real nature of objects, according to this view, is *Prakāśa* (light of the subject)—(प्रकाश एव अर्थानां स्वरूपम्).

2. वर्तमानावभासानां भावानामवभासनम् ।
अन्तःस्थितवतामेव घटते बहिरात्मना । *IPK* I. v, 1.

would remain unmanifest (*arthaḥ prakāśatmatayā vinā*[3] *aprakāśaḥ syāt*), even as it was before (*prāg-iva*). The light of the subject cannot be different from that of the object (*na ca prakāśo bhinnaḥ syāt*)[4]. The light of the subject is, therefore, the very essence of a thing (*prakāśatā arthasya ātmā*).[5] It is not possible to say even in doubt that knowledge pertaining to an object is separate from the light of the subject (self-consciousness).[6] If we think that the knowledge of an object is apart from that object, say a jar or cloth, then it will not be possible to cognise it. Unless the know-ledge of each different object rests on the subject (*svātman*), practical life would become impossible.[7] The teacher, therefore, holds the view that knowledge is one, not diverse, and it is not apart from the object. To prove this, he says, if the light of the subject be different from the object (*bhinne prakāśe*) and remains as one in itself (*abhinne ca*), i.e., if it remains without variety or distinction in respect of different objects, it would result, then, in the confusion of one object with another (*saṅkāro viṣayasya tat*). Therefore, the object, that is made manifest, has the light of the subject as its essential nature (*prakāśyo 'rtho prakāśatmā*). For, what is not light, i.e., what is not known by a perceiver, cannot be said to exist (*aprakāśaśca na siddhyate*).[8]

An objection is raised against the above-said view by the Pūrvapakṣin, Bāhyārthānumeya-vādin, a school of Buddhists, who believe in the existence of inferable external objects. According to them, all the worldly transac-tions, connected with *Pramāṇa* (perception), are dependent upon determi-nate cognition and that is possible only because there is the direct percep-tion of an external object which has the nature of mere reflection of *Pravṛti-vijñāna* (consciousness) that is changing and momentary, but the *Vijñāna* (*bodha*) remains really as one. So the Pūrvapakṣin says, if the light of consciousness (*bodha*) be assumed to be without diversity in itself, it cannot be the cause of variety in manifestation (in determinate cogni-

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3. प्रमातृसंज्ञाप्रकाश-स्वरूपतां विना । *Pvr.* p. 14.

4. स्वातम—'प्रकाश.' अर्थस्वरूपात् 'भिन्नश्च न स्यात्' । (*S*).

5. आत्मप्रकाशता अर्थस्य आत्मा भवति । (*S*) ; *IPK* I, v, 2.

6. तस्मात् भिन्नः प्रकाशोऽर्थस्य संबन्धी भवति इति संभावनैव (शङ्कापि) नास्ति । *IPV* I, 158. See fn. 32.

7. प्रकाशश्च यदि घटेऽन्यः पटेऽन्यः तदा अनुसंधानस्य अयोगः—द्वयोः प्रकाशयोः स्वात्ममात्र-पर्यवसानात् इति वितत्य उपपादितं 'नश्येत् जनस्थितिः' इत्यत्र । *Ibid.*

8. *IPK* I, v, 3.

tion).[9] Therefore, this variety in manifestations, being without any perceptible cause (i.e., mere accidental affections), leads to the inference of external objects.[10] He further says, the rise of *Vāsanā* (*vāsanā-prabodhaḥ*) which, according to the view of the Vijñāna-vādin, is nothing else but the residual traces of impressions (*saṁskāra*), cannot be taken to be the cause of variety in manifestations. For, then the question will arise, 'What is the cause of variety in the rise of *vāsanā* (*tat-prabodhasya vaicitre kim nibandhanam*) ?'[11] The teacher denounces the point of view of the opponent who upholds the separate and independent existence of the external objects. He first weakens the supposition of the Pūrvapakṣin. He says, there may be the possibility of admitting the existence of objects (*syād etat*), but there is another possibility also, that is, since all transactions are performed by means of the various manifestations, what is then the use of admitting the external objects, whose existence cannot be established by any reason ?[12]

In the *Vimarśini*, various reasons are given to establish the existence of external objects, according to Bāhyārtha-vādins. The manifestation (*prakāśa*) of an object as identical with the self-luminous Self (*Svātman*) leads to the confusion with regard to the difference of objects from one another, as one is '*nīla*' (blue) and the other is '*pīta*' (yellow). The light of consciousness has no variety in itself. Therefore, says the Pūrvapakṣin, we have to admit the possibility of existence of the external objects. According to Pratyabhijñā, it is the nature of the light of consciousness (*Prakāśa*) to manifest various objects, as different from one another. The Sautrāntika (Buddhist) explains the variety of objects as due to reflection in the *Vijñāna* (mind), the Śaivātma-vādin refutes this on the ground that reflection implies the existence of an object that is reflected

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9. न ह्यभिन्नस्य बोधस्य विचित्राभासहेतुता ॥ *IPK* I, v, 4b.
'अभिन्नस्य'—अविचित्रस्य । (*S*).

10. तत्तदाकस्मिकाभासो बाह्यं चेदनुमापयेत् । *Ibid.*, 4a.
'आकस्मिकाभासः'—अज्ञातहेतूद्भवाभासः । *Ibid.*, fn. 65.

11. न वासनाप्रबोधोऽत्र विचित्रो हेतुतामियात् ।
तस्यापि तत्प्रबोधस्य वैचित्र्ये किं निबन्धनम् ॥ *Ibid.*, 5.
'अत्र'—अर्थाभासवैचित्र्ये । (*S*).

12. स्यादेतदवभासेषु तेष्वेवावसिते सति ।
व्यवहारे, किमन्येन बाह्येनानुपपत्तिना ॥ *Ibid.*, 6.
'अवसिते'—समाप्ते । *Ibid.*, fn. 171.

in the mind. But the supposition of an object other than mind (*Vijñāna*) is contradictory to the doctrine of Vijñāna-vādins. On the other hand, the Vijñāna-vādin explains the diversity of manifestations as caused by the rise of *Vāsanā* (*vāsanā-prabodhaḥ*). *Vāsanā* is a technical term which generally means 'the knowledge derived from memory', or 'the impression of pervious perception in the consciousness'.[13] But the question arises, upon what depends the rise of *vāsanā* that causes diversity in the manifestations? We may have, therefore, to resort to the theory of the Bāhyārtha-vādin. The teacher is not inclined to accept the Bāhyārtha-vadin's view. He says, it is no use to seek reasons for establishing the existence of external objects, as practical life (*loka-vyavahāra*) is accomplished by manifestations only.[14] Our view, on the other hand, is that external objects have no independent existence apart from their knowledge or luminousness (*prakāśad-bhinnaḥ*). It is not possible to admit separate and independent existence of the objects, for, in that case, absence of luminousness (*prakāśābhāvaḥ*) will have to be attributed to them, which is counter to our doctrine. Besides, it is not possible to prove that the 'whole' (*avayavī*, consisting of parts) exists in parts by the relation of inherence (*samavāya-siddhi*).[15] Also, we cannot accept the atomic theory of Vaiśeṣikas, according to which the external objects are made of combinations of atoms and the aggregates of objects are composed of the binary and the tertiary compounds produced from atoms. These theories fail to prove the existence of objects.[16] Therefore, in reality, there remains nothing extern[al] (*iti na kiñcit avaśiṣyate bāhyam tattvataḥ*).

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13. 'स्मृतिजनकः संस्कारो वासना' इति तावत् प्रसिद्धम् । *IPV* I, 167.
न तु अपूर्वानुभवजनकः स्मृतेरनुभवमूलत्वात् । *Ibid*, fn. 81.

14. आभासैरेव तैः भवता अभ्युपगतैः व्यवहारसिद्धेः, न हि नित्यानुमेयेन कश्चित् व्यवहार इति किं बाह्येन । *IPV* I, 178.
सत्यपि बाह्येऽर्थे तत्समर्पितेषु आभासेष्वेव व्यवहारसिद्धेः । *Ibid*.. fn. 179.

15. अभ्युच्चयबाधकास्तु अवयविनो वृत्त्यनुपपत्तिः, समवायासिद्धिः । *Ibid*.
(i) अभ्युच्चयबाधकः— अधिका बाधकाः ।
(ii) समवाय—अवयवेषु अवयवी वर्तते । *Ibid*. fns. 183,184.

16. अणुसंचयबाह्यवादेऽपि संचयस्य अन्यस्य अभावे अणव एव, ते च यदि संयुज्यन्ते निरन्तरतया तत् अवश्यं दिग्भागभेदः । *IPV* I, 179.
तत्र यदि सान्तरा परमाणवः तददृश्यता, संचयस्यावधिनियमाभावः, अर्थक्रियानुपयोगः, धारणकर्षणाद्यभावः, आलोकपुञ्जघटयोरेकदेश एव दर्शनं, पार्थिवतैजसादिवस्त्वन्तरदृक्प्रसंग इति हि एते शतशो दोषाः । *Ibid*., fn. 190.

Now the teacher gives his own explanation about the existence of the external objects. He says, the Lord, the Supreme Being whose essential nature is sentience (*cidātman*), manifests externally all the objects which are within Him (*antaḥ sthitaṃ*), by the sovereignty of His will (*icchā-vaśāt*), without requiring any material cause (*nirupādānam*), 'like a Yogin, who brings into existence innumerable objects he desires to create, by mere power of his will, without recourse to any extraneous substance'.[17]

The opponent is, now, put into doubt whether the external objects are like reflections in the mirror of *Vijñāna* (consciousness), in which case some external objects will have to be supposed to be the cause of variety, or are like the creations of a Yogin from his mere power of will, and so we will have to admit the power of freedom of *Samvid* to be the only cause of manifestations of objects. He is, therefore, inclined to establish the existence of external objects by inference. The teacher refutes the possibility of inference regarding the existence of external objects as follows: Inference is not possible with respect to things which have not been formerly perceived (*anābhāta-pūrve*). As for the senses, they have, of course, been cognised to some extent (*ābhātameva kiñcin mātram*),[18] because of the cognitions of manifestations (i.e., perceptions) of things like seed, etc., which are of the nature of cause (*bījādeḥ hetu-vastunaḥ ābhāsāt*).[19] The object that is outside the light of consciousness has never become manifest (externally) in any way. Therefore, its existence cannot be proved even by inference.[20] It is an established fact that all determinate cognitions (*vikalpas*), like inference, etc., are based on direct perception, but, with regard to external objects, we do not have the experience of a former perception and, as such, any inference with regard to external objects that is based on *vikalpa* is impossible.[21] We know by inference the existence

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17. चिदात्मैव हि देवोऽन्तः स्थितमिच्छावशाद्बहिः ।
योगीव निरुपादानमर्थजातं प्रकाशयेत् । *IPK* I, v, 7.

18. अनुमीयते किंचिन्मात्रं निमित्तम् । *Pvr.*, p. 17.
किंचिदुपलब्धेः कारणम् । *IPV* I. 188.

19. अनुमानमनाभातपूर्वे नैवेष्टमिन्द्रियम् ।
आभातमेव बीजादेराभासाद्धेतुवस्तुनः ।। *IPK* 1, v. 8.

20. आभासः पुनराभासाद्बाह्यस्यासीत्कथंचन ।
अर्थस्य नैव, तेनास्य सिद्धिर्नाप्यनुमानतः ।। *Ibid.*, 9.
—'आभासाद्' बाह्यस्य—चिदात्मप्रकाशाद् बाह्यस्य । (*S*).

21. अनाभाते च नास्ति विकल्परूपस्य अनुमानस्य व्यापारः । *IPV* I, 190.

of the senses because of the perception of the objects. Just as in the instances like "seed is the cause of plant" and "thread is the cause of cloth", the relation of cause and effect is to be ascertained with the help of perception and non-perception [22] We cannot ascertain the existence of external objects by any such means of right knowledge.[23] Besides, the existence of anything that is outside the light of consciousness, cannot be established by any means, like inference. The teacher, therefore, lays stress on the principle that everything external indwells in the Self. He says, the mass of the so-called objects is manifested only as resting within the Lord (Self) (*svāminaḥ ātma-samsthasya eva bhāva-jātasya bhāsanam asti*). Without that there will not be the rise of will, which is a kind of the determinate consciousness (*āmarśaḥ*), i.e., the first conscious activity to make externally manifest the objects from within. The process of creation or emanation from the Lord follows the illustration of potter who proceeds producing externally pots, etc., from his reflective (*icchāmarśaḥ*). And the act of creation is not possible witho reflective desire on the part of the Lord.[24] Thus, the teacher gives a reason in support of the view that everything is externally manifested by the Lord, that indwells within Him.

The opponent questions here, how the reflective desire (*parāmarśa*) being a *vikalpa* (a determinative process) be attributed to the Lord, who is of the nature of pure consciousness? The teacher says, sentiency (*vimarśa or āmarśa*), that is the autonomy of consciousness, is the very nature of the light of the subject. For, otherwise, though there be the reflection of the external objects in it, yet this light would be merely like insentient crystal, etc.[25] The teacher, now, lays stress on sentiency

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22. तथा च बीजात् अङ्कुरः तन्तुभ्यः पटः इत्यादौ कार्यकारणभावः प्रत्यक्षानुपलम्भबलन तावत् निश्चेयः। *IVP* I, 188.

23. तदियं व्याप्तिः अनुमानमनाभाते विषये न भवति विकल्परूपत्वात् ... ... *Ibid*., fn 242.

24. स्वामिनश्चात्मसंस्थस्य भावजातस्य भासनम्।
अस्त्येव, न विना तस्मादिच्छामर्शः प्रवर्तते ॥ *IPK* I, v, 10.

(i) आत्मसंस्थस्य 'आत्मनीवाभेदेन' वर्तमानस्य। *Pvr*., p. 17, (*S*).

(ii) कुम्भकृतो 'घटं करवाणि' इति इच्छाशब्दवाच्यः परामर्शः प्रवर्तते, तद्वत् ईश्वरस्य निर्मातृतामयो विमर्श इच्छारूप. स्यादेव। (*S*).

25. स्वभावमवभासस्य विमर्शं विदुरन्यथा।
प्रकाशोऽर्थोपरक्तोऽपि स्फटिकादिजडोपमः। *IPK* I, v, 11.

(i) अवभासस्य— आत्मप्रकाशस्य। (*S*).

of the Self or freedom of consciousness. He says, the Self is sentiency (*caitanya*), the implied sense of which is the sentient activity (*cit-kriyā*) or the liberty in respect of conscious activity (*citi-kartṛtā*). It is, therefore, said (in Āgamas) that the Self (*Ātman*) is distinct from the insentient (*jaḍāt sa hi vilakṣaṇaḥ*).[26] It is stated in the *Śiva-sūtras* that *Ātman* is of the nature of *cit* or consciousness (*caitanyam ātmā*). *Citi* is an essential characteristic of *Ātman*. It comprises *cit-kriyā* or *vimarśa*, i.e., the creative thought, and also *citi-kartṛtā*, i.e., the sovereignty of the creative desire (*svātantrya*).[27] In the *Yoga-sūtras*, Patanjali says, 'The power of sentiency does not undergo any change' (*citi-śaktir-apariṇāminī*).

Ātman is said to possess, as its essential characteristics, light or luminosity (*Prakāśa*) and thought (*Vimraśa*) and, as such, it is distinct from insentient. The question arises here, how is the existence of insentients to be explained, if non-luminosity (*aprakāśa*) and lack of thought (*avimarśa*) be attributed to them, which distinguish them from the sentient. With this question in mind the teacher says: The creative thought (*pratyavamarśa*) is the very life of sentiency (*citiḥ pratyavamarś-ātma*). It is the Transcendental Word (*parā-vāk*), which ever shines with its self-dependent sentient nature (*svarasoditā*). It is the freedom of consciousness (*svātantrya*). It is the chief power of the Supreme Self (*tad-aiśvaryam paramātmanaḥ*).[28] It is the eternal stir (*sphurattā*), the Supreme Reality (*mahā-sattā*). It is beyond the limitations of time and place (*deśa-kāla-aviśeṣiṇi*). This (*citiḥ*), being the essence of all (*sāra*), is spoken of as the heart (the resting place) of the highest Lord (Self) (*hṛdayam parameṣṭhinaḥ*).[29] The teacher further says, *Citi* being of such nature, in reality, no distinction can be made between the sentient and

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26. आत्मात एव चैतन्यं चित्क्रिया चितिकर्तृता ।
तात्पर्येणोदितस्तेन जडात्स हि विलक्षणः । *Ibid.*, 12.

27. चितिक्रिया च चितौ कर्तृता, स्वातन्त्र्यं संयोजनवियोजनानुसंधानादिरूपम् आत्ममात्रतायामेव (चितावेव)... । *IPV* I, 202.

Activity in consciousness consists of freedom in uniting, separating and holding together (manifestations).

28. चितिः प्रत्यवमर्शात्मा परा वाक्स्वरसोदिता ।
स्वातन्त्र्यमेतन्मुख्यं तदैश्वर्यं परमात्मनः ।। *IPK* I, v, 13.

29. सा स्फुरत्ता महासत्ता देशकालाविशेषिणी ।
सैषा सारतया प्रोक्ता हृदयं परमेष्ठिनः ।। *Ibid.*, 14.

the insentient. Because of this stir (*spanda*) or power of creative thought (*Vimarśa-Śakti*), the Self makes Himself as the object of knowledge (*jñeyī kuryāt*). The objects have no separate existence (*jñeyam tu na pṛthak-sthiti*). If it be contrary to that (*tad-aunmukhyāt*), his freedom would be lost (shattered) (*asya svatantratā khaṇḍeta*).[30] From the freedom of His own, He who is one without a second (*advayātmanaḥ svātantryāt*), the Lord (Self), creates Himself in the form of various subjects and objects, as separate from Himself (*ātmānam nirmāya*); thus He does not lose His freedom (*svātantryāmuktam ātmānam*), and carries the transactions of the world by the desires of the created beings like *Īśa* and others (*īśādi-saṁkalpai vyavahārayet*)[31]

As stated above, *Citi*, the conscious principle (the subject), is of the nature of *Pratyavamarśa*. It is free consciousness which is all-powerful. It identifies others (*param*) with itself and itself with others (i.e., objects), merges both into one and denies both, which have been merged into one.[32] In its essential nature, *Pratyavamarśa* is the inner speech (*Parāvāk*). The term implies the conversation of *Ātman* (soul) with itself, going within, before its external manifestation is unveiled (*avicchinna camatkārātmakam*) as expressed in language. *Parāvāk* refers to the Transcedental Word which is free from objective relation. The power of speech (*pratyavamarśa*) is impossible without the power of thought (*vimarśa*). As *Citi* (*vimarśa*) is the soul or life of the expressed speech (*śabda*), so it is also called *Parā Vāk* (the Transcendental Word). This *Citi* (sentiency) is eternal and shines independently (*svarasoditā – svarasena cidrūpatayā anastamitā–sadoditā*). It is the autonomy of consciousness (*svātantrya*), i.e., the Self is endowed with sovereignty of power or self-dependent power. *Parā* means infinite or all-pervading (*pūrṇatvāt parā*) and *Vāk* implies that this world existed first in the Transcendental word which is identical with thought (*vakti viśvam alapati pratyavamarśena iti vāk*). All the limited perceivers included in the category of objects (*bhāva-rāśau*) also derive their limited powers from the *Citi* (the Transcendental Self). In the principal Āgamas, this *Citi* is stated to be the Absolute Existence

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30. आत्मानमत एवायं ज्ञेयीकुर्यात्पृथक्स्थिति ।
ज्ञेयं न तु तदौन्मुख्यात्खण्ड्येतास्य स्वतन्त्रता ॥ *Ibid.*, 15.

31. स्वातन्त्र्यामुक्तमात्मानं स्वातन्त्र्यादद्वयात्मनः ।
प्रभुरीशादिसंकल्पैर्निर्माय व्यवहारयेत् ॥ *Ibid.*, 16.

32. विमर्शो हि सर्वंसहः परमपि आत्मीकरोति, आत्मानं च परीकरोति, उभयम् एकीकरोति, एकीकृतं द्वयमपि न्यग्भावयति इत्येवं स्वभावः । *IPV* I. 205.

(*mahā-sattā*), all-pervading and eternal, uneffected by the limitations of time and place. The world is the expansion of the *mahā-sattā*, hence it is called *sphurattā*. It is the essence (*sāra*) of all that exists. It is said to be the heart (*hṛdayam*) of the Transcendental Self. In the Āgamas, *hṛdaya* implies the supreme power of *Vimarśa* (*idam eva hṛdayam vimarśa-rūpam...tatra tatra abhidhīyate*). The power of thought or reflective activity (*Vimarśa-Śakti*), called also '*parā-vāk-śakti-mayam*', is ultimately the origin of all, as it is said, '*yat sāram asya jagataḥ sā śaktir mālinī parā*'. Although the Supreme Self possesses innumerable powers, yet it is His power of *Vimarśa* that brings forth objects from Himself, which are not apart from Him (*avyatirikta*). If the objects be supposed to be apart from the Self, then his *svātantrya* (self-dependent power) will cease, as He will be dependent upon other things (*anyādīnatvam pāratantryam asya āniyate*). The Lord (Self) manifests Himself in two ways, one in the form of sentient objects which are full of power of freedom (*svātantrya-yuktatābhāsanena*) and the other in the form of insentient objects (*svātantrya-śūnyatābhāsanena*). Both the kinds of objects, being identical with the Self, are manifested by Him by virtue of His power of *Vimarśa*, which is His chief power (*vimarśa-śakti balāt...saiva pradhānam*).[33]

Here the question arises, how is it that the created beings like *Īśa* or other gods are not devoid of freedom (*svātantrya*)? Freedom is the nature of Self as denoted by "I"-consciousness. *Īśa* and other created beings are as good as insentient objects like stones, etc., being thought of the order of "this", i.e., being reduced to the level of objects, as such, they are lacking freedom. So the Pūrvapakṣin asks, how do you account for the freedom of *Īśa* and other gods? The teacher says, the Lord, the Supreme Self, does not become different in the form of gods like *Īśa* and other created beings (*na asya anyatātmanaḥ*) because of the difference in their mental attitudes, i.e., *saṅkalpas* or *vimarśa* (*ahantādi-parāmarśa bhedāt*). Their freedom is intact, because the mental attitudes of these created beings, gods and others, are one with "I"-consciousness of the Supreme Self, i.e., the Universal Consciousness (*asya sṛṣṭeḥ aham-mṛśyatayaiva*). The teacher explains this idea by the analogy of the 'consciousness of the meaning of a noun, derived from a root' which 'rests on the consciousness of the action, as represented by the personal termina-

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33. तस्मात् स्वातन्त्र्यशून्यताभासनेन स्वातन्त्र्ययुक्तताभासनेन च यत् इदम् उभयं ज्ञेयम् आत्मरूपमेव परमेश्वरो भासयति तत् (भासनम्) विमर्शशक्तिबलात् एव, इति सैव प्रधानम् इति।
IPV I, 217.

tion."[34] On the basis of this idea, even the so-called insentient objects are also not devoid of *svātantrya*, for the existence of the object is not apart from the existence of the subject. When we say, "*nīlam idam*" (this is the blue object), we mean to say, "*aham vedmi 'nīlam idam'* " (I know this is the blue object). According to this view, the objects are not devoid of *svātantrya*, the essential characteristic of which is *aham-parāmarśa* (self-consciousness). Thus, there ultimately exists no gulf between the subject and the object.[35]

It has been established above that all thoughts of all the created beings, in reality, rest in one pure "I"-consciousness (*aham-parāmarśa*), which is the essence (*tattva*) of all cognitions. This *aham-parāmarśa* has perception and remembrance, etc., as its powers and perception has variety of forms such as certainty (*nirṇaya*), doubt (*saṁśaya*), etc. Accordingly, the material objects are also of various kinds. The teacher now explains how one and the same thought (*aham-parāmarśa*) functions in variety of forms corresponding to various kinds of objects. He says, the power of *Vimarśa* or *Citi* which is *aham-vimarśa-mayī* (self-consciousness), by coming within the range of various objects, which are separated from the Lord (the Supreme Self) by His power of Māyā, is called by different names such as perception (*jñāna*), imagination or thought (*saṅkalpa*), ascertainment or decision (*adhyavasāya*), etc., and thus assumes the various forms of determinate consciousness.[36] At the time of indeterminate experiences, like the first experiences of boys, etc., also there exists the determinate consciousness. If there be no determinate consciousness, not even in a subtle form, in these experiences, there will be no possibility of running, etc.[37] The Pūrvapakṣin questions here, *Vimarśa* or *Pratyavamarśa* cannot be admitted to be present in the first experiences (*sākṣatkāra-kṣaṇe*) as, for instance, in the case of small boys learning

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34. नाहन्तादिपरामर्श-भेदादस्यान्यतात्मनः ।
अहंमृश्यतयैवास्य सृष्टेस्तिङ्वाच्यकर्मवत् ॥ *IPK* I, v, 17.

35. अनेन नीलादेः अपि, इदं नीलम् इति मध्यपरामर्शेऽपि मूलपरामर्शे अहमित्येव विश्रान्तेः आत्ममयत्वम् उपपादितमेव । नीलम् इदम् अहं वेद्मि इति, अहं-प्रकाशे इति हि इयत्तत्त्वम् ।
IPV I, 221.

36. मायाशक्त्या विभोः सैव भिन्नसंवेद्यगोचरा ।
कथिता ज्ञानसंकल्पाध्यवसायादिनामभिः ॥ *IPK* I, v. 18.

37. साक्षात्कारक्षणेऽप्यस्ति विमर्शः कथमन्यथा ।
धावनाद्युपपद्येत प्रतिसंधानवर्जितम् ॥ *Ibid*., 19.

the meaning of such expressions as "*gām ānaya, naya*, etc.", but the first experiences in their case must be due to remembrance arising from the impressions (*saṁskāra*) of such experiences which they had in their previous lives (*atha bālasya prāg-janma-anubhūta-saṁketa-smṛteḥ evam*).[38] In reply to this, the teacher says, *Vimarśa*, the determinate knowledge, is the essential nature (*svabhāva*) of *Citi* (self-consciousness).[39] Even in the first experiences of boys (*prathama anubhava samaye*) or in the acts of speaking or running quickly, *Vimarśa* is present. It cannot be supposed to be entirely lacking, although it may be present in a very subtle form. The Pūrvapakṣin states, it is possible that the subtle determinate consciousness may be present in the indeterminate in certain cases, as stated above. But, in other cases, the determinate consciousness is explicitly present, because of its grossness and also being denoted by certain indicatory words which appear as separate from the subject like other external objects. The question arises, how can the indicatory words be held as one with or non-separate (*apṛthakbhūtaḥ*) from the light of the subject, i.e., the indeterminate consciousness ?[40] In reply to this question the teacher says, the determinate knowledge (*adhyavasāya*) such as expressed by the words "this is the jar", is the potency of the highest Lord (Self) (*pareśa-śaktiḥ*), which is beyond the name and form, and always shines as one with the Self (*ātmeva—abhedena—bhāsate*) and never apart as object denoted by the word "this"(*na tu idantayā*).[41] The teacher clearly says that even the determinate knowledge, expressed by the words "this is the jar", rests in the indeterminate consciousness that is potent to utter the same for indicating the certain determinate knowledge (the perception of the object), implied. Although all cognitions rest in the one indeterminate consciousness or *aham-vimarśa* ("I"-consciousness), yet they appear, at the objective level, in diverse forms of determinate knowledge. This is what the teacher states in conclusion : Though *Citi* (consciousness)

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38. *IPV* I, p. 226.

39. विकल्पो हि प्रत्यक्षस्य व्यापार,...न च व्यापारः तद्वतो भिन्नो युक्तः, तत्स्वरूपभूतो हि सः *IPV* I, 228.

40. तत्र शब्दो नीलादिवत् एव पृथक् प्रतिभासते—नीलम् इदम् इति, स कथं प्रकाशस्वरूपात् अपृथग्भूतः स्यात् ? *IPV* I, 231.

41. घटोऽयमित्यध्यवसा नामरूपातिरेकिणी ।
परेश-शक्तिरात्मेव भासते न त्विदन्तया ॥ *IPK* I, v, 20.

is one and devoid of diversity (*akramā*), yet owing to the affection by temporal and spatial limitations of the variety of objects, it assumes diverse forms (becomes *sakramā*) as perception (*jñāna*), remembrance (*smṛti*), determinate knowledge (*avasāya*), etc.[42]

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42. केवलं भिन्नसंवेद्य-देशकालानुरोधतः ।
ज्ञानस्मृत्यवसायादि सक्रमं प्रतिभासते ॥ *Ibid.*, 21.

CHAPTER XIV

POWER OF DIFFERENTIATION

Apohana-śakti-nirūpanam.

Differentiation (*apohana*) is a determinative process (*vikālpa*) which implies certainty between two different things of contrary nature, such as between fire (*vahni*) and non-fire (*avahni*) or between jar (*ghaṭa*) and non-jar (*aghaṭa*) (*sa hi dvayākṣepī viniścayaḥ*). The power of Differentiation (*Apohana-Śakti*) is indispensable to all determinate knowledge (*vikalpa*).[1] By virtue of this power, the perceiver is capable of determining or ascertaining the manifestation of one object as different from that of another. It upholds both the former two powers, viz., the powers of Remembrance and Knowledge (*tad-ubhaya anugrāhiṇī apohana-śakti*). The determinative process (*vimarśa* or *vikalpa*) applies only to the worldly things, which are of the nature of diversity (*Māyā*), to whatever is related to speech. It cannot apply to the Self (*Ātman*) or the self-consciousness (*aham-pratyavamarśaḥ*), the essential nature of which is light (*prakāśātmā*), although it is embodied in speech (*vāg-vapuḥ*), but that is the transcendental speech (*parā*), the inner speech which is one with *saṁvid* (*saṁvid-rūpāveśi*) and ever shines within (*antara-avabhāsamānaḥ*) ; it is different from that sound which is of the nature of an object and, as such, is the object of the sense of hearing.[2] In determinacy many images are constructed in the mind and one particular manifestation is differentiated from all else, which was first doubted.[3] So the teacher says that the nature of determinacy cannot be attributed to the self-consciousness (*aham-*

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1. The determinative process begins with the selection by the mind (*Manaḥ*) of some points out of the mass reflected on the *Buddhi*. It is like carving an image out of a big stone. It consists in a reaction of the mind on the sense data recorded (to speak figuratively) on the *Buddhi*, in making a selection of certain group of points from the whole mass, in adding to the selected something from the old store of memory and in giving it a definite shape and name. (Pandey, *Abhinavagupta*, 1935, 282-83).

2. विषयरूपात् श्रोत्रग्राह्यात् शब्दादन्य एव अन्तरवभासमानः संविद्रूपावेशी शब्दनात्माभिलापो वागित्यनेनोक्तः । *IPK* I. 239-240.

3. विविधा कल्पना विविधत्वेन च शङ्कितस्य कल्पोऽन्यव्यवच्छेदनं विकल्पः । *Ibid.*

pratyavamarśaḥ) which is the very life or essence of the light of consciousness (*prakāśātmā*), even though it is embodied in the transcendental speech (*vāg-vapuḥ*), because determinacy is certainty, which depends upon two objects, say a jar and non-jar.[4] It is possible that there appears manifestation of both jar and non-jar, which are essentially different from each other, in place of one and the same object due to imperfect perception, and the perceiver determines or ascertains it to be the manifestation of one object as different from another. But nothing else shines like the light of consciousness (subject), that is different from that (*bhedinaḥ*), i.e., which is not-light.[5] The act of determinacy cannot, therefore, apply to the Self (*Ātman*) which is of the nature of light (*prakāśa*), since nothing contrary to light (*aprakāśa*), viz., of the nature of darkness, shines. Differentiation is not possible in such entities as *prakāśa* (light) and *aprakāśa* (darkness), which are contrary in nature, since the latter does not shine. For this reason, the essential nature of the Self, which is sentient (*cit*) and luminous (*prakāśa*), is only self-consciousness (*aham-pratyavamarśaḥ*) and not determinacy (*vikalpa*).[6]

The Purvapakṣin asks the teacher to elucidate the process of differentiation, since we have not even heard of the name of *aghaṭa*, not to speak of its rejection. How can the impression or idea (*vāsanā*) of non-jar arise on perception of jar ?[7] This question can be put to the Buddhist, according to whom non-jar does not exist in any form. But according to us, says the teacher, both jar and non-jar do exist within the Self, so the differentiation of jar can arise by the rejection of non-jar appearing in one and the same object. He says, both "this" and "not-this" shine in the Self (*tat-atat-pratibhā-bhājā*). The subject feels the certainty of "this" (*tat-niścayanam*) by rejecting "not-this" (*atat-vyapohanāt*), and this is spoken of as the determinate knowledge

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4. अहं प्रत्यवमर्शो यः प्रकाशात्मापि वाग्वपुः ।
नासौ विकल्पः स ह्युक्तो द्वयाक्षेपी विनिश्चयः ॥ *IPK* I, vi, 1.

5. भिन्नयोरवभासो हि स्याद्घटाघटयोर्द्वयोः ।
प्रकाशस्येव नान्यस्य भेदिनस्त्ववभासनम् ॥ *Ibid.*, 2.

6. यस्त्वयं प्रकाशो नाम तस्य स्थाने यः संभाव्यते स तावद् अप्रकाशरूपो न भवति... ... यस्मात् एवं, ततो द्वयाभावादपोहासंभवे विकल्परूपत्वाभावात् चिन्मात्रे परामर्शात्मनि अहमिति प्रत्यवमर्श एव, न तु विकल्पः । *IPV* I, 242-43.

7. ... ...कथमघटस्य निषेधनं क्रियते, न ह्यघटस्य केनचिन्नामापि गृहीतम्, अघटवासनापि घटे दृष्टे कथंकारं प्रबुध्यताम् ? *IPV* 1, 243.

(*vikalpa*) as is denoted by the expression. "this is jar" (*ayam ghaṭaḥ*).[8] When the determinate knowledge of *ghaṭa* arises, i.e., when an object, say '*ghaṭa*', is perceived with certainty, it serves some practical purpose (*vyavahāra*). The term "*aghaṭa*" denotes various and numerous cognitions of different objects, which are rejected in the act of differentiation to get the determinate knowledge (*vikalpa*) of a particular object "*ghaṭa*."[9] On the other hand, in the state of indeterminacy (*avikalpa-daśāyām*), the object "*ghaṭa*", in its nature of *Cit* (conciousness), remains as one with the Universal Consciousness, and, as such, it serves no practical purpose of the world.[10]

The Pūrvapakṣin questions here, why cannot the process of determinacy or differentiation apply to self-consciousness (*aham-vimarśa*), as, in this, the consciousness of objects other than the Self (*an-aham-vimarśa*) gets negated? The teacher replies, the self-consciousness (*aham-iti-vimarśaḥ*) that gives up its sentient nature by the power of obscuration (*cit–tattvam māyaya hitvā*) and shines distinctly as limited subject (*pramātṛtvena avabhāti yaḥ*) within the limitations of the body, the intellect, the vital airs or the supposed voidness (*dehe buddhāv atha prāne kalpite nabhasīva vā*) is a determinate entity (*sa vikalpa eva*), no doubt, as it differentiates itself from others (*anya-vyapohanāt*). *Vikalpa* (determinacy) owes its being to manifestation or awareness of another thing, which is of opposite nature (*para-pratiyogyavabhāsajaḥ*).[11] Here the teacher offers the following explanation on the point at issue. *Aham-vimarśa*, in its pure aspect, does not imply determinacy, as it is not subject to the process of differentiation from its opposite entity *an-aham-vimarśa*. *Aham-vimarśa* (self-consciousness) has two aspects, the pure and the impure. The former is that *vimarśa* which relates to pure consciousness, the ultimate nature of the perceiving Self characterised by pure light (*prakāśa*). To this aspect of *aham-vimarśa*, determinacy cannot be attributed, since its opposite entity characterised by darkness (*aprakāśa*) cannot become manifest. The latter aspect, i.e., the impure

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8. तदतत्प्रतिभाभाजा मात्रैवातद्व्यपोहनात् ।
तन्निश्चयनमुक्तो हि विकल्पो घट इत्ययम् ।। *IPK* I, vi, 3.

9. Refer to fn. 3 above.

10. तदविकल्पदशायां चित्स्वभावोऽसौ घटः चिद्रदेव विश्वशरीरः पूर्णः, न च तेन (हेतोः) केचिद्व्यवहाराः । *IPV* I, 244.

11. *IPK* I, vi. 4-5.

aspect of *aham-vimarśa* is that which relates to the Self that comprises the body (*śarīra*), the mind (*buddhi*), the vital airs (*prāṇa*) and the void (*sūnya*) respectively, according to other different schools—*Dehātma-vādins*, *Vijñānātma-vādins*, *Prānātma-vādins* and *Śūnyātma-vādins*. The differentiation can apply to this aspect of *aham-vimarśa*, i.e., that relating to the body, the mind, the vital airs or the void, since their corresponding opposite entities, viz., *vimarśa* pertaining to the non-body, the non-mind, the non-'vital airs' and the non-void are also manifest, which can, therefore, be rejected in the process of differentiation. In this sense *aham-vimarśa*, in the impure sense, can imply the determinate knowledge (*vikalpa*) pertaining to the Self. This impure aspect of *aham-vimarśa*, arises by the power of *Māyā* that veils the pure nature of the Self, the self-luminous conscious entity.[12] According to some schools, like Śaṅkara's system, the veiling of the pure nature of the Self is a form of *bhrānti* (illusion), but Pratyabhijñā holds *Māyā-Śakti* as a self-dependent power of the Self (*Svātantrya-Śakti*). Hence the impure *aham-vimarśa* is a *vikalpa*, i.e., the determinate consciousness, of the Self as the body, etc.

At this stage, there arises a very important point. The *aham-vimarśa*, in its pure state, implies the two experiences, viz., the direct experience (*anubhava-mātra-rūpa*) relating to the Self as identical with the universal consciousness (*Śivātman*). This pure self-consciousness (of the nature of direct experience) is denoted by "*aham-iti*" (I am). The other experience is of the nature of unification or reflection (*anusaṁdhānātmā*) of the pure Self as immanent in the objective world, i.e., in the state of *Sadā-śiva*, as is denoted by the experience "*aham-idam-iti*" (I am this). The impure state of *aham-vimarśa* also, which relates to the body, etc., is similarly of two types. The first type of direct experience (*anubhava-mātra-rūpa*), in this impure state, is denoted by "*aham sthūlaḥ*" (I am fat) and the second type, i.e., the experienee of the nature of unification or reflection (*anusaṁdhānātmā*), is denoted by "*yo'ham sthūlo abhavam, so 'ham kṛśo ; yo 'ham bālaḥ, sa evādya yuvā......*" (I, who was fat, am now thin; I, who was a boy, am now grown up as a youngman, etc.). With regard to the latter experience, the Pūrvapakṣin doubts that, in the case of impure *aham-vimarśa*, in which there is the unification of the consciousness of the body, etc., with the pure self-consciousness (*anusaṁdhāna*), it may not be held as *vikalpa*. To this objection, the teacher replies : The association of the present distinct cognition with the

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12. तत् (शुद्धप्रकाशरूपस्य) अपहस्तने तु परमेश्वरस्य स्वात्मप्रच्छादनेच्छा-रूपाभेदाप्रकाशनं भ्रान्तिरूपं प्रति स्वातन्त्र्यरूपा मायाशक्तिर्हेतुः । *IPV* I, 249.

previous one, which takes place due to the past impressions (in the case of the limited subject), is also called *kalpana* (the determinate knowledge), which is particularly called *pratyabhijñā* (recognition), as it is also related to the body, etc., which shine separately as limited subjects (*bhinnāvabhāsinī*).[13] The experience *pratyabhijñā* is also a form of determinate knowledge (*kalpana*), which results from a process of differentiation, because, although in it there is unification of the present cognition with the former resting in the self-luminous *Cit* owing to past impression (*Saṁskāra*), it relates to the objective or limited Self, the body, the mind, etc., corresponding to the schools referred to above. In the pure state of *anusaṁdhāna* (unification), one experiences the identity of his pure Self with the objective world, but no *vikalpa*, on the other hand, in the impure state, one experiences *vikalpa* (determinative knowledge) relating to the Self as identified with the body, etc.

The teacher now arrives at his main doctrine. He says, ultimately all this universe comprising the experiences of the limited perceivers, the body, the mind, etc., are illumined by the light of consciousness (*samvid-prakāśa*), one self-luminous Universal Perceiver. That Perceiver which illumines the body, the mind, etc., (limited perceivers of the other schools), does not require another higher perceiver to illumine it (the former), then the latter perceiver will also need another higher perceiver for its illumination, which will lead to a progression of higher and higher perceivers, resulting in *regressus ad infinitum*.[14] So we must admit one and only one Perceiver, the Lord (*Prabhu*), who, even in practical life (*vyavahāre 'pi*), i.e., for practical purposes of the world, enters into the body, etc. (*dehādim-āviśan*) by his free will (*sva-icchayā*), and manifests externally (*bhāsayet bahiḥ*) the mass of objects, which shine within Him (*antara-bhāntam arthaugam*).[15] Thus it is established that even in practical life, i.e., in selling and purchasing, in witnessing a performance, in giving a lesson, etc., the Lord, the Supreme Perceiver, identifying Himself with the bodies and the vital airs, etc., of the limited perceivers, say *Caitra*, *Maitra*, etc., manifests externally,

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13. कादाचित्कावभासे या पूर्वाभासादियोजना ।
संस्कारात्कल्पना प्रोक्ता सापि भिन्नावभासिनि ॥ *IPK* I, vi. 6.

14. न च देहादीनां पूर्वपूर्वप्रमातृवेद्यता—येन प्रमातुरप्रकाशे प्रमेयं न भाति तत् (देहादि-प्रमातृ-) प्रकाशश्च न पूर्वप्रकाशं विना, सोऽपि न प्रमात्रन्तरप्रकाशं विना—इत्यनवस्था स्यात् । *IPV* I. 258.

15. तदेवं व्यवहारेऽपि प्रभुर्देहादिमाविशन् ।
भान्तमेवान्तरर्थौघमिच्छया भासयेद्बहिः ॥ *IPK* I, vi, 7.

as separate from one another, all the objects which shine within Him. This internality or the identity of the external objects with the Supreme Consciousness is not ultimately broken.[16] In this manner, the Lord, not only performs His five great functions, viz. *mahāsṛṣṭi* (great creation), *mahā-sthiti* (great sustenance), *mahā-pralaya* (great dissolution), *prakopa-tirodhāna* (obscuring Himself with ignorance, by His great anger) and *dikṣajñānadyanugraha* (showing favours by imparting the secret doctrine, and knowledge, etc.), but also performs the acts of ordinary living beings.[17]

Concluding the subject, the teacher says, it is thus established (*iti niścitam*) that everything shines within the Self (*antarābhāsaḥ sthitaḥ eva*) in all experiences like remembrance (*smṛtau*), determinate cognition which depends upon differentiation (*apohana-parāyaṇe vikalpe vā*) and perception (*jñāne va*).[18] *Antarābhāsaḥ* here implies the internal luminousness of the Self, the Supreme Consciousness, which is the real *Pramata* (Perceiver), within which rest all the limited subjects and objects. It does not refer to the body, the mind, the vital airs or the void as thought to be the real perceiver by different schools mentioned above. In perception, in which the objects are externally manifest, this external manifestation of that which is internal is natural (*naisargikaḥ, sahajaḥ*), i.e., is due to *svātantrya* (the self-dependent power). Perception is a direct experience independent of any other experience, unlike remembrance, etc., which depend upon other experiences like the former perception, etc.[19] In remembrance, etc., the manifestations arise from the residual traces of the previous perceptions. Hence, in the case of perception, the manifestation is distinct (*sphuṭa*) and, in the case of remembrance, etc., it is indistinct (*asphuṭa*).[20] In perception, the senses come in direct contact with the external objects, hence its manifestation is distinctly visible (*sphuṭa*)

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16. यत् किल प्रभुः परस्परं व्यवहारकाले क्रेयविक्रेयप्रेक्षाव्याख्यादौ चैत्रमैत्रादिसंबन्धिनो देहप्राणादीन् एकतया तावति आभासे आविशन् अन्तर्भान्तिमेव अनुज्झितान्तःप्रकाशमेव सन्तं बहिः एकाभासतया भासयति । *IPV* I, 261.

17. तेन न केवलं महासृष्टिषु महास्थितिषु महाप्रलयेषु प्रकोपतिरोधानेषु दीक्षाज्ञानाद्यनुग्रहेषु भगवतः कृत्यपञ्चकयोगः यावत् सततमेव व्यवहारेऽपि । *IPV* I, 262.

18. *IPK* I, vi, 8.

19. किन्तु नैसर्गिको ज्ञाने बहिराभासनात्मनि ।
पूर्वानुभवरूपस्तु स्थितः स स्मरणादिषु ।। *IPK* I, vi, 9.

20. ...इति सिद्धोऽनुभवस्मरणादौ आभासभेदः, अन्तराभासवर्गस्य बहिराभासनम् अव्यवधानेन स्फुटता, व्यवधानेन तु तात्कालिकत्वाभावात् अस्फुटता इति । *IPV* I, 268.

and natural (*naisargikaḥ*). It is not so in remembrance. In the determinate cognition (*vikalpa*) also, which is free in its working (*svaira-cāriṇa*), because it can manifest anything in any desired order or position within the range of the *Buddhi* (mind), the manifestation is natural, viz., self-dependent or independent of any other experience (*naisargikaḥ, svatantraḥ*). In *vikalpa*, i.e., imgery, etc., the manifestation is inborn in the internal mind and is thus independent of anything else like external objects, hence it is *svatantra* (self-dependent) and *svaira-cāriṇa* (free in its working). It is urged or stimulated by itself to work in any desired direction (*yathābhimata-saṁsthānābhāsanāt*), and remains confined within the mirror of the *buddhi*.[21] As all living beings have the capacity to manifest, in determinate knowledge, imagination, etc., all that is desired to be manifested (*yathābhīṣṭa-samullekhāvabhāsanāt*), it proves that they are endowed with the powers of knowledge and action.[22] In reality, every determinate cognition (*vikalpa*) is innate in the internal soul (*Ātman*) which possesses the potential powers of *jñāna* (knowledge) and *kriyā* (action). The *Jñāna-Śakti* is that which 'manifests' (*avabhāsana-rūpaḥ*) and *Kriyā-śakti* is that which 'evolves' (*ullekhana-rūpaḥ*). The former relates to the experiences in the internal consciousness and the latter refers to the evolution of manifestations of the external objects.

It is thus established that *Jñātṛtva-Śakti* (the Cognitive Power) of the Supreme Self (*Svātman*) functions in three distinct forms, as the powers of Remembrance, Knowledge and Differentiation, in the whole creation from *Brahma* (the highest sentient being) to an insignificant insect.

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21. स नैसर्गिक एवास्ति विकल्पे स्वैरचारिणि ।
यथाभिमतसंस्थानाभासनाद् बुद्धिगोचरे ।। *IVP* I, vi, 10.

22 अत एव यथाभीष्ट-समुल्लेखावभासनात् ।
ज्ञानक्रिये स्फुटे एव सिद्धे सर्वस्य जीवतः ॥ *Ibid.*, 11.

CHAPTER XV

SUBSTRATUM OF THE THREE POWERS—ONE SUPREME CONSCIOUSNESS (MAHEŚVARA)

Ekāśraya-nirūpanam.

The powers of Remembrance, Knowledge and Differentiation are fully discussed in the preceding chapters. The present chapter establishes that the underlying basis of these three powers is one, the great Lord (Maheśvara)—the Supreme Perceiver, who is free to bring about the union or separation of these powers, unlike insentient things, such as fire etc., which is the substratum of the powers of burning, emitting heat and light, but lacks the freedom of will (consciousness) in making use of its powers itself.[1]

The teacher says, that pure consciousness (*pratibhā—samvid*), which assumes various forms as affected by a variety of objects (*tat-tat padārtha-krama-rūṣitā*), is the perceiving subject (*Pramātā*), the great Lord (Maheśvara),[2] who is the eternal and unchanging light of consciousness in its essential nature (*akramānanta-cidrūpaḥ*).[3] It is this consciousness that manifests itself in variety of forms of diverse objects. The mutual relation (*jñāteyam*) of objects is possible only, because they rest together in

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1. अधुना तु तासां शक्तीनाम् एक आश्रयः, स च तच्छक्तिसंयोजनवियोजनादिस्वाच्छन्द्ययोगात् महेश्वरः न तु जडस्वरूपवह्न्यादिवत् दाहकपाचकादिशक्त्याश्रयमात्रम् ।

   IPV I, 275.

2. Maheśvara, in the Śaiva terminology, means the manifestor of the impure creation, on which all the worldly transactions depend, the highest reality...(which) contains all within.

   It is spoken of as light, but it is neither the recipient of light from the ordinary known source, sun, nor even is identical with him or any other that can be thought of. It is perfectly independent of them. It is the ultimate source of all the sources of all lights.

   (Pandey, *Abhinavagupta*, 208, 218)

   न तत्र सूर्यो भाति न चन्द्रतारकं नेमा विद्युतो भान्ति कुतोऽयमग्निः ।
   तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्वं तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति ॥

   Kaṭha. Up. II, 5, 15.

3. या चैषा प्रतिभा तत्तत्पदार्थक्रमरूषिता ।
   अक्रमानन्तचिद्रूपः प्रमाता स महेश्वरः ॥ *IPK* I, vii, 1.

the one subject (*eka pramātari pratitiṣṭhatsu*) facing one another, entering in it through the channels of different cognitions (*tat-tad-vibhinna-saṁvitti-mukhair*).[4] The insentient objects do not have mutual connection in themselves, except through their knowledge, which is the common ground or attribute of all of them. Otherwise, how can mutual relationship of objects, which are connected with different temporal and spatial orders and are self-confined (*sva-samāpinām*), be possible ? Their mutual relationship is established by their shining together in the subject (*sakṛdābhasa-sādhyo'sau samanvayaḥ*).[5] The teacher now explains the possible cause of the mutual connection of different things. It is their knowledge or awareness resting in the consciousness (subject) that brings about their mutual relation. He says, according to the Naiyāyikas, the general relation of cause and effect in different things is established in five possible ways, viz., by means of two perceptions and three non-perceptions (*pratyakṣa and anupālambha*), which are stated in the language of the Indian logic as : (1) *agni pratyakṣa* (a person perceives fire), (2) *dhūma anupālambhaḥ* (he does not see smoke), (3) *dhūma pratyakṣa* (he directly perceives smoke), (4) *vyatireke agni anupālambhaḥ* (if he does not see fire) and (5) *vyatireke dhūma anupālambhaḥ* (then he does not find smoke also). All these five means are in themselves confined to their respective spheres ; but, since they rest together in one self-consciousness, the perceiving subject (*Pramāta*), so the causal relation between things can be established by means of these five. It is only when the knowledge of the five premises, 'fire', 'absence of smoke', 'smoke', 'absence of fire' and 'absence of smoke' enter through five channels of perception and non-perception into one self-consciousness, the subject (*samvid*), as it were the sea, then resting in it together as unified, they become dependent upon one another, in causal relation, through his power of freedom (*svatantratayā*), otherwise they will remain unrelated like jar and cloth.[6] The teacher states the same idea in the text as follows : As perceptions and

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4. तत्तद्विभिन्नसंवित्तिमुखैरेकप्रमातरि ।
प्रतितिष्ठत्सु भावेषु ज्ञातेयमुपपद्यते ॥ *Ibid.*, 2.

5. देशकालक्रमजुषामर्थानां स्वसमापिनाम् ।
सकृदाभाससाध्योऽसावन्यथा कः समन्वयः । *Ibid.*, 3.

(i) स्वसमापिनाम्—स्वरूपमात्रप्रतिष्ठानाम् । (*S*).

6. यदा तु प्रत्यक्षानुपलम्भस्रोतः-पञ्चकेन तानि पञ्च-वस्तूनि एकसंवित्समुद्रविश्रान्तानि कृतानि तदा एकीभूतानि प्रमात्रा स्वतन्त्रतया अन्योऽन्यसापेक्षाणि न तु घटपटादिवत् भास्यन्ते ।
IPV I, 286.

non-perceptions remain exclusively confined to their respective spheres and are different from one another, the establishment of the relation of cause and effect, therefore, results from oneness of the subject (*eka-pramātṛjā*).[7] The Pūrvapakṣin questions, the causal relation in different things is established by remembrance, how do you say, then, that it depends on the oneness of the subject (*Pramātā*) ? The teacher replies, the same self-consciousness (*sva-saṁvittiḥ*), which is itself the proof of its own existence in remembrance, is also itself, and no other, the means of establishing the existence of the former perception.[8] The self-consciousness of the later remembrance is not different from that of the former perception. It is one and the same consciousness that existed before and experienced the former perception, which gives rise to the later remembrance[9] That same self consciousness is the subject (*Pramātā*) on which depends the establishment of the causal relation between two things. The relation of contraries (*bādhya-bādhaka-bhāva*) is also possible only because of the fact that all cognitions rest in one permanent subject (*jñānānām eka-pramātṛ-pariniṣṭhiteḥ*), while resting in themselves separately, the cognitions themselves cannot annul one another (*svātma-niṣṭhāvirodhinām*).[10] The relation of contraries, as, for instance, between the cognition of a piece of mother-of-pearl and that of a piece of silver in place of one and the same object, cannot be established by these two opposite cognitions themselves, since the one cognition, that of the real piece of mother-of–pearl, as different from the other, i.e., the cognition of a piece of silver, is not potent to know the latter as unreal and reject the same. Therefore, we have to admit the existence of one knower (*Pramātā*) who judges the essence of both the cognitions, accepts the correct cognition and rejects the other.

The Pūrvapakṣin questions here, just as the consciousness of the absence of jar on the ground is nothing but the consciousness of the voidness of the ground, so the real knowledge of mother-of-pearl

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7. प्रत्यक्षानुपलम्भानां तत्तद्भिन्नांशपातिनाम् ।
   कार्यकारणतासिद्धि-हेतुतैकप्रमातृजा ॥ *IPK* I, vii, 4.
8. स्मृतौ यैव स्वसंवित्तिः प्रमाणं स्वात्मसंभवे ।
   पूर्वानुभवसद्भावे साधनं सैव नापरम् ॥ *Ibid*, 5.
9. यदेव स्मृतिस्वसंवेदनम् तदेव अनुभवस्य स्वसंवेदनम् । *IPV* I, 289.
10. बाध्यबाधकभावोऽपि स्वात्मनिष्ठाविरोधिनाम् ।
    ज्ञानानामुदियादेक-प्रमातृपरिनिष्ठितेः ॥ *IPK* I, vii, 6.

is nothing else than the consciousness of invalidity (ficticiousness) of the perception of silver (*rūpya-jñānāpramātva-vit*).[11] The teacher replies this objection as follows: He says, your point is not right; for, from the knowledge of the bare ground, the ground's existence as a separate entity apart from jar (*aghaṭātmatā*) may be established, but certainly it cannot establish the absence of jar (on the ground) which is capable of being perceived (*upalabdhi-yogyasya*).[12] 'We talk of two types of non-existence in our practical life. The one is "*tādātmyābhāva*", i e., non-existence of a thing as identical with that wherein it is said to be non-existing, e.g., "the ground (*bhūtala*) is not jar" (*iha bhūtalam na ghaṭaḥ*). The other is "*Vyatirekābhāva*", i.e., non-existence, which denies separate possible existence of a thing at a particular time and place: "Here on this ground there is no jar" (*iha bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti*). In the case of the first of these, transaction is based simply on the knowledge of the bare ground (*śuddha-bhūtala-jñānāt*)...' In the other case, i.e., in the case of "*Vyatirekābhāva*", direct perception is responsible for the idea of non-existence (*yatra tu dṛśyatvam viśeṣaṇam avaśyam upayogi*).[13] The case of *Vyatirekābhāva* has the fault of having too wide a scope (*atiprasaṅga*).[14] The teacher says, the ground is always separate from other things (*viviktam*); because all objects have their separate and self-confined existence. How then is it that the knowledge of the ground (*taj-jñānam*) is the cause of the consciousness of absense of other things (*bhinnasya-abhāva sādanam*) at one time (*jātu*) and not at another ?[15] Thus "*Vyatirekābhāva*" (according to the opponent's view) should imply the absence of even a *piśāca* (thief).[16] It is under certain special circumstances

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11. विविक्तभूतलज्ञानं घटाभावमतिर्यथा ।
तथा चेच्छुक्तिकाज्ञानं रूप्यज्ञानाप्रमात्ववित् ॥ *Ibid.*, 7.
एवम् अप्रमाणतासंवेदनमेव रजतज्ञानस्य बाध्यत्वम् उच्यते । *IPV* I, 296.

12. नैवं शुद्धस्थलज्ञानात्सिद्ध्येत्तस्याघटात्मता ।
न तूपलब्धियोग्यस्याप्यत्राभावो घटात्मनः ॥ *IPK* I, vii, 8.

13. *IPV* I, 297–98; Pandey, *Bhāskarī* III, 105.

14. *IPV* I, 299.

15. विविक्तं भूतलं शश्वद्भावानां स्वात्मनिष्ठितेः ।
तत्कथं जातु तज्ज्ञानं भिन्नस्याभावसाधनम् ॥ *IPK* I, vii, 9.

16. एतेन (व्यतिरेकाभावेन) अत्र भूतले पिशाचो नास्ति
इत्यपि स्यात्—इति आपतितं मन्तव्यम् ॥ *IPV* I, 300.

only, not always, that the knowledge of the bare ground will indicate the absence of any particular object, say a pot (*ghaṭa*), only and nothing else. But we know from the common experience of everyday life that the existence of one thing means the non-existence of another.[17] This, however, would not mean that the knowledge of non-existence of anything on the bare ground indicates the idea of the absence of a particular object, say *ghaṭa* only, and not any other thing. This reasoning leads to the fact that it is the sentient subject who infers about the absence of a particular object (*ghaṭa*) only, the idea of which comes into his consciousness in some particular circumstances, and not the idea of any other thing, say *piśaca* (thief), which is not in his consciousness in those circumstances. So the teacher says, there is the mass of light, in case of one who can see, or touch (with the ground), warm or soft in the case of a blind man, or in darkness, that establishes his cognition of the absence of a jar (*aghaṭātmatām sva-jñānam sādhayet*). For, the person, who desires to find out not-being of a certain object, is found using the sense-organ, through which it can be perceived.[18] The absence of a particular object, say pot, is perceived by a person possessing normal eye-sight, with his eyes, as well as by a blind man, or by any person in darkness, by his sense of touch feeling with his hand the cool plain ground and not the hard and round substance of the pot ; in a similar manner, the absence of another object, say a thief (*piśāca*), can also be known by one possessing eye-sight as well as by a blind man, or by any person in darkness. It is only the subject (*Ātman*, *Pramātā*) who ultimately gets the idea of the absence of a pot or a thief in special circumstances. With the same idea in mind, the teacher says that the absence of a jar (*aghaṭātmatā*) and non-existence of imperceptible *piśaca* (*bhūtale piśāco nāsti*) are not two analogous instances, although the latter is also an instance of *Vyatirekābhāva*. The difference between the two is due to certain conditions (*kasyām-cit eva daśāyām*). In the case of the non-existence of the imperceptible *piśāca*, there is the possibility of his remaining hidden anywhere. The teacher says, just as a *piśāca* remain imperceptible when he is apart from light, i.e., when he remains in darkness

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17. इह भाव एव भावान्तरस्य 'अभाव' इति व्यवहर्तव्य:
इति अयं तावत् अपरित्याज्य: प्रातीतिक: (अनुभवसिद्ध:) पन्था: ॥ *Ibid.*, 301.

18. किं त्वालोकचयोऽन्धस्य स्पर्शो वोष्णादिको मृदुः ।
तत्रास्ति साधयेत्तस्य स्वज्ञानमघटात्मताम् ॥ *IPK* 1, vii, 10.

(*i*) तत्र—भूतले (ii) तस्य—भूतलस्य

he can remain hidden even where there is the possibility of his being within light itself (*yathā anālokaḥ piśacaḥ adṛśyaḥ syāt, sa eva piśācaḥ ālokābhyantare api adṛśyaḥ syāt*). And because he is imperceptible (*adṛśyaḥ san*), so his existence within the ground cannot totally be denied (*bhūtalasya antar sa sarvathā niṣedhyaḥ na bhavati*).[19]

Having explained the nature of not-being in practical life (*abhāva-vyavahāra*), the teacher makes use of it in the present context. He says, thus the ascertainment of the real mother-of-pearl may mean its not-being the cognition of silver, but the former cannot prove invalid the knowledge of silver, got on the former occasion (*tat tva ādya-rajata-jñapteḥ aprāmāṇya-vedikā na syāt*).[20] As, at the time of cognition of mother-of-pearl, the minor term (*dharmī*), i.e., the previous cognition of silver, is non-existent (*dharmyasiddher api*), the relation of contraries cannot be maintained even by inference (*tasmāt, anumanataḥ api bādhā, —bādhya-bādhakabhāvaḥ—naiva bhavet*). It is possible only due to there being one subject (*eka-pramātṛ-jā*), because it is proved to be so by our personal experience (*sva-saṁvedana-siddhā*).[21] The teacher means to say that neither one particular cognition is potent itself to contradict the other, nor is there the possibility of inference to annul the false cognition of silver, owing to the absence of the minor term (*dharmī*) in the process of inference (*anumāna*).

Concluding the subject, the teacher says, the ultimate fact is that all kinds of functions, whether pure or impure, are held on the basis of one all-pervading Lord (Vibhu), the Self, in whom indwell the manifestations of mass of objects, so very different from one another (*atyartha-bhinnārthā-vabhāsa-khacite vibhau*).[22] Not only the causal relation, remembrance, contradiction of false cognitions, etc., depend upon the existence of one permanent perceiver, but also all the affairs of the world,

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19. पिशाचः स्यादनालोकोऽप्यालोकाभ्यन्तरे यथा ।
अदृश्यो भूतलस्यान्तर्न निषेध्यः स सर्वथा ॥ *Ibid.*, 11.

20. एवं रूप्यविदाभाव-रूपा शुक्तिमतिर्भवेत् ।
न त्वाद्यरजतज्ञप्तेः स्यादप्रामाण्यवेदिका ॥ *Ibid.*, 12.

21. धर्म्यसिद्धेरपि भवेद्बाधा नैवानुमानतः ।
स्वसंवेदनसिद्धा तु युक्ता सैकप्रमातृजा ॥ *Ibid.*, 13.

22. इत्थमत्यर्थभिन्नार्थावभासखचिते विभौ ।
समलो विमलो वापि व्यवहारोऽनुभूयते ॥ *Ibid.*, 14.

comprising the inferior functions of selling and buying and the superior functions of learning and imparting knowledge to others, and so on, can be possible as resting on the omnipresent Lord, Maheśvara, the Supreme Consciousness. The objects of the world vary by the power of Māyā (*māyābalāt bhedaika-prāṇitāḥ*), but the ultimate subject, the sole perceiver remains, in essence, One Supreme Being and no other (*vibhoḥ svarūpam anyathā na bhavati*).

CHAPTER XVI

THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF THE SUPREME CONSCIOUSNESS (*MĀHEŚVARYA*)

Māheśvarya-nirūpaṇam : The doctrine of manifestation (*Ābhāsavāda*).

The essential nature of the one basis of the three said powers, Maheśvara, the Self, is explained in the present chapter. It is represented by the term *Māheśvarya* or *Svātantrya*[1] which means the sovereignty of the Lord's will, viz., absolute liberty and autonomy of consciousness. By virtue of His *Māheśvarya*, the Lord (Maheśvara) is potent to manifest externally the world comprising a mass of objects, which ever exist within Him. The objects are, therefore, named, in the system, as *ābhāsas* (manifestations). The Lord has not only the potency of externalizing infinite number of diverse manifestations forming various objects of the world by their association or combination with and separation from one another, but also the absolute liberty to make use of His powers of Remembrance, Knowledge and Differentiation[2] with respect to these (*ābhāsas*). Maheśvara has two aspects, *Prakāśa* (the light of consciousness) and *Vimarśa* (the power of manifesting itself in a concrete form),[3] which correspond to his two primary powers, the power of Cognition (*Jñāna-Śakti*) and the power of Action (*Krīya-Śakti*). *Māheśvarya*, the sovereignty of the Lord's will, with regard to His said powers, is also a form of His power of Action (*Kriyā-Śakti*).[4] It is treated by the teacher in the Section dealing with "Knowledge" (*Jñānādhikāra*), as ultimately the powers of Knowledge and Action are innate in the pure Supreme Consciousness, the Reality, All *ābhāsas* arise from the Lord's *Jñāna-Śakti*, a form of pure self-consciousness, which remains unaffected by them.

The Doctrine of Manifestation (Ābhasavāda) : The teacher says, in the context of the formation of *ābhāsas*, the 'manifestations'

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1. तन्माहेश्वर्यं स्वातन्त्र्यरूपम् । *IPV* I, 316.
2. तच्च (स्वातन्त्र्यम्) ज्ञानविषयं क्रियाविषयं च । *Ibid.*, 317.
3. प्रकाशविमर्शात्मकं चिदेकघनम् एकमेव संविद्रूपम् । *Ibid.*
4. ज्ञानात्मक-क्रियाविषयं स्वातन्त्र्यं...क्रियाशक्तिरूपम् । *Ibid.*

differ only inasmuch as that in some cases they depend upon immediate sense contact (*tatkālika-akṣya-sāmakṣya-sāpekṣāḥ*); and in other cases, as in the case of the blind or in thick darkness, they do not depend upon that (i.e. the immediate sense contact) (*anyathā anyatra*). But there is no difference (*viśeṣaḥ na bhavet*) in the essential nature of the 'manifestations' of objects (*arthāvabhāsasya*) figuring in determinate cognitions (*vikalpādau*), referring to the past, present or future objects.[5] The commentator says that, in the case of perceivers with normal eye-sight, the manifestations are distinct (*sphuṭa*) (*bāhyendriya-pratyakṣatvam*... ...*yatra sphuṭata-vyavahāraḥ*) because they are perceived in the collocations of *ābhāsas* (*vyāmiśrāḥ*).[6] And in the case of the blind or in thick darkness, they are indistinct (*asphuṭa*), as they are revived internally without recourse to senses (*asāpekṣa*) by remembrance arising from the residual traces (*saṁskāras*) of the past perceptions.[7] In the case of perceivers born blind, they arise from the residual traces of the perceptions of previous births. (*jāti-nayana-hīnasyāpi rūpam-ityābhāso janamāntara-pratyakṣa-saṁskāraja eva*).[8] There is no difference in the constituent *ābhāsa*, its essential nature being one with the *Prakāśa* aspect of the Self (*prakāśa-mānataikasāre vidyamane.*).[9] The difference or change refers to the combinations or collocations of *ābhāsas*, in which each constituent *ābhāsa* is a separate entity, as such, it is ever the same. The constituent *ābhāsas* associate in various ways to form collocations of *ābhāsas*. The combination and the separation of *ābhāsas* such as in the experiences "I see this object" (*nīlam idam paśyāmi*), "I imagine this" (*ūtprekṣe*), "I think determinately" (*saṅkalpayāmi*), "I remember" (*smrāmi*), "I do" (*karomi*), "I know" (*vedmi*), and so on, are made by the Self (*bhagavatā*), by his power of freedom (*svātantryena*) and thus they function distinctly or

5. तात्कालिकाक्षसामक्ष्य-सापेक्षाः केवलं क्वचित् ।
आभासा अन्यथान्यत्र त्वन्धान्धतमसादिषु ॥
विशेषोऽर्थावभासस्य सत्तायां न पुनः क्वचित् ।
विकल्पेषु भवेद्भावि-भवद्भूतार्थगामिषु ॥ *IPK* I, viii, 1-2.

6. ततसापेक्षाः (आभासान्तरसापेक्षाः)—तद्व्यामिश्राः क्वचित् आभासा भवन्ति, यत्र स्फुटताव्यवहारः । *IPV* I, 321.

7. अपि तु प्राक्तनमेव बाह्येन्द्रियप्रत्यक्षत्वम् अनुसंधत्ते (स्मरतीत्यर्थः) । *Ibid.*

8. *IPV* I, 321, fn. 26.

9. परमेश्वरस्वरूपान्तर्भूतत्वे पुनराभासानां न कुतश्चित् व्यवच्छेदः । *IPV*, I, 323.

indistinctly.[10] In this way the varying processes of *ābhāsas* go on at all times, in the past, the present and the future.[11] The distinctness or otherwise of the manifestations depends only upon limited perceivers and not on the Supreme Perceiver.[12]

The Pūrvapakṣin questions, the difference is possible in the case of the collocations of *ābhāsas* pertaining to external objects, in relation to which external senses operate. How do you account for the difference in the internal *ābhāsas* of pain and pleasure, in relation to which there is no operation of external senses? The teacher replies, although manifestations, such as, of pleasure, etc., or of those things which are their causes, remain always the same (without any difference), yet the difference does come in them because they relate to the past, viz., as they depend upon the objects of the past (*atītatvāt tathā sthitiḥ*). But when the manifestations of pleasure, etc. are deeply (*gāḍham*) and determinately (*vikalpena*) conceived (*ullikhyamāne*), they do shine as such (*tathā sthitiḥ*), i.e., as extreme pleasure, etc., because they are observed as the manifestation "clear" (*sphuṭam asyopalakṣaṇāt*).[13] Therefore, they have deep effect upon the individual perceiver. The difference or varying nature (*vaicitryam*) of the internal *ābhāsas* is due to the association of the *ābhāsas* of the present feelings with the *ābhāsas* of the cognitions of the past or future perceptions of objects of both the kinds, those causing pleasure, such as fragrant garlands, sandal, etc., and those causing pain, as snakes, thorns, etc. The *ābhāsa* of the feeling is not so distinct or deep (*sphuṭa*) when the perceiver's thought is not fully engrossed in it. It, however, becomes distinct (*sphuṭa*) when he is deeply absorbed in thinking (*gāḍham-ullikhyamāne*) about the objects causing such feelings.

The Pūrvapakṣin now questions that in the presence of external objects causing certain feelings of pleasure or pain, variation or difference

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10. एतदुक्तं भवति—नीलमिदं पश्यामि, संकल्पयामि,...इत्यादौ नीलाभासोऽसौ स्वरूपतोऽनूनाधिकः...ते पुनराभासाः स्वातन्त्र्येण यदा भगवता संयोज्यन्ते वियोज्यन्ते च तदा अयं स्फुटत्वास्फुटत्वादि व्यवहारः। *Ibid.*, 322.

11. एवं त्रैकालिकव्यवहारवैचित्र्योपपत्तिः। *Ibid.*

12. एष च स्फुटास्फुटतादिव्यवहारोऽपि सकलादिप्रमातृविश्रान्त एव न पुनः परमार्थप्रमातरीति। *Ibid.*, 323., fn. 37.

13. सुखादिषु च सौख्यादि-हेतुष्वपि च वस्तुषु।
अवभासस्य सद्भावे-ऽप्यतीतत्वात्तथा स्थितिः॥
गाढमुल्लिख्यमाने तु विकल्पेन सुखादिके।
तथा स्थितिस्तथैव स्यात् स्फुटमस्योपलक्षणात्॥ *IPK* I, viii, 3-4.

(*vaicitryam*) in the collocations of the *ābhāsas* can be possible. But, what reason have we to admit the same in the absence of external objects? The teacher replies, externality is merely an attribute (*upādhi*) of manifestations (*ābhāsas*) which are of the nature of 'being' (*bhāva*) or those which are of the nature of 'not-being' (*abhāva*); it does not constitute their essential nature (*na teśām ātmā*); therefore, they exist as ever-existing internally (*teṣām sattā āntarānām satām sattā eva sadā*).[14] Externality is not the nature of *ābhāsas* of pleasure or pain or absence thereof.[15] Every such feeling is always internal. Sometimes, by the sovereignty of his will, the perceiver experiences *ābhāsas* of certain feelings in association with the *ābhāsas* of different external objects. In such cases, the *ābhāsas* of feelings vary according to the reflections of *upādhis*, viz., external objects. This association of the *ābhāsas* of external objects with the *ābhāsas* of internal feelings does not cause any impurity (*mlānatā*) in the nature of the latter. It makes no difference in the internal *ābhāsa* of blue lotus even in the absence of the *ābhāsa* of the external blue lotus, or in the internal *ābhasa* of a particular man in the absence of the *ābhāsa* of an external king. Similarly, there is no difference in the internal *ābhāsas* of experiences of pleasure and pain felt from the union with and separation from one's beloved, even in the absence of the *ābhāsas* of external objects, viz., beloved, etc., which cause such feelings by their union or separation. It is thus clear that the absence of external objects does not affect the essential nature (viz., variety) of the internal feelings of pleasure or pain.[16]

The state of internality of *ābhāsas* of external objects lies in their being internal experiences in the internal organ, mind (*antaḥ-karaṇa* or *Buddhi*) and their externality lies in their being objects of perceptions (*grāhyaḥ*) existing apart from the perceiver. Both these states of *ābhāsas*, viz., their internality and externality, have knowledge as their essence (*tattva*) or common characteristic which is internal and one with the *prāmāta* (perceiver). The Pūrvapakṣin questions on this point, in such a state,

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14. भावाभावावभासानां बाह्यतोपाधिरिष्यते ।
नात्मा सत्ता ततस्तेषामान्तराणां सतां सदा ॥ *Ibid.*, 5.

15. ये भावाभासा अभावाभासाश्च तेषां बाह्यत्वं नाम आत्मा—स्वरूपं न भवति ।
IPV I. 326.

16. ततश्च यथा नीलाभासाभावे उत्पलाभासस्य न किंचित् वृत्तं स्वरूपतो, राजाभासाभावे वा पुरुषाभासस्य, तथा बाह्यत्वाभासाभावेऽपि सुखाभासस्य दुःखाभावाभासस्य कान्ताभासस्य च न स्वरूपतः काचन म्लानता इति आन्तराणां सदैव स्थितिः एषाम् । *Ibid.*, 327.

why this intrinsic internal character of *ābhasas* does not affect their causal efficiency ? The teacher says, they do not exercise their functional capacity (*artha-kriyā*), which depends upon their separateness (*bheda-nibandhanā*), owing to their internality, because of their oneness with the subject (*āntaratvāt pramātraike*). Their functional capacity is due to their externality (*sā bāhyatve*), which arises from separateness of manifestations from one another and from the subject (*sā bhinnābhāsabhedataḥ*).[17] The *ābhāsas* do not have any causal efficiency, because of their internality, as that is due to their identity with the self-consciousness. *Ābhāsa* of causal effiiciency, which is external, is another *ābhāsa* different from internal. Exercising of certain causal efficiency is not, therefore, the essential nature of objects.[18]

Now the teacher states the essential nature of *ābhāsas*. He says, as the *ābhasas* are essentially of the nature of *cit* (consciousness), so they always exist internally. But when they are manifested externally by the Lord's power of *Māyā*, they exist externally also, as material objects.[19] The essence of *ābhāsas*, whether internal or external, is ultimately consciousness which is innate in the internal self-luminous subject (*Pramatā*). These *ābhāsas* become externally manifest as material objects, by means of *Māyā*, having freedom of power (*svātantrya-rūpaya māyayā*). The internal *ābhāsa* (*antarābhāsaḥ*) is not incongruous with the external (*bāhyatva*). It is rather the underlying basis of all the external *ābhāsas* (*sarvābhāsa-bhitti-būto 'sau*).[20]

The Pūrvāpakṣin questions again, as has been said above, the causal efficiency of external objects is due to their externality, for instance, in the case of potters manufacturing pots, but how can we explain the causal efficiency of internal experiences, like the conceptions (*vikalpa-jñānani*) of external objects, such as one's beloved or a thief, which cause pleasure or fear, although the objects giving rise to such feelings are not

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17. श्रान्तरत्वात् प्रमात्रैक्ये नैषां भेदनिबन्धना ।
    श्रर्थक्रियापि बाह्यत्वे सा भिन्नाभासभेदतः ॥ *IPK* I, viii, 6.

18. यतः प्रमात्रैक्यकृते श्रान्तरत्वे तस्मात न श्रर्थक्रिया इति, श्रर्थक्रियाभासोऽपि च श्राभासान्तरमेव इति श्रर्थक्रियाकारित्वमपि न भावानां सत्त्वम् । *IPV* I, 330.

19. चिन्मयत्वेऽवभासानामन्तरेव स्थितिः सदा ।
    मायया भासमानानां बाह्यत्वाद्बहिरप्यसौ ॥ *IPK* I, viii, 7.

20. नायम् श्रन्तराभासो बाह्यत्वस्य विरोधी प्रत्युत सर्वाभासभित्तिभूतोऽसौ ।
    IPV I, 331-32.

actually present externally? The teacher says, that which is conceived in imagination, is also external, because it shines as separate from the subject, since it is denoted as "this" (*ayam*) (*pṛthak prathaḥ*). Internality is oneness with the subject (*pramātraikātmyam āntaryam*) and externality consists of separateness from the subject (*tato bhedo hi bāhyatā*).[21] The conceptions of objects, though internal experiences, are also to be treated as external *ābhāsas* like those of the actual objects such as one's beloved or a thief, etc., since the combinations of such *ābhāsas*, causing pleasure or pain, operate in their separation (*bheda*) from the perceiver, though in respect of their pure knowledge they are one with the subject.

The teacher now explains the cause of externality of internal feelings of pleasure or fear, which are caused by the mere conceptions (thought) of objects like one's beloved or thief. He says, it is the will of the Lord, the perceiver, (*bhartur icchā*), that what is conceived in imagination (*ullekha*) as well as pleasure, etc., shines externally (*bahirātmanā prakāśati*), exactly as do the objects of sense-perception, etc., (*akṣādibhuvām-viṣayānām prakāśaḥ yathā*), which are directly perceptible (*adhyakṣa-rūpaḥ*).[22] The externality of the internal feelings can, therefore, be accounted for as due to the absolute liberty and autonomy of consciousness (*svātantrya of Ātman*). The internal luminousness, or the light of consciousness, by its intrinsic power of freedom (*Svātantrya, Icchā-śakti*), produces externally all the internal *ābhāsas*, whether those of actual objects or of conceptions of such objects causing internal feelings of pleasure or fear. Thus also are externally manifested, by the perceiver's power of will (*Svātantrya* or *Māheśvarya*), all kinds of feelings, such as permanant feelings (*sthāyī-bhāvas*), transitory feelings (*vyabhicārī-bhāvas*), etc., of pleasure or pain, love or hate, which remain confined within the range of the internal (organ *antaḥ-karaṇaika-gocarāḥ*).[23]

Concluding the subject, the teacher says, as has been established, wordly affairs cannot be possible without unification of cognitions (*saṁvidām aikena vinā*). Their unification is due to their oneness with

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21. विकल्पे योऽयमुल्लेखः सोऽपि बाह्यः पृथक्प्रथः ।
प्रमात्रैकात्म्यमान्तर्यं ततो भेदो हि बाह्यता ॥ *IPK* I, viii 8.

22. उल्लेखस्य सुखादेश्च प्रकाशो बहिरात्मना ।
इच्छातो भर्तुरध्यक्ष-रूपोऽक्षादिभुवां यथा ॥ *Ibid.*, 9.

23. सुखदुःखप्रायास्तु भरताद्युक्तरूपाः स्थायिव्यभिचारिरूपा
रतिनिर्वेदादयोऽन्तःकरणैकगोचरा बहिरात्मना भान्ति । *IPV* I, 335.

the light of consciousness (*prakāśaikyāt tadekatvam*). And, therefore, it is proved that 'that' light is the one subject (*pramātaikaḥ*). That very subject (*pramātā*) is the highest Lord (Maheśvara), because of his ever-existing *Vimarśa* of free nature, i.e., *Svātantrya*, (*niyatena vimṛśattvena*), and because this *Vimarśa* is nothing but the sportive Lord's transcendental powers of knowledge and action (*vimarśa eva devasya śuddhe jñāna-kriye*).[24] Unless we assert the ultimate unity in the diversity of cognitions, everything will be in a state of chaos. Their unity is due to their identity with the light of consciousness, the perceiver (*pramātā*). Although variety (*vaicitryam*) is the nature of external objects, yet their manifestation is, in essence, one with the light of the subject. *Pramāta* (the subject) is, therefore, called the illuminator of cognitions (*devaḥ*) or maker of variety of manifestations (*citrābhāsa-kṛt prabhuḥ*). He is called *Maheśvara* (the great Lord), because of his *Vimarśa* (i.e., the power of externalizing Himself in concrete forms of objects), and *Deva*, since he indulges himself in the sport of carrying various worldly activities by his powers of knowledge and action which arise from His *Vimarśa*. It is from the *Vimarśa* aspect of the Supreme Lord (Maheśvara) that all pure and impure creation from the *Śiva tattva* upto the earth emanates, as will be explained in the following chapters.

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24. तदैक्येन विना न स्यात्संविदां लोकपद्धतिः ।
प्रकाशैक्यात्तदेकत्वं मातैकः स इति स्थितम् ॥
स एव विमृशत्वेन नियतेन महेश्वरः ।
विमर्श एव देवस्य शुद्धे ज्ञानक्रिये यतः ॥ *IPK* I, viii. 10-11.

CHAPTER XVII

POWER OF ACTION

Kriyā-śakti.

In the foregoing chapters, devoted to Utpaladeva's philosophy,[1] it has been established that the Supreme Consciousness is the highest Reality (*parama tattva*), which is called *Maheśvara* (the great Lord) in masculine gender. He is endowed with *Prakāśa* and *Vimarśa*. *Prakāśa* is light or pure knowledge (*prakāśa-rūpatā jñānam*). It is pure self-luminousness or self-consciousness (*aham-vimarśa*). In the same light (*jñānam*) rests His *Vimarśa* which is nothing but activity (*vimarśaḥ kriyā*). The nature of *Vimarśa* is *svātantrya* (liberty) (*svātantryātma vimarśaḥ*). *Svātantrya* is the sovereignty of His will (*Icchā-śakti*). In fact, *Vimarśa* comprises the pure powers of knowledge and action, the two primary powers of the Lord (Maheśvara) (*vimarśa eva davasya śuddhe jñāna-kriye*). His power of knowledge functions in three forms, as powers of remembrance, cognition and differentiation (*Smaraṇa-śakti, Jñāna-śakti and Apohana-śakti*). As has been stated above, the underlying basis of the three said powers is the Supreme Consciousness (Maheśvara). *Vimarśa* functions in the form of the power of action (*Kriyā-śakti*). It is by virtue of this *Vimarśa* that the Supreme Reality is called *Maheśvara* and *deva*, because He indulges Himself in the sport of creation, preservation and destruction of the world. From His *Vimarśa* or *Kriyā-śakti*, arise the pure and impure creation from *Śiva-tattva* to *Pṛthivī* (the principle of solidity), being the last of the 36 *tattvas* (the principles of creation), and this objective world, which is created by His free will (*svātantrya*), is his state of immanence (*viśvamayaḥ prasaraḥ*). *Prakaśa*, the pure light, or *Samvid*, is the substratum of all this objective manifestation (*sarvābhāsa-bhittibhūto 'sau*) as well as stands beyond this universe (*viśvottīrnaśca samvid*).

In the present chapter, we shall discuss about the nature of the power of action (*Kriyā*), as given in the text.[2] An objection is raised with regard to *Kriyā-śakti* (power of action). The term *Kriyā* is associated with the very notion of many, as it involves *Kartā* (actor), *Karma* (object of action) and *Kriyā* (the process of action). Similarly

1. Expounded in *IPK*, Part I (*Jñānadhikara*).
2. *IPK*, Part II (*Kriyādhikāra*).

an act of knowing also implies the inevitable relation of *Jñātā* (knower), *Jñeya* (object of knowledge) and *Jñāna* (the function of knowledge). The plurality involved in *Kriyā-śakti* does not, therefore, accord with the nature of the Supreme Consciousness, the substratum of various powers, which is unity. The teacher holds that the Supreme Consciousness, though remaining as one underlying basis (*ekāśraya* or *bhitti*), yet assumes plurality in the form of manifestations of diverse objects, contained in its *Kriyā-śakti*, just like a mirror which, though remaining as one, yet involves plurality in the shape of varied reflections of objects passing before it. It will also be noted that the idea of action in the system closely corresponds with the doctrine of momentariness of the Buddhist school. *Kriyā* is a mere appearance of a long seris of closely similar physical forms in such a quick succession as to produce a persistence of vision, just like an appearance of a flame. In order to understand the Śaiva (Pratyabhijñā) view of action, it will be important first to know the Bauddha conception of it. The Bauddha views the action 'objectively or empirically and asserts that it is only a definite mental construct, which is based upon the observed series of spatial points at which a particular body of man, animal or anything else is seen in a temporal succession ; and that no 'doer' apart from the body is seen and, therefore, the admission of a permanent 'doer' (*kartā*) is baseless'.[3] The following are the points which the Bauddha brings against the Śaiva :—

'(*a*) Action is a series; it is characterised by succession and, therefore, is multiple. Hence, it cannot be spoken as one. For, unity is the opposite of multiplicity and, therefore, cannot co-exist with multiplicity. Accordingly, it is illogical to say that action is one and serial or successive also at the same time. (*b*) Unity of action cannot by asserted on the ground that it resides in one, has one substratum ; because there is no experience of a substratum, different from the momentary beings, which constitute the series. The momentary beings (*kṣaṇas*) alone, coming in succession, are experienced. (*c*) Even if, for the sake of argument, a substratum be accepted, how can it, being affected by the various constituents of the series, characterised by temporal, spatial and formal differences, be spoken of as one ? (*d*) Recognition of the body, that is found at various places in a temporal order as the same, is not sufficient to establish its identity and unity. For, it is due to similarity of the body of the preceding moment with that of the following, just as in the case of the flame of a lamp ;...... (*e*) Action is not real (*satya*) because

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3. Pandey, *Bhāskarī* III, Introduction, CCII.

it is made up of a series, the members of which are held up together in the order of priority and posteriority by the determinative activity of the mind. For, whatever is determinately grasped is not real: the real is momentary and indeterminate.'[4]

'The Śaiva conception of action is based not upon the observation of its external objective aspect only, but also on the subjective grasp and analysis of the internal subjective aspect. It approaches the problem of action not only from the point of view of empiricism but also from that of voluntarism. Accordingly, while it accepts the serial and, therefore, multiple nature of the action as an observable external phenomenon, it points out the subjective and internal aspect as well. It asserts that the appearance of a particular body at successive points of space in temporal order, which we empirically observe and call action, is only an expression of the will of the individual. This assertion is based upon the fact of experience. We experience within some kind of internal stir (*āntara spandana*) before the commencement of the series, which constitutes the external aspect of the action. The worldly action, therefore, is a unity, because of oneness of the will, of which it is an expression, and the will is one because of the oneness of the purpose that it aims at. Thus, action, taken in both of its aspects, is unity in multiplicity: the uniy is internal and subjective and multiplicity is external and objective'.[5] The word "*kriya*" is used in the text not only in the sense of the empirical action, but also in that of the metaphysical power of action (*Kriyā-śakti*), as attributed to the Lord (Maheśvara) as one of His primary powers.

In the text, says the teacher, thus, by establishing the existence of one subject (*ekasya samarthanāt*), the objection of the opponent (the Bauddha) that 'action which is successive (*sakramā*), viz., diverse in nature, cannot be one (*ekā*) and belong to one (*sakramā kriyā ekasya na, ekā api na bhavati*) has been refuted (*tat pratikṣiptam*)[6]. The Pūrvapakṣin questions here, the nature of *kriyā* is succession (*krama*) which is caused by the time factor (*kāla*). The succession (plurality) cannot be assigned to the eternal subject, who is of the nature of pure consciousness (*cinmaya*) and is unaffected by the time factor (*kāla-kalanā-hīna*). How can, then, *kriyā* be attributed to the subject? The Uttarapakṣin replies, the worldly action can be admitted to be successive, owing to the power of

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4. *Ibid.*, CCIII.
5. *Ibid.*, CCIII-IV.
6. अत एव यदप्युक्तं क्रिया नैकस्य सक्रमा।
   एकेत्यादि प्रतिक्षिप्तं तदेकस्य समर्थनात्। *IPK* II, i, 1.

time, but the eternal activity of the Lord (*śaśvati prābhavi kriyā*), which is of the nature of *Vimarśa* (*ātma-vimarśa-rūpā*), cannot be successive (*na tu prābhavyāḥ kriyāyāḥ sakramatvam syāt*), like the Lord himself (*prabhor iva*).[7] *Kala-śakti* is one of the powers of the Self, whose function is to divide *ābhāsas* (manifestations) and thus make them successive at different moments of time. *Kriyā-śakti* is innate in the subject and is unaffected by the time factor. It is, therefore, eternal and devoid of plurality, just like the subject itself, which exists always as one (unity). The teacher now makes the function of this *Kāla-śakti* clear. He says, in reality time is succession, observable in the movement of the sun and other planets (*sūryādi-sañcaraḥ*), the blooming of different flowers in different seasons (*tat-tat-puṣpādi-janma vā*) and in the alternations of winter and summer (cold and hot seasons) (*śītoṣṇe vātha*).[8] *Kāla* is, therefore, nothing but the order of succession which may be observed in the simultaniety of certain manifestations (*ābhāsas*) (*yaugapadyam api ābhāsayoḥ*) or in their alternations or in the notions of their longer or shorter durations (*cira-kṣiprādi-dhīr api*) in which they occur. Succession depends on multiplicity (*kramo bhedāśrayaḥ*). The latter depends on the existence of certain manifestations and non-existence of others (*ābhāsa-sad-asattvataḥ*), and that is brought about by the Lord Himself, who manifests variety of manifestations (*citrābhāsa-kṛtaḥ prabhoḥ sakāśat*).[9] The subject is potent to form these *ābhāsas* just as he is capable of forming varied manifestations in dreams and fancies (*svapna saṅkalpādau*) from his own consciousness (*samvid*) and not from anything extraneous.[10] Thus the limited perceiver (*pramātā*) manifests *ābhāsas* in varied and numerous forms as, for instance, the *ābhāsas* of 'red', 'pot', 'big', 'hard', etc., having a common basis, and distinguishes one *ābhāsa*, say, that of a pot, from another *ābhāsa*, say, that of a piece of cloth, by the *ābhāsa* of their exclusiveness or distinctiveness (*pṛthaktvābhāsena*). When the *ābhāsa* of autumn appears in the total absence of the *ābhāsa* of spring (*hemanta-bhāsena sarvathaiva sūnyam*), and the latter in the absence of the former,

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7. सक्रमत्वं च लौकिक्याः क्रियायाः कालशक्तितः ।
घटते न तु शाश्वत्याः प्राभव्याः स्यात्प्रभोरिव ॥ *Ibid.*, 2.

8. कालः सूर्यादिसंचारस्तत्तत्पुष्पादिजन्म वा ।
शीतोष्णे वाथ तल्लक्ष्यः क्रम एव स तत्त्वतः ॥ *Ibid.*, 3.

9. क्रमो भेदाश्रयो भेदो-ऽप्याभाससदसत्त्वतः ।
आभाससदसत्त्वेतु चित्राभासकृतः प्रभोः ॥ *Ibid.*, 4.

10. य एव संवित्स्वभाव आत्मा स्वप्नसंकल्पादी आभास-वैचित्र्यनिर्माणे प्रभुः प्रभविष्णुः इति स्वसंविदितस्तत एव तौ भवतः । *IPV* II, 12.

there arises succession (*krama*), which is the essence of time (*kalātma*).[11] The power of *Ātman* which brings about the manifestations of certain things in the absence of certain others, and vice versa, is known as the *Kāla-śakti* of the Lord.[12] The limited perceiver (*pramātā*) is, thus, potent to form diverse *ābhāsas* (*citrābhāsa-kṛt prabhuḥ*). The teacher says that *Pramātā* manifests *ābhāsas* in two varieties, viz., *deśa-kramābhāsa* and *kāla-kramābhāsa*. He makes the spatial succession (*deśa-kramābhāsa*) manifest by means of variety of manifestations of bodies (*mūrti-vaictrya*) and the temporal succession (*kāla-kramābhāsa*) by means of manifestation of variety in the forms of action (*kriyā-vaicitrya*).[13] The former variety, i.e., succession in relation to place (*deśa-kramābhāsa*), that which is caused by the diversity of the shapes of bodies (*mūrtya-vaicitrya*), are manifested in the form of differences (*bheda*) in dimensions of things, distances—such as far and near, and the shapes of various *ābhāsas* of places like home, compound, forest, temple, garden, etc. The latter variety (*kāla-kramābhāsa*), formed by *kriyā-vaicitrya* (diversity of forms of action), is that which is observed in the *ābhāsas* of actions like 'is born' (*jāyate*), 'is existing' (*asti*), 'is growing' (*vardhate*), 'is changing' (*vipariṇamate*), 'is decaying' (*apakṣiyate*) and 'is dead' (*vinaśyati*), in reference to an individual body.[14] This variety can, also, be observed in the combinations of *ābhāsas* relating to different actions like 'he goes home after bathing in a river' (*snātvā gṛham vrajati*), 'he leaves his home after taking food' (*bhuktvā sa gṛhāt vrajati*), etc.[15]

The Pūrvapakṣin objects, the *ābhāsas* of all sorts are manifested by the perceiver (*Pramātā*), but he is manifest to nobody; rather all are manifest to him (*sa hi nahi kasyacit ābhāsate, tasya sarvam ābhāti*). How are, then, explained the following experiences of the subject: 'I was; I am; I shall be', 'I stay at home; I stay in forest; I stay in temple; etc.' since he is not himself subject to succession relating to place

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11. तथाहि... ...तदा कालात्मा क्रम उतिष्ठति। *Ibid.*, 12-13.
12. सेयम् इत्थंभूताभासवैचित्र्यप्रथनशक्तिः भगवतः 'कालशक्तिः' इत्युच्यते। *Ibid.*, 13.
    (i) प्रथनशक्तिः—आभासानाभासप्रथनसमर्थताख्या। *Ibid.*, Fn. 54.
13. मूर्तिवैचित्र्यतो देशक्रममाभासयत्यसौ।
    क्रियावैचित्र्यनिर्भासात्कालक्रममपीश्वरः॥ *IPK* II, i, 5.
14. तद्यथा गृहमिति... ...क्रिया इति उच्यते। See *IPV* II, 13-14.
    तथा चासौ जायते इति जन्मक्रियावभासः तथास्ति विपरिणमते विवर्धते-ऽपक्षीयते विनश्यतीति सत्तादिक्रियाणां प्रकाशः... ... ...इत्येष कालक्रम एकस्यापि क्रियाश्रितः। *Ibid.*, Fn 60.
15. द्रष्टं चान्यत्रापि स्नात्वा भुक्त्वा व्रजतीति... ... ...क्रियाविशेषाभासभेदः। *Ibid.*

and time. The diversity of *ābhāsas* relating to far and near or past, present and future cannot thus be attributed to *Pramātā* (perceiver).[16] The teacher replies, the variety of manifestations of forms (*ābhāsa-bhedaḥ*) causes temporal succession in all things (*sarvatra kāla-kramaḥ bhavet*). It belongs to the limited subject, such as "the void", etc., (*vicchinnābhāsa-śūnyāder bhavati*). It does not relate to the universal subject, who is shining eternally (*sakṛd-bhātasya mātur īśvarasya na bhavati*).[17] The spatial succession in things, also, belongs to the limited subject only (*mitātmanaḥ mātuḥ*). To the universal subject (*amitasya tu*), the objects shine (*bhāvāḥ bhānti*) as one with itself (*svātmanā pūrṇa*) and, therefore, like the Self itself (*svātmā iva*).[18] The multiplicity of *ābhāsas* of the kind caused by temporal succession and spatial succession can be attributed to *Śūnya* (the void) or *Prāṇa* (the vital air), or *Buddhi—Vijñān* (the cognition) or *Śarīra* (the body), which constitutes the limited perceiver according to different schools, namely, *Śunya-vādins* (the Buddhist Nihilists), *Pranātma-vādins*, *Vijñāna-vādins* and *Dehātma-vādins* (the *Cārvāka* materialists) respectively. The *ābhasas* cannot be attributed to *Ātman*, the Supreme Consciousness (real *Pramātā*), which is the Ultimate Reality (*paramārtha*). The Pratyabhijñā denounces the view according to which action, involving successsion or plurality, is attributed to the real Perceiver (*paramārtha pramātā*), the Lord (Maheśvara), who is beyond the succession pertaining to time and place.

The teacher now concludes the topic : It is thus established that the power which manifests the variety of subjects and objects with their characteristic limitations (*tathā vijñātṛ-vījñeya-bhedaḥ*), is but the creative power (*Nirmāṇa-śakti*) of the Lord, who knows them as such (*evam viduṣa īśituḥ*).[19] The nature of this *Krıyā Śakti* is the unlimited power of self-

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16. ततश्च तौ प्रमातरि कथं दृश्येते च 'अभवम् अहं भवामि भवितास्मि' इति... ... ...दूरत्वादि भूतत्वादि वा ? See *IPV* II, 16-17.

17. सर्वत्राभासभेदोऽपि भवेत्कालक्रमाकरः ।
विच्छिन्नाभासः शून्यादेर्मातुर्भातस्य नो सकृत् ।। *IPK* II, i, 6.

18. देशक्रमोऽपि भावेषु भाति मातुर्मितात्मनः ।
स्वात्मेव स्वात्मना पूर्णा भावा भान्त्यमितस्य तु ।। *Ibid.*, 7.

19. किं तु निर्माणशक्तिः साप्येवं विदुष ईशितुः ।
तथा विज्ञातृविज्ञेयभेदो यदवभास्यते ।। *Ibid.*, 8.

(i) विदुषः—असौ विद्वान् (ज्ञानशक्तिमयः) ज्ञातृज्ञेयक्रिया-वैचित्र्यभेदं वेत्ति अनवरतं यः तस्य सा निर्माणशक्तिः । *IPV* II, 24. See also fn. 99.

manifestation (*avicchanna-svātma-vimarśa-mayī*), constituting the sovereignty of the Lord's will (*icchā*), that is unobstructed and self-dependent (*apratihata-svātantrya-rūpā*) and independent of all the rest (*ananya-unmukhatā-rūpā*). From its initial form of pure reflection (*vimarśa*), it thickens into the gross form of diverse *ābhāsas* of limited subjects and objects. The example of mirror and the multiplicity of reflections cast in it represents *Pramātā* and its varied manifestations with the difference that the former lacks 'will' which is the essential nature of Maheśvara, the Supreme Perceiver (*Pramātā*). In the manner as stated above, the Lord (Maheśvara) diversifies Himself in the form of various *ābhāsas*, by the sovereignty of His will, according to *Kāla-krama* (succession in time) and *deśa-krama* (succession in space).

The power of action (*Kriyā-śakti*), the nature of which is discussed above, is also called, in the Pratyabhijñā, *Nirmāṇa-śakti*, because it is by virtue of this power that all multiplicity of things, viz., knowers, varieties of knowledge and the objects of knowledge, and actors, actions and objects of actions are manifested. In fact, this power is responsible for creation of this objective world of diverse nature.[20] Some Śaivas call the *Nirmāṇa-śakti* relating to *deśa-krama* as *Cit-śakti* (*evam deśa-krame tu asya cicchaktiḥ ucyate anyaiḥ*).[21]

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20. Utpaladeva, therefore, calls it *Sṛṣṭi-śakti* also, in his *vṛtti* *Pvr.* p. 40.

21. *IPV* II, 24.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATION—I

THE LAW OF DIVISION

Bhedābheda-vimarśanam (Unity in Diversity).

In Part II of the text (*IPK*), entitled *Kriyādhikāra*, the teacher sets forth the doctrine concerning "action" (*Kriyā-śakti*) and its three laws of relation—the Law of Division (*bhedābheda*), the Law of Perception (*māna tat phala meya*) and the Law of Causation (*kārya-kāraṇa*). These three laws comprise the very essence of this universe, since all the transactions of the world depend upon them. Whereas the law of Division (*bhedābheda*) is the fundamental law of *Kriyā-śakti*, the Laws of Perception and Causation are the extension of the same. *Bhedābheda* is the basic relation which operates in the other two categories of relation, viz., Perception and Causation. The objective world which is the expansion of the *Vimarśa* aspect of the Supreme Being, is governed by these three laws of *Kriyā-śakti*. Out of these three, the first, namly, the Law of Division or the relation of *bhedābheda* (Unity in Diversity), is fully discussed in the present chapter. The other two laws, the Law of Perception and the Law of Causation, are expounded in the following two chapters.

As has been said above, the Supreme Being (Maheśvara) is endowed with *Kriyā-śakti* or *Nirmāṇa-śakti* (creative power) which is unrestricted and limitless (*apratihata-sāmarthyāt bhagavato nirmāṇa-śakti*). This is no other than His power of manifesting or projecting outward from within Himself the objective reality comprising the universe and its multiplicity of objects which give rise to different categories of relation such as *Kriyā* (action), *Sambandha* (mutual connection), *Sāmānya* (generality), *Draya* (substance), *Dik* (space) and *Kāla* (time). These are treated, in Pratyabhijñā, as *ābhāsas* (manifestations) contrary to the view held by the *Bāhyārtha-vādins* who believe in the existence of external objects as the cause of such cognitions.

Every experience involves some kind of relation among the various objects experienced, and of the experienced with the experiencer, for

instance, the experience 'father's son' (*pituḥ putraḥ*) involves parental relation, the branch of a tree implies the relation of part and whole, the king's servant (*rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ*) shows the relation of dependence, and so on. Taking these instances into consideration, we find that relation is ultimately based on two external realities. Relation has no separate external reality, apart from the facts of experience. The analysis of any experience reveals the essential nature of relation which comes under the general category, Unity in Diversity (*bhedābheda*). Apparently, in the example '*rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ*', when a person hears the word '*rājñaḥ*', the image that arises in his consciousness is that of the king. At the next moment he hears the word '*puruṣaḥ*' and the image of a man arises in his consciousness. Singly, the two notions arouse the feeling of incompleteness, but when the two images stand together, they are looked upon as a whole, because there is no more incompleteness. In this conception of the whole the two are not merged in the subject. They are not conceived as merged in each other, nor standing absolutely apart from each other. They represent 'Unity in Diversity'. Similarly, the special categories of relation mentioned above, viz., action, mutual connection, generality, substance, space and time are all based upon the general category, the relation of *bhedābheda* (Unity in Diversity). The two phases of the general category, the unity and multiplicity, are found in different objects or in the different states of the same object. Multiplicity is, generally speaking, associated with the objects as they exist outside the consciousness, independently of each other. Unity, however, is associated with them as they figure in the consciousness joined together as one. This unity is due to the independent unifying activity of the subject. In the cognitions of action, etc., there is the awareness of unity in multiplicity (*bhedābheda*).[1]

It is said above that the essential nature of the Lord's creative power (*Nirmāṇa-śakti*) is to manifest diverse objects; as such everything is manifestation (*ābhāsa*). We experience three types of *ābhāsas* in this world, (i) the *ābhāsas* of the fictitious appearances, as, for instance, the appearance of two moons to a perceiver, when he looks askance at one moon, (ii) the *ābhāsas* of the real objects of the world, such as pot, cloth, etc., and (iii) the *ābhāsas* of the categories of relation, like *Kriyā* (action), *sambandha* (mutual connection), etc. The question arises, if, according to the *ābhāsa-vādin*, everything is manifestation (*ābhāsa*), how do we then differentiate, in practical life, *ābhāsas* as unreal (*asatya*), real (*satya*)

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1. Pandey, *Bhāskarī* I, Introduction, vii-x.

and indistinctly real (*samvṛti-satyam*)[2] ? If the above-mentioned three types of *ābhāsas* have no difference in their essential nature, as manifestations, how do they serve the practical purpose of the world, as real, unreal and indistinctly real objects ? The teacher replies the objection as follows : He says, the concepts of *kriyā* (action), *sambandha* (mutual connection), *sāmānya* (generality), *dravya* (substance), *dik* (place) and *kāla* (time) are all real (*satyāḥ*), because they persist as stable (*sthairyāḥ*) ; they are not proved to be false at any later stage, as illusive manifestations, like the appearance of two moons, when a man looks askance at one moon. They serve our purpose in every-day life (*upyoga*...). They are all based upon unity in multiplicity (*ekānekāśrayā*).[3] The *ābhāsas* of the three types, unreal, real and indistinctly real, are, in their *prakāśa* aspect (as luminousness), identical with the Absolute Reality (*paramārtha satya*). But *Vimarśa*, which determines the causal efficiency of things, differentiates them from one another. *Vimarśa*, the essential nature of which is the determinate thought relating to objective reality, becomes aware of the unreal, real and indistinctly real character of things. By virtue of *Vimarśa*, the perceiver is capable, in the case of unreal manifestation , to judge that they do not continue to remain the same as before.

The question now arises that unity and plurality are contradictory ; how can they be attributed to one and the same thing ? The teacher sets aside the objection as follow : He says, the internal reality of things of diverse nature, is a unity (*tatra antaraṁ tattvam ekam*). The same unity, when it becomes the object of sense perception (*tadeva-indriya-vedyatām samprāpya*), attains muliplicity (*anekatām yāti*), because it is unified with the manifestations of time, space and the essential nature of objects

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2. असत्यं द्विचन्द्रादौ सत्यं नीलादौ संवृतिसत्यं क्रियादौ, यथा रूपादयो भिन्ना अपि ह्येकं ज्ञानं जनयन्ति, यथा परमाणवो बह्वो नियमेनार्थक्रियां कुर्वन्ति......, तथैव संवृतिसत्यं, यथा स्वधर्मेणार्थोऽवच्छिद्य अवसीयते पररूपस्वरूपेण येन धर्मेण संव्रियते, इति—भ्रान्त्यादेर्व्यतिरिक्तं संवृतिसत्वमिति । *IPV* II, 28, fn. 13.

संवृत्या सत्यं संवृतिसत्यम्, बौद्धमते क्रियासामान्यादेः विकल्परूपत्वेनाविद्यारूपया संवृत्या सिद्धत्वात् । *Bhāskarī* II, 32.

Dr. Pandey translates '*samvṛti-satyam*' as 'real only because of determinate cognition'. *Bhāskari* III, 127.

3. क्रियासंबन्धसामान्यद्रव्यदिक्कालबुद्धयः ।
सत्याः स्थैर्योपयोगाभ्यामेकानेकाश्रया मताः ॥ *IPK* II, ii, 1.

(*deśa-kāla-svabhāvataḥ*).[4] The pure consciousness (*samvit mātra lakṣam*) is the supreme essence (*pāramārthikam tattvam*) of the objects of diverse nature, and it is because of that that they become the object of sense perception and assume multiplicity of form according to place and time and their own nature. In certain cases, we do find that contradictory characteristics are attributed to one and the same thing, under different circumstances, without involving any inconsistency, as for instance, (i) '*kāraṇam akāraṇam*' (The same thing is both cause and no-cause), (ii) '*nīlam pītam*' (The same thing appears as green and yellow), and (iii) '*avikalpakaṁ savikalpakam iti*' (The same thing is changeless and changeful or diverse). To quote an instance, referring to the first proposition, if a seed is sown in fertile soil, it grows into a sprout and if it is thrown in sand, it does not grow at all. Referring to the second propcsition, for instance, one and the same object appears green and yellow when it is seen through two different mediums, viz , two pieces of glass or conch having different colours. The third proposition can be referred to this cosmos, which is changeful (diverse) (*savikalpaka*) in view of its ever-changing manifestations of various objects, and changeless (*avikalpaka*) viewed in its essence as being one Supreme Consciousness. Similarly, it is not wrong to say that unity and plurality exist in one and the same thing.[5]

The teacher now gives the process by which one and the same thing can be viewed as unity in multiplicity. He says, the mind reflects (*manonuvyavasāyi sat*) on what has been received through external senses, and makes the mental constructs such as action, etc , (*karmādi-kalpanāḥ karoti*), which rest on these two—unity and multiplicity (*tad dvayālambanā*), and which are constituted of the activity of the subject (*mātṛ-vyāpāra-*

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4. तत्रैकमान्तरं तत्त्वं तदेवेन्द्रियवेद्यताम् ।
संप्राप्यानेकतां याति देशकालस्वभावतः ॥ *Ibid.*, 2.

5. अथ व्यपदेशमात्रम् एतत् 'कारणम् अकारणं च' इत्यादि... ...नीलं पीतम् अविकल्पकं सविकल्पकम् इत्यपि सर्वं मायापदे व्यवहारमात्रम् । *IPV* II, 35-36.

Bhāskarāchārya interprets the above lines as follows: Just as one and the same thing is both a cause and no-cause, so unity and plurality can be attributed to one and the same thing and, hence, although internally the objects are, in essence, one consciousness, yet in practical view as denoted by 'blue and yellow' (*nīlam pītam*), 'determinate and indeterminate' (savikalpakaṁ avikalpakam), etc., they imply their multiplicity externally, at the empirical level (*māya-pade*).

इह मायापदेऽपि वस्तुनश्चिन्मयत्वेऽपि अन्तरेकं बहिरनेकं नीलं पीतम् अविकल्पकं सविकल्पकमित्येकानेक-नीलपीताविकल्पक-सविकल्पक-ज्ञातृ-ज्ञानादिकं सर्वं व्यवहारमात्रमिति... ...
Bhāskari II, 40.

mayīḥ).[6] The objects shine separately (*viviktābhā-bhāvāḥ*) and, as such, are self-confined (*svātma-niṣṭhā*), i.e., they are independent of one another's existence. But when they are unified, in so far as they are mutually connected in one subject (*eka-pramātari anyonyānvaya-rūpaikya-yujaḥ*), they constitute the basis of the idea of the relation (*sambandha-dhī-padam*).[7] Unity and plurality both are involved in relation. Neither of the two, by itself, is sufficient. The special categories referred to involve unity in plurality. While in some cases both are without, in others unity is within and the multiplicity is without. In the case of *sambandha* (mutual relation), the unity is only within the subject, whereas plurality is both within and without. In the case of *Kriya* (action), the object under operation gives rise to two ideas, the idea of multiplicity because of multiplicity in associations at different moments, and the idea of unity or sameness because of the consciousness of a persisting element in all the different associations. Thus, a set of successive cognitions gives rise to two ideas, plurality and unity. When these two ideas are unified in consciousness, there is awareness of unity in plurality.[8] In a similar manner, we can arrive at the same result in the case of other categories of relation.

The Pratyabhijñā maintains that the series of cognitions (*buddhayaḥ*) are associated in the subject, the self-consciousness, which is their very life (*sva-saṁvedanātmā pramātā jñāna-mālāyāḥ antaḥ sūtra-kalpaḥ jīvita-bhūtaḥ*). He is free (*svatantraḥ*). As Śiva, He is perfectly free from all impurities (*viśuddha-svabhāvaḥ*). At the level of *Māyā*, the same Śiva turns into *Paśu*, the limited perceiver. His mind is at work at the time of his forming determinate cognitions, and thus it makes the mental constructs such as action, relation, etc. This activity is of the nature of ascertainment, as it follows close upon the former indeterminate experience. 'The subject is said to have the impression of the former indeterminate cognition, as it persists in him even at the time of differentiation.'[9] This mental activity is, therefore, of the nature of reflection or reaction (*anuvyavasāyī*). Hence these mental constructs, action, etc., rest on unity and multiplicity, so far as the indeterminate knowledge (*nirvikalpakaṁ jñānam*), the

6. तद्द्वयालम्बना एता मनोऽनुव्यवसायि सत् ।
करोति मातृव्यापारमयीः कर्मादिकल्पनाः ॥ *IPK* II, ii, 3.

7. स्वात्मनिष्ठा विविक्ताभा भावा एकप्रमातरि।
अन्योन्यान्वयरूपैक्य-युजः संबन्धधीपदम् ॥ *Ibid.*, 4.

8. See Pandey, *Bhāskarī* I, Introduction, x-xi.

9. Pandey, *Bhāskarī* III, 132.

essential nature of which is unity, persists in the determinate knowledge (*niścayātmakaṁ vikalpakaṁ jñānam*), which is multiple in nature. The indeterminate knowledge is one with the Supreme Consciousness and the determinate is separated from it and assumes diverse forms. The categories of relation like *kriyā*, *samānya*, *sambandha*, *dravya*, *dik* and *kāla* are manifested by the light (*prakāsa*) of the self-consciousness. It is, however, the activity of the perceiver's mind which gives rise to the various forms of cognition resting on the basic relation of unity in multiplicity. *Sāmānya* (generality) is a common characteristic of a class of things which are similar (*samānānām yat ekam bhāti tat sāmānyam*) ; expansion (*vaitatyam*) of an individual, associated in time, space and form, is *kriyā* (*devadattasya yat vaitatyam sā kriyā*) ; an object which consists of parts and which is extended in space is called *avayavī* (whole) (*avayavānāṁ yad aikyaṁ vaitatyaṁ ca deśataḥ so'vayavī*), viz., whole is union of parts ; 'relative position (*dik*) consists in fixing upon the limit of a thing and then determining the position of another thing in relation to it as "this is in front of that," etc.'[10] ; 'Present time is coincidence of a certain action of an individual with his own being. And past and future are absence of such coincidence.'[11] The ideas denoted by 'small' and 'big', combinations of diffe-rent numbers, etc. are the special categories of *sambandha* (mutual relation). According to some, *Samavāya* (inherence) is the same as *Sāmānya* (generality), or that the former is the very life of the latter. According to some, *Samavāya* is nothing but mutual relation (*sambandha*), and according to others, it is something that depends upon relation. The *kārakās* also depend upon *kriya* (action) which is in turn based upon time ; the latter rests, through action, upon all kinds of objects. And that action (*kriyā*) itself depends upon *sambandha* (mutual relation). Therefore, the practical life (*loka-yātrā*) in all its various forms depends upon relation. The nature of relation is, in brief, as follows : The perceiver experiences the manifesta-tions of things individually and independent of one another ; when they are cognised as one with the perceiver, they constitute the basis of the idea of relation (*sambandha*). In the example '*rājñaḥ puruśaḥ*' (the king's servant), the perceiver is not satisfied with one cognition '*rājñaḥ*' (king), so he forms another cognition '*puruṣaḥ*' (man). When the two ideas are associated in his consciousness, not identically, then the idea of relation

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10. इमम् अवधिं कृत्वा अयम् इत्थम् ततोऽस्य अयं पुरस्तात् इत्यादिर्दिक् ।

IPV II, 43.

See Pandey, *Bhāskarī* III, 133.

11. अस्यायं क्रियाप्रतानः सहभावेन (वर्तमाने) आस्ते विनाभावेन वा (भूते भविष्यति च) इति...

Ibid., See fn. 66.

'king's man' satisfies him.[12] In this manner, all types of relations arise when various cognitions of objects are mutually connected as they are united in one subject, viz. the self-consciousness.

The determinate cognitions (manifestations) of the concepts of generality (*jāti*) and substance (*dravya*) involve unity in their nature even outside the subject also (*bahir api eka-rūpatām ālambante*), as well as multiplicity owing to multiplicity of individuals and the parts, which they represent, respectively (*vyaktyeka-deśa-bhedam cāpi*).[13] In generality (*jāti*), for instance, we perceive externally both the diversity of cows from one another and the unity in non-varying and recurring idea of the cow common to all the animals belonging to that class. In this category the idea of unity and that of multiplicity rests on the class existing externally, unity corresponding to one common quality in all the members of the class and multiplicity corresponding to the individual members of the class. When we perceive a substance, i e., a physical object, we observe (i) the parts (*avayavas*) of which that object is made up, and (ii) the object as a whole (*avayavī*), apart from the parts (*avayavas*). In both the cases, the multiplicity and the unity are outside. As an instance of the category of *dravya*, consisting of the relation between the whole (*avayavī*) and parts (*avayavas*), let us examine the object chair. The chair denotes the cognition of an object, extended in space and consisting of many parts combined as one inseparate whole It also denotes the cognitions of many distinct objects —legs, back, sides, seat, etc., which comprise the constituent parts of the chair, viewed separately. In the two views, the unity and multiplicity is observed externally.

The relation of '*kārakas*' is also due to the determinate consciousness of '*kriyā*' (predicate) (*kārakānāṁ samanvayaḥ kriyā-vimarśa-viṣayaḥ*); and the concept of '*dik*' (relative position), etc., depends upon the relation between the limited and the limiting (*avadhyavadhimad-bhāvānvayālambā*).[14] From this point of view, it is possible for the subject, who

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12. 'राज्ञः पुरुष' इति, तथाहि—राजा यदा पूर्वं धिया गृहीतोऽपि न स्वात्मविश्रान्त्या तुष्यति तदा रूपान्तरेण पुंसा श्लेषं भजन् कृतार्थी भवति पुरुषोऽप्येवं । *Ibid.*, 46.

13. जातिद्रव्यावभासानां बहिरप्येकरूपताम् ।
व्यक्त्येकदेशभेदं चाप्यालम्बन्ते विकल्पनाः ।। *IPK* II. ii, 5.

14. क्रियाविमर्शविषयः कारकाणां समन्वयः ।
अवध्यवधिमद्भावान्वयालम्बा दिगादिधीः ।। *Ibid.*, 6.

seeks causal efficiency, to achieve the desired purpose (*evam eva artha-kriyārthinaḥ mātuḥ artha-siddhiḥ syāt*), by means of an object that has both unity and multiplicity (*bhedābhedāvatārthena*). Therefore, the ideas of relation, etc., are not erroneous (*tena na bhrāntir īdṛśī*).[15] The relation subsisting in the *kārakas*- subject, object, instrumental, etc., just as in *pramātā*, *prameya* and *pramāṇa*, is ultimately caused by the determinate cognition of '*kriyā*' (action), which is unified with the self-consciousness.[16] A particular function that is denoted by a *kāraka* is related to many subservient functions, for instance, 'the cooking of food' is related to the functions : 'burning fuel', 'boiling rice' and so on. The function of a *Kāraka* is ultimately reduced to unity owing to *svātantrya* (freedom) of *Pramata*, the self-consciousness.[17] The relation of the powers of *kārakas* with the things, on which they rest, is also due to the determinate consciousness of *kriyā* (action). And the things and their powers have direct relation with *Kriyā*. It is this *Kriyā-śakti*, the power of action, alone that gives rise to relation of so many kinds (*kriyaiva bhagavati etāvad vijṛmbhitaṁ sambandham āvirbhāvayati*).[18] *Dik* (relative position) which denotes separateness of two objects from each other, such as, 'this is before, behind or far away', determinately cognised as external to the subject, is conceived first as unity, then as diversity, and finally rests, as one idea, in the internal unity (*āntaram ekatvam*).[19] Like *Dik*, *Deśa* and *Kāla* (space and time) also which denote diversity of actions (*kriyā*) and objects externally, rest ultimately in the internal unity (*dig-deśa-kāla*

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15. एवमेवार्थसिद्धिः स्यान्मातुरर्थक्रियार्थिनः ।
भेदाभेदवतार्थेन तेन न भ्रान्तिरीदृशी ॥ *Ibid*, 7.

16. कारकाणां कर्त्रादिशक्त्याधाराणां द्रव्याणां च योऽन्योन्यं समन्वयो दृश्यते, यथा मातृमेयमानानां मिथः (अन्वयः), सोऽन्तर्लीनप्रमात्मक-क्रियाविशेषपरामर्शैकनिमित्तकः ।
IPV II, 50.

17. काष्ठैः स्थाल्यामोदनं पचति चैत्र इति वाक्यगम्यो योऽर्थः स तत्त्वतः क्रिया, तदेवाख्यातशब्दो वाक्यमित्युच्यतेऽत्रभवता तत्र च काष्ठगतं ज्वलनादि स्थालीगतं संतपनादि तण्डुलगतं विचटनादि च यत् तत्पाकरूपम्—इत्येवं भेदेनामर्शो स्फुरत्यपि चैत्रचेतनस्वातन्त्र्यविश्रान्त्यामभेद एव पर्यवस्यतीति । *Ibid*., fn. 89.

18. कारकशक्तीनामपि यः स्वाश्रयैः संबन्धः सोऽपि क्रियापरामर्शनिमित्तकः, द्रव्याणां च शक्तीनां च क्रियया साकं साक्षात् संबन्धः, इति इयं क्रियैव भगवती एतावद्विजृम्भितं संबन्धम् आविर्भावयति... ... *IPV* II, 50-51.

19 अस्मादिदं पूर्वं परं दूरे इत्येवं बहिर्भिन्नतया परामृश्यमानयोः भावयोरन्तर् अभेदपूर्वकं भेदावमर्शमध्यम् अभेदविश्रान्तं च यत् रूपम् आमृश्यते तत् दिग् इत्युच्यते । *Ibid*.

vimṛśyamānā āntaram ekatvam āśrayante). Similarly, number (*saṁkhyā*), magnitude (*parimāṇa*), separation (*pṛthaktva*), combination (*saṁyoga*), division (*vibhāga*), etc., may be taken as forms of relation (*sambandha-rūpāḥ*),[20] which are manifested by the power of determinate cognition (*parāmarśa*) of the perceiver (*pramātā*). The perceiver is not satisfied (*santoṣam apuṣyataḥ*) until the object, that shines as resting within him, is not determinately cognised together with its relation with another, and this determinative activity is nothing but the manifestation of the power of action (*kriyā-śakti-vijṛmbhā-mayī*) which rests in the subject (*svarūpa-niṣṭhā*).[21]

Kriyā-śakti, whose essential nature is *svātantrya*, freedom or sovereignty of the perceiver's will, is the cause of the relation of unity and plurality (*bhedābheda-sambandhaḥ*), and this relation is the essence of all worldly transactions. The concepts of *kriyā*, *sambandha*, etc. which represent as different forms of relation, play an important role in practical life (*sakala-loka-yātrā*) Whereas unity in plurality (*bhedābheda*) is the ultimate universal relation underlying all this objective reality, the cosmos, without which it will be reduced to chaos, it is the *Vimarśa* aspect of the Supreme Reality (Maheśvara) which actually expands in the concrete form (*vistāraḥ*) of the material objects. The causal efficiency (*artha-kriyā*) of things, which is accomplished by the *Pramātā* by virtue of his *svātantrya* (freedom of the self-consciousness), also depends upon the relation of unity and plurality.

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20. एवं संख्या-परिमाण-पृथक्त्व-संयोग-विभाग-प्रभृतिषु संबन्धरूपतैव वाच्या।
Ibid., 52.

21. यत्र पदार्थाभासस्य आत्मविश्रान्त्या संतोषमपुष्यतः आभासान्तर-परामर्शविश्रान्ति-साकाङ्क्षतया स्वरूपनिष्ठा तत्र संबन्ध-रूपतैव क्रियाशक्तिविजृम्भामयी, ...
Ibid., 53.

CHAPTER XIX

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATION–II
THE LAW OF PERCEPTION

Māna-tat-phala-meya-nirūpaṇam (Perception and the object perceived).

The relation of unity in plurality (*bhedābheda*) is the first or fundamental law of *Kriyā-śakti*, as has been enunciated and explained in the last chapter. It is this basic relation in which are rooted all the categories of relation, like action (*kriyā*), mutual connection (*sambandha*), generality (*sāmānya*), substance (*dravya*), relative position (*dik*) and time (*kāla*), and which is also the postulate of the two other universal laws of *Kriya-śakti*, viz., the law of Perception and the law of Causation. The latter two laws are, in reality, the corollaries or the derivatives of the law of Division, the relation of unity in plurality (*bhedābheda*). Whereas the universe comprising infinite number of diverse objects is the expansion (*vistāraḥ*) of the *Vimarśa* aspect of the Supreme Reality (Maheśvara), all practical life in this world (*loka-yātrā*) depends upon the operation of the three universal laws of *Kriyā-śakti*. In the present chapter is discussed the nature and function of the law of Perception (*pramāṇa*) which is the only means of right knowledge of the existence of things.

In the ultimate view (*paramārthataḥ*), the relation of unity and plurality assumes two forms : (i) the relation of *Jñāpya* and *Jñāpakatva*, viz., the object of knowledge and the knower, and (ii) the relation of Kārya and Kāraṇa, viz., effect and cause. The former relation is the same as that which exists between *Pramāṇa* and *Prameya* being indispensable for the existence of things (*vastu-siddhiḥ*). Pratyabhijñā holds everything including the cognitions of *Kriyā*, *Sambandha*, etc., as facts of experience contrary to the view of the Vedāntins that all this is illusive in nature (*kriyā-sambandhādi-buddhayaḥ na bhrānti svabhāvāḥ*). The teacher says, *Pramāṇa* (Perception) is that by means of which an object is determinately cognised as "this" and "of such nature" (*yad vaśād idam iti etādṛk iti evam vastu vyavasthāpayate*). It is also self-luminous (*tat so'pi svābhāsaḥ*) and rises afresh every moment (*abhinavodayaḥ*).[1] That Pramāṇa, which

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1. इदमेतादृगित्येवं यद्वशाद्व्यवतिष्ठते ।
वस्तु प्रमाणं तत्सोऽपि स्वाभासोऽभिनवोदयः ॥ *IPK* II, iii, 1.

determinately cognises within itself (*antas-tathā-vimarśātmā saḥ*) an object, which is denoted by a single expression (*ekābhidhānaviṣaye—ekaika-śabda-vācye*) and which is unaffected by temporal and spatial limitations (*deśa-kālādyabhedini*), is termed *miti* (the cognition), provided it is not contradicted by another act of cognition in respect of the same object (*vastunyabādhitā*), such as the cognition of an illusive snake is by that of a real piece of rope and the cognition of a piece of silver by that of real conch shell.[2] *Miti* means only right cognition, free from an error with respect to an object, and does not denote a false apperception, like the appearance of two moons, when a perceiver looks askance at one moon.

Pramāṇa is nothing but the reflection of an object cast in the light of the subject (*pramātṛ-saṁlagno'rtha-pratibhāsaḥ*).[3] The light (*prakāśa*) of the limited perceiver (*māyā pramātā*) facing an object is affected by the latter in varied ways and is reflected back in the form of ever new and diverse manifestations (*abhinavodayaḥ*). Thus, every moment *ābhāsas* appear anew as determined by *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇābhimata-ābhāsaḥ*). The preceiver is endowed with *Vimarśa*, the power of determinate cognition, by virtue of which he can differentiate one object, say pot, from another, say cloth, or *nīla* from *pīta*. Pure sentience alone (*śuddhā nirviśeṣā citiḥ*) which characterizes *Atman* according to the Vedānta system, is not potent to form the determinate cognitions of things as different from one another.[4] It is the essential nature of *Māyā pramātā* (the limited perceiver) to form the various determinate cognitions pertaining to different objects, but in all the cognitions self-consciousness (*sva-saṁvedanam*) persists unceasingly (*abādhyamānam*).[5] Thus *Pramāṇa* (perception) is that which illuminates the *ābhāsa* of an object (*nīla*) as inseperate from the light (*prakāśa*) of the limited perceiver.[6] It functions with its power of

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2. सोऽन्तस्तथाविमर्शात्मा देशकालाद्यभेदिनि ।
एकाभिधानविषये मितिर्वस्तुन्यबाधिता ॥ *Ibid.*, 2.

3. तस्मादादिसिद्धप्रमातृसंलग्नोऽर्थप्रतिभासोऽर्थे प्रमाणत्वेन उपदिश्यते ।
IPV II. 63, fn. 19.

4 सोऽपि यदि शुद्धो निर्विशेषो (यथा वेदान्ते) न तर्हि नीलस्यैव व्यवस्थाहेतुः भवेद्— पीतादावपि तस्य तथात्वात्, तदसौ नीलोपरक्तो नीलोन्मुखो नीलप्रकाशस्वभाव इत्याभासः सन् नीलस्य व्यवस्थापकः (स विमर्शमयः संविदात्मा) । *IPV* II, 65.

5. अस्ति च इदं स्वसंवेदनं—यत् सर्वत्र अबाध्यमानम् । *Ibid.*, 67.

6. इत्येवं स्वत्वेन आभासमानः (मायाप्रमातरि संबन्धित्वेन निर्भासमानः) यः आभासः (नीलाद्यवभासः)—नवनवप्रमेयोन्मुख्यात् नवनवोदयः स प्रमाणम् यतः प्रमां विधत्ते । *Ibid.*, fn. 32.

determinate knowledge (*vimarśa*), the very life of which is the word (*vimarśaśca śabda jīvitaḥ*), and the same is unaffected by time and place, etc., i.e., is free from all associations with other *ābhāsas*, such as place and time, etc.[7] Knowledge is, therefore, the characteristic of *Pramāṇa* (*tad-bodha-rūpam*), which depends upon knowledge for its very existence (*bodhya-niṣṭham*) and so rests on the nature of *Pramātā* (*pramātṛ-svarūpa-viśrantam*).[8] Whereas *Pramāṇa* is knowledge (*bodha*) innate in *Pramātā*, which is externalized (*bahirmukhatām-āgatam*) in the form of cognition of an object (i.e. *miti*), *Pramā* is its internal state (*antar-mukhatām-āgatam*). The essence of *Pramā* is *vimarśa* which associates with every presentment of object and does not vanish any time. Being of the nature of effect, *Pramā* changes every moment on account of the varied manifestations of objects facing *pramātā*. *Miti* (cognition of an object) is a state of limitation of *Pramāṇa*, (*saṁkocāvasthāyāṁ sā mitir bhavati*). *Pramā*, the internal aspect of *Pramāṇa*, which corresponds to the cognition of an object (*miti*), ultimately gives up its limitation and, in a moment, becomes one with *Pramātā* in nature.[9]

Here, the Pūrvapakṣin questions, as you say that diversity is the nature of *ābhāsas* pertaining to an object, how can *miti*, which refers, as its object only, to that which is denoted by a single expression : (*ekābhidhāna-viṣaye mitiḥ*), operate on every one of the *ābhāsas* and also imply only one particular object of known character (*svalakṣaṇam*) ? The teacher says, even in respect of one object, which is established by a single determinate cognition (*anusaṁdhāna-sādhite ekasminn arthe*) *ābhāsas* diversify, viz., different kinds of *ābhāsas* arise, (*ābhāsaḥ bhidyate*), according to the taste or desire (*yathā-ruci*) or the purpose (*yathārthitam*) or the traditional knowledge (*yathā-vyutpatti*) that one has of the

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7. विमर्शबलेन च यतः प्रमाणं विमर्शश्च शब्दजीवितः शब्दश्च आभासान्तरैः देशकालादिरूपैरनामृष्टे एकत्रैव आभासमात्र प्रवर्तते—घट इति... *Ibid.*, 69-71.

'न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते ।
अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देनगृह्यते । *Ibid.*, fn. 47.

8. तत्तद्बोधरूपं बोध्यनिष्ठं प्रमातृस्वरूपविश्रान्तं प्रमाणम् । *Ibid.*, 78.

9. वस्तुनि—वस्तुविषये सा मितिः, संकोचावस्थायां सा मितिर्भवति... ...तथा च न तस्या अन्तर्मुखेपि प्रमातृत्वम् । ... ...बहिर्मुखतामागतं प्रमातुः स्वरूपं प्रमाणं भवति, पुनरन्तर्मुखतामागतं तावदत्यक्तविषयोपरागवत् प्रमा स्यात्, ततः क्षणेनसंकोचत्यागे एषा प्रमापि प्रमातृरूपैव भवति......
Bhaskari II, 91.

object.[10] The views formed of one single object differ according to the desire of the perceiver (*rucim—svātantrayam*), the causal efficiency (*arthitam*) of the object in the mind of the perceiver, or according to its particular character being generally known (*yathā-vyutpatti*). Thus the *ābhāsas* of objects become diversified according to the mental attitudes of different perceivers, for instance, a man, in different postures, appears in different forms: as "long" *ābhāsa*, when he stretches himselt like a tree (*dīrghatām eva kadācit vimṛśati, yā tarūṇām api asti*), "round' *ābhāsa* (*vṛtta*), when he is sitting in a compact form like a stone (... *vṛttatām yā śilānām api sambhavinī*), "tall" *ābhāsa* when he is standing erect like a post (*ūrdhva-dig-ākramaṇa-rūpam vā ūrdhvatām, yā sthāṇor api sambandhinī*), or *ābhāsa* of "a normal man", when he is moving in a usual form of a human being (*gamanāgamanādi-svatantra-bhāva-yogyatā-rūpaṁ vā puruṣatvam, yad anya-puruṣa-sādhāraṇam*).[11] Similarly, the *ābhāsas* of "smoke" and that "of sandal-wocd" appear as different from one another.[12] But these *ābhāsas* do not get affected owing to their association with time and space.[13] So do the *ābhāsas* with respect to one single object vary, in the views of different perceivers, such as *ābhāsas*: "it is something" (*asti idam iti, sattvābhāsam eva paśyati*),[14] "jar" (a perceiver, in this case, forms the particular view of the object pot as a means of fetching water),[15] "substance" (a perceiver, in this case, takes it to be an object that can be brought or taken away at one's will),[16] "gold" (a perceiver, in this case, takes notice of its value)[17] and "bright" (a

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10. यथारुचि यथार्थित्वं यथाव्युत्पत्ति भिद्यते ।
आभासोऽप्यर्थ एकस्मिन्ननुसंधानसाधिते ॥ *IPK* II, iii, 3.

11. दीर्घवृत्तोर्ध्वपुरुष (आकारैः) यथाभासाविभिद्यन्ते ॥ *Ibid.*, 4 ac.

12. धूमचान्दनतादिभिः (आकारैः) यथा... ... ॥ *Ibid.*, 4 bc.

13. देशकालाविभेदिनः... ... ॥ *Ibid.*, 4 d.
ते आभासाः तथा भिद्यमानापि देशकालभेदं न स्पृशन्ति ।
S, See *Pvr.*, 44

Bhāskari II, 94, gives. देशकालविभेदिनः ।
Dr. Pandey translates it as: '*ābhāsas*...though limited by time and space.'
Pandey, *Bhāskarī* III, 148.

14. When a perceiver, expecting to see nothing, finds something, say, a *ghaṭa*. *S*.

15. उदकाहरणार्थी घटाभासम् । *IPV* II, 91.

16. स्वतन्त्र-नयनानयनयोग्यवस्त्वर्थी द्रव्याभासम् । *Ibid.*

17. मूल्याद्यर्थी काञ्चनाभासम् । *Ibid.*

perceiver, in this case, is attracted by its splendour),[18] and each of these different *abhāsas* is given a particular name, according to the particular purpose that it serves (*bhinnārtha kāriṇas te padaṁ dhvaneḥ*).[19] The causal efficiency of objects which appear as isolated *ābhāsas* is individually fixed (*vastūnām ābhāsabhedād artha-kriyā niyatā, ekaika-mātra-svarūpā*); it is because those isolated *ābhāsas* shine as one, owing to their resting on a common *ābhāsa* (*sāmānādhikaraṇyena abhedinām pratibhāsāt*).[20] Here the question arises, if different *ābhāsas* mix together to discharge one function what is it that limits their mixing up? The teacher says, just as there is the idea of oneness in different rays of a lamp, or in different currents of the ocean, due to their discharging one particular function (*eka-kārya*), so there lies the idea of oneness in different *ābhāsas* pertaining to an object, which do not contradict one another.[21]

As said above cognitions formed with regard to a single object are many and are manifested as different *abhāsas* according to the desire of the perceiver, according to its particular causal efficiency, and according to its particular character being generally known to ancestors.[22] In spite of the variations in the *ābhāsas*, it is *Vimarśa* which determines the particular character of an object in accordance with the particular view held at every time.[23] For instance, with regard to a single man in his different postures, one cognises his tallness like that of a tree when he stands erect and extends himself to a great height, or his roundness like that of a compact stone, when he keeps all of his limbs joined together, or his loftiness, when he extends himself in height like a post, or as a normal man in his walking posture. Similarly different views may be held in respect of a scholar or a

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18. हृद्यतार्थी श्रौज्ज्वल्याभासम् । *Ibid.*

19. एकैकश्चासावाभास एकैक शब्देन व्यवहारार्थं । तत्तत् नियतार्थक्रियार्थिभिरघट इति सन्नाभिधीयते । *Pvṛ.* p. 45.
तथैव सद्-घट-द्रव्य-काञ्चनोज्ज्वलतादयः ।
श्राभासभेदा भिन्नार्थकारिणस्ते पदं ध्वनेः ॥ *IPK* II, iii, 5.

20. श्राभासभेदाद्वस्तूनां नियतार्थक्रिया पुनः ।
सामानाधिकरण्येन प्रतिभासादभेदिनाम् ॥ *Ibid.* 6.

21. पृथग्दीपप्रकाशानां स्रोतसां सागरे यथा ।
श्रविरुद्धावभासानामेककार्या तथैक्यधीः ॥ *Ibid.*, 7.

22. स्वतन्त्रं वा विवेचनम् श्रर्थितानुसारेण वा पूर्वंप्रसिद्ध्युपजीवनेन वा । *IPV* II, 86.

23. व्यामिश्रणाप्राणो विमर्शः तदा तदेकं स्वलक्षणं । *Ibid.*, 87.

soldier corresponding to his different characteristics, such as intelligence or dullness, courage or cowardice, ordinary qualities or extraordinary qualities and so on Various *ābhāsas* may be formed with regard to smoke, as arising from different kinds of material, such as common wood, *sandal* or *śrīkhaṇḍa* and so on. With regard to common objects like a pot (*ghaṭa*), etc., also *ābhāsas* differ according to different causal efficiencies of an object,—one desirous of using a pot for the purpose of fetching water, cognises it as the *ābhāsa* of a tumbler or a vessel, one concerned with its value, as the *ābhāsa* of a precious metallic object, one being attracted by its splendour and beauty, as an *ābhāsa* of a bright and lovely object, one conceiving its hardness, as an *ābhāsa* of a hard object, and so on. Thus, *Vimarśa* varies in various ways with regard to different objects. The question arises, now, how is it that particular name is given to a particular object, if it is viewed in so many forms of different *ābhāsas*? To reply this question, the Pratyabhijñā says that, among the various *ābhāsas* pertaining to a particular object, there exists one predominating *ābhāsa* corresponding to one fixed commonly known causal efficiency (*niyatārtha kriyā*). It, therefore, stands as a principal or primary *ābhāsa* while the rest are associated with it as subordinate or secondary *ābhāsas* depending upon the former as their common substratum (*sāmānādhikaraṇam*). It is to this common substratum or the predominant *ābhāsa* that a particular name is given, as in the case of a vessel '*ghaṭa*'. The multiplicity of *ābhāsas* pertaining to an object is in this way individualized on the basis of the one primary or predominant *ābhāsa*. From the fact that an object is viewed in the form of only one *ābhāsa*, according to one causal efficiency only, which stands as the common substratum, we cannot say : the question of multiplicity of *ābhāsas* in respect of an individual object does not arise. It is not possible to ignore the multiplicity of *ābhāsas* corresponding to isolated objects, rather this multiplicity plays an important role in the practical life. The fact is that so many *ābhāsas* pertaining to an individual object, different from one another, associate together in giving rise to one particular causal efficiency, for instance, various rays of light, forming one continuous flame, possess a certain causal efficiency of illuminating a room, or numerous rivers and streams (*srotasām*), mixing together in one ocean, discharge one particular function, viz., causal efficiency of giving rise to tides and waves, etc., which characterizes it.[24] So the various *ābhāsas* pertaining to an object, serve one particular purpose, just as a vessel (*ghaṭa*) serves the purpose of fetching water for drinking. There is, however, a

24. सागरपतितानि च स्रोतांसि बहुतरतरङ्गारंभार्थक्रियाकारीणि । *Ibid.*, 97.

limitation in the combination of *ābhāsas*, for instance, *rūpābhāsa* (manifestation of form) cannot join with *mārutābhāsa* (manifestation of air), which are contrary to each other (*virodhāt*).[25] In the examples cited above, the *ābhāsas* are not contrary, so they can unite with one another.[26] In such cases, every one of the *ābhāsas* appropriates to itself one particular causal efficiency.

The Pūrvapakṣin questions here ; he says, it should not be possible for the *ābhāsas* of fire, smoke and the causal relation between the two (fire and smoke) to associate with one another, since they are cognised through different *pramāṇas*. The mutual combination of these different *ābhāsas*, therefore, requires to be explained. The teacher says, even in the case of ordinary fire (*avaśiṣṭe vahnau*), its causal relation and heat, and its standing for the meaning of a conventional word, etc., are known through one *pramāṇa* only. So is the case with other things also (*vahnyādau*).[27] It is by the providential power (*bhagavatyā niyati-śaktyā niyamitaḥ*) that the *ābhāsa* of the common fire, remaining unqualified owing to its non-association with the *ābhāsas* of time and place,[28] combines with the *ābhāsas* of fuel, its cause, the smoke, its effect, the heat, odourlessness, quality of rising upwards, its nature contrary to water, its being denoted by a conventional word and its other characteristics, all of which are known by one *pramāṇa* only.[29] The combination of *ābhāsas* of objects with one another as well as with the *ābhāsas* of time and place, is also established by one *pramāṇa*, viz., the light proceeding from the perceiver (*pramātā*) which receives the various reflections of objects. The *pramātā* is unaffected by these *ābhāsas* and remains as one, though *pramāṇa* gets diversified by numerous objects facing it (*pramāṇa bahutva*). In a cognitive

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25. नहि रूपाभासो मारुताभासेन मिश्रीभवति—विरोधात्।

26. येषाम् अविरोधः त एव आभासा मिश्रीभवन्ति। *Ibid*, 98.

27. तत्राविशिष्टे वह्न्यादौ कार्यकारणतोष्णता।
तत्तच्छब्दार्थताद्यात्मा प्रमाणादेकतो मतः॥ *Ibid.*, 97-98.

28. अविशिष्टो यद्यपि वह्न्याभासो देशकालाभासप्रमुखैः आभासैः असंकीर्णत्वेन सामान्यमात्ररूपत्वात्... ... ... *IPK* II, iii, 8.
IPV II, 99-100.

29. तथा च—वह्न्याभास इन्धनकार्यत्वाभासेन धूमकारणताभासेन उष्णस्वभावताभासेन च स्वाभाविकाव्यभिचारितसाहचर्यः प्रतीयमानो विश्वत्रैव सर्वदैव च तथा प्रतीतो भवति... ... ततश्च नियतिशक्त्युपजीवनेन धूमाभासोऽपि अग्न्याभासाव्यभिचारी......कार्यता कारणता उष्णता च तस्य तस्य शब्दस्यार्थता...गन्धरसशून्यता ऊर्ध्वदिक्संयोगिता जलविरोधिता च......स एकस्मादेव प्रमाणात् मतः—संविदित इति। *IPV* II. 100-102.

experience, it is not only one *pramāṇa* that functions but a combination of different *pramāṇas* (*bhinna-pramāṇānām kalāpa iti*). So the teacher says that the activity of the person, with a purposive attitude (*arthinaḥ*) in respect of a particular object at the time of its perception (*tāt-kālikī*), proceeds from a single cognition (*svalakṣaṇe*) that is the aggregate of so many different cognitions (*pramāṇa-samūhād eva*), like those of place, time, etc., which are apparently diverse (*deśādike—deśa-kālādi-pratyakṣa-bheda-sāhityena*) and are identical with the perceiver (*antaḥ—pramātari—abhinnam*). Not only does this activity proceed in the case of direct perception, but also even in the case of inference (*anumānataḥ api*), when objects are not directly facing the *pramātā*.[30]

According to the Pratyabhijñā, unity in plurality in respect of objects is thus brought about by the power of *Vimarśa* ; that is the self-dependent power (*svātantrya*) of consciousness, the great Lord (*parameśvara*). Saugatas, on the other hand, hold that unity in things remains intact whether they are placed at long distance away or near at hand (*dūrānti-kādau arthasya abhedaḥ*). In the former case, i.e., when the things are far away and hence imperceptible to senses, their unity, as for instance, in fire and smoke, is cognised by inference (*anumāna*) ; in the latter case, i.e., when the objects are near and perceptible to senses, unity in diversity is perceived by direct sense observation, as in a chair comprising several parts, such as four legs, seat, back, etc. In regard to this point the teacher states that the awareness of unity in diversity got either by inference or by direct sense perception (*anumāna or pratyakṣa*) is ultimately due to the functioning of *Vimarśa*, the chief *ābhāsa* (*mukhyābhāsa*). He, therefore, states : oneness (i.e., sameness) of the objects cannot be contradicted (*arthānām ekatvam anivāritam*), which (objects) appear as different *ābhāsas* (*bhinnāvabhāsa-cchāyānām*) because of their remoteness or nearness (*dūrāntikatayā*), being beyond sense perception or directly facing the senses (*parokṣa-adhyakṣatātmanā*), or owing to their externality or internality (*bāhyāntaratayā*), or on account of the defects in the accessories of knowledge (*vyañjakasya doṣaiḥ*), or otherwise (*anyatayā api vā*), since they collectively shine as one primary *ābhāsa* (*mukhyāvabhāsataḥ*), and for the reason that each one of these isolated *ābhāsas* arises only from one determinate cognition and is recognised as such

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30. सा तु देशादिकाध्यक्षान्तरभिन्ने स्वलक्षणे ।
तात्कालिकी प्रवृत्तिः स्यादर्थिनः, अप्यनुमानतः ॥ *IPK* II, iii, 9.

(*eka-pratyavamarśākhyāt*).[31] The teacher further says that remoteness or nearness of objects will not at all affect their causal efficiency, for, the causal efficiency (*arthakriyā*) of the objects is not naturally their own (*sahajā na*). It is fixed by the will of the Lord (*īśvara-icchayā hi niyatā sā*). Therefore, the object cannot be thought to be unreal (or anything different) simply because it does not perform functional activity (*tena asyā artha-kriyāyā akriyātaḥ asya arthasya anyatā—avastutvam—na bhavet*), because of the fact that it depends upon the will of the Lord.[32]

The Pūrvapakṣin questions again, according to this view, the perceiver becomes aware of the relation of unity and diversity in things by his power of *Vimarśa*. It is not, therefore, possible to differentiate between real manifestations and fictitious appearances, since it is one and the same *Vimarśa* that cognises a piece of silver in place of a piece of mother-of-pearl, two moons in place of one, a snake in place of a piece of rope, and so on. How can we explain the cognition of real things in place of fictitious things apperceived before? The teacher says, even when there is consciousness of silver at the sight of mother-of-pearl, there is actually no silver in place of mother-of-pearl (*śuktau rajataika-vimarśe 'pi rajata-sthitiḥ na bhavati*), because there is no agreement between the two cognitions arising from that common substratum (*upādhi-deśa-asaṁvādāt*). In the case of apperception of 'two-moons", it is a fictitious sight that appears in the heavenly vault (*dvi-candre 'pi nabho-deśāsaṁvādād anyatha—mithya—bhavati*).[33] In the case of fictitious appearances, cognitive activity of the perceiver is not right (*samucita*). Several explanations are offered by different schools of thought in India about the rise of fictitious appearances. This is, indeed, a hotly discussed topic in the Vedānta system. Eight different views held about the nature of illusion are as follows :—

1. *asat-khyāti* (appearance of an unreal thing) ;
2. *ātma-khyāti* (appearance of *ātman*, i.e. momentry *vijñāna*—mind);

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31. दूरान्तिकतयार्थानां परोक्षाध्यक्षतात्मना ।
बाह्यान्तरतया दोषैर्व्यंञ्जकस्यान्यथापि वा ॥
भिन्नावभासच्छायानामपि मुख्यावभासत: ।
एकप्रत्यवमर्शाख्यादेकत्वमनिवारितम् ॥ *Ibid.*, 10-11.

32. अर्थक्रियापि सहजा नार्थानामीश्वरेच्छया ।
नियता सा हि तेनास्या नाक्रियातोऽन्यता भवेत् ॥ *Ibid* , 12.

33. रजतैकविमर्शेऽपि शुक्तौ न रजतस्थिति: ।
उपाधिदेशासंवादाद् द्विचन्द्रेऽपि नभोऽन्यथा ॥ *Ibid.*, 13.

3. *anyathā-khyāti* or *viparīta-khyāti* (appearance of a thing different from or contrary to a real thing);
4. *akhyāti* (non-appearance of real thing);
5. *asthira-khyāti* (unstable appearance);
6. *asādhārana-khyāti* (uncommon appearance);
7. *anartha-kriyākārī-khyāti* (phenomenon that does not satisfy the essential causal efficiency); and
8. *anirvacanīya-khyāti* or *anirvācya-khyāti* (phenomenon indescribable as real or unreal).

According to the Pratyabhijñā school, these are only partial explanations for the nature of illusion. The school states that it is the imperfection of the determinate cognition (*vimarśa*) that gives rise to appearance of an unreal thing in place of a real thing (*apūrṇa-khyāti-rūpa akhyātir eva bhrānti-tattvam*).

The Śūnya-vādins hold illusion to be *asat-khyāti*, i.e., appearance of an unreal thing, whereas *Kṣaṇika-vādins* state that it is *ātma-khyāti*, i.e., appearance of nothing external but momentary *vijñāna*—mind. The Naiyāyikas, particularly Cintāmanikāra's school, define illusion as *anyathā-khyāti*, i.e., appearance of a thing different from or contrary to a real thing due to some defect in the sense of sight. The Sāṁkhyas and the followers of Prabhākara's system call it *akhyāti*, i.e., non-appearance of a real thing. The Vedāntins, particularly the Śaṅkara's school, regard it as *anirvacanīya-khyāti*, viz., a phenomenon indescribable as real or unreal. The Sāṁkhya system explains the cause of illusion as follows: A perceiver experiences illusion (*bhrānti*), when he wrongly perceives, for instance, a snake in place of a rope, and says "it is snake" (*ayaṁ sarpaḥ*). In this expression, 'it' (*ayam*) denotes only a partial perception of the real object rope causing common knowledge (*sāmānya jñāna*) of two different objects, alike in shape, rope and snake. The present wrong cognition of snake arises from remembrance (*smṛti*) of the past perception of a real snake, as in the experience of illusion, the perceiver lacks the proper ascertainment of the real object due to darkness, etc. The Vedāntin regards illusion to be indescribable as real or unreal, for the reason that its cause (*upādana-kāraṇa*) is nescience (*avidyā*). Pratyabhijñā considers these explanations unsound. It maintains that erroneous cognition of snake in place of rope and that of silver in place of a piece of mother-of-pearl, are instances of *apūrṇa-khyāti*, since the perceiver lacks perfect and complete Vimarśa at the time of his experiencing the so-called illusion (*bhrānti*).[34] The Vedāntin questions here, cannot we say that even the

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34. ततो यावता पूर्णेन रूपेण प्रख्यातव्यं विमर्शपर्यन्तं तावत् न प्रख्याति,—इत्यपूर्णख्यातिरूपा ख्यातिरेव भ्रान्तितत्वम् । *IPV* II. 113.

right knowledge of silver or snake is an instance of *apūrṇa-khyāti*, since the whole world is a *bhrānti* (illusion), the *Brahman* alone being the ultimate Realty? The Pratyabhijñā replies, from the view point of *Māyā* (the principle of obscuration), the whole objective world may be considered as *bhrānti* (*māyā padaṁ hi sarvam bhrānti*), but for practical purposes, the illusion of silver or snake in the long illusion (*bhrānti*) of this world is similar to a dream within another dream.[35] The Vedāntin will, however, admit that the right perceptions of the *ābhāsas* of silver and a piece of mother-of-peal or snake and rope, as isolated objects, are not illusions, but the phenomenon of illusion lies in the combination of the different *ābhāsas* arising from the cognition of the different objects. We call this wrong combination of *ābhāsas* as illusion, because the former *Vimarśa* (determinate cognition) corresponding to the knowledge of silver is not in agreement with the later *Vimarśa* that corresponds to the right knowledge of the piece of mother-of-pearl. Similarly in the case of appearance of two moons, the former *Vimarśa* pertaining to the combination of the *ābhāsas* of "two" and "moons" vanishes and is replaced by the proper *Vimarśa* pertaining to the combination of "one" and "moon", at the later time.

The teacher lays down a postulate that *ābhāsas* and their combinations are governed by the law of *Niyati* (Providence), which determines a *prameya*. '*Prameya*' is the same as '*vastu*' or '*tattva*', denoting an object (*vastu tattvam prameyam—iti paryāyaḥ*). The existence of *prameya* is dependent upon the *svātantrya* (self-dependent power) of the great Lord, the Supreme Perceiver (*pramātā*) (*sakala-prameya-siddhiḥ parameśvara eva āyattā*). The difference of objects from one another in respect of qualities (*guṇaiḥ*), such as sound, etc., and their identity in respect of the "generality", etc., (*jātyādibhiḥ*) can be established (*upapadyate*) on the basis of one perceiver (*Pramātā*).[36] *Prameya* manifests itself in the various *ābhāsas* of objects. The Lord (*Pramātā*) has the power (*svātantrya*) to diversify or unify *ābhāsas* corresponding to the different forms of *prameya*.[37] Unlike the Vedānta, the Pratyabhijñā

35. मायापदं हि सर्वं भ्रान्तिः; तत्रापि तु स्वप्ने स्वप्न इव गण्डे स्फोट इव अपरेयं भ्रान्तिरुच्यते, अनुवृत्त्युचितस्यापि विमर्शस्यास्थैर्यात् । ... सम्यग्विमर्शनानुवृत्त्याभासनं संवादनं, ··· तस्याभावात् कारणात् । *Ibid.*, 114-115.

36. गुणैः शब्दादिभिर्भेदो जात्यादिभिरभिन्नता ।
भावानामित्थमेकत्र प्रमातर्युपपद्यते ॥ *IPK* II, iii, 14.

37. सर्वथा तावदत्र प्रमेये भगवत एव भेदने च अभेदने च स्वातन्त्र्यम् ।
IPV II, 116-17.

does not consider the diversity of the objective world as contrary to the non-dualistic nature (*advaita*) of the Ultimate Reality, the great Lord (Maheśvara), the Supreme Perceiver.

Concluding the subject, the teacher says that Perception (*pramāṇa*) can only apply to external objects or to internal feelings (*nīla-sukhādikaṁ vyavatiṣṭhate*), and never to the Supreme Perceiver, the Lord. He says, what room is there for Perception (*pramāṇa*) which gives rise to ever-new *ābhāsas* (*kim pramāṇam navābhāsaḥ*), in reference to the Lord (*īśvare*), who is like a smooth surface of the wall that serves as background (substratum) (*sama-bhitti-talopame*) to the picture of the diversity of the universe (*viśva-vaicitrya-citrasya*), who is contrary to even a touch of unreality (*viruddhābhāva-saṁsparśe*), viz., beyond even a modicum of unreality, who is the highest reality (*paramārtha-sati*), who is the eternal subject (*pramātari purāṇe tu*), who is ever self-shining (*sarvadā-bhāta-vigrahe*) and in whom rest all forms of cognition (*sarva-pramiti bhāgini*).[38] It is established that the Lord is potent or free (*svatantra*) to manifest objects by combination and separation of *ābhāsas* on the background of His own *prakāśa*, one aspect of the Reality, and this diversity of objects rests on unity, like cinematograph pictures projected on a screen. Thus, *ābhāsas* cannot be null and void (*asad rūpatvāyogāt*) as they exist in the real luminousness (*prakāśa*) of the Lord. *Pramāṇa*, which is identical with *Pramātā*, cannot, therefore, operate on the Lord. Here the question arises, if perception (as the means of right knowledge) is of no avail in respect of the Lord, what is the use of the *Śāstra* which is concerned with the knowledge (recognition) of the Lord, the Supreme *Pramātā*? The Lord cannot be the object of perception or knowledge (*pramāṇa*), hence the *Śāstra* is useless. To this question the teacher gives the following reply: Because of ignorance (*mūḍhatā-vaśāt*), the role (function) or the essential nature of the Highest Being (Maheśvara), like His lordliness (*Īśatva*), etc., (*iśādi-vyavahāraḥ*) was never before looked upon (recognised) as that of the Self, the Subject (Perceiver) (*apravartita-pūrvaḥ*). The Pratyabhijñā Śāstra makes us aware of this function (action) of the Lord as ultimately resting upon or arising from one self-consciousness, the

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38. विश्ववैचित्र्यचित्रस्य समभित्तितलोपमे ।
विरुद्धाभावसंस्पर्शे परमार्थसतीश्वरे ।।

प्रमातरि पुराणे तु सर्वदा भातविग्रहे ।
किं प्रमाणं नवाभासः सर्वप्रमितिभागिनि ।। *IPK* II, iii, 15-16.

Supreme Perceiver (*atra—ātmani pramātṛ-rūpe*).[39] Although *Pramātā*, the Supreme Perceiver, being self-luminous, cannot, indeed, be known by *pramāṇa*, i.e., any cognitive process, yet it is the veil of ignorance (*mūḍhatā, moha*) that hides His infinite light (*pūrṇa-cetanatā*). The Śāstra, therefore, aims at removing this veil of ignorance (*mohāpasāraṇa-mātram*) by bringing into light the powers of *Pramātā* (*tasya pramātuḥ śakti-prakāsena pravartyate*), viz., revealing His *Svātantrya* (liberty or sovereignty) with respect to His powers of will, knowledge and action (*icchā-śakti, jñāna-śakti* and *kriyā-śakti*). This is only the purpose of the Pratyabhijñā Śāstra.[40]

39. अप्रवर्तितपूर्वोऽत्र केवलं मूढतावशात् ।
शक्तिप्रकाशेनेशादिव्यवहारः प्रवर्त्यते ॥ *Ibid.*, 17.

मायाव्यामोहवशात् पूर्वं यो न प्रवर्तितः ईशादिव्यवहारः केवलम् अत्र (अस्मिन्नात्मनि प्रमातृरूपे) तत्शक्तिप्रकाशेन प्रवर्त्यते प्रतिपाद्यते (साध्यते) । *S*, See *Pvr.*, p. 50.

40. एतेन शक्तीनाम् इच्छाज्ञानक्रियाणां प्रकाशकेन प्रत्यभिज्ञारूपेण व्यवहारसाधनपरार्थानुमानात्मना शास्त्रेण तं व्यवहारं प्रवर्तयतां (जन्तूनाम्) । *IPV* II, 129.

CHAPTER XX

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATION–III
THE LAW OF CAUSATION

Kārya-kāraṇa-tattva-nirūpaṇam (Effect and Cause).

The present chapter is devoted to the third law of *kriyā-śakti, viz.*, the Law of Causation, which operates in the relation between effect and cause (*kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva*). We shall, first, examine the nature of cause and effect in the light of this doctrine.

It has been established that Self, the Lord, is the Supreme Perceiver or Knower (*Pramātā*); it will now be proved that he is the Supreme Actor (*Kartā*). The teacher says, because of His unlimited power (*ananta-śaktitvāt*), the Lord makes the objects manifest (*amūn bhāvān ābhasayati*), by the sovereignty of His will (*icchā-vaśāt*). And this is the power of Action (*eṣā kriyā*) that is His creativeness (*sā asya nirmātṛtā*)[1] The Lord's activity of manifesting externally objects existing within Him, is known to be His *nirmātṛta* or *Nirmāṇa-śakti* (creative power). The Pūrvapakṣin objects to this proposition and argues as follows : He says, effect is seen coming out of a certain cause, as, for instance, when a plant grows from a seed. There appears no sentient being functioning in the production of an effect from a cause. How can we admit sentient activity in the acts of creation ? The teacher replies, the insentient cause, say seed, has no potential power to bring into existence the effect (*sattā*), say the plant, whether it be existing or not, in the cause, seed, (*yad asataḥ sataḥ*). The relation between cause and effect is, therefore, nothing but the relation between the creator and the object of creation (*tataḥ kārya-kāraṇatā kartṛ-karmatva-tattvaiva*).[2] Ultimately the cause is no other than the Self (*cetana*) which is both the Perceiver (*pramātā*) and the Actor (*kartā*), and the effect no

1. एष चानन्तशक्तित्वादेवमाभासयत्यमून् ।
भावानिच्छावशादेषा क्रिया निर्मातृतास्य सा । *IPK* II, iv, 1.

2. जडस्य तु न सा शक्तिः सत्ता यदसतः सतः ।
कर्तृकर्मत्वतत्त्वैव कार्यकारणता ततः ॥ *Ibid.*, 2.

other than the object (*karma*) manifested by *Kriyā-śakti* (*kartṛtvam eva hi kāraṇatvam karmataiva ca kāryatvaṁ na tvanyat*). From the following reasons it will be clear that an insentient lacks the power of creativeness :—

Whatever is non-existing will ever remain as such (*yad asat tad asad-yukta*), for nothing existent in nature can arise from non-existent (*nāsataḥ sat-svarūpatā*). And what is existing has nothing to gain by again coming into existence (*sato 'pi punaḥ sattā-lābhena arthaḥ na bhavati*).[3] There can be four alternatives, which may be postulated about the effect : it is existing, it is non-existing, it is both or it is neither. The last two, being self-contradictory, are out of the question. So we shall have to consider it either to be existent or non-existent. It cannot be admitted as inexistent, for, then, how should we account for its existence, since existence and inexistence are contradictory. So we arrive at the first alternative that effect is existent. If it is existent, what is the meaning of its coming into being from certain causes and by certain means? For instance, in the case of a pot produced by a potter, what is the use of the wheel, rod and thread? If the pot existed before it was brought into being, the activity of making it by means of the wheel, etc., ceases to have any purpose (*atha sann eva ghaṭaḥ tarhi kim anyad upayācyeta daṇḍa-cakra-sūtrāt ?*).[4] Now the teacher explains how an effect, say a pot, is produced from a cause. The relation of cause and effect (*kārya-kāraṇatā*) is nothing but transformation of what exists internally as self-consciousness (*saṁvid*), into the object of both, the internal and external senses, (*sāntar-viparivartinaḥ ubhayendriya-vedyatvam*), through the power of that some one (*tasya kasyāpi śaktitaḥ*), viz., the great Lord (Self).[5] The causality, or creativeness, attributed to the potter, for instance, originally exists in his consciousness. This creativeness is manifested externally by the potter's activity of his internal and external senses. Thus pots, etc., are produced by the power of the potter's consciousness, viz., his *nirmāṇa-śakti*, just as diverse reflections are manifested in a mirror by the power of the mirror itself or the fleeting objects in dreams by the power of

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3. यदसत्तदसद्युक्ता नासतः सत्स्वरूपता ।
   सतोऽपि न पुनः सत्तालाभेनार्थः, अथ चोच्यते ॥ *Ibid.*, 3.
4. *IPV* II, 139.
5. कार्यकारणतालोके सान्तर्विपरिवर्तिनः ।
   उभयेन्द्रियवेद्यत्वं तस्य कस्यापि शक्तितः ॥ *IPK* II, iv, 4.

Saṁvid.[6] The commentator says that, in the case of the potter's creativeness, ultimately it is his consciousness that can be admitted to be responsible for producing the effect (pots, etc.), and none of the *tattvas* (principles), like the body (*sārīra*), the vital air (*prāṇa*), the mind (*vijñāna*), or the void (*śūnya*), admitted as the subject (*Kartā*) by the alien schools, is potent to create things, as they are insentient in nature. We must, therefore, admit that the creativeness lies in the Supreme Perceiver (*Cidātman*), who brings into existence all kinds of objects in diverse forms.

As stated above, the teacher says, action is thus one (*evam kriyā ekā*). It involves succession and exists within and without (*sakramāntar bahiḥ-sthitiḥ*). This definitely belongs to one who is capable of assuming both internality and externality (*ekasyaiva ubhayākāra-sahiṣṇoḥ*). This has been established (*sa evam upapādita*).[7] The teacher says, the creativeness originally exists in self-consciousness (*saṁvid*). The process of creation passes successive stages being *sakrama*, since it first begins in the internal senses; then it is carried on by the external senses, until the objects are manifested. This activity (*kriyā*) is one (*ekā*), because it is identical with *kartā* (actor) and *karma* (the object) (*kartṛ-karmaikāśrayatādātmyāc ca ekā*)[8]. *Saṁvid* is one substratum of both the subjective and the objective aspects of the universe (*sa ca eka āśrayaḥ saṁvid-rupaḥ*). Hence, it is capable of assuming both internality and externality. The Pūrvapakṣin questions here ; he says, this postulate may be correct in the case of creation of pots, etc., by the potter who is a sentient being. How can we admit it in the case of the seed and the plant and such like instances of cause and effect, which we know to be insentient ? The teacher replies, the effect is that which, in relation to what was within a thing at one time, is out of it at another time (*yad antar yad apekṣayā tasyaiva bahis tat-kāryam*). Both (*dvayī*), the internality and externality of a thing, are admitted to be in relation to the subject (*bāhyāntara-sthitiḥ dvayī pramātṛ-apekṣayā ca uktvā*). Therefore, the subject alone is the cause (*tena pramātaiva bhāvānām kāraṇam bhavati*). And he remains the same in both the kinds of manifestations, internal

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6. यथा दर्पणान्तःकुम्भकारनिर्वर्त्यमानघटादिप्रतिबिम्बे दर्पणस्यैव तथावभासनमहिमा, तथा स्वप्नदर्शने संविदः, तथापि तन्महिम्नैव एतेन इदं बहिः स्फुट-रूपं क्रियते । *IPV* II, 141.

7. एवमेका क्रिया सैषा सक्रमान्तर्बहिःस्थितिः ।
एकस्यैवोभयाकार-सहिष्णोरुपपादिता ॥ *IPK* II, iv, 5.

8. *IPV* II, 143.

and external, of the object (*sa ca kāryasya ābhāsa-dvaya-sthitau eka eva sthitaḥ*). Therefore, the action is said to belong to one (*tat kriyā ekasya uditā*).[9] Thus it is established that creativeness belongs ultimately to one *Pramātā* and not to insentient entities. In the case of a plant (growing from a seed) also, in reality, the great Lord is admitted to be the cause (*ata eva aṅkure api nimittam parameśvaraḥ*), because nothing else, not even the seed, etc., insentient in nature, can be established to be the cause (*tad anyasyāpi niranusandhānasya bījāder hetutā na upapadyate*).[10] The *Naiyāyikas* also admit an intelligent being (the Lord) to be the cause of the growth of plant from seed. Here the question arises that the Lord can be admitted to be the Efficient Cause (*Nimitta-kāraṇa*) and not the Material Cause (*Upādāna-kāraṇa*), as he possesses only the power of causing creative activity in atoms (*paramāṇus*), for production of objects like plants, etc., by successive stages. The Material Cause consists of the elements--seed, earth, water, light, etc., and all these elements gradually transform into the Inherent Cause (*Samavāya-kāraṇa*) of the plants. The teacher asserts, as a matter of fact, that causality of nothing can be attributed to the insentient. It is the intelligent Being, the Lord, who, in the form of the Universal Energy, manifests Himself in the material aspect as plants and trees together with seed, earth, water, etc.[11] In a similar manner, it is that potter who, by the sovereignty of his will (*svātantrya*), produces pots, etc., through regular successive operations on clay, water, etc. (*tat-tat-mṛdādi-saṁskāra-krameṇa*). And this creative activity is governed by the laws, fixed by the Lord (*aiśvarya-vyavasthayā—īśvara-kṛta-niyati-sajña-maryādayā*).[12] The fact is that insentient matter impelled by sentient beings (*cetana*) is transformed into effects. The clay and water, etc., are, in themselves, impotent to produce anything unless a sentient being (potter) transforms them into various objects (pots, etc.). The urge of a sentient being is, therefore, indispensable for the production of the effect. In

9. बहिस्तस्यैव तत्कार्यं यदन्तर्यदपेक्षया ।
प्रमात्रपेक्षया चोक्ता द्वयी बाह्यान्तरस्थितिः ॥
मातैव कारणं तेन स चाभासद्वयस्थितौ ।
कार्यस्य स्थित एवैकस्तदेकस्य क्रियोदिता ॥ *IPK* II, iv, 6-7.

10. *Ibid*, 8.

11. ततश्चेश्वर एव बीजभूमिजलाभाससाहित्येनाङ्कुरात्मना भासते,—इतीयानत्र परमार्थः । *IPV* II, 146.

12. तथा हि कुम्भकारोऽसावैश्वर्यैव व्यवस्थया ।
तत्तत्मृदादिसंस्कार-क्रमेण जनयेद् घटम् ॥ *IPK* II, iv, 9.

(a) See, *Pvr*. p. 53.

the present instance, potter is the Lord and the master of his will (*svatantra*) who rules the activity of the wheel and shaft, etc., to effect change (*saṁskāra*) in the elements of clay and water. The potter's activity is, in reality, nothing but that of the great Lord (Maheśvara).

The teacher now gives another analogy regarding the creativeness of the Lord. He says, by sheer power of will of the yogins (*yoginām icchā-vaśena*), even without clay or seed (*mṛd-bīje vinaiva*), pots and plants, etc., come into being (*tad-ghaṭādi jāyate*), which are lasting for some time and serve their respective purposes (*tat-tat-sthira-svārtha-kriyākaram*)[13] The Pūrvapakṣin raises an objection to this analogy. He says, should we, therefore, admit that the creativeness of the Lord is like that of a thaumaturgist (*yogin*), who produces trees or pots, etc., by his mere will, without the need of seeds, clay, etc.? In such a state of affairs, i.e., the ultimate cause being the Lord's power of will alone, seeds, clay, etc., cannot be admitted to be the natural causes of trees, pots, etc. In other words, we totally deny the necessity of a particular cause for production of a certain effect, since the will of the Lord alone is said to be the cause of everything, like the will of a yogin. The teacher sets aside the objection as follows: He says, when it is known through other means of knowledge that the object, that we perceive, is not a creation of a yogin (*yogi-nirmāṇatā-abhāve pramāṇāntara-niścite arthe sati*), then, alone, it can serve as reason (*hetuḥ*) for drawing an inference, whether it be an effect (*kāryam*) of a certain cause or an essential nature (*svabhāva*) of the effect (*kārya-hetuḥ svabhāva-hetuḥ vā bhavati*). But in both the cases the reason (*hetuḥ*) has the causal law (*utpatti*) as its ground (*te eva utpatti-mūlajaḥ*).[14] The Pūrvapakṣin supposes that there are two kinds of things, one those created by mere will of a yogin and the other those produced from natural causes such as soil, seed, etc., but according to the view of the Pratyabhijñā, the two kinds of creativeness are not different from each other, as both of them are caused by *Vimarśa* (the determinate consciousness). A yogin creates an object, say, a pot or a tree, as cleverly as a potter produces a pot by his skilled activity of transforming clay in such forms.

According to some philosophers, a yogin invisibly causes activity in atoms (*paramāṇus*) to produce things like a pot or a tree, by the power of his will. To them, the teacher replies, we may admit that creation of certain

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13. योगिनामपि मृद्बीजे विनैवेच्छावशेन तत् ।
घटादि जायते तत्तत्स्थिरस्वार्थक्रियाकरम् ॥ *IPK* II, iv, 10.

14. *Ibid*, 11.

effects (objects) from certain causes is accomplished by a yogin invisibly, but it is wrong to suppose that atoms are gathered by him invisibly, for the purpose. The ultimate fact (*paramārtha*) is that the Supreme Perceiver performs his five-fold activity (creation, etc.) pertaining to the objective world in two ways, one by stages (*sakrama*) as in the case of potter's creativeness and the other without stages (*akrama*) as in the case of the creativeness of a yogin. In the latter case, objects are manifested by a sentient being (yogin) in his own self like reflections cast in a mirror.[15]

The Pūrvapakṣin objects again, by accepting the above doctrine, the reasoning based on inference will have to be admitted as without any value, since, according to the view point of the teacher, effects can evolve even without natural causes. In such a state of things, there exists no law governing causation. The effects may, then, be said to be produced without causes or from different causes or a cause may remain effectless. In the instance of the creativeness of a yogin, the fire may be created by him without smoke (effect) or smoke without fire (cause). The Uttarapakṣin replies, it is known that objects produced by a yogin from his will-power are not different in nature from the natural products, as scorpions created from the mixture of curd and dung are different from scorpions of natural birth, in respect of *rasa* and *vīrya* (fluid and semen), viz., the effect potential.[16] In this way, we infer the existence of fire from smoke, a certain tree from a certain *Śiṁśapa* seed, and so on. Moreover, we have no reason (*pramāṇa*) to deny the fact that creativeness belongs to the sentient being (yogin in the above instance), as is well-known in the world; nor can we say that we cannot ascertain or expect certain effects from certain natural causes. In the case of the yogin's creativeness, we can, therefore, say that his will is the proper cause of the effects produced by him. Our view point is based on inference (*utpatti mūlajaḥ*). The fact is that a particular reflective power of perceivers, known as *pratibhā* (genius) cultivated from the practice (*abhyāsa*) of innumerable lives, guides them in determining the production of particular effects from certain causes. Besides, the production of effects from natural causes is governed by the Lord's *Niyati-śakti* (causal law maintained universally by Providence). Due to this *Niyati*, there exists a common understanding or

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15. परमार्थतस्तु स एव क्रमाक्रमरूपविश्वसृष्ट्यादि-कृत्यपञ्चक-प्रपञ्चस्वभावः प्रकाशते ; चेतनो हि स्वात्मदर्पणे भावान् प्रतिबिम्बवदाभासयति,—इति सिद्धान्तः । *IPV* II, 153.

16. योगीच्छापि सर्वथा तादृशमेव न तु वृश्चिकगोमयादिसंभूत-वृश्चिकादिन्यायेन कथंचित् रसवीर्यादिना भिन्नं कार्यं जनयति । *Ibid.*, 155.

experience (*sāmānādhikaraṇam*) which determines the nature of a particular tree from a certain seed (say, *śiṁśapa*), etc., in accordance with the natural order formerly observed (*pūrva-nītyā*).[17] It may also be observed that creation of objects, like scorpions, from the causes of contrary nature, like the mixture of curd and dung, accords with the *Niyati-śakti* of the Lord. So, there is no reason to deny the fact that a yogin can create smoke without fire or fire without smoke.

An objection is raised here. According to the theory of manifestation (*ābhāsa-vāda*), *ābhāsas* (manifestations) only are the real things of the world. As such, the fire on the mountain, which is not manifest to the inferer, is nothing. How, then, that which is not manifest, can be the cause of smoke ? Since smoke cannot be supposed to arise from unmanifest fire, so the inference : 'fire is the cause of smoke', will have not a leg to stand upon. The teacher replies this objection as follows : Owing to the past experience of noticing invariable concomitance of fire and smoke, etc., the fresh smoke and the like can become possible again only owing to the cause (*adhipati*) that is not perceptible to senses (*parokšat*), viz., which is remote to the perceiver, such as the *ābhāsa* of fire, etc. (*bhūyaḥ nūtanam dhūmābhasādi parokṣād adhipater—vahneḥ—yuktā*). It is because it was manifested as a common *ābhāsa* to all the perceivers and had become one with them (*yasmāt dhūmābhasadi tat-tat-pramātreka-vahni-ābhasādito bhavet*).[18] The cognition of fire always accompanies that of the smoke, in the mind of a perceiver, hence, the *ābhāsa* of fire must inevitably be associated with the *ābhāsa* of smoke, both of which are one with the luminousness of the perceiver (*pramātreka*). So the effect is invariably concomitant with the cause, as such, the effect is an inevitable sign of the existence of the cause (*kāryam avyabicāryasya kāraṇasya liṅgam*).[19] Although the fire may not be manifest as a blazing flame, yet from the manifestation of smoke, the existence of the unblazed fire cannot be denied. Consequently the two ideas, those of fire and smoke, are associated. Here, the Pūrvapakṣin questions, but then there should be the inference of fire from the smoke, which comes out of the jar of a cowherd, in which it is collected and preserved even after the fire is extinguished. The questioner refers to a proverbial pot, having a small hole, which is filled by cowherds with smoke and placed by them in a

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17. तस्मात् नियतिशक्त्यायत्तः शिंशपाभास-वृक्षाभासयोः पूर्वंनीत्या सामानाधिकरण्याभासो हेतुबलात् । *Ibid.*, 161.

18. *IPK* II, iv, 12.

19. *Ibid.*, 13 a.

field to frighten animals. The teacher replies, the effect that is invariably concomitant with the cause, is the indicative sign (*liṅga*) of the cause. But, the *ābhāsa* of that smoke (*tad-ābhasaḥ*) which is not fresh, is due to another *ābhāsa* of the 'smoke' which is the cause (*adhipateḥ paraḥ*) and which was perceived by some other perceiver, but is beyond the awareness of the present perceiver.[20] *Ābhāsa* of smoke arising from the cowherd's smoke-pot indicates invariably the existence of fire to a perceiver. But, in this case, it is also inferred by the perceiver that the smoke that is the cause of the smoke in the pot must have existed elsewhere, and is stored in it cleverly by the cowherds.

The Pūrvapakṣin raises a very strong objection here. He says, from the above it is clear that the cause of smoke is fire, that of the plant is a seed, and so on. So why should we bring in another entity of sentient nature in the process of causation, or, in other words, why should we assert at all the existence of a sentient being as *karta* (actor)? The teacher, in this context, refers to the Buddhist view of causation. According to the Buddhists, the causal relation (*kārya-kāraṇatā*) is nothing more than— 'this (smoke) being there, that (fire) is there' (*asmin sati idam asti*), but it cannot hold good in the case of the insentients which lack desire or need (*apekṣā*) and are, therefore, devoid of consciousness (*sā api apekṣā-vihīnānām jaḍānām na upapadyate*).[21]

Cause and effect follows a certain order of succession. The two things, which have simultaneous existence, like pot and cloth, are not related in casual order. According to the Saugata, cause is antecedent to the effect. Even if we admit this, we cannot deny the fact that the causal relation has reference to sentient beings. The causal relation has no meaning for insentients wanting thought and consideration (*apekṣā-vihīnānām*). It cannot be attributed to motiveless insentient things. Motive (*apekṣā*) and reflection or determinate thought (*vimarśa*) is the essential nature of sentients (*caitanya*). To attribute sentience (*citiḥ*) to objects, like pot, fire, etc., is only complementary (*upacarita*). Insentient objects (*jaḍāḥ*) have no thought in themselve ; they are manifest in their limited forms and their manifestation is one with the luminousness of *Svātman* (the Supreme Perceiver). Here, the teacher gets the chance of proving, from the instance of the locative case in the statement : '*asmin*

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20. … …अन्यप्रमातृगात् ॥

तदाभासस्तदाभासादेव त्वधिपतेः परः ॥ *Ibid.*

21. *IPK*, II, iv, 14.

sati...', that the mutual relation of the objects and actions as represented by words (viz. nouns and verbs, etc.) have meaning only to sentient beings but not to insentients. Tne teacher says, the meaning of the locative case (in *asmin sati*...) cannot be attributed to the insentients, which are self-confined (*svātmaika-niṣṭhānām*) and possess no comprehension (*anusandhāna-varjinām*), whether they are of the nature of 'being' or that of 'non-being' (*sad-asattā-pade 'pi*), such as 'when the seed be existing, the plant will be non-existing or vice versa' (*yadi bījam sad aṅkuro 'san, athāpi viparyayaḥ*).[22] Therefore, the mutual relation of objects (*bhāva-samanvayaḥ*) indicated by case terminations (*vibhaktyarthaḥ*), that which is known as *Kriyā-kāraka-bhāva*, viz., the relation subsisting between nouns and verbs, is possible (*yuktaḥ*), because they rest on one subject (*pramātreka-samāśrayaḥ*).[23]

An objection is raised again, the Sāṅkhyas believe that cause and effect are connected by the relation of identity (*tādātmya*). According to the school, *Prakṛti* which is the agent of creation, is held by them as insentient. In view of this theory, what is the use of propounding the doctrine that the casual agent is the sentient being (viz. *kartṛ-vāda*)? The teacher says, if cause and effect are mutually of the same nature, then there would be unity only (*kārya-kāraṇayoḥ paraspara-svabhāvatve api ekatvam eva*). For, if difference be admitted, then they would not be mutually of the same nature (*bhede hi, naiva anyonya-svarūpatā*).[24] A question arises again, the things connected in causal relation, like seed and plant, or *Pradhāna*, which appears in the form of a chain of innumerable creations and destructions, and its effects, the things evolving and assuming different forms, represent to be cause and effect, when only a part of the whole chain is taken into consideration, so that what precedes is the cause and that which comes after in this chain is called the effect. Thus the conception of causality is based on the analysis of what is essentially a unity. With regard to this point, the teacher says, action (*kriyā*) which follows the temporal order (*kāla-kramānuga*), is the assumption of

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22. न हि स्वात्मैकनिष्ठानामनुसन्धानवर्जिनाम् ।
सदसत्तापदेऽप्येष सप्तम्यर्थः प्रकल्प्यते ॥ *Ibid.*, 15.

23. अत एव विभक्त्यर्थः प्रमात्रेकसमाश्रयः ।
क्रियाकारकभावाख्यो युक्तो भावसमन्वयः ॥ *Ibid.*, 16.

24. परस्परस्वभावत्वे कार्यकारणयोरपि ।
एकत्वमेव भेदे हि नैवान्योन्यस्वरूपता ॥ *Ibid.*, 17.

multiplicity of forms (*vibhedaḥ*) by that whose nature is unity (*ekātmanaḥ*). It is because the self, possessing freedom and power, has the nature of undergoing or causing transformations (*svatantrasya śaktimataḥ pariṇamattayā*) and, as such, is, in reality, to be held as causal agent (*evam hetoḥ tasya kartṛtā eva tathā syāt*).[25]

The teacher concludes the doctrine of causality as follows: He says, it is not consistent with reason to hold that evolutive activity (*kriyā*) belongs to insentients like *Pradhāna*, etc. (*jaaḍsya pradhānādeḥ evam ca na yuktam—kartṛtā na yuktā*); because the insentient, being an isolated unity and object of perception, is opposite to the unity in multiplicity (*bhedābheda-virodhataḥ*), which characterises action. It is, therefore, reasonable to admit that the evolutive activity belongs to the sentient (*cidātman*), which is one, yet having, in itself, diversity of manifestations (*ābhāsa-bhedād ekatra*), viz., which has the nature of unity in diversity.[26] Even if we admit the unity of consciousness (*cid-ekatve*) to be truly real (*vāstave 'pi*), there can be no evolutive activity (*kriyā na syāt*), which is characteristic of the desire to create (*cikīrṣā-lakṣaṇā*), unless there be the determinate consciousness of the identity of various *ābhāsas* (*ābhāsa-bhinnayor ekatva-parāmarśaṁ vina*) falling in two groups, as actors and objects (*kartā* and *karma*) or sentients and insentients.[27] Because, insentient (*Pradhāna*) lacks the essential nature of the cause or the agent (*kāraṇatā kartṛtā ca*), and of such nature is also pure cit (*cetana*), which is devoid of the determinate consciousness of the identity of *ābhāsas*,[28] so it is the will (*icchā*) itself of the Lord, who desires to exist in the form of the world comprising *ābhāsas* of innumerable objects like pot, cloth and so on.

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25. एकात्मनो विभेदश्च क्रियाकालक्रमानुगा ।
तथा स्यात्कर्तृतैवैवं तथा परिणमत्तया ॥ *Ibid.*, 18.
'ततः परिणामे स्वतन्त्रस्य शक्तिमतः कर्तृतैव हेतुता स्यात्' । *Pvr.*, p. 56.

26. न च युक्तं जडस्यैवं भेदाभेदविरोधतः ।
आभासभेदादेकत्र चिदात्मनि तु युज्यते ॥ *Ibid.*, 19.

27. वास्तवेऽपि चिदेकत्वे न स्यादाभासभिन्नयोः ।
चिकीर्षालक्षणैकत्व-परामर्शं विना क्रिया ॥ *Ibid.*, 20.
चिदेकत्वे वास्तवेऽपि सति, आभासभिन्नयोः एकत्वपरामर्शं विना चिकीर्षालक्षणा क्रिया न स्यात् । *S.*

28. इत्थं—यतो न जडस्य कारणता, न कर्तृता, न चिकीर्षालक्षणैकत्वपरामर्शरहितस्य चेतनस्यापि—इति । *S.*

that is the cause, the agent and the action (..*maheśvarasya icchaiva hetutā kartṛtā kriyā ca*).[29] The teacher means to say that *icchā* (will) i.e. *svātantrya* of the Lord (freedom of consciousness) itself has the characteristic of being *Upādāna-kāraṇa* (material cause), viz., *hetutā*, of this world, its *Nimitta-kāraṇa* (the efficient cause), viz., *kartṛtā*, and *kriyā* (the act of causation).

It is clear from the above that evolutive activity or act of causation can neither be attributed to insentient things nor to pure sentiency (*citiḥ*) lacking the self-dependent power (*svātantrya*) or determinate consciousness (*parāmarśa, vimarśa*). The Pratyabhijñā theory of causation is evidently opposed to that of *Śuddha-brahma-vādins*, in whose view the universe is manifested by pure *cit* (consciousness). According to the Pratyabhijñā, pure *cit* is not potent to manifest numerous varieties of *ābhāsas* (manifestations) of the world, assuming the relation of *bhedābheda* (unity in diversity). It is by virtue of *vimarśa* (determinate thought, comprehension) and *Prakāśa* (light of consciousness), that the world manifestations emanate from the Supreme Perceiver, the Lord, Who is essentially *prakāśa-vimarśa-maya*. The Vedāntin's *Brahman*, the nature of which is conceived as pure *cit* only, being devoid of *Vimarśa*, lacks comprehension and desire of creating the world (*cikīrṣā-lakṣaṇa-ekatva-parāmarśa-rahitaḥ*). It does not possess the essential characteristics of being the cause or the agent of the world. Like this, the Pratyabhijñā considers all the Vedāntic doctrines inconsistent with facts. The Vedānta holds that the world is manifested in pure *cit* (consciousness) by the principle of nescience (*avidyā*), which is contrary to the nature of *cit* being pure knowledge (*vidyā eka-rūpā citiḥ*). The Vedāntin is, further, questioned whether *avidyā* belongs to *Jīva* or *Brahman*. It cannot belong to the former, since *Jīva* is nothing other than *Brahman* (*jīvo brahmaiva nāparaḥ*) and the nature of *Brahman* is pure knowledge (*sat-cidānandam brahma*). Nor can *avidyā* belong to *Brahman* because it means to contradict the very nature of the latter.

29. इत्थं तथा घटपटाद्याभासजगदात्मना ।
तिष्ठासोरेवमिच्छैव हेतुता कर्तृता क्रिया ॥ *IPK* II, iv, 21,

CHAPTER XXI

THE DOCTRINE OF TATTVAS

Tattva-nirūpaṇam (The Categories of the Objective Reality)

In the foregoing chapters, the nature of *Jñāna* (knowledge) and *Kriyā* (action), the two primary characteristics of the Ultimate Cause, has been fully ascertained, as expounded in the first two *adhikāras* (sections) of *IPV*. It has been stated that *Kriyā* implies that power which manifests all the objects of the world (*viśva-padārtha-avabhāsana-lakṣaṇā*), both sentient and insentient. The present chapter is devoted to an investigation of the nature of these objects (*padārthas*), which are treated in the system as collocations of *ābhāsas* (manifestations). The objective Reality is classed into thirty-six cetegories, called *tattvas*, viz., the fundamental principles of creation, the highest of these being the *Śiva-tattva* and the lowest the earth (*pṛthivi*). The entire domain of the objects and worlds is the result of the combinations of these *tattvas*. This doctrine is common to all the schools of Śaivism which have emerged in India, though described in them variously, as based on different Śaivāgamas. In the Pratyabhijñā system, these categories of the objective Reality are treated simply as *ābhāsas*. A *tattva* is a division in the general classification of the constituents of which diverse objects of the world are made. Every such division (*tattva*) is marked by certain characteristics peculiar to it. It appears to be undivided (*ekam-avibhaktam bhāti*) in the various groups of things, for example, in mountain, tree, city, etc., all of which are, in their essential nature, constituted of earth; so are river, lake and sea, constituted of water.[1] It is called by one particular name, to distinguish it from the other constituent *tattvas*. These *tattvas* do not, however, remain isolated; they are all pervasive. Everything is a combination or collocation of the constituent *tattvas*. We call this world earthly (*pārthiva*) not because it is made up of earth alone, but because earth is its chief constituent.[2]

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1. भिन्नानां वर्गाणां वर्गीकरणनिमित्तं यदेकमविभक्तं भाति तत्तत्वं, यथा गिरिवृक्ष-पुरप्रभृतीनां नदीसरःसागरादीनां च पृथिवीरूपत्वमब्रूपत्वं चेति। *IPV* 11, 192.

2. Pandey, *Abhinavagupta*, 234; cf. *Tantrāloka* VI, 3.

The doctrine of *tattvas* is one of the interesting doctrines of the Pratyabhijñā system, which is concerned with the ultimate constitution of this universe. As stated above, it is also given in other systems of Śaivism with slight alterations. Originally the Sāṅkhya system enumerates twenty-five *tattvas*, the categories of creation, which are derived from the various Upaniṣads, particularly *Kaṭhopaniṣad*, in which they are scattered in different passages. They are incorporated by the Śaivas in total in their system, to which has been added by them eleven more *tattvas*, making the total number of *tattvas* thirty-six.

In the Pratyabhijñā system, the thirty-six *tattvas* are explained as follows: The teacher says, *Kriyā* (action) which manifests itself both internally and externally (*antar-bahir-vṛttiḥ*), in accordance with the tamporal succession (*kāla-kramānugā*), is inborn in the subject (*mātur eva*). The same is the highest category of the objective Reality, called *Śiva-tattva*, the nature of which is *Prakāśa* and *Vimarśa*, the former being its internal aspect and the latter its external aspect. Therefore, it is stated that knowledge and action are mutually inseparable (*anyonya-aviyukte jñāna-karmani*).[3] The nature of cause and effect has been admitted by other alian schools to be insentient. In reality, the relation of cause and effect which is nothiug but *Kriyā*, depends upon pure *cit* (consciousness) that shines internally and externally in the form of different *ābhāsas* being one with the luminousness of the Self (*prakāśa-paramārthenāpi vapuṣā tad-ābhāsa-rūpeṇa vartamānāḥ*).[4] *Vimarśa* is *Kriyā* and the same is the very life of *Jñāna*; hence *Kriyā-śakti* cannot be attributed to one who lacks *Jñāna-śakti*.[5] The essential nature of things (*sarva-bhāvānām pārmārthikaṁ vapuḥ*) is, therefore, *Jñāna* and *Kriyā*, inseparate from each other (*aviyukta-jñāna-kriyā-rūpam*). *Śiva tattva* sustains in itself diversity in the form of variety of body and action, and brings about creations and dissolutions of all the subsequent *tattvas*. *Śakti tattva* is not, in essence, a separate *tattva*; it emphasises the *vimarśa* aspect of the *Śiva-tattva*.

Utpaladeva does not count *Parama Śiva* (the Ultimate Reality) as a *tattva*. It is the transcendental state of the Supreme Consciousness

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3. एवमन्तर्बहिर्वृत्तिः क्रिया कालक्रमानुगा ।
मातुरेव तदन्योन्यावियुक्ते ज्ञानकर्मणी ।। *IPK* II, iii, 1.

4. कार्यकारणभावः......चिद्रूप एव अन्तर्बहिरात्मना प्रकाशपरमार्थेनापि वपुषा तदाभासरूपेण वर्तमानः कालक्रममाक्षिपन् क्रियाभिधीयते । *IPV* II, 189.

5. ज्ञानं विमर्शानुप्राणितं, विमर्श एव च क्रियेति । *Ibid.*, 189-90.

(*parā saṁvit*), free from qualities (*nirguṇa*) and stands above all the *tattvas* (*tattvātitā*). It is endowed with the power of manifestation (*prakāśa*) by virtue of which it is called *Śiva-tattva.* The whole universe from microcosm to macrocosm imbibes the cognitive power (*jñātṛtva-śakti*) from the *Prakāśa* aspect of *Parama Śiva*, or *Śiva-tattva*. It also contains in itself the power of perception (*Vimarśa*) owing to which, it is called *Śakti-tattva* This *tattva* implies the Power principle or Energy which transforms into matter. The universe imbibes the power of physical activity (*Kartṛtva-śakti*) from the *Vimarśa* aspect of the *Parama Śiva.* Utpaladeva does not explicitly name, in the *Kārikā*, either *Śiva-tattva* or *Śakti-tattva*, both of which are enumerated by the commentator, Abhinavagupta, in the thirty-six *tattvas*. *IPK*, III, i, 1, however, asserts that *Kriyā* is the highest reality, innate in the subject, which is objectified (*pramātur antasthitasyātmano bahiṣkāra eva kramānugata kriyā iti*).[6] It is this highest objective reality which is named *Śiva-tattva* by Abhinavagupta.

Utpaladeva enumerates the *tattvas* from *Sadāśiva* or *Sādākhya-tattva.* He says, though this objective reality (*kriyā*) is one, yet it can be analysed in a number of *tattvas* (categories) enumerated as follows : At first, there comes into being the category called *Sādākhya*, because of the predominance of the internal aspect, i.e., the power of knowledge (*kintu āntara-daśodrekāt sādākhyam tattvam āditaḥ*). Then, there comes into existence *Parameśvara-tattva*, when the external aspect comes into predominance (*bahir-bhāva-paratve tu parataḥ pārameśvaram*).[7] The first *tattva* is called *Sādākhya-tattva* for the reason that, in this internal state of pure knowledge, there is not even the taint of activity and change. This *tattvā* represents the *sattā* aspect of *Śiva. Sādāhkya* literally means '*saditi*', i.e., *Sadāśiva* or *sattā* of *Śiva*. The same two *tattvas* are called by two other names, *Īsvara-tattva* and *Sadā-śiva tattva. Īśvara-tattva* implies 'opening out' (*bahir–unmeṣa*) in the form of external manifestations. It is called *unmeṣa* as the world evolves from it, i.e., becomes externally manifest. The *Sadāśiva-tattva* represents the 'closing in' (*nimeṣa*), i.e., in which the world dissolves itself, or in which all manifestations merge.[8] The next *tattva* is *Sadvidyā-tattva* or

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6. *Pvr.* III, p. 59.

7. किन्त्वान्तरदशोद्रेकात्सादाख्यं तत्त्वमादितः ।
   बहिर्भावपरत्वे तु परतः पारमेश्वरम् ॥ *IPK* III, i, 2.

8. ईश्वरो बहिरुन्मेषो निमेषोऽन्तः सदाशिवः ॥ *Ibid.*, 3 a.

Śuddhavidyā-tattva (true or pure knowledge), which is the principle of correlation in the universal experience. It is the common resting place or substratum (*sāmānādhikaraṇyam*) of both the I-consciousness and this-consciousness (*aham-idam-dhiyoḥ*).[9] It is, in essence, the state of pure knowledge in which there is no distinction between the subject and the object. This state of experience is also called *Parāpara*, i.e., the state of unity of the transcendental (*para*) and non-transcedental (*apara*) states (*parāparadaśā*). It is called *Śuddha-vidyā*, because, in it, the things which attain the state of objectivity as denoted by 'this' (*idam-bhāvopapannānām*) and have descended to the level of the objects of knowledge (*vedya-bhūmim-upeyuṣām*), are of the nature of essence of knowledge (*bodha-sāratvād*) ; because, in this state, they are perceived in their real nature (*yathā-vastu-avalokanāt*).[10] *Prakāśa* aspect of the Universal Consciousness, viz., pure knowledge, is characterised by the consciousness of 'I' (subject) and *Vimarśa* aspect is characterised by the consciousness of 'this' (object). These two aspects represent the characteristics of *Sadāśiva-tattva* and *Īśvara-tattva* respectively. In *Sadvidyā-tattva*, the consciousness of the subject 'I' and that of the object 'this' are not yet separated from each other, i.e. the object has not become distinct from the subject. The state of experience in this *tattva* is represented by the identity of the consciousness of the subject and that of the object (*aham-idam-dhīḥ*), viz., in this experience, the object (*idam*) is viewed as the subject (*aham*). The same idea is represented by the expression *parāpara-daśā*. *Para* is the transcendental Self, i.e., the state of perfection or infinity of the Self and *apara* is the limited self, that which has descended to the level of the object (*anātma*). *Sadvidyā* is, therefore, the unity of the Universal or Infinite Self and the limited self. So the teacher states, in the two categories Sadāśiva and *Īśvara*, objects are not only in non-transcendental state, because they shine as not-self (*atra bhāvānām anātmatvena bhāsanād aparatvam*), but they are also in the state of transcendence (*paratva*), because they are covered (*ācchādat*) by I consciousness, viz., they shine as identical with the Self (*paratā ahantayā ācchādāt*). The state of *Sadvidyā* which is common to the two categories, the *Sādākhya* and the *Īśvara*, is, in reality, the transcendental-cum-non-transcendental state of the Self (*parāpara-daśā hi sā*).[11]

Others maintain that *Vidyā* (i.e. *Śuddhavidyā*) is the consciousness of diversity of objects in the subject, who is still of the nature of pure

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9. सामानाधिकरण्यं च सद्विद्याहमिदंधियोः ॥ *Ibid.*, 3 b.

10. *Ibid.*, 4.

11. *Ibid.*, 5.

knowledge (*bodhātmano 'pi kartuḥ bhāveṣu yā bheda-dhīḥ sā eva vidyā iti anye manyante*). But this consciousness of diversity is brought about only by the power of *Māyā* (*sā bheda-dhiḥ māyā-śaktyā eva bhavati*), as it is found in the subjects called *Vidyeśvaras* (*yathā vidyeśvarākhyāḥ pramātāraḥ vartante*).[12] In the state of an individual being (*paśu-bhāve*), it is *Vidyā-śakti* which reveals the power of the Lord, viz., *Parameśvara-śakti* or *dṛk-kriyātmikā-śakti* (*paśu-bhāve tasya maheśvarasya aiśvarya-svabhāvasya prakāśikā vidyā-śakti*). And that power which is responsible for obscuration, is called *Māyā* (*tirodhāna-karī māyābhidhā punaḥ*).[13] The power of *Māyā* displays its activity while it manifests pure diversity (*eka rase bhede*) and identifies the Self with the not-Self (*ahamtaya anātmani īkṣate*), such as *Śūnya* (the void), *Buddhi* (the mind), *Prāṇa* (the vital air) or *Śarīra* (the body).[14] *Māyā tattva* is the principle of limitation and differentiation. It dissolves *Prakāśa* and *Vimarśa* aspects of the *Parama Śiva* and the perception of the world, now, becomes distinct in the process of evolution. The *Māyā-śakti* is that power which differentiates objects from subjects. It veils the pure consciousness (*cinmātṛ-bhāga*), so as to produce the various *ābhāsas* of objects. It is, also, defined as veiling power (*vimohinī-śakti*), as it causes delusion (*moha*) by which one arrogates *Śarīra*, *Prāṇa*, *Buddhi* or *Śūnya* to one's Self.

As a result of *Māyā-Śakti*, the limited subject (*pramātā*), *Śūnya*, etc., who perceives the limited objects as separate from it (*prameya vyatirekiṇi*), is, in fact, itself an object (*meya*) and, as such, is enclosed by the pentad, viz., the five sheaths consisting of *Kalā* (art), *vidyā* (knowledge), *rāga* (interest), *niyati* (place) and *Kāla* (time) (*Kālādika-pañcaka-veṣṭhitaḥ*).[15] Being the offshoots of *Māyā*, they cause limitation to the universality of art, knowledge, interest, place and time respectively in relation to various *jīvas* (perceivers). The *Māyā-tattva* is, in itself, the connecting link between omnipotence and limited action, omniscience and limited knowledge, perfection and limited interest, omnipresence and limited place, and eternity and limited time. Thus *kalā* represents, in various limited perceivers, the limitation with regard to authorship, or the faculty of doing things, or practising arts ; *Vidyā* the limitation with regard to knowledge of particular objects, faculty of knowing and thinking various things ; *Rāga* the limitation in regard to

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12. *Ibid.*, 6.
13. *Ibid.*, 7.
14. *Ibid.*, 8.
15. यश्च प्रमाता शून्यादिः प्रमेये व्यतिरेकिणि ।
माता स मेयः सन्कालादिकपञ्चकवेष्ठितः ॥ *Ibid.*, 9.

interest, that which attributes qualities to perceivers (*pramātās*) and objects perceived (*prameyas*) ; *Niyati*, the limitation in regard to presence in space, that which causes restriction by confining a perceiver to a particular space ; and *Kala*, the limitation in regard to presence in time, that which fixes the durations in the acts of perceivers. Thus, by the principle of *Māyā* the perceiver loses the divine or superhuman faculties of omniscience, omnipotence, etc., and becomes limited in powers (*saṁkucitaḥ*). This limited perceiver is the same as the *Puruṣa* of *Sāṅkhyas*.

Puruṣa is the individual subject and *Pradhāna* (or *Prakṛti*) the limited individual object. The latter is the root cause of all subsequent division into *kārayas* (objects) and *karaṇas* (capacities) (*sarva-kārya-karaṇa-vibhāgarūpam pradhānam nāma tat sarvam prameyam*). The remaining twenty three principles of creation are all included in the category of objects (*prameyam*). The teacher says, *Meya* (object) is of twenty-three kinds, consisting of ten *kāryas*, material elements, and thirteen *karaṇas*, capacities, (*trayo-viṁśatidhā meyaṁ yat kārya-karaṇātmakam*). There is one category, called *Pradhāna*, which is the state of non-differentiation of all *meyas* (*tasya avibhāga-rūpyekam pradhānam*). And it is the root cause (*mūla-kāraṇam*) of all the 23 *meyas*.[16] There are thirteen kinds of capacities (*karaṇas*) including both the internal and the external, and the material elements (*kārya-vargaś ca*) are of ten kinds (*daśadhā*), falling into two divisions, gross and subtle (*sthūla-sūkṣmatva-bhedataḥ*).[17] The thirteen *karaṇas* are (i) the five sense perceptions—hearing (*śrotram*), feeling of touch (*tvak*), sight (*cakṣu*), taste (*rasanā*) and smell (*ghrāṇam*) ; (ii) the five capacities of action—expression (*vāk*), handling (*pāṇi*), locomotion (*pāda*), rejecting refuse (*pāyu*) and function of sex (*upastha*) ; and (iii) the three capacities of mental operation—undetermined thought (*mana*), determined thought (*buddhi*) and self-arrogation (*ahaṁkāra*). The ten *kāryas* are (i) the five physical factors or great elements (*mahābhūtas*), namely,—vacuum or void (*ākāśa*), gases, air, etc., (*vāyu*), fire (*agni*), liquids, water, etc., (*jala*) and solids, earth, etc., (*pṛthivī*) and (ii) the five subtle elements (*tanmātras*)—sound (*śabda-tanmātrā*), touch feeling (*sparśa-tanmātrā*), colour (*rūpa-tanmātrā*), flavour (*rasa-tanmātrā*) and odour (*gandha-tanmātrā*). All these make thirty-six *tattvas*, but Utpaladeva has actually enumerated

16. *Ibid.*, 10.
17. त्रयोदशविधा चात्र बाह्यान्तःकरणावली ।
कार्यवर्गश्च दशधा स्थूलसूक्ष्मत्वभेदतः ॥ *Ibid.*, 11.

thirty-two *tattvas*, the categories of the objective reality, implied in *Kriyā* or *Vimarśa* aspect of the Supreme Reality (*Parama-śiva*); those are *Sādākhya-tattva*, *Parameśvara-tattva*, *sad-vidyā-tattva*, *Māyā-tattva* and its five offshoots, *kalādika-pañcaka* (*Kāla*, *Niyati*, *Rāga*, *Vidyā and Kalā*, five sheaths), *Pradhāna*, and its twenty-three offshoots, thirteen *karaṇas* (capacities) and ten *kāryas* (material elements).

It will be interesting to note, in the end, that various attempts have been made by the Indian systems of philosophy to analyse the fundamental principles which are at work in the creation of this universe. Initially, twenty-five principles of creation are enumerated by the Sāṁkhya school, which are entirely incorporated in the Śaiva schools, with minor variations in their explanations. As said above, the Sāṁkhyas themselves derived these principles from the Upaniṣads, particularly *Kaṭhopaniṣad*, in which they are scattered in different verses.[18] The Buddhists have mentioned, in the Jātakas, seven principles, or forms of life, namely *Rūpa* (the physical body), *Prāṇa* or *Jīva* (the vital air), *Liṅga-śarīra* (the astral body), *Kāma-rūpa* (the animal soul), *Manas* (the human soul), *Buddhi* (the spiritual soul) and *Ātman* (the Supreme Soul), seven in total.[19] These seven categories

18. *Kaṭha. up.* iii, 10-11.

19. Sinnet, *Esoteric Buddhism*, Chapter 1.

Compare the Buddhist *tattvas* :—

In the Buddhist Jātakas are mentioned the following seven constituents of the world or forms of life :—

(i) The first principle or form of life is *Rūpa* (body). It represents the elements of physical body without motion and consciousness. This form of life is what we call inanimate (*jaḍa*) life, and is the first stage of life found in rocks, earth, water, fire, etc. It corresponds to *annamaya koṣa* of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, the principle of materiality.

(ii) The second principle of life is *Prāṇa* or *Jīva*, the vitality. This is the development of the first principle. We find in certain bodies the only motion, the life without consciousness. Innumerable such insects, bacteria and germs and living cells in our bodies fall in this category, possessing body and *prāṇa* (life) but no sensation. The vegetable kingdom possesses this sort of life. In this stage, the sense of feeling has not yet developed. This corresponds to the *Prāṇa-maya koṣa* of *Taittirīya Up.*

(iii) The third principle of life is *Liṅga-śarīra* (astral body). It is that stage of development of the second form of life in which the powers of sight, hearing, taste, smell, feeling of touch, etc., appear by instinct. Consciousness is still at the lowest stage. No pain and pleasure is felt in this form of life. Actions of the organs in the body go in a mechanical process. It corresponds to the five sense perceptions and five powers of motor nervous system.

(iv) The fourth principle of life is *Kāma-rūpa*, the animal soul. It is the vehicle of will, the body of desires. It is the highest developed principle of brute creation, the seat of all animal desires and potent force in the human body. Upto this stage we marked the animal life in its maximum development as in dogs, cows, horses, monkies, etc. It corresponds with the *Mano-maya koṣa* of the *Taittirīya Up.*

begin from the principle of materiality (*rūpa*) and end with the Supreme Soul (*Ātman)* which is the reverse of the order of categories in the Śaiva system, in which the principles of creation begin from the Supreme Being (*Parama-śiva*) and end with the principle of solidity (earth). The Sāṁkhya scheme of *tattvas* begins from the individual soul (*Puruṣa*). The atomic theory of the Vaiśeṣika system is the result of a deeper analytical treatment of the objective reality, the matter.

(v) The fifth stage of life is called the *Manaḥ* (the human soul), which is the seat of reason and memory. In majority of mankind it is not fully developed. This stage corresponds with the *Vijñāna-maya koṣa* of *Taittirīya Up.* in its lower stage.

(vi) The sixth stage of life is *Buddhi* (the spiritual soul), the developed form of the fifth stage. Sometimes it has been said 'we do not truly possess any sixth principle ; we, merely have the germs of the sixth principle.' It corresponds with the *Vijñāna-maya koṣa* in its higher stage.

(vii) The *Ātman*, the supreme soul, is the seventh principle. It vitalizes that continuous thread of life which runs all through evolution, uniting in a definite succession, the almost innumerable incarnations of that one life which constitutes a complete series. It corresponds with the *Ānanda-maya koṣa* of *Taittirīya Up.*

There is a similar development of life in higher planes (*lokas*).

CHAPTER XXII

DIVINE HIERARCHY AND TRANSMIGRATORY SUBJECTS

Pramātṛ-tattva-nirūpaṇam: divine hierarchy, nature of perceivers; their bondage and release; three impurities—*Āṇava*, *Kārma* and *Māyīya*; *Pati* and *Paśu*; different types of perceivers; three common states of perceivers—*Jāgrat*, *Svapna* and *Suṣupti*; the fourth state and beyond the fourth—*Turyā* and *Turyātīta*; four methods of obtaining liberation and *samāveśa*; *summum bonum* of the Pratyabhijñā.

The third part of the Pratyabhijñā Śāstra is entitled *Āgamadhikāra*, which gives the theological matter as incorporated in the system directly from the Śaivāgamas. Utpaladeva's originality lies in giving philosophical interpretation to these mythological accounts of the deities, various kinds of perceivers and their different states, etc. This portion, as the commentator Abhinavagupta says, is mainly meant for the *upāsakas* (worshippers), who are devoted to the realization of the Self. Although this part does not have much philosophical interest, yet the treatise on the system would be incomplete, if these matters are omitted in it. The doctrine of *tattvas*, explained in the last chapter, is also included in the *Āgamadhikāra* of *IPK*. According to this doctrine, the whole universe comprising the multiplicity of *pramatās* (subjects) and *prameyas* (objects) constitutes of thirty-six *tattvas*. Not only are all these *tattvas* pervasive in microcosm and macrocosm, but every one of the five great elements constituting the materiality of the sensible universe is also pervaded by all the principles of creation.

The present chapter will first deal with the divine hierarchy, according to the order given in the text (*IPK* III, ii). The teacher says, *Rudra* is the presiding deity in the state of non-differentiation or dissolution in which the subject alone exists, divorced from all objects (*pramātṛtā-mātra-sthitau*). *Brahmā* is the deity presiding over the creation of the universe consisting of diverse *prameyas* (*bhinna-prameya-prasare*). *Viṣṇu* is the deity that presides over the state of sustenance or continuity of the same (*tad vyavasthitau*)[1]. The trinity of the deities in this system is the same as that of the Hindu

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1. तत्रैतन्मातृतामात्रस्थितौ रुद्रोऽधिदैवतम् ।
भिन्नप्रमेयप्रसरे ब्रह्मविष्णू व्यवस्थितौ ॥ *IPK* III, ii, 1.

mythology in general with the difference that *Rudra* (*Śiva*) comes first, because the Pratyabhijñā starts from the state of non-differentiation or dissolution of the universe. After dissolution comes creation and the next subsistence. No mention is made about the final dissolution of this creation.

We have next the nature of transmigratory subjects, their bondage and release, according to Āgamas. The subject (*pramātā*) is enveloped by five sheaths, i.e., affected by the limitations called *Kāla* (time), *niyati* (space), *rāga* (interest), *vidyā* (knowledge) and *kalā* (art). He is blinded by *Māyā*, the principle of obscuration, (*māyāndhaḥ*) and is fettered by the chains of *karma* (actions) (*karma-bandhanaḥ*). He thus becomes *saṁsārin*, i.e., undergoes births and deaths.[2] His physical body (*sthūla-śarīra*) is subject to change into different states: infancy, boyhood, youth, old age and dissolution. His subtle body (*sūkṣma-śarīra*) consisting of *antaḥ karaṇa* (mind) and senses, etc., follows the innumerable births of the soul.[3] He is said to be liberated from bondage when he is made to recognise his powers or Lordliness (*aiśvarya*) by true knowledge (*vidyābhijñāpita-aiśvaryaḥ*) and becomes pure *cit* (sentiency) in its original plenitude (*cidghanaḥ*).[4] Whereas release lies in the removal of the veil of ignorance (*mohaḥ-mūḍhatā*), bondage means *saṁsāra* (cycle of births and deaths) which is the consequence of its non-removal. Either of these is, in essence, only a particular mode of thinking (*abhimanana-sāram*).[5] As a person affected by an evil spirit (*bhūta*) thinks (through wrong notion) that he has been taken away, is cured of his trouble by removal of his delusion (*moha*)[6]; so a limited perceiver (*paśu*) thinking, under the influence of ignorance (*moha*), 'I am not the all-powerful Lord' (*nāham īśvaraḥ*) is cured of his inferiority complex by the Pratyabhijñā Śāstra, which teaches him, 'You are the great Lord possessing freedom (*svātantrya*) with respect to the powers of knowledge and action. As a plant exists within the earth, emerges from it

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2. एष प्रमाता मायान्धः संसारी कर्मबन्धनः । *Ibid.*, 2 a.

3. देहोऽपि हि स्वरूपसादृश्यं बाल्ययौवनादिष्वनुवर्तयन् संसरतीव । बुद्ध्यादेस्तु जन्मान्तरेऽपि संसरणम् । *IPV* II, 319.

4. विद्याभिज्ञापितैश्वर्यश्चिद्घनो मुक्त उच्यते । *IPK* III, ii, 2 b.

5. यथोक्तं 'मायाविमोहिनी नाम...' ...तदपसरणमेव हि परमेश्वरतालाभो मुक्तिः, तदनपसरणमेव संसारः, अभिमननमात्रसारं हि एतद् द्वयम् । *IPV* II, 128-30.

6. यथा भौतस्य (भूताविष्टस्य) भासमाने एवात्मनि 'अपहारितोऽहम्' इति मोहान्मन्यमानस्य मोहोऽपसार्यते,......... *Ibid.*, 130.

and dissolves into it, so the whole universe rests within you, who are the self-luminous Lord, the conscious Self (*tvayi samvid-rūpe viśvam*).'[7] It is stated that recognition of the Self is achieved by the perceiver in his life time by dint of *abhyāsa* (*Śaiva-yoga*), as prescribed in the *Śaiva Śāstra*. By practising *samāveśa* (*Śaiva-yoga*), he realizes the identity of his Self with the Supreme Self with the consequence that, in this very body, he manifests, to a limited extent, not in plenitude, divine powers, *aṇimā, laghimā* etc.[8] It is also believed that when he quits his body and his limited vital airs cease to function, he attains the state of Universal Consciousness (*viśvātmakatā*).[9]

The released soul (subject) is called *Pati* (Lord), when he looks upon the objects as non-different from himself (*svāṅga-rūpeṣu bhāveṣu*). He is called *Paśu* (limited and fettered subject), when he perceives the objects as separate from himself, by *Māyā* (*māyāto bhediṣu*), and is defiled by sufferings (*kleśa*) and actions (*karma*).[10] *Pati* (free soul) sees all objects as part and parcel of his own Self whereas *Paśu* (a fettered soul) suffers miseries, as a consequence of his actions.

Paśu (the limited perceiver) is explained in the Pratyabhijñā Śāstra as one who possesses the three impurities (*malas*) : *Āṇava, Kārma* and *Māyīya*. The impurity, called *Āṇava*, is that which is due to loss of the essential nature of the Self, viz., loss of the powers of knowledge and action in his consciousness (*sva-svarūpa-apahānitaḥ*). *Āṇava*, the innate impurity, veils the cognitive and active powers of the Self and thus makes him imperfect and limited in nature (*yenāsāv aṇuḥ-saṁkucito jātaḥ*). By this impurity, the Self loses its *svātantrya* (the self-dependent power). *Āṇava* is of two kinds, (1) the loss of freedom of knowledge (*bodhasya svātantrya-hāniḥ*) and (2) the loss of knowledge of *svātantrya*, viz., freedom of action (*svātantrya-sya api abodhatā*).[11] The impurity, called *Māyīya*, is that experience in

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7. तथा पशुलोकस्य भासमान एव आत्मनि 'नाहमीश्वरः' इत्यादि मोहादभिमन्वतो मोहोऽपोह्यते। यो हि ज्ञानक्रियास्वातन्त्र्ययुक्त; स ईश्वरो...यथा सिद्धान्तपुराणादिषु प्रसिद्धः, तथा च त्वम्—इति। ......यस्मिन् स्थिते यदुदेति लीयते च तत् तत्पूर्वापरभागव्यापि यथा भूमावङ्कुरः, तथा च त्वयि प्रकाशरूपे विश्वम्,—इति। *Ibid.*, 130-31.

8. अभ्यासभावनाबलेन तु शिवशासनोपदिष्टेन देहघटादावेव परमेश्वरतासमावेशमभिनिविश्य पश्यत इहैव शरीरे पारमेश्वर्यांशधर्मोद्गमः (अणिमादिः), न तु वस्तुतः पूर्णता। *Ibid.*, 131-32.

9. देहत्वस्यैव संकोचप्राणस्य गलने यथास्थितविश्वात्मकतापत्तेः। *Ibid.*, 132.

10. स्वाङ्गरूपेषु भावेषु प्रमाता कथ्यते पतिः।
मायातो भेदिषु क्लेशकर्मादिकलुषः पशुः॥ *IPK* III, ii, 3.

11. स्वातन्त्र्यहानिर्बोधस्य स्वातन्त्र्यस्याप्यबोधता।
द्विधाणवं मलमिदं स्वस्वरूपापहानितः॥ *Ibid.*, 4.

which the object is viewed as different from the subject (*bhinna-vedya-prathā*). Births and fruits of actions are due to it (*janma-bhoga-dam*).[12] *Māyīya* is an impurity caused by Māyā, the principle of limitation, by which the perceiver is cut off, as it were, from the Universal Consciousness and becomes a separate entity. The impurity, called *Kārma*, belongs to the subject who lacks sentiency (*kartaryabodhe*),[13] i.e., the subject looked upon as *śarīra* (the body), *prāṇa* (the vital air), etc. *Kārma* is that impurity of the subject by which he lacks the knowledge of right and wrong (*dharma* and *adharma*). Due to this the subject considers himself to be the body, the vital air, etc., as separate from the real Self. All the three are caused by the power of *Māyā* (*māyā-śaktyaiva tat trayam*), hence they are also called *Māyīya*.[14] The limited perceivers affected by these three impurities are placed in the lower category, because they consider themselves as apart from the Universal Consciousness and lack *svātantrya* (freedom). They thus suffer from births and deaths and other afflictions which are beyond their control.

Different types of perceivers : Those, who have pure knowledge, but, at the same time, are without the power of perfect freedom of action (*śuddha-bodhātmakatve 'pi yeṣām nottama-kartṛtā*), are made separate from Himself by the great Lord (*bhartrā svātmano bhinnāḥ nirmitaḥ*), because of the absence of freedom of action in them (*kartṛtā-atyayāt*).[15] Although there are the same characteristics, as perfect knowledge, eternity, etc., in all of them (*bodhādi lakṣaṇaikye 'pi*), yet they are different from one another (*teṣām annyonya–bhinnatā*), because of the will of the Lord to exist differently (*tathā-īśvara-icchā-bhedena*). Such subjects are called *Vijñāna-kevalas*.[16] They possess pure knowledge of *Ātman* but lack higher *svātantrya* (freedom) and *svātma viśrānti* (resting in the Self), as such consider themselves as separate from *Svātman*. Though they are said to have passed the state of arrogating to themselves the position of the body, the vital air, the mind and the void, looked upon as the Self in different schools, by knowing their essential nature to be pure knowledge, they are yet separate from the Self, because of the will of the Lord.[17] They are

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12. भिन्नवेद्यप्रथात्रैव मायाख्यं जन्मभोगदम् । *Ibid.*, 5a.
13. अबोधात्मक-कर्तृगतं । *S*, see *Pvr.*, p. 65.
14. कर्तर्यबोधे कार्मं तु मायाशक्त्यैव तत्त्रयम् । *Ibid.*, 5 b,
15. *Ibid.* 6.
16. ... ...ते च विज्ञानकेवलाः । *Ibid* , 7.
17. ईश्वरेच्छाविशेषेण तेषां शरीरादिशून्यान्त-प्रमातृपदोत्तीर्णानां ... ... । *IPV* II, 224.

said to possess only one impurity, the *āṇava-mala*.[18] They lack the self-dependent power of knowledge (*svātantrya-hāniḥ bodhasya*). The subjects *Śūnya*, etc., who are lacking knowledge are called *pralayākalas* (*śūnyādi-abodha-rūpāḥ pralayākalāḥ*). They have the impurity of *Kārma*, besides *Ānava*. But it is not certain whether they may or may not have impurity of *Mayā*.[19] *Pralayākalas*, known also *Akalas*, are those perceivers who, lacking knowledge, formerly (i.e. in the state of creation) arrogated to themselves the position of *Śarīra* (the body), etc., and are rendered destitute of senses and bodies in the state of dissolution. They remain without the bodies, etc., till the end of the dissolution. When the new creation takes place, they readopt bodies, etc. They do not only possess *Āṇava mala* (innate impurity) but also *Kārma-mala* in the form of the residual traces of their actions, good or bad (*dharma* or *adharma*), performed in their former lives.[20] They may or may not be affected by *Māyīya-mala*, yet they possess ignorance of *svātantrya* (*svātantryasyāpi-abodhatā*). The subjects, who have known themselves as pure consciousness and have become all-knowing and all-doing (*bodhānām api kartṛ-juṣām*), on destruction of their impurity of Kārma (*kārma-malakṣatau*), possess the impurity of *Māyā* because they are attached to the enjoyment of objects, as separate from themselves (*bhinna-vedya-juṣām*). They are called *Vidyeśvaras*.[21] *Vidyeśvaras* are those perceivers who neither possess *Āṇava-mala* nor *Kārma-mala*, but are affected by pure *Māyīya-mala*. They look upon themselves as self-consciousness (*cinmātṛ*) and are omnipotent and omniscient. They have, however, the traces of the determinate knowledge of the bodies, the senses, the *lokas*, etc. *Vidyeśvaras* and *vijñāna-kevalas* are not born again and again, though they are still affected by *Māyā*. *Pralayākalas* do also remain inexistent for some time till the end of dissolution. Although all the gods and other perceivers, viz., transmigratory souls (*bhavinaḥ*), have all the three impurities, yet the

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18. तत्र विज्ञानकेवलो मलैकयुक्तः । *Ibid.*

19. शून्याद्यबोधरूपास्तु कर्तारः प्रलयाकलाः ।
तेषां कार्मो मलोऽप्यस्ति मायीयस्तु विकल्पित; ।। *IPK* III, ii, 8.

20. ... ...करणकार्यरहिता अबोधरूपाः कर्तारश्च । प्रलयावधि हि ते तथाभूता उत्तरकालं तु कार्यकरणसंबद्धा एव भवन्ति; यतस्तेषां न केवलमुक्तरूप आणव एव मलो यावत् कार्मोऽपि वासनासंस्काररूपो धर्माधर्मात्मास्त्येव । *IPV* II, 225.

21. बोधानामपि कर्तृत्वजुषां कार्ममलक्षतौ ।
भिन्नवेद्यजुषां मायामलो विद्येश्वराश्च ते ।। *IPK* III, ii, 9.

chief among them is *Kārma*, which is the cause of a succession of births (*saṁsāra*).[22] All the created beings, gods, etc., are of fourteen kinds as given in the Śaiva-śāstra, who are transmigratory (*bhavinaḥ-saṁsāriṇaḥ*) and possess all the three impurities.[23] The transmigratory beings are of two kinds, because of the rise and disappearance of the three impurities in them, viz., *paśus* and *patis*. *Paśus*, the limited perceivers, experience only the three ordinary states : *Suṣupti* (dreamless sleep), *svapna* (dream state), and *jāgrat* (waking state) ; *patis*, the free souls or the released souls, enter into *samāveśa* in the *turyā* (the fourth state) and *turyātīta* (beyond the fourth state). This is explained by the teacher as follows :

The principle of free consciousness (*cit-tattva*) that constitutes the limited subjects, *Śūnya*, etc., which are devoid of sentiency (*acid-rūpasya śūnyādeḥ*), remains as limited (*mitam*) and occupies a subordinate position (*guṇatayā sthitam*), descending to the level of an object. In this state, the conscious principle is endowed with the power of action in predominance (*kartṛtā-mayam*) and is developed by the power of *kalā* (*kalodbalitam*).[24] This is the characteristic of the limited perceiver (*paśu*) who experiences the ordinary three states. Now the teacher gives the characteristics of *Pati*, the free soul, who enters the fourth state (*turyā*) and beyond the fourth (*turyātīta*), which are experienced by him in *samāveśa* (yogic concentration or realization). *Jñāna* (true knowledge) is the essential requisite of *samāveśa*, i.e., penetrating into the reality (*tat-samāveśa-lakṣaṇam*) ; it consists in equal predominance of both knowledge and free action of the Self (*cidātmanaḥ kartṛtāyāś ca bodhasya ca mukhyatvam*) and the consequent subordinate position of *Śūnya*, etc. (looked upon as limited perceivers). In this state, the *Śūnya*, etc., remain as subordinate to the sentient Self (*cidātman*) (*śūnyādau tadguṇe*).[25]

The teacher now gives the definition of the three states, *suṣupti* (dreamless sleep), *svapna* (dreaming state) and *jāgrat* (waking state) respectively. In the *Āgamas*, *Suṣupti* is defined as follows : The absence of

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22. देवादीनां च सर्वेषां भविनां त्रिविधं मलम् ।
    तत्रापि कार्ममेवैकं मुख्यं संसारकारणम् ॥ *Ibid.*, 10.

23. देवादयः स्थावरान्ताश्चतुर्दशधा शास्त्रेषु परिगणितास्ते सर्वे 'भविनः' संसारिणः, तेषां च त्रयोऽपि युगपन्मालाः । *IPV* II, 227.

24. कलोद्बलितमेतच्च चित्तत्वं कर्तृतामयम् ।
    अचिद्रूपस्य शून्यादेर्मितं गुणतया स्थितम् ॥ *IPK* III. ii. 11.

25. मुख्यत्वं कर्तृतायाश्च बोधस्य च चिदात्मनः ।
    शून्यादौ तद्गुणे ज्ञानं तत्समावेशलक्षणम् ॥ *Ibid.*, 12.

object of knowledge characterises the *Śūnya-pramatā*, i.e., the perceiver in the state of deep sleep (*śūnye jñeya-śūnyatā*). In this state, the perceiver is devoid of Buddhi, etc. (*buddhyādi-abhāvātmani*), but he arrogates to himself subjectivity, viz., "I" (*ahantā-kartṛtā-pade*) and which refers only to the vague and formless residual trace (*asphuṭa-rūpa-saṁskāra-mātriṇi*)[26]. In the *Śūnya*, there is the internal activity of senses (*sākṣāṇām-antarī vṛttiḥ*), which sets the vital airs, etc., in motion (*prāṇādi-prerikā*), and that which is the so called life (*jivanākhya matā*); or it is the subjectiveness (ego) arrogated to one's vital airs—*prāṇas* (*prāṇe 'hantā*) and which consists of the group of eight (*puryaṣṭakātmikā*).[27] Thus, deep sleep (*suṣupti*) is the state of rest of the conscious thinking subject in the *prāṇa* (vital air) which is in the state of *Śūnya* (void).[28] It is like the state of dissolution (*pralayopamam*). It is of two kinds (1) that in which the objective consciousness persists (*savedyam*) and (2) that in which there is no objective consciousness (*apavedyam*). In the former, the subject has the impurity of *Māyā*; but, in the latter, he is free from it (*māyā-mala-yutāyutam*).[29] The state of dreaming of subjects is that in which the creation of objects remains within the span of mind only (*manomātra-pathe 'pi*), and is such that, due to illusion (*vibhramāt*), the objects shine so clearly as if they are related to the external senses (*bhāvānāṁ sṛṣṭiḥ akṣa-viṣayatvena spaṣṭāvabhāsā*)[30] And the wakeful state (*jāgaraḥ*) of the subjects is that in which the creation of the objects is common to all subjects (*sarva-pramātṛīṇām sādhāraṇī sṛṣṭiḥ*), and has stability (*sthirā*) inasmuch as

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26. शून्ये बुद्धयाद्यभावात्मन्यहन्ताकर्तृतापदे ।
अस्फुटारूप-संस्कार-मात्रिणि ज्ञेयशून्यता ॥ *Ibid.*, 13.

27. साक्षाणामान्तरी वृत्तिः प्राणादिप्रेरिका मता ।
जीवनाख्याथवा प्राणेऽहन्ता पुर्यष्टकात्मिका ॥ *Ibid.*. 14.
प्राणादि=प्राण, अपान, समान, उदान, व्यान,
पुर्यष्टकशब्दवाच्यः=प्राणादिपञ्चकं, बुद्धीन्द्रियवर्गः, कर्मेन्द्रियगणो, निश्चयात्मिका च यतो धीर्व्यज्यते । *IPV* II, 237.

28. तावत्मात्रस्थितौ=तावत्येव शुद्धे या विश्रान्तिः=तावत्येव शून्यतामात्र एव प्राणे ।
IPV II, 237, fn. 54.

29. तावन्मात्रस्थितौ प्रोक्तं सौषुप्तं प्रलयोपमम् ।
सवेद्यमपवेद्यं च मायामलयुतायुतम् । *IPK* III, ii, 15

30. मनोमात्रपथेऽप्यक्षविषयत्वेन विभ्रमात् ।
स्पष्टावभासा भावानां सृष्टिः स्वप्नपदं मतम् ॥ *Ibid.*, 16.

it is external (*bāhyatayā*), being the object of the senses (*sarva-akṣa-gocaratvena*).[31]

Finally the teacher gives us the methods of realization for liberation as follows: He says, the three states, mentioned above, are to be given up (*heyā iyam trayī*), because of the predominance of *prāṇa*, etc., and the subordinate position of 'freedom of power of action', viz., *svātantrya*, in them (*prāṇādeḥ prādhānyāt kartṛtā-guṇe*), for, they are accompanied by pleasure or pain according as this 'freedom of power of action' increases or decreases (*tad-hāna-upacaya-prāya-sukha-duḥkhādi-yogataḥ*).[32] In each of the two states, waking and dream, life (*prāṇa*) constitutes inhaling and exhaling of breath (*prāṇāpāna-mayaḥ prāṇaḥ*). In the state of deep sleep, the *prāṇa* is called *samāna*, the essential nature of which is its rest for a while in the cavity of the heart, or in the intervals between inhaling and exhaling of breath (*sauṣupte tac chedātmā samānākhyaḥ*). As such, *Samāna* is comparable to the time, technically called *Viṣuvat* (equinoctial time).[33] When in *turyā* state, it (*Prāṇa*) goes up through mid passage, i.e., the nerve called *Suṣumnā* (which is identified with the spinal cord), it is called *Udāna* (*madhya-ūrdhva-gāmyudānākhyas turyagaḥ*). In this state all diversity of the external object-world is burnt, as it were, in fire, i.e., is dissolved (*huta-bhuṅmayaḥ*). The same is identified with that of the free souls *Vijñānakala*, *Mantra* and *Īśa* (i.e., higher *pramātas*, upto *Sadāśiva*). In this state, the function of *Prāṇa* is called *Vyāna*. And the state beyond *Turya* (*paraḥ*) is the state of Maheśvara or Parama Śiva, the Self of the whole universe (*viśvātmakaḥ paraḥ*).[34]

The state of liberation is attained by higher *pramātās* (*patis*) as well as common souls (*paśus*) by dint of the perfect knowledge of the Ultimate Reality. This is achieved not merely by the pursuit of intellectual knowledge, but also by practising the various spiritual methods of yogic meditation and intuition (*samāveśa*), as prescribed in the Śaiva Śāstra. In the Āgamas, four methods are prescribed for obtaining

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31. सर्वाक्षगोचरत्वेन या तु बाह्यतया स्थिरा ।
सृष्टिः साधारणी सर्वप्रमातॄणां स जागरः ॥ *Ibid.*, 17.

32. हेया त्रयीयं प्राणादेः प्राधान्यात् कर्तृतागुणे ।
तद्धानोपचयप्राय-सुखदुःखादियोगतः ॥ *Ibid.*, 18.

33. प्राणापानमयः प्राणः प्रत्येकं सुप्तजाग्रतोः ।
तच्छेदात्मा समानाख्यः सौषुप्ते विषुवत्स्ववत् ॥ *Ibid.*. 19.

34. मध्योर्ध्वगाम्युदानाख्यस्तुर्यगो हुतभुङ्मयः ।
विज्ञानाकलमन्त्रेशो व्यानो विश्वात्मकः परः ॥ *Ibid.*, 20,

liberation. viz, *Anupāya*, *Śāmbhavopāya*, *Śāktopāya* and *Āṇavopāya*. Each of the succeeding methods in the above order leads to that which immediately precedes and ultimately the first (*Anupāya*) is the direct means of liberation. The difference between *Anupāya* and *Śāmbhavopāya* is very slight, but the first is the highest state of the second. In the Pratyabhijñā the intuitional method prescribed is called *Samāveśa* which implies 'complete immersion' and is best defined as 'merging into the ultimate form, the highest Reality, of that which, being apparently separate from the ultimate, is limited'. The *Samāveśa* is gradually performed according to the process known in the Yoga-śāstra as *saṁyama* comprising concentration, contemplation and meditation. So long as the perceiver cognises his self as *Śūnya*, *Prāṇa*, *Buddhi* or *Śarira*, he remains as *Saṁsārin*. As said above, there are three states of *Saṁsāra*, viz., *Jāgrat*, *Svapna* and *Suṣupti*. The state of liberation is attained by following the process of immersion which is the complete reverse of emergence, i.e. manifestation. When the perceiver, directed by his spiritual Guru, devotes himself to *Samāveśa*, concentrates his mind upon the nature of the absolute Self, such as its all-pervadingness (*pūraṇatā*), omniscience (*sarvajñatā*), omnipotence (*sarva-śaktimānatā*), etc., and thus emerges from the state of *prameya*, viz., the level of the object, like *Śūnya*, *Prāṇa*, etc., he experiences the states of *Turyā* (the fourth) and *Turyātīta* (the state beyond *Turyā*). These states are different from *Jāgrat*, *Svapna* and *Suṣupti*, experienced by common perceivers. *Turyā* and *Turyātīta* are reached by yogins only when their *samāveśa* becomes uninterrupted after some practice. Such yogins who attain the highest state of *Samāveśa* are known as *Jīvan-muktas*, for even in their life time, they are said to be released.[35] The *Śaiva-yoga-śāstra*, therefore, prescribes for the devotee the ideal of passing over the three common states and adopting the fourth state to attain *jīvan-mukti*.[36]

Summum bonum of the Pratyabhijñā : In *IPK* IV, 1, it is stated that the highest Lord alone is the very Self of all the living beings: He alone knows eternally that He is this entire universe.[37] The limited individual subject is ignorant of the real nature of his true Self (*sva-svarūpa aparijñāna-mayaḥ*). Such perceivers (*pumān—puruṣas*) are admitted to be

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35. सेयं द्वय्यपि जीवन्मुक्तावस्था 'समावेश' इत्युक्ता शास्त्रे ।

36. *IPK* III, ii, 18. *IPV* II, 231.

37. स्वात्मैव सर्वजन्तूनामेक एव महेश्वरः ।
विश्वरूपोऽहमिदमित्यखण्डामर्शबृंहितः ॥ *IPK* IV, i, 1.

many. They have *bhoga*, i.e. reap the fruit of their actions, which consists of pleasure and suffering (*duḥkha-sukhātmakaḥ*). Due to limited action, they have limited enjoyment (*kriyānandau*).[38] He who realizes that, being the Self of the universe (*viśvātman*), all that exists is only his glory (*vibhava*) and supreme power (*aiśvarya*) (*sarvo mamāyam vibhavaḥ*), is said to have attained the position of Maheśāvra (*maheśatā*), even when he is still experiencing the determinate cognitions in his life (*vikalpānām prasare'pi*).[39] One who recognises himself thus to be identical with the Lord, the supreme ruler and the controller of this universe, is said to be liberated even in his life time (*sa jīvan eva muktaḥ*). The liberated looks upon the common objects as inseparate from himself, as does the great Lord ; but, he who is bound, sees them as altogether different from himself.[40] The former knows that the Lord (Śiva) is ever full of the mass of the innumerable objects (*tattvas*), which are lying within Him. He is infinite consciousness and bliss (*cidānanda-ghanaḥ*), whose transcendental state is absolutely uninterrupted (*parama-akṣara-vigrahaḥ*).[41] He thoroughly knows also his Self to be of such nature, viz., that of Śiva, and also its powers of knowledge and action. Having known this, a man thinks and does all that he desires.[42] The teacher means to say that he who has recognised his profounder self as the Lord, knows what is of the highest value to man and accordingly acts to accomplish his desired objects in life (*yathepsitān paśyan jānāti ca karoti ca*). When one realizes his inner being, one's deeper faculties, he has full masetry over his thought and action, that makes him the architect of the world he desires to live in, as a liberated soul, or a free man, dependent upon his own Self. He remains happy and contented with what he achieves in his life by dint of his own powers of comprehension and action, because of his divesting himself of inferiority complex and dependence on others.

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38. स्वस्वरूपापरिज्ञानमयोऽनेकः पुमान् मतः ।
तत्र सृष्टौ क्रियानन्दौ भोगो दुखसुखात्मकः ॥ *Ibid.*, 3.

39. सर्वो ममायं विभव इत्येवं परिजानतः ।
विश्वात्मनो विकल्पानां प्रसरेऽपि महेशता ॥ *Ibid.*, 12.

40. मेयं साधारणं मुक्तः स्वात्माभेदेन मन्यते ।
महेश्वरो यथा बद्धः पुनरत्यन्तभेदवत् ॥ *Ibid.*, 13.

41. सर्वथा त्वन्तरालीनानन्ततत्त्वौघनिर्भरः ।
शिवः चिदानन्दघनः परमाक्षरविग्रहः ॥ *Ibid.*, 14.

42. एवमात्मानमेतस्य सम्यग्ज्ञानक्रिये तथा ।
जानन्यथेप्सितान्पश्यञ्जानाति च करोति च ॥ *Ibid.*, 15.

He thinks that his own profounder faculties, now recognised, are there to provide him what he desires and lead him to final beatitude. The Pratyabhijñā, however, lays an emphasis on the fact that the Self is pure consciousness (*āmarśa*), which is the only reality. All else has no reality of its own, but that of the Self. One who knows this fact, is said to be liberated. He who views the reality of the external objects apart from the reality of the Self, is said to be bound (*baddhaḥ*). The nature of that reality is *svātantrya*, the self-dependent power. Herein lies the essence of the doctrine. The fact is that the Self is the pivot of one's life, and hence Self-recognition is the means of achieving one's fortunes (*samasta-sampat-samavāpti hetum*). Utpaladeva says, in the end, that he has set forth this Pratyabhijñā Śāstra 'in order that common man may have the transcendental power or success (siddhi) without much effort' (*janasya ayatna siddhyartham*...).[43]

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43. *IPK* IV, ii, 3.

CHAPTER XXIII

PHILOSOPHICAL MOVEMENTS IN INDIA (1)
ŚAIVA MOVEMENT

Antiquity of Śaiva movement; Śaiva scriptures; Chronology of Tantras and Āgamas; Śaivāgama sects; Doctrines of the different Śaivāgama sects: Pāśupata system of Nakulīśa; Śaiva Darśana; Vīra Śaiva School; Śāktas; Kashmir Śaivas, their three main divisions: Āgama Śāstra, (Śaivāgamas, *Śiva Sūtra*); Spanda Śāstra (*Spanda-Kārika*, *Tantrāloka*, *Tantrasāra*, and *Vātūlanātha Sūtras*) Pratyabhijñā Śāstra (*Pratyabhijñā-hṛdayam*); Characteristic features of Āgamic tenets in Pratyabhijñā; Role of religion and supernatural in Pratyabhijñā; Śaiva Yoga.

Antiquity of Śaiva moment: In the history of Indian philosophical speculation, there arose from a very early age two main currents of thought from two different religious movements, the Vedic and the Śaiva. Both these movements seem to have grown side by side in India from time immemorial. The first movement grew within the ambit of the Vedic scriptures and the other developed from the Śaivāgamas, the scriptures of the Śaivas. The Śaiva movement seems to have been in vogue as far back as 3000 B.C. 'Amongst the many revelations that Mohenjo-daro and Harappa have had in store for us, none perhaps is more remarkable than the discovery that Śaivism had a history going back to the Chalcolithic age or perhaps even further still, and that it takes its place as the most ancient living faith in the world.'[1] Scholars, like Father Heras, are unanimously of opinion that Śiva is the God of the Dravidians or Proto-Indians and the Śaiva movement in India dates from centuries earlier than the Vedic mevement.[2]

Śaiva scriptures: Āgamas—Tha Śaivas have authoritative scriptures called Śaiva Āgamas and Tantras. It is not yet ascertained that these are as old as the cult of Śiva. Etymologically, *Āgama*[3] means 'that which

1. Sir John Marshall, *Mohenjo-daro and the Indus Civilization*, London. Probasthian (1931).

2. 'The Liṅga in Vīra-Śaivism,' Art. by Swami Srikumara, *Prabuddha Bhārata*, April, 1942, p. 261.

3. According to the Śaiva Siddhānta, Śaivāgamas confer the following meaning to *Āgama*: *Ā means Pāśa*, *Ga—Paśu*, and *Ma—Pati*; Paranjyoti. *Śaiva Siddhānta*, p. 7.

has come down from Guru to Śiṣya', (Prof. Whitney), and in the Tantras it is defined as 'which has emanted from the mouth of Śiva'. The word is sometimes jointly used as *Nigamāgama* which is explained as follows: *Nigama* is that form of Āgama wherein Pāravatī is Guru instead of Śiṣya as opposed to Āgama wherein Pāravatī is Śiṣya and Śiva is Guru. Broadly speaking Āgamas fall into three groups: (1) Śākta Āgamas, (2) Pañcarātra Āgamas and (3) Śaivāgamas. The orthodox Śaivas believe that the Śaivāgamas are of eternal existence like the Vedas and originally consisted of nine crores of verses which decreased through the ages being partly handed down from generation to generation. Some of the Śaivāgamas are still extant at present. A mythological account of the Śaivāgamas from the time of *Satyayuga* to our age (*Kaliyuga*) is given by Abhinavagupta in his *Tantrāloka*, 35.

Tantras—In *Kāśikā Vṛtti*, the word *Tantra* is derived from the root '*tan*' (to spread). Tantra is that scripture by which knowledge (*Jñānam*) is spread (*tanyate, vistāryate jñānam anena iti tantram*). The suffix *tra* comes from the root 'to save'. That knowledge is spread which saves. Vācaspati, Ānandagiri and Govindānanda derive the word from the root *tantri* or *tatri* in the sense of the origination of knowledge (*Vyutpādana*).[4] Woodroffe gives a large number of references to the Vedas occuring in the various Tantras, which are a widespread literature in India, Tibet, Nepal and China.[5] This shows that they are to some extent indebted to the Vedic scriptures for their matter. The scholar says, "In my opinion it is not yet possible to present, with both accuracy and completeness, the doctrine and practice of any particular Tāntric school and to indicate wherein it differs from other schools."[6] The characteristic feature of this branch of literature is that it prescribes Sādhanās and rituals. Jayaratha, the commentator of Abhinavagupta's *Tantrāloka*, has classified Tantras into three groups: (1) *Dvaita* Tantras, (2) *Dvaitādvaita Tantras* and (3) *Advaita* Tantras. *Kāmaja* (*Kāmika*), *Yogaja*, *Cintya*, *Aṁśuman*, *Dīpta*, *Kāraṇa*, *Ajita*, *Sūkṣama*, *Sahasra* and *Maukuṭa* (*Suprabha*) belong to the first group and are known as God-taught Tantras. *Vijaya*, *Niśvāsa*, *Madgīta*, *Pārameśvara*, *Mukhabimba*, *Siddha*, *Santāna*, *Nārasiṁhaka*, *Candrāṁśu*, *Vīrabhadra*, *Āgneya*, *Svayambhuva*, *Visara*, *Raurava*, *Vimala*, *Kiraṇa*,

4. तनोति विपुलान् अर्थान् तत्त्वमन्त्रसमन्वितान् ।
त्राणञ्च कुरुते यस्मात् तन्त्रम् इत्यभिधीयते ॥
Kāmika Āgama of Śaiva Siddhānta; See Woodroffe, *Śakti and Sākta*, pp. 17-18.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 93.

Lalita and *Saurabheya* form the second group and are mentioned as man-revealed Tantras. *Advaita* Tantras, belonging to the third class, consist of eight groups, each comprising eight Tantras having different names.[7] The Kashmir Research Department has published the following Tantras: *Bṛhannīla Tantram, Gandharva Tantram, Mālinīvijaya Tantram Mālinīvijaya Vārtikam, Mṛgendra Tantram, Netra Tantram, Svacchanda Tantram, Uḍāmareśvara Tantram, Vidyārṇava Tantram, Tantrāloka* and *Tantrasāra* of Abhinavagupta. Almost all these Tantras are voluminous. Some of them, particularly *Vidyārṇava* Tantram, seem to belong to the later ages. None of the scholars seems hitherto to have devoted his attention exclusively to the study of the Tāntrika literature of Kashmir and revealed even a few grains of historical truth it contains.

Chronology of Tantras and Āgamas : It is not possible to fix the definite period when the evolution of Śāivāgamas took place. But it is believed by scholars that its development was simultaneous with the Vedic Cult. The amalgamation of the Śaiva form of worship and the Vedic seems to have taken place in the Upaniṣadic period, if not earlier, and some scholars even think that Śaivism is the development of the Vedic religion. S. G. Sakharpekar quotes numerous references, in his paper on "Evolution of Śaivāgamas", from the various works belonging to the period prior to the fourth Century A.D., and even earlier, to prove the antiquity of the Śaivāgamas. It has been pointed out that in the *Mahābhārata* also there is a reference to the Āgamic worship in Śānti-parva, 257, 7, proving that Śaivāgamas existed in the Epic age. The learned scholar states, "It appears that there arose a controversy between the Vaidikas and the Āgamavādins in respect of consistency of the Śaivāgamas with the Vedas. The question was debated by the Śaivācāryas with the Vaidikas and it was established that the Śaivāgamas are consistent with the Vedas in philosophical questions but independent with regard to Śiva worship.'[8]

The following views are held by some scholars about the date of origin of the Śaivāgamas : Dr. Paranjyoti says, 'With regard to the date of the Āgamas, as there is no direct information that can be availed of, indirect methods have to be adopted for the purpose of ascertaining them. Considering that the Śaivāgamas are spoken of in the *Sūta Saṁhitā*, the date

7. See K. C. Pandey, *Abhinavagupta*, 1st Ed., pp. 75-80.

8. Art. "Evolution of Śaivāgamas", p. 65; and Art. "Āgamic Vīra-Śaivism", p. 300; by S. G. Sakharpekar, *Proceedings and Transactions of the Seventh All-India Oriental Conference, Baroda*.

of this work is likely to offer a clue to the date of the Āgamas. The work also refers to the Buddhism and the Jainism which flourished even as early as the third and the second century B.C. By this time, then, the Śaivāgamas were in existence.'[9] S. S. Suryanarayana Śāstrī writes, 'It is not possible to fix definitely the period when the Āgamas came into being. Some of them that exist now go in for a criticism of the Jainism and the Buddhism, the Sāṁkhya and the Mīmāṁsā and the Advaita Vedānta and could have been evolved only after these systems ; but some at least of these, the Pāśupata and the Pañcarātra Āgamas, should have been current before the compilation of the *Vedānta Sūtras*, as those two systems are refuted by Bādarāyaṇa in the second pāda of the second chapter of the Sūtras. Some of the systems are at least as old as the *Mahābhārata*...'[10] He continues 'It has been suggested that the Āgamic systems were developed out of the Brāhmaṇas in the same way as the Upaniṣads, though at a much later stage, and that some of the later Upaniṣads like the *Śvetāśvatara*, which addresses the Supreme Being by a sectarian title and not *Param Brahman*, as of yore, probably grew up under the shadow of the Āgamas. Antagonism to the Vedānta is clearly present in the Āgamas as seen from frequent criticism thereof.'[11] P. T. Srinivasa Iyengar also holds the same view.[12] S. S. Suryanarayana Śāstri brings to notice some Āgamic passages which claim Vedic authority for their doctrine. The doctrine itself can be shown to be consistent with theism, as found in the Upaniṣads. The following Āgamic passages affirm the derivation of the Āgamas from the Vedas :—

1. *siddhānto veda-sāratvāt* (As the Siddhānta consists of the essence of the Veda). *Suprabhedāgama*
2. *veda-sāram idam tantram* (This tantra is of the essence of the Veda). *Makuṭāgama*.
3. *vedāntārtham idam jñānaṁ siddhāntam paramaṁ śubham* (This Siddhānta knowledge which is the significance of Vedānta is supremely felicitous). *Makuṭāgama*.[13]

Bhandarkar refers to Haribhadra's *Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya*, where is said that Gotama and Kaṇāda were of the Śaiva faith (prov Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas as Śaivas and Pāśuptas). The learned Profes says, "The idea that the Pāśupatas are Vaiśeṣikas and the Śaivas

9. Paranjyoti, *Śaiva Siddhānta*,
10. S. S. Suryanarayana Śāstri, *Śivādvaita of Śrīkaṇṭha*, p. 1.
11. *Ibid*. pp. 2-3.
12. See P. T. Srinivasa Iyengar, *Outline of Indian Philosophy*, pp. 126-130. *op. cit.*, p. 3, fn.
13. *op. cit.*, pp. 3-4.

Naïyāyikas is no doubt fantastic......It represents an attempt of the various religious sects to affiliate themselves to one of the six recognised schools of philosophy." ("The text cited by Dr. Bhandarkar reads thus: '*naiyāyikāḥ sadāśiva-bhaktatvāt śaivā ityucyante, vaiśeṣikās tu pāśupatā iti*'.)[14]

S. S. Suryanarayana Śāstri also points out the 'alleged Dravidian origin of the Āgamas'. He says, 'the suggestion has been made that the present Āgamas are Saṁskṛta translations of Tamil originals, which constituted an altogether independent body of doctrines, that the translators into Saṁskṛta assimilated the views, as far as they could, to their own Vedic religion, that when, owing to many causes partly natural and partly political, the Tamil originals were irretrievably lost, the Saṁskṛta translations alone survived, that the suggestions they contain about the Vedic origin of the Āgamas are not worthly of credence and that the very names—Āgama meaning that which has come (presumably from another language), and *Tantra* (which comes from *tantu*, thread, the literal translation of the Tamil word '*nul*'), meaning work,—are fairly strong indications in support of this contention......'[15] The learned scholar, however, leaves the veracity of these views unascertained. From an intensive study of the printed texts of Śiavāgamas (published by Kashmir Research Department), we can say with certainty that there is nothing to show that the Śaivāgamas, known to Kashmirians, are the translations of Tamil texts. The language and the numerous references to the names of the later authors like Śaṅkarācārya, Govinda and others show that they are written very late, or at least some portions of them have been added lately. The Kashmir Śaivās totally refuse to assert that the Śaivāgamas have any connection with the Vedas. They go to the extent of claiming them to be of divine origin. The authority of the Vedas is entirely denied by them. This clearly shows that the Kashmir Śaivāgamas have been treated as quite independent of the Vedic scriptures.

P. T. Srinivasa Iyengar points out that 'the first adumbrations of the Śiva Tantras are found in the *Taittirīya Yajurveda*, but states that Tantric system developed into an organised system of beliefs and practices in South India in the earlier centuries of the Christian era.[16] 'The

14. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
See Bhandarkar, *Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and Minor Religious Systems*, p. 117.

15. *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5.

16. P. T. Srinivasa Iyengar, *English Translation of Śiva-sūtra-vimarśinī*, Preliminary Note.

Lalitavistara or the biography of Shākyamuni states that he had special knowledge of Nigama, Puraṇās, Itihāsas and the Vedas. Whenever both the Vedas and the Nigamas are mentioned in the same passage, the latter term refers to the Tantra, which goes by the name *Āgama-nigama*.' With these remarks A. Avalon, one of the authorities on the subject (Tantras), concludes that the period of the evolution of Tantras, though uncertain, is the same as that of the Āgamas as he says, 'Tantras are śāstras called Āgamas.'[17]

From the above-cited findings of the scholars, we come to the conclusion that the definite chronology of the Āgamic and Tāntric literature and its original sources are still unascertained. The views held by them show, at least, that Tantras and Āgamas originated much earlier than the Christian era, the Buddhist age, and even the age of *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* of *Yajurveda*, if they cannot be directly affiliated to the Vedic scriptures in any respect.

Rise of Avaidika systems : It may be stated that the Brāhmanas by and by accepted the worship of the aboriginal tribal gods and attempted to reconcile it with the Vedic form of worship. The *Pāśupata*, *Bhāgavata*, and *Tāntric* developments preceded the Buddhist times. In the epics the non-Vedic forms of religion are readjusted by Vaidikas (Brāhmanas). Durgā worship is mentioned in *Mahābhārata* in the beginning of Bhīṣma-parva. Pāśupata system is mentioned in the Nārāyaṇīya section (Śānti-parva, 340. 5. 64). In the Vana-parva, Arjuna is said to obtain the weapon from Paśupati, the Lord of cattle, who is looked upon as dwelling in the Himalayas with his wife Umā. The Bhāgavatas have also grown in the epic period. The tradition about Kṛṣṇa Vāsudeva as Vedic thinker exists in *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* III, 17, where Kṛṣṇa, son of Devakī, is mentioned as pupil of Ṛṣi Ghora Aṅgirasa. Another school which wielded some influence upon Brāhmanic religion is that of *Pañcarātras*. Both Bhāgavatas and Pañcarātras emphasised the religious side. The Philosophy of these minor systems has been refuted by Śaṅkara in *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya*.

Śaivāgama Sects : The following Śaiva schools flourished in India in different ages and developed their distinct doctrines : (1) the Mahāpāśupata, or Nakulīśa Pāśupata, (2) the Śaiva Siddhānta, (3) the Vīra Śaiva, (4) the Śāktas and (5) the Kashmir Śaivas. Besides these sects, many other minor sects, like Nepala Pāśupatas, are mentioned, but they are stated to have

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17. A. Avalon, *Principles of Tantras*, Vol. I, 1st Ed., Introduction (p. xli).

merged in the main sects in course of time. Each sect has got some peculiarity to distinguish it from others and has a literature of its own. Since the date of the Buddha which marks the date of evolution of criticism in India, various schools of thought grew within the ambit of the Vedic cults; the Śaiva sects also inevitably developed their own schools of thought side by side with the Vaidikas and modified their peculiar faith and religious forms in the direction of the Vaidika schools of thought. It is certain that the fountain-head of the philosophical speculations of the Vaidika schools and the Śaiva systems is one and the same.

Doctrines of the different Śaivāgama Sects: The various Saiva systems, mentioned above, are associated with the Śaivāgamas or Śaiva Tantras in respect of their religious doctrines though they can be affiliated more or less with the Vedas and the Upaniṣads in respect of their philosophical ideas. The main ideas of the systems are as follows :—

The Pāśupata System of Nakulīśa : Mādhavācārya summarizing the system in *Sarvadarśane Saṁgraha*, says that 'the doctrine of the Vaiṣṇavas known by its technicalities of the servitude of souls and the like...', is disapproved by certain Māheśvaras ; since it brings with it 'the pains of dependence on another. It cannot be a means of cessation of pain and other desired ends.' They put forth strong arguments against the Vaiṣṇava doctrine such as it is quite impossible for 'those depending on another and longing for independence to become emancipated, because they still depend upon another (others), being destitute of independence like ourselves and others.' They hold that the liberated spirits possess the attributes of the Supreme Deity, 'because at the same time that they are spirits, they are free from the germ of every pain as the Supreme Deity is'. So these Māheśvaras adopt the Pāśupata system 'which is conversant about the exposition of five categories, as the means to the highest end of man.' According to the system there are eight pentads, the acquisitions, the impurities, the expedients, the localities, the perseverance, the purifications, the initiations and the powers, and there are three functions. They maintain that impurity is an evil condition pertaining to the soul. This is of five kinds—false conception, demerit, attachment, interestedness and falling, which are the root of bondage. The cessation of pain is of two kinds, impersonal and personal. Of these, the impersonal consists in the absolute extirpation of all pains; the personal in supremacy consisting of the visual and active powers. Union is the conjunction of the soul with God through the intellect.

The system differs from other recognized systems in the following points : 'The cessation of pain (or emancipation) is in other systems (as in

the Sāṁkhya) the mere termination of miseries, but in this system it is the attainment of supremacy or of the divine perfections. In other systems the *create* is that which has become, and that which shall become, but in this system it is eternal, the spirits, and so forth, the sentient and insentient. In other systems the *Principium* is determined in its evolution or creative activity by the efficacy of works, whereas in this system the *Principium* is the Lord not thus determined. In other institutes, union results in isolation, etc., while in these institutes it results in cessation of pains by attainment of the divine perfections. In other systems paradise and similar spheres involve a return to metempsychosis, but in this system they result in nearness to the Supreme Being, either followed or not followed by such return to transmigratory experiences.'[18]

Śaiva Darśana : This system is also known as the *Śaiva Siddhānta* which means 'Śaivite accomplished end' and claims to be an independent school. It is prevalent in South India especially in the Tamil country. It is said to have originated there about the eleventh century A. D. About this system Cowell says, 'the Śaivas have considerable resemblance to theistic Sāṁkhya; they hold that God, souls, and matter are from eternity distinct entities, and the object of philosophy is to disunite the soul from matter and gradually to unite it to God. Śiva is the chief deity of the system and the relation between the three is quaintly expressed by the allegory of a beast (*Paśu*), its fetters (*Pāśa*), and its owner (*Pati*). Paśupati is a well-known name of Śiva, as the master or creator of all things.'[19] Twenty eight Āgamas are the chief authority of the sect.[20] The followers of the system reject the foregoing opinion that 'the Supreme Being is a cause independent of our actions, etc.,' on the ground of its being liable to the imputation of partiality and cruelty. They, on the contrary, hold the opinion that 'the Supreme Being is a cause in dependence on our actions, etc.' and they maintain that there are three categories distinguished as the Lord, the soul and the world (*Pati*, *Paśu* and *Pāśa*)'. According to the school, there are four feet (steps) for the attainment of the goal—learning, ceremonial action, meditation and morality. The individual soul (called *Paśu* in the system) is also known by such synonyms as the non-atomic (*aṇu*),[21] *kṣetrajña* (knower of the body) and so on. They say,

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18. Cowell and Gough, *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha*, English Translation, Chap. VI, pp. 103 ff.

19. *Ibid*., Chap. VII, p. 112.

20. A list of the Āgamas is given in Mr. Foulkes' "*Catechism of the Śaiva Religion*." *Kiraṇa* and *Karaṇa* are quoted in the treatise on the system in *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha*. *Op. cit*., p. 113.

21. *Op. Cit*., p. 119, fn. 1. '*Aṇu* ; the soul, when clothed with these primary things (desire, knowledge, action, etc.), is an exceedingly small body.' (Foulkes).

we must not admit like Cārvākas that the soul is the same as the body, since on this view we cannot account for memory, as there is a proverb that one cannot remember what another has seen. Nor may we say with the Naiyāyikas that it is cognizable by perception,[22] as this would involve an *ad infinitum regressus*. 'If the soul were cognizable, there would need to be again a second knower; and this would require another still, if the second were itself to be known.' Nor must we hold it non-pervading with the Jains, nor momentary with the Bauddhas, since it is not limited by space or time. Nor may we say with the Vadāntins that it is only one, since the apportionment of different fruits proves that there are many individual souls ; nor with the Sāṁkhyas that it is devoid of action, since when all the various 'fetters are removed, *Śruti* informs us of a state of identity with Śiva, which consists in intelligence in the form of an eternal and infinite vision and action. The souls are said to be three-fold denominated as *Vijñānakalāḥ*, *Pralayākalāḥ* and *Sakalāḥ*. The first are those who are under the influence of *Mala* only. The second are those who are under the influence of *Mala* and *Karman*. The third are those who are bound in the three fetters of *Mala*, *Karman* and *Māya*, hence their name *Sakalāḥ*. This tenet is almost in accord with the corresponding *Trika* tenet as incorporated in the Āgamādhikāra of the Pratyabhijñā system. The *puryaṣṭaka* is a subtle body apportioned to each individual soul, which continues from the creation until the close of the *kalpa*, or until liberation. It is composed of the thirty *tattvas* beginning with 'earth' and ending with *Kalā* . Each soul wanders by the law of *Karman*, through all the bodies produced by the world. Maheśvara shows compassion to some of those souls who are joined to the *puryaṣṭaka* body, as possessed of peculiar merit, and grants them to be the lords of the world. In the system, *Māyā* is an energy of the Divine Being and all the world is potentially contained (*māti*) in itself when the whole cosmos is annihilated ; and again, when creation starts it all comes (*yāti*) into manifestation. Hence the derivation of the name (*Māyā*).[23]

Vīra-Śaiva-School. This school appears to be a compromise between the Śaivas and the Vaidikas. S. G. Sakharpekar mentions this as one of the main schools of the Śaivas.[24] C. Hayavadana Rao, in his

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22. 'The mind or internal sense perceives soul ......' See *op. cit.*, p. 119, fn. 3.

23. See *op. cit.* pp. 112-127 ; Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy* II, pp. 722-731 ; Radhakrishnan, *History of Philosophy Eastern and Western* I, pp. 369-380.

24. Ref. 'Evolution of Śaivagamas' by S. G. Sakharpekar. *Proceedings and Transactions of the Seventh All-India Oriental Conference*, 1933, pp. 65 ff.

Introduction to Śrīpati's *Bhāṣya* of the *Brahma Sūtras* (published in 1936), writes that, according to his own statement, Śrīpati specially composed the work for the benefit of the Vīraśaivas whom he describes thus: 'The Śaivas who have knowledge of the Vedas and Āgamas and their inner spiritual meanings; who are fired with the desire to attain *Mokṣa*; who are the followers of the Vedic path; and who are strict in following the tenets of pure or strict Śaivism.'[25]

The Vīraśaiva School follows the *Bhedābheda* doctrine which is not in conformity with the monistic doctrine of Vedānta. The three views, *Bheda*, *Abheda* and *Bhedābheda*, were current among the early teachers of the Uttaramīmāṁsā School, as is evident from the *Brahma Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa I, iv, 20, 21 and 22. The doctrine represented by Āśmarathya in the Sūtra I, iv, 20, which reads '*Pratijñā-siddher-liṅgam āśmarathyaḥ*', is *Bhedābhedavāda*, that by Audulomi in the Sūtra I, iv, 21, reading '*Utkramiṣyata evambhāvād ityaudulomiḥ*', is *Satyabhedavāda* and that by Kāśakṛtsna in the Sūtra I, iv, 22, reading '*avasthiter iti kāśakṛtsnaḥ*' is *Abhedavāda*. The Vīraśaiva School seems to uphold the early *Bhedābheda* School of Āśmarathya.[26]

It is known that the Vīraśaiva School was founded by Basaveśvara of Kalyana in the later part of the twelfth century, in the time of the king of Kalachuri. According to some scholars the school dates from the 2nd century A D. or even earlier. It is yet unknown that it is a distinct branch of the ancient Āgamic Śaiva religion. But it is clear that the current of *Bhedābheda* thought was in vogue very early, being equally old and consistent with the Vedas. This system also has authoritative scriptures, namely Śaivāgamas. The history of Vīraśaivas lies, in fact, in obscurity. S. G. Sakharpekar thinks that it is not written systematically from the Āgamic point of view. Dr. Bhandarkar has remarked that it is a jealous copy of Brāhmanism. The distinctive feature of the Vīraśaiva School is *Liṅgadhāraṇa*, i. e. a Vīraśaiva puts a *Liṅga* on his own body and engages himself in attaining unity (*aikya*) of Śiva and Jīva (*Liṅga* and *Aṅga*). The technical terms used in Vīraśaiva scripture are found used in the Vedas too.[27] Sakharpekar quotes many references from the Purāṇas and Smṛtis to show the antiquity of this School. It has been observed that the chief doctrines of the Vīraśaiva School are adumbrated in the Vedas and Upaniṣads, but they are treated exhaustively in the

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25. C. Hayavadana Rao, *Śrīkara Bhāṣya* by Śrīpati, I, Introduction, p. 24.

26. See G. Thibaut, *The Vedānta-Sūtras with the commentary of Saṅkarācārya* (translated), I, p. 277 fn.

27. 'Āgamic Vīraśaivism' by S. G. Sakharpekar, *op. cit.* pp. 399 ff.

later portion of the twenty-eight Śaivāgamas. It does not discard the authority of the Vedas but ignores the *Karma-kāṇḍa* section, i.e. the section dealing with rituals, of the Vedas.[28]

The history of Vīraśaivism prior to Basava is enshrouded in the mist of unknowable past. The decipherment of the picto-phonographic inscriptions of the Indus valley has revealed the history of the Dravidian culture and civilization, for we come across such significant words as *Āṇ*, *Anil*, *Amma* and *Ātma* having a perfect correspondence to *Śiva*, *Śaraṇa*, *Śakti* and *Sriṣṭi*. The theory advanced by the Āgamas is that the *Liṅga* is the cause and the principle of the evolution and involution; God, *Āṇ* or Śiva, is described as *Parā Saṁvit*, the consciousness pure and perfect. The working of the potential complexity and multiplicity in the one, is what we call, from our point of view, manifestation, creation, becoming, world, or *Ātma* in Dravidian. The power by which the self-consciousness brings out of itself its potential complexity and multiplicity, is termed *Amma* or *Cit Śakti*; and being self-conscious, it is obviously of the nature of the will. This *Amma* is termed *Jāta-vedas*: 'that which has right knowledge of all births.' *Anil* or *Śaraṇa* is the silent observer of the multiple existence. *Anil* is the *Akṣara Puruṣa*, the immutable soul, which is our real Self, 'our divine unity with God.' It is by realizing our oneness with this *Anil* or *Akṣara Puruṣa* that we get freedom from the shackles of desire, freedom from the binding law of works. Whereas there are four units or entities—*Āṇ*, *Anil*, *Amma* and *Ātma* corresponding to *Śiva*, *Śaraṇa*, *Śakti* and *Sriṣṭi* as formulated in Vīraśaiva system, there are three principles, in the lower creation, —Matter, Life and Mind which, in the more popular Indian philosophical terminology, are called *Tāmas*, *Rājas* and *Sattva*. The Śaivāgamas declare that *Śiva* is the *sat* aspect of Reality while *Śakti* is its *cit* aspect. '*Śiva* and *Śakti* are, as it were, the transcendent and the immanent, the static and the dynamic, the impersonal and the personal aspects of Reality.' The word *Sthala* is also used to denote the eternal, impersonal, divine entity (also called *Śiva-tattva*). These are the main tenets of the Vīraśaiva School.[29]

Śākta School: All over India we find various schools of Śāktas with their peculiar faiths, which are quite allied to the Śaiva Schools.

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28. *Ibid.*

29. See 'Vīraśaivaism' by Kumaraswami, *Prabuddha Bhārata*, April 1942; 'Vīraśavism' by Kumaraswami, *History of Philosophy Eastern and Western* I, pp. 393 ff.; Edward P. Rice, *A History of Kanarese Literature*, pp. 49 ff.

The origin of the Śākta School is also enshrouded in the mists of the past. The deities of the two schools, Śaiva and Śākta, are almost common. Śiva and Śakti are held as two great generative principles and the architects of the universe. The main principles of the Śākta School are as follows: The Śāktas believe that with Śiva and Śakti are associated the two male and femal cosmogonic elements called *Bindu* and *Nāda*. These are interpreted by the Śaivas as the cognitive and active powers. Kṣemarāja, in his commentary on the stanza "*prasarad-bindu-nādāya....śaṅkara-kṣīra-sindhave*" of *stavacintāmaṇi*, explains the terms '*Bindu-nādau*' as '*sāmarasyātmike jñāna-kriyā-śaktī yasya*', i.e., the terms *Bindu* and *Nāda* imply the power of knowledge and the power of action. The Śaivas postulate the law of Causation, Śiva being the Ultimate Cause. The Śāktas believe that Śiva, independent of Śakti that represents power, is unable to perform the functions of creation, etc.[30] The universal power (*Śakti*) assumes several forms of which the two chief are *Cit Śakti* and *Māyā Śakti*. *Māyā*, defined as 'the sense of difference' (*bhedabuddhi*), appears at the close of the fine creation, i.e., after *Śuddhavidyā*, in the enumeration of thirty-six *Tattvas*. This *Māyā* causes limitation to the Jīva. *Māyā Śakti* is defined as the 'function of negating,' (*niṣedha-vyāpāra-rūpā śakti*; Yogarāja's Commentary on *Paramārthasāra* by Abhinavagupta). The formless cannot assume form unless formlessness is negated. Eternity is negated into finality, all-pervading into limited, and so on. It is by negating itself to itself that the Self becomes its own object in the form of the universe. The Āgamic meaning of *Māyā* is that which involves (*mā*) and evolves (*yā*), i.e., which causes involution and evolution. S. Śivapādasundaram gives the classification of *Māyā* as follows: *Māyā* is differentiated as *Śuddhā* and *Aśuddhā*. Under the former (*Śuddhā*) are given *Nāda* (*Jñāna-śakti* only), *Bindu* (*Kriyā-śakti* only), *Sādākhya* (both *Śaktis* equal), *Īśvara* or *Maheśvara* (*Kriyā-śakti* predominating) and *Śuddhavidyā* (*Jñāna-śakti* predominating). Under the latter (*Aśuddhā Māyā*) are given *Kāla* (time), *Niyati* (space) and *Kalā*. *Kalā* is analysed into: *Vidyā*, *Mūlaprakṛti*, *Puruṣa*, *Rāga* and *Guṇa*. *Guṇa* is further differentiated as *Citta* and *Buddhi*. *Buddhi* develops into *Ahaṅkāra* which assumes three forms, *Bhūtādi* (*Tāmasa*), *Taijasa* (*Sātvika*) and *Vaihārika* (*Rājasa*) *Bhūtādi* comprises *Tanmātrās* and *Mahābhūtas* (great elements); *Taijasa* consists of *Manas* and *Jñāna-indriyas* (five sense organs); and *Vaihārika*

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30. "शिवः शक्त्या युक्तो यदि भवति शक्तः प्रभवितुम् ।
न चेदेव देवो न खलु कुशलः स्पन्दितुमपि ॥"

Pañcastavī, KSTS

is composed of *Karma-indriyas* (five organs of action).[31]

Śakti, the female consort of Śiva, is the predominant deity of the Śāktas. According to them, Śiva is the powerless agent, whereas all power belongs to Śakti. Śākta-āgama-vādins have their own scriptures, the Tantras affiliated to Śakti, such as *Śri Vidyarṇava Tantram*, published by the Kashmir Research Department. As religion the school has been much denounced because of its peculiar rituals and crude and vulgar forms of worship. It may, however, be admitted that the Śākta cult is very ancient and is followed upto this day by numerous thoughtful people, particularly in South India, without the least change in their devotion for Śakti. Apart from the fact that it is one of the living faiths of India, the philosophy grown under its fold is, indeed, in accord with the Western Science, since *Śakti*, according to the school, represents force or energy, the primordial natural force-principle, which is the Ultimate Cause of the Universe. A. Avalon quotes a charming passage from a Sūfī author of Dabistan (7th century A.D.) who speaks of the mother of the world (Śakti) as follows : "The *Māyā* (Śakti) is the maker of the productions of this world and of its inhabitants, and the creator of the spirits and of the bodies. The universe and its contents are born from it."

According to the Śākta School, God in the form of mother is the Supreme power which creates, sustains and withdraws the universe. Whereas Śiva is the unchanging consciousness, Śakti is its changing power appearing as mind and matter. 'Both mind and matter derive from what Herbert Spencer calls the Primal Energy (*Ādi Śakti*) and Haeckel the fundamental spirit-matter substance.' Herbert Spencer calls the most general phenomena of the universe as vibration, energy or play of force. Woodroffe writers in his *Śakti and Śākta*, 'Herbert Spencer, the philosopher of modern science, carries the investigation further, holding that the universe, whether physical or psychical, whether within or without us, is a play of force which, in the case of matter, we experience as object, and that the notion that the ultimate realities are the supposed atoms of matter, to the properties and combinations of which the complex universe is due, is not true.'

Kashmir Śaivas ; Their three main divisions : There are three main divisions of the Kashmir Śaivas corresponding to the division of their literature into the three Śāstras : (1) the Āgama Śāstra, (2) the Spanda Śāstra and (3) the Pratyabhijñā-Śāstra. A brief history of the development of these Śāstras is given below.

Śaivaism is the earliest and the most prevalent cult. Śiva-Śakti cults were in vogue along with the Vedic faith in every part of India

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31. S. Śivapādasundaram, *The Śaiva School of Hinduism*

from very ancient times, and in Kashmir before the time of Ashoka. As stated above, the history of the Introduction of Śaivaism in Kashmir is shrouded in mystery. In fact, it flourished there from the dawn of history. The facts furnished by Kalhaṇa in his *Rājataraṅgiṇī*, the chronicle of the kings of Kashmir, indicate the wide prevalence of the Śaiva cult in the valley from an early period, and that it occupied the first place among the Hindu cults of the valley. From time to time various philosophical doctrines reached Kashmir from outside which had their impact on the philosophy that had grown there among the followers of the Saiva cult. Buddhism was welcomed by Kashmiris long before the Christian era, and Kashmir became its stronghold since the time of Ashoka (273—232 B.C.). Here was convoked an Assembly of the Buddhist theologians which recognised the *Mahāyāna* and *Hīnayāna* schools of Buddhistic thought. In spite of the phenomenal success of Buddhism in Kashmir for a few centuries, Śaivaism continued to be the vital force.

The revival of Śaivaism came in Kashmir from the seventh century A.D., and in the 8th and 9th centuries Buddhism gradually disappeared. In the 9th century, it was the sage Vasugupta, who revealed the *Śiva Sūtras* which form the bedrock of the whole superstructure of Kashmir Śaivism. The *Śiva Sūtras* do not only enunciate the fundamental concepts of Kashmir Śaivaism, but also show a way to practical realization. This line of thought was developed by two ācāryas Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa (circa 9th century) and Somānanda (contemporary of Vasugupta, 850—900 A.D.) in two different directions. While Kallaṭa handed down the doctrines as a system of religion, Somānanda supplied the logical reasoning in their support and thus founded a system of *Advaita* philosophy of the Śaivas on the basis of what was at first taught as a system of faith. This development resulted into the emergence of the three different forms of Kashmir Śaivaism : (1) the Āgama Śāstra, (2) the Spanda Śāstra and (3) the Pratyabhijñā Śāstra, corresponding to the three broad divisions of its literature. The whole literature comprising its three divisions is known as *Trika Śāstra.* The Āgama Śāstra is regarded as of superhuman authorship and of eternal existence. It is said that in course of time Āgama Śāstra disappeared from the world and was revived again by Śrīkaṇṭha, the incarnation of Śiva, the promulgator of Śaivāgamas. The sage Durvāsas was inspired to spread the knowledge of the Śaivāgamas which was handed down to the later ages by his three mind-born sons and their successors. The same (Āgama Śāstra) was taught in the later ages by Vasugupta and his successors. The *Śiva Sūtras* revealed by Vasugupta lay down both the philosophical doctrines (*jñāna*) and the practices (*kriyā*) of the system as revelations believed to have

come down (*āgama*) through the ages, being handed down from teacher to pupil. Generally speaking, the Āgama Śāstra gives the rudiments of Kashmir Śaivaism, and shows the path of practical realization by means of the processes of Yoga system, known as *Śaiva Yoga* or *Śaiva-samāveśa.* The school of Yoga Śaivaism prescribes various yogic methods of *Saṁyam* (concentration of mind) for achieving lower and higher *siddhis* (occult powers) and the glories of liberated life. These methods are called *Śāmbhavopāya, Śāktopāya* and *Āṇavopāya.* The Āgama Śāstra gives an exposition of these three methods of realization which is the main theme of the whole Trika-śāstra. The *Śiva-sūtras* form the most important part of the Āgama Śāstra from the Trika point of view. The Spanda Śāstra, being the second system, was started by Kallaṭa, the pupil of Vasugupta, who most likely composed the *Spanda Sūtras.* The same was carried on by Kallaṭa's successors, Pradyumna Bhaṭṭa, Prajñārjuna, Mahādeva Bhaṭṭa and Bhāskara. The Spanda Śāstra gives a comprehensive exposition of the three Yogic methods of realization (the mystical *upāyas*). The Pratyabhijñā Śāstra, being the third system, was started by Somānanda, the author of *Śivadṛṣṭi*, and was carried on by the line of his disciples,—Utpaladeva, Lakṣmaṇagupta, Abhinavagupta, and the later teachers. As already stated, it lays stress on the theoretical method of realization, viz., the pursuit of knowledge and reason alone, necessary for liberation, and relegates the yogic methods to a subordinate position. It, thus, primarily represents the philosophy proper of the Trika Śāstra.

Kashmir Śaivaism (Trika Śāstra) comprising the above mentioned three divisions, is, in brief, a school of absolute monism, which presents a conception of positivism in a theistic outlook in contradistinction to the Vedāntic '*neti, neti*'. According to the school, Śiva, the Ultimate Reality, is the prolific cause and the essence and identity (Self) of every thing. He abounds in bliss and consciousness and is endowed with omniscience, omnipotence and sovereignty of will. He is everything and yet beyond everything, or, He is both immanent (*Viśvamaya*) and transcendent (*Viśvottīrṇa*). Time, form and space do not limit Him, for He is above all mutation and change. Śiva (the supreme Being) and Ātman (Self) are identical. Puruṣa or Paśu, being the fragment of the inter-related whole, is no other than Śiva Himself, but is in a state of limitation and self-forgetfulness. Recognition of the identity of the individual self (Paśu) and Śiva restores the original state of absolute perfection to the former. This is his state of *Mokṣa.* The *Paśu* (*Puruṣa*) has taken on three impurities (*Malas*) which are responsible for obscuring the divine within him. When these three impurities get dissolved, he realizes the divine within him in its crystalline purity: It may be pointed out that, in spite

of certain differences in different schools of thought, the core of the Indian philosophy has remained the same throughout India, e.g., the idea of the repetition of death and rebirth as the fate of man, which eventually urges him to strive for release from such a prospect, the varying fortunes, characteristics and experiences of a man as the result of the transmigration and re-incarnation of personal soul expiating the action (*karma*) of former lives ; the final release from rebirth and its adjuncts of pleasure and pain, to be achieved by reabsorption into the universal soul, of which the individual souls are but emanations, and the merit of actionless, introspective ascetic life believed to be the passport of release from rebirth. These ideas constitute the central thought in all the three forms of Kashmir Śaivaism.

Āgama Śāstra : Śaivāgamas—Among the works belonging to Śaivāgama class, there is a number of Tantras, of which the following comprise chiefly the Āgama Śāstra of Kashmir : *Mālinī Vijaya* (or *Vijayottara*), *Svacchanda*, *Vijñāna Bhairava*, *Ānanda Bhairava* (lost), *Mṛgendra*, *Mataṅga*, *Netra*, *Naiśvāsa*, *Svāyambhuva*, *Rudra-yāmala*,[32] *Vidyārṇava*, etc. Most of these had existed long before the appearance of the Trika.

Tantra Śāstra is mostly *Sādhana Śāstra*. *Sādhana* consists of various means employed to produce purity of mind which is indispensable for achieving heavenly life and liberation according to these schools. Tantras are thus broadly divided into *Sādhana, Siddha* and philosophy. The well known divisions among the Sādhakas (practisers of Tāntric performances) are (1) Dakṣiṇācāras and, (2) Vāmācāras.[33] In these divisions, *Sādhanas* are, on the one hand, being used in developing natural powers of man, and, on the other hand, being degraded to the base forms of black magic for serving the ill-doings of men. Usually every Āgama consists of four sections or *Kāṇḍas*, (1) *Vidyā* or *Jñāna Kāṇḍa*, (2) *Yoga Kāṇḍa*, (3) *Kriyā Kāṇḍa* and (4) *Caryā Kāṇḍa*.[34]

Kashmir Śaivāgamas are mainly dogmatic treatises interspersed with philosophical speculations and logical reasoning. Being mostly devotional, they teach the various methods and practices of Śaiva Yoga, muttering of prayers to gods, and so on, among other theological matters. *Tantrāloka* of Abhinavagupta, an encyclopeadia of Tāntric doctrines, gives the summary of contents of *Advaita Tantras* which existed in Kashmir

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32. J. C. Chatterji, *Kashmir Śaivaism*, p. 8.
33. Woodroffe, *Śakti and Śākta*.
34. Paranjyoti, *Śaiva Siddhānta*.

in the author's time. Woodroffe says that the Kashmirian Śaivāgamas, although their followers are also Advaitins, have very subtly criticised Śaṅkara's doctrines on several points. mainly in respect of holding *Śuddha Brahman* as the Ultimate Cause and the world as illusion.

Mālinī-vijayottara-Tantram is, according to Abhinavagupta, the most important Āgama treatise for the Trika. It is an earlier treatment of the same subjects, more or less, as are dealt with in the *Tantrāloka*. Like the most Āgama texts, it is a coversation between Śiva and Śakti. *Mālinī-Vijaya* describes the Śaiva Yoga of the Trika System. Its sacred and divine character is avowed by Paramīśa who teaches it to Devī. Paramīśa is said to have learned it from Aghora. The Tantra is said to be the briefest resume of a large Tantra called the *Siddha-Yogīśvarī-tantram* consisting of nine crore verses interpreting Śaivaistic teachings in the light of *Bheda, Abheda* and *Bhedābheda*. *Mālinī vijayottara* is stated to be the last part of this Tantra. Like all Tantras, the magical and religious works, this also treats of incantations, their philosophy, initiation, bodily discipline, etc. It is said that the adorer becomes the adored himself by following the prescribed methods. He comes to feel his close kinship with nature. To him both the animate and the inanimate are glowing with divinity. The world is not an illusion to the Tāntric adorer. Potency of the mantras is the main theme of the Tantras. The Tāntric mantras, followed according to the directions given in the Śāstras, bring about certain results. Each and every Mātṛkā (a, ā, etc.) in a mantra is a living energy in itself. The mantras are thus believed to be the harmoniously living forces strong enough to accomplish even the most difficult undertakings of the Tāntric worshipper. The three methods of liberation, namely, *Āṇavopāya*, *Śāktopāya* and *Śāmbhavopāya* as set forth in the *Śiva Sūtras*, are described in the *Mālinī Vijaya* as follows: '*Āṇava* is that inspiration of *Rudra Śakti* which is attainable by utterance, the conscious mental discipline (*karaṇa*), contemplation, incantation and the bodily centres. *Śākta* is the name of that stage which is obtainable by the contemplation through the mind on the object of meditation, accompanied by utterance. *Śāmbhava* indicates the state which is produced by the deep and penetrative spiritual insight involving absolutely no mental concentration on any particular object.'[35] Mokṣa, in the Tāntric point of view, is the unfoldment of powers brought about by the Self-realization. It is not the giving up of the mortal coil and thus

35. आणवोऽयं समाख्यातः शाक्तोऽप्येवंविदः स्मृतः ।
एवं शाम्भवमप्येभिर् भेदैर्भिन्नं विलक्षयेत् ॥
MV II, 20-23; See p. 112, fn. 13,

acquiring immunity from death. To a real Tāntric, birth and death are phenomena of his own creation.

Mālinī Vijaya Tantra is the origin of the conceptions of creations, *Vijñānākala*, *Sakala*, *Pralayākala*, *Vidyeśvaras* and so on. This is also the main source of the first eleven *Tattvas* of the Śaiva System in addition to the twenty-five *Tattvas* of the Sāṁkhya. The original sources of the contents of this Tantra have not yet been traced by any scholar, in the earlier literature. In *Tejopaniṣad* we, however, have a reference about '*Āṇavaṁ Śāmbhavaṁ Śāktam*'. About the time of authorship of this Upaniṣad we are not in a position to say anything. At any rate we know that the Upaniṣad does not belong to the older group.[36]

Svacchanda Tantram : This voluminous work consisting of 3780 verses, is a dialogue between Śiva as Svacchanda Bhairava and Śakti as Bhairavī. '*Svacchanda*' literally means 'own will' and is thus a synonym of '*Svātantrya*', i.e., self-dependence or freedom of will. Like *Mālinī-vijaya* and its offshoot *Tantrāloka* of Abhinavagupta, *Svacchanda Tantra* deals with the same principles as treated of in the former two works, but in a peculiar strain of its own. In its philosophical parts, it gives an exposition of thirty-six *Tattvas* not as merely abstract principles, but as great cosmic facts, picturing them in symbols and in forms of exquisite poetry and painting them, as it were, on a most gigantic scale, over and against the background of an equally gigantic cosmic canvas. The Tantra prescribes a form of *Yoga-dhyāna* for the aspirant who is directed to concentrate his mind, in ecstatic meditation, on this awe-inspiring and, at the same time, irresistibly attractive scene, which presents a great drama of life and action, not just in one world and universe, but in countless universes scattered all over boundless space and moving about in equally unbounded time. The whole work pulsates with a profound sense of realization of All-independent Will, *Svacchanda*.

Śūnyatā plays an important part in certain schools of Buddhist thought. The Tantra describes the six states of *Śūnyatā* and explains the conception of the Ultimate *Śūnyatā* as the Transcendental Being (*Anuttara*, *Para* or *Viśvottīrṇa*), the highest and last Reality, which is, in reality, '*Aśūnya*' (*aśūnyam śūnyam ityuktam*), i.e., not 'voidity' or 'emptiness' in the ordinary sense of the term, but a positive being (*Sattā-mātra*) from which emerge infinite universes and annihilate into it. It is this *Śūnya* which contains in itself everything and which materializes itself in the concrete form of

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36. *Mālinī Vijayottara Tantram*, ed. Madhusudan Kaul, *KSTS* XXXVII, Introduction.

this physical and subtle universe (*tatra tatra paraṁ śūnyaṁ sarvaṁ vyāpya vyavasthitam, tadeva bhavati sthūlaṁ sthūlopādhivaśāt priye*).[37] The final reality is both transcendental as well as immanent (*sarvātītam paraṁ tattvaṁ sarvaṁ vyāpi vyavasthitam*). Hundreds and thousands of universes as well as all Śāstras, all arts and sciences, all moral and spiritual disciplines, even all magic, are included in the *Tattvas*.[38] While the universe is so vast, the Jīva is infinitely small, like a mathematical point (lit. a hundredth part of the hundredth part of a tip of hair), but he is capable of infinite expansion.[39]

Vijñāna Bhairava—This work is also a text of the Āgama Śāstra, being a conversation between Siva as Bhairava and Śakti as Bhairavī. *Vijñāna Bhairava* is regarded as the essence of another Tantra, the *Rudra Yāmala*. Its main topic is *Yoga-dhyāna*, of which it prescribes no less than 112 forms.[40] As its contribution to philosophy, *Vijñāna Bhairava* explains how it is due to Śakti that Śiva appears in the forms which are conditioned by space and time.[41]

37. *A Descriptive Analysis of KSTS*, pp. 35-36.
The text goes on :
षट् शून्यानि परित्यज्य सप्तमे तु लयं कुरु ।
तच्छून्यं तु परं सूक्ष्मं सर्वावस्था-विवर्जितम् ॥
अशून्यं शून्यम् इत्युक्तं शून्यं चाभाव उच्यते ।
अभाव: स समुद्दिष्टो यत्र भावाः क्षयं गताः ॥
सत्ता-मात्रं परं शान्तं तत्-पदं किमपि स्थितम् ।
स्थूलसूक्ष्मप्रभेदेन तदेकं संव्यवस्थितम् । *ST* IV, 291—95.
38. भुवनानि विचित्राणि शतशोऽथ सहस्रशः ।
तत्त्वाभ्यन्तर-संस्थानि शास्त्राणि विविधानि च ॥
... See *Ibid.*, p 37.
39. बालाग्र-शतभागस्य शतधा कल्पितस्य तु ।
तस्य सूक्ष्मतरो जीवः स चानन्त्याय कल्पते ॥
See *Ibid.*
40. How this *Yoga-dhyāna* is to be practised is indicated in the following verses :
व्योमाकारं स्वमात्मानं ध्यायेद् दिग्भिरनावृतम् ।
निराश्रया चितिः शक्ति: स्वरूपं दर्शयेत् तदा ॥
···काम-क्रोध-लोभ-मोह-मद-मात्सर्य-गोचरे ।
बुद्धिं निस्तिमितां कृत्वा तत् तत्त्वम् अवशिष्यते ॥
इन्द्रजालमयं विश्वं......पश्यतश्च सुखोद्गमः ॥ *VB* I, 91, 100, 101.
Op. Cit. P. 32.
41. One of the verses on this runs thus :
यथालोकेन दीपस्य किरणैर् भास्करस्य वा ।
ज्ञायते दिग् विभागादि तद्वच्छक्त्या शिवस्य च ॥ *VB* I, 21.
See *Ibid.*

Parā-Triṁśikā being a collection of thirty odd verses taken from the *Rudra-Yāmala* Tantra, also belongs to the Āgama Śāstra. Its importance lies in the fact that it is perhaps the earliest work on the mystery of the Sanskrit alphabet (*Varṇamālā*). It is really what may be called the 'cosmic phonetics', and is intimately connected with the doctrine of the four stages in the manifestation of speech, viz., *Parā*, *Paśyantī*, *Madhyamā* and *Vaikharī*. Man as Paśu, i.e., 'creature in bondage', is ordinarily acquainted with the *Vaikharī*, the physically articulated speech, alone. The three other forms (stages) of speech are hidden in the 'cave' (*guha*), i.e., heart. The verses give the relation between the articulated speech and the hidden mystery of the inarticulated sound, and its connection with the thirty-six principles of creation (*Tattvas*), treated as *Spandas*, i.e., speeding vibrations.[42]

Śiva Sūtras—The Sūtras are believed to be *a Rahasyāgama-śāstra-saṁgraha*, being the work of Śiva Himself. They, therefore, form a part of the Āgama Śāstra to which is attributed divine authorship. According to tradition, recorded by Kṣemarāja, the Sūtras were found, by the sage Vasugupta, inscribed on a rock at the foot of the Mahādeva mountain, about twelve miles from Srinagar.

The *Śiva Sūtras* are a protest, first, against certain later schools of Buddhism, preaching the nihilistic doctrine of 'no *Atman*', in direct opposition to the Buddha himself, who nowhere says that 'there is no *Atman*'. He, on the contrary, states that to say that 'there is no *Ātman*' would mean preaching the doctrine of the nihilist (*Uccheda-vāda*). (See *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, Vol. IV, 400-401). Secondly they are a protest against the doctrine of dualism. This explains why the very first Sūtra so emphatically declares that, not only the *Ātman* most certainly is, but that man's consciousness, in its essential nature; is in itself the *Ātman* (*caitanyam ātmā*) and that the *Ātman* itself is Śiva, the great Lord, *Maheśvara*, nothing else (*Ātmaiva śivaḥ*).[43]

While the *Śiva Sūtras* thus begin with a highly philosophical declaration, they constitute a practical treatise which tells how to realise, in direct experience, the philosophical truths enunciated therein. This practical aspect of the Sūtras is called '*Upāya*', i.e., 'means of approach' and each of the three divisions of the Sūtras gives 'an exposition of a way of approach' (*upāya-prakāśanam*).

The basic ideas of the *Śiva Sūtras* are the same as we have in the Āgamas of the Trika, i.e., the unfoldment of the three means of liberation,

42. *Op. cit.*, p. 33,
43. See Ibid., pp. 10-11.

Śāmbhava, Śākta and *Āṇava*, the *Malas* (impurities), etc. It is stated that Śrīkaṇṭha, an incarnation of Śiva, appeared once before Vasugupta in a dream and told him, 'There exists a sacred lore under this big stone. Reveal it and teach to those who deserve a favour'.[44] Śiva wished to do a favour to the suffering humanity by the revelation of the traditional sacred lore which unfolds the three means of emancipation: *'dvaita-darśanādhivāsita-prāye jīvaloke rahasya-sampradāyo mā vicchedi'*. On awaking, the sage found the Śūtras engraved on a big stone known in Kashmir as *Śiva Pala* which is said to exist on the Mahādeva hill with the side, containing the engravings, remaining inverted after they were revealed to Vasugupta. The Sūtras are divided in three sections, dealing with the three means of liberation. Guru Vasugupta taught them to his disciples Kallaṭa and others. Kallaṭa taught them to Kṣemarāja who added a commentary, called *Vimarśinī*, to the Sūtras.

In the first section (*Unmeṣa*) are given the characteristics of the Self (*ātmano lakṣaṇam*) as *'caitanyam ātmā'*. The idea is common to the whole of the Indian philosophical literature. It is interpreted as *'viśvasya svabhāvaḥ caitanyam'* (the essential nature of the universe is *Cit*—consciousness). This *Citi* is said to belong to the Ultimate Parama Śiva (*tat parama-śivasyaiva bhagavataḥ*). In reality, the *Śiva Tattva*, being a created *Tattva*, is inferior to *Ātman* or *Caitanya* (*tato nyūnam*), as the latter is said to be *anāśrita* (independent). Contrary to the doctrine of *Dvaitavādins*, *Ātman* is declared to be the soul of the whole world of diversity, from the lowest *Tattva*, the earth, to the highest, *Parama Śiva*. *Citi*, being *Ātman*, is defined in the *Īśvara Pratyabhijñā-Kārikā* as *'citiḥ pratyavamarśātmā'* which is explained as *'citi-kriyā svātma-camatkāra-lakṣaṇaḥ'*. This definition is evidently against the tenets of the Laukikas (Cārvākas), the Vaidikas, the Yogācāras and the Mādhyamikas who hold the body (*Śarīra*), the vital airs (*Prāṇa*), the mind (*Buddhi*) and the void (*Śūnya*), respectively, as the Self (*Ātman*) or *Pramātā* (knower). It is emphatically stated in the Sūtra that the body, the vital airs, the mind and the void, being only apparent (*kalpita*), are not the real *Pramātā* which is *ahaṁ-vimarśamaya* (the ego). The commentator concludes the Sūtra with the remark that all that exists cannot be of insentient nature (*nahi acetyamānaḥ ko'pi kasyāpi kadācid api svabhāvo bhavati,.....caitanyaṁ sarvadā svaprakāśam paramārtha-sad asti iti pramāṇīkṛtam*).

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44. 'अत्र महीभृति महति शिलातले रहस्यम् अस्ति,
तद् अधिगम्य अनुग्रह-योग्येषु प्रकाशय'
SS, Commentary, p. 2.

Unlike the *Brahma Sūtras*, the *Śiva Sūtras* are a Sādhana Śāstra. In the former, *Sādhanas* (performances) precede the knowledge of *Ātman* as is denoted by the word '*atha*' in the sūtra : '*athāto Brahma-jijñāsā*' (Then, therefore, the enquiry into Brahman). We note also that while the former begins with the definition of *Saguṇa Brahman*, the qualified Supreme Being, i. e., the immanent Self, as One from which the creation, sustenance and destruction of the universe proceed (*janamādyasya yataḥ*), in the latter we have the definition of the transcendental Self (*svarūpa lakṣaṇa*). After the first Sūtra follows the next one which declares the cause of bondage as "*ajñānam bandhaḥ*", construed also as "*Jñānam bandhaḥ*", i.e., (1) ignorance or (2) false knowledge constitutes bondage. The bondage consists of the two-fold impurity known as *Āṇava-mala* (innate impurity). It is explained in the light of the famous Kārikā of *IPK* as: '*svātantrya-hānir bodhasya svātantryasyāpi bodhataḥ, dvidhāṇavam malam idaṁ sva-svarūpāpahānitaḥ*'. The first line states that *Āṇava-mala* consists of false knowledge by which one knows his Self (*Ātman*) as imperfect (*apūrṇa*) due to his not cognizing the omnipotence (*Svātantrya*) innate in the Self. The second line expounds another kind of *Āṇava* impurity, the positive ignorance of the nature of the Self, in consequence of which one admits the body, the vital airs, the mind or the void as one's Self.

In *SS* 1, Sūtras 3 and 4, the cause of bondage has been stated to be of two kinds of innate impurity, *Māyā-mala* and *Kārma-mala*. The fifth Sūtra describes the first means of liberation, *Śāmbhava samāveśa*. The Sūtra, reading '*Udyamo bhairavaḥ*', means: 'The Spiritual elevation causes union with Parama Śiva (*Bhairava*)'. The 'Spiritual elevation' is attained by the concentration on the nature of the Lord. It illuminates the intelligence (*pratibhā*) of the Sādhaka (Practiser) with the knowledge of both the aspects of the Universal Self : (1) *Viśvamayaḥ prasaraḥ* (the lord immanent in the world) and (2) *Viśvottīrṇaś ca saṁvit* (the lord in the form of the pure consciousness transcending the universe). In the next Sūtra we are told that the result of performing the *Śāmbhava Samāveśa* is the cessation of plurality view. The Sūtra reading—'*śakti-cakra-saṁdhāne viśva-saṁhāraḥ*'—means that by concentration on the group of all grades of *Śaktis* (powers of creation etc.), the universe, consisting of the thirty-six *Tattvas* merges in the highest Self (*Saṁvit*). In that state, subject and object become one. Even after rising from the *Samāveśa*, the practiser (Sādhaka) is free from his plurality view. In the Sūtra—'*Jāgrata-svapna-suṣupta-bhede turyābhoga-sambhavaḥ*', we are told that the wonderful experience of the blissful state of *Turyā* (the superior state of consciousness illuminated by knowledge) takes place when the Sādhaka

differentiates the three states, *Jāgrata*, *Svapna* and *Suṣupti*, followed consecutively by *Turyā*. The next three Sūtras describe the three states of the Self, viz., *Jāgrata*, *svapna* and *Suṣupti*. *Jāgrata* is defined as '*Jñānam jāgrata*' (waking state is that in which perceptions take place) ; *Svapna is* defined as '*svapno vikalpaḥ*' (i.e. the dreaming state is that in which false conception of perceptions are formed in the mind) ; and *Suṣupti* is defined as '*aviveko māyā-sauṣuptam*' (the state of deep sleep is characterised by the absence of perception, i.e., when the knowing faculty ceases to function). Further we learn that the individual soul experiences the three states mentioned : '*Tritaya-bhoktā vīreśaḥ*'. In Sūtra 12, it is stated that the inexpressible blissful experience takes place only when the Sādhaka performs the particular Yoga, *Śāmbhava Samāveśa*, in *Turyā state* (Fourth state). The Sūtras continue stating the experiences of a particular Yogin devoted to the Śaiva Yoga.[45]

Spanda Śāstra : *Spanda Kārikās*—These compositions are the earliest and only original texts belonging to the Spanda Śāstra division of the Trika. They constitute the basis on which the entire Spanda literature developed. Regarding their authorship, there are two views, one that they are by Vasugupta himself ; and the other that Kallaṭa composed them. Utpala Vaiṣṇava, on the strength of the 53rd Kārikā, not found in the recension of Kṣemarāja, attributes their authorship to Kallaṭa, while Kṣemarāja attributes them to Vasugupta, probably on the authority of the 16th verse of the *Spanda Nirṇaya* found in his recension. The Kārikās seem, in fact, to be the work of Kallaṭa. The Spanda-śāstra lays down the main principles, as enunciated in the *Śiva-sūtras*, in a greater detail and in a more amplified form, without giving philosophical reasonings in their support. In fact, the Spanda system owes its origin to the *Śiva-sūtras* and concerns itself with their elucidation and popularisation. The author describes *Spanda* as that power of consciousness which infuses life into the physical senses. An object when sensed has no basis apart from consciousness.

Spanda Kārikās (verses) are 51 in number in which the fundamental principles of Śaivaism, as aphoristically given in the *Śiva Sūtras*, are epitomized. The literature that developed on these Kārikās are (1) the *Vṛtti* by Kallaṭa, (2) *Vivṛti* by Rāmakaṇṭha, (3) *Pradīpikā* by Utpala, (4) *Spanda Sandoha* by Kṣemarāja and (5) *Spanda Nirṇaya* also by Kṣemarāja. The idea underlying the *Spanda Śāstra* is that Śiva's *Spanda* (energy) out of its own nature manifests on the background of its own pure Self the whole

45. See P. T. Srinivasa Iyengar, *Śiva Sūtra Vimarśinī* (Translation).

universe comprising the thirty-six categories from the earth upto Śiva. The first twenty-five verses (constituting chapter I) expound the energy of *Svarūpa* (*Svarūpa-spanda*), i.e., the real nature of Śiva. The next seven verses (comprising chapter II) explain the energy in the rise of *Sahaja Vidyā* (innate knowledge), i e., intuition. The following nineteen verses (Chapter III) explain the energy in His glory (*Vibhūti-spanda*). In chapter IV, the supreme state of *Spanda* as well as the eloquent power of the author's own teacher is panegyrized. The first chapter describes the essential nature of the *Spanda* principle, means of its attainment along with its recognizing characteristic, and the refutation of the objections raised against the means. It tells us how the delusion of the world ceases by strict adherence thereto. Further, it establishes the indestructibility of the *Spanda* principle, although the world of objects brought into play by that principle is destructible. The theory of Nihilism is 'exploded.' Finally, it urges that the enlightened should cut to pieces, in a manner befitting Yogins, the veil of darkness. In the second chapter the universe is described twofold, pure and impure, the pure in the form of mantras, etc., emanating from that reality, being identical with and getting merged in that, and the othar (impure) also being identical with that. In the end it states how the Yoga practisers get their desired objects fulfilled by the realization of the *Spanda* principle. The third chapter (*Vibhūti-spanda*) deals with the manifestation of the knowledge of desired objects, the operative energy and subjection of hunger, etc., the acquisition of omniscience and the disappearance of grief. Next, it defines the evolution of the nature of *Spanda* and so on. It tells us why we should discard certain powers which only stand as obstacles in the way of the superior meditation. It also describes the process leading to inspiration. In short, the doctrine of *Spanda* rejects the theory of the Vedāntins that '*Viśvam yan na tad eva brahma*.'[46] According to this doctrine, the world is a play of energy, force or vibration, which is in conformity with modern science, and not an illusion, the result of error in perception as the Vadāntins suppose.

The discovery of the concept of the '*Spanda*' in the Trika Śāstra is, indeed, most important from the point of view of modern Science. The word '*Spanda*' is derived from the root meaning 'to throb', 'to move', and seems etymologically to be the same word as English 'speed' (cf. Dutch, Old English, 'spoed'). Bût, in the context of the Trika Śāstra, '*Spanda*' means 'speeding with pulsation and rbythm'. '*Spanda*' has the same meaning also in expressions like '*prāṇa-spanda*', i.e., 'life pulsation'.

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46. The *Spanda Kārikā*, *KSTS* VI, and The *Spanda-nirṇaya*, *KSTS* XLII, with English Translation, etc., by Madhusudan Kaul.

It has been known in India since the Vedic age that everything in the universe of objects is only a 'system of ceaseless goings' (*jagati*) (*yat kiñ ca jagatyām jagat— Īśāvāsyopaniṣad* I). Even the hardest, heaviest, the apparently standing-still, mass of matter, in this physical universe, is just a volume of 'pulsating, throbbing, waving, vibrating flowings' (*Spanda-niḥṣyandāḥ* ; *SK*, 19). In these circumstances, the discovery of modern physics that 'matter' is only 'waves of various lengths'—without there being any essentially 'solid, hard stuff in matter'—is really a rediscovery of what the Trika Śāstra conceived centuries ago as the '*Spanda*'.[47]

Tantrāloka and Tantrasāra—The *Tantrāloka* is the most voluminous work by Abhinavagupta and forms an encyclopaedia of the Trika Śāstra. The *Tantra-sāra*, by the same author, is just a brief summary of the *Tantrāloka*. While the *Tantrāloka* is composed in an abstruse language and in a metrical form, the *Tantrasāra* is written in easy prose and is considerably short. The *Tantrasāra* is, in fact, an excellent introduction to the *Tantrāloka*. Whereas Vasugupta and Kallaṭa are the promulgators of Āgama and Spanda branches of Trika Śāstra, which stress 'its faith, fact and practical discipline' necessary for realization, and Somānanda and Utpaladeva are the founders of the Pratyabhijñā Śāstra, the philosophy proper of the Trika, Abhinavagupta combines both the aspects of the Trika, its faith (rituals and practices) and philosophy. He is, indeed, the greatest exponent of the system as a whole. The contents of the *Tantrāloka* are mainly based on the *Mālinī Vijaya Tantra*. Despite the fact that it combines all the aspects of the Trika, the *Tantrāloka* is predominantly a practical treatise. It includes, *inter alia*, certain mystery practices (*prakriyās*), called *Kula-prakriyā* and *Krama-Prakriyā*. The author himself calls it a 'Mystery-Practice Treatise'. It deals extensively with most of the ritual practices of the Trika, like *Dīkṣā*, etc. It is thus pre-eminently practical, but, at the same time, it is vastly learned and profoundly philosophical.

The first chapter, which is chiefly philosophical, opens with an explanation of the first two Śiva Sūtras and defines the key-word '*Caitanya*', saying '*caitanyam iti bhāvāntaḥ śabdaḥ svātantrya-mātrakam*' (*TĀ* I, 28). Thus, *Caitanyam* means not any particular state or states of consciousness, but consciousness in general, consciousness as such, free from all limiting conditions, free absolutely from an objective context, viz., any thing to depend upon, like the body, the mind, etc. *Caitanya* is just Self-dependence (*svātantrya-mātra*). It is '*cit-kriyā citi-kartṛtā*', i.e.,

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47. Cf. J. C. Chatterji, Art. 'Trika Śāstra', *Shārada*, I, i, 1952.

absolute liberty and autonomy of consciousness, as Utpaladeva says. This *Caitanya* is emphatically declared to be the *Ātman*, the one nuclear core in every personality, the one central point of reference in each and every experience, the deepest depth of the subconscious in each vividly conscious personal ego.[48] The *Tantrāloka* I, gives definitions and explanations of various other terms. The next four chapters of the work deal, in detail, with the same three *Upāyas* (methods of realization), which constitute the three sections of the *Śiva Sūtras*. According to Abhinavagupta's view, the three means described are those of *Abheda*, *Bhedābheda* and *Bheda* respectively.[49] Pratyabhijñā has been treated as another way of realization, a way of reasoning (*tarka*), requiring no practice of any kind (*Anupāya*). This, he says, is the highest of all the methods.[50] In this connection he refers to *Śrī Siddhā Tantra* and to the eighteenth Paṭala of the *Mālinī Vijaya*. The *Mokṣa* (emancipation) for which the above four means are prescribed is stated to be the revealing of one's own real nature.[51] The knowledge (*Jñāna*) is considered as indispensable to emancipation.[52] This is attained by *Dīkṣā* which is potent to dispel the veil of *Mala* (impurity) that hides the Self.[53] The individual self is enwrapped with the veil of ignorance resulting from the *Malas* (impurities) of three kinds—*Āṇava*, the innate impurity, causing limitation with regard to the Self-knowledge, *Māyīya*, the impurity arising from the principle of limitation and *kārmīya* impurity, the outcome of our deeds, good or evil. The trammels of *Malas* are said to be cut asunder by the dawning of the divine light on the individual Self. It is attained by the spiritual knowledge gained by the performance of a particular Yoga called the *Samāveśa*.

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48. *A Descriptive Analysis of KSTS*, pp. 23-26.
49. अभेदोपायमत्रोक्तं शाम्भवं शाक्तमुच्यते ।
भेदाभेदात्मकोपायं भेदोपायं तदाणवम् ॥ *TA* I, 230.
50. ततोऽपि परमं ज्ञानं उपायादिविवर्जितम् ।
आनन्दशक्तिविश्रान्तम् अनुत्तरमिहोच्यते ॥ *Ibid.*, 242.
51. इति ज्ञान-चतुष्कं यत् सिद्धिमुक्तिमहोदयम् । *Ibid.*, 245.
मोक्षो हि नाम नैवान्य: स्वरूपप्रथनं हि स: ।
स्वरूपं चात्मन: संविन्-नान्यत् तत्र तु या: पुन: ॥ *Ibid.*, 156.
52. सम्यग्ज्ञानं च मुक्त्येककारणं स्वपरस्थितम् ।......
TĀ I, 233. See also Commentary.
53. मलो नाम किल द्रव्यं चक्षु:स्थपटलादिवत् ।
तद्विहन्त्री क्रिया दीक्षा त्वञ्जनादिककर्मवत् ॥ *TA* I, 239.

The work also deals with various philosophical topics like time, space, the nature and division of the thirty-six principles (*Tattvas*), from the principle of Solidity (earth) to Śiva, the one All-benign Lord (*devaḥ sa ekaḥ śivaḥ*), who ever shines through all the principles and their infinite combinations and permutations,—shines in the form of a condensed mass of the supreme spiritual effulgence (*eṣu anvitaṁ rūpam bhāti param prakāśa-nibiḍam ; TĀ*, 9, 1). The two chapters (11 and 12) of the work deal with the principle of *Māyā* and its five offshoots, *Kalā*, etc., which, acting as 'cloaks', make the All-underlying Śiva appear as the punctual, even mathematically punctual, centre of each divided and divisive personality, such as a man's. Another chapter (13) which is also of some philosophical significance, treats of the conferment of powers (*Śakti-pāta*) by Śiva. The rest of the work deals with various ritual practices and forms of worship.[53]

Vātūlanātha-sūtras—The Śaiva Yoga had a considerable growth even after the twelfth century as is evident from the *Vātūlanātha-sūtras*, which lay down certain Yogic processes as means for achieving divine realisation. They expound the secret method of *Samāveśa* in a greatly complex manner. These Sūtras are thirteen in number in which a special term *Sāhasa* (adventure) is used to describe an unprecedented and extraordinary yogic experience. The first Sūtra states that 'the real nature is acquired by the firm stay in the pre-eminent *Sāhasa*', i. e., 'one under the influence of the indomitable courage' (*mahā-sāhasavṛttyā svarūpa-lābhaḥ*). The method is explained in the third Sūtra which states : 'Entry into the great vacuity results from the bursting open of the two boards', i. e., 'by cutting asunder (stopping) the inhaling and exhaling breaths' (*ubhaya-paṭṭodghaṭṭanān-mahāśūnyatā-praveśaḥ*). Further the Sūtras tell us that 'the firm stay in the universal consciousness is brought about by the destruction (annihilation) of the couple', i.e., the perceiver (subject) and the perceived (object). (*yugma-grāsān niravakāśa-saṁvinniṣṭhā*). In this complex and mystical manner are the processes and the object of the Yoga *samāveśa* described in these Sūtras.[54]

Pratyabhijñā Śāstra : *Pratyabhijñā-hṛdayam*—The Āgamic tenets of the Pratyabhijñā Śāstra are best summarised in the *Pratyabhijñā-hṛdayam* by Rājānaka Kṣemarāja, a brief idea of which is as follows. *Citi* (consciousness) being absolute or self-dependent (*svatantrā*), is the ultimate cause of this universe. By the power of its own will (*svecchā*), it unfolds the universe upon its own screen (*svabhittau*). This universe is manifold (*nānā*) in consequence of the separation of mutually related objects and subjects (from one another). The subject, whose essential

53. *A Descriptive Analysis of KSTS*, pp. 23-26.

54. *Vātūlanātha-sūtras*, ed. with Eng. translation by Madhusudan Kaul, *KSTS*, No. 39.

nature is limited *citi* (*citi-saṁkocātmā*), is a microcosm. *Citta* (the sense organ) is nothing else than *cit* descended from the stage of *cetana* and passed into a state of limitation due to the object of perception (*cetya-saṁkocinī*). That *citta* especially constitutes the real nature of the *Māyā-pramātā* (subject). He is one *Ātman*, being Śiva whose essence consists in *cit*. He is of two-fold form, one as light (*prakāsa–rūpa*) and the other as the limited manifestation (*saṁkocāvabhāsavat*). He is threefold being covered by three impurities (*malas*), *Āṇava*, *Māyīya* and *Kārma*. He is of fourfold constitution, because he is composed of the void (Śūnya), the life (*Prāṇa*), the *pūryaṣṭaka* (i.e , the subtle body consisting of mind, senses, etc.) and the body (*Śarīra*). The seven pentads, i.e., the thirty-five *Tattvas* from Śiva to the earth, make up his nature. In consequence of the limitation of the *śaktis* of this *Māyā-pramātā* (*Ātman*), he becomes the *mala*-covered *sāṁsārin*, i e., takes a succession of births. Like the Lord (Śiva), he carries out the five processes of the universe, viz , emanation (*sraṣṭṛtā*), reabsorption (*saṁhartṛtā*), stabilization (*sthāpakatā*), enveloping ((*vilaya-kāritā*) and dispensing grace (*anugrahītṛtā*). Underlying these there exist five other secret processes, viz., manifesting, enjoyment, meditation, seeding and dissolution. To be a *saṁsārin* means being led astray by on's own *śaktis* when one is ignorant of that authorship of the fivefold process. In the following sūtras, the teacher sets forth a meditative process (*Samāveśa*) for achieving divine realization which 'saves during lifetime' from *Saṁsāra* (cycle of births and deaths). In the process of *Samāveśa* (*Samādhi*), *citta* becomes *citi* by directing itself inwardly to the stage of *cetana*. The Sādhaka (worshipper) gradually approaches more and more permanent *Samādhi* by meditating on one's identity with *cit*. The result achieved by this is stated, in a mystical language, in one sūtra (17) thus: 'By opening the centre there follows the attainment of spirit and bliss (*cidānanda-lābha*)'. The Sādhaka penetrates into the perfect Self and thus acquires the Lordship (*Śivatā*, *Māheśvarya*), i.e , achieves salvation in one's lifetime (*jīvan-mukti*).[55]

Characteristic features of Āgamic tenets in Pratyabhijñā : Sum-marising the system in *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha*, Mādhavācārya states in his prefatory note, as follows : 'Other Māheśvaras are dissatified with the views set out in the Śaiva system in attributing to motiveless and insentient things causality (in regard to the bondage and the liberation of transmigrating spirits). They therefore seek another system, and proclaim that the construc-tion of the world (or series of environments of those spirits) is by the mere

55. Kurt F. Leidecker, *The Secret of Recognition* (*Pratyabhijñā-hṛdayam*), Translated into English.

will of the Supereme Lord. They pronounce that this Supreme Lord, who is at once other than and the same with the several cognitions and *cognita*, who is identical with the transcendent Self posited by one's own consciousness, by rational proof, and by revelation, and who possesses independence, that is, the power of witnessing all things without reference to aught (anything) ulterior, gives manifestations, in the mirror of one's own soul, to all entities as if they were images reflected upon it. Thus looking upon recognition as a new method for the attainment of ends and of the highest end, available to all men alike, without any the slightest trouble and exertion, such as external and internal worship suppression of the breath, and the like, these Māheśvaras set forth the system of Recognition (*Pratyabhijñā*).'[56]

The above remarks clearly show the theistic outlook of the Pratyabhijñā system. It will be observed that almost similar philosophical speculations grew in different Śaiva systems from their original theological content derived from the Śaivāgama sources. These minor systems of Śaivas and Śāktas differ slightly from one another in certain ideas and doctrines, although their common philosophical idea is not, in the least, at variance with the main Upaniṣadic thought. As already stated, at the outset of this work, the Śaivāgamas, in course of time, incorporated a stock of varied philosophical ideas and terms from the Vedic sources, particularly the Upaniṣads and the six Brāhmnical systems. These Śaiva systems, therefore, owe the slight variation in their ideas also to the different Śaivāgama sources. A contrast between the two prominent Śaiva systems, the Pratyabhijñā system of Kashmir and the Śaiva Darśana of South India, shows that they are almost similar to each other and differ only in minor things. Both of them recognize three categories, *Pati*, *Paśu* and *Pāśa*, and both deal with the cause of *saṁsāra* (world) and emancipation. In both the forms of the Śaiva system three kinds of defilements or fetters are recognised, *Mala*, *Māyā* and *Karman*. The Pratyabhijñā calls them the three *malas* (impurities), the first as *Āṇava-mala*. The creation known as *Vijñānākala* is said to be under the influence of *Mala* only. The creation known as *Sakala* still retains his organs and is subject to all the three defilements, *Mala*, *Māyā* and *Karman*. In these two systems, as well as in other Śaiva schools, the analytical doctrine of the *Tattvas* varies in slight degrees, mostly in their mere interpretations. The Pratyabhijñā and Śaiva systems both preach monism, the former, as "Realist-cum-idealist non-dualist", and the latter as "Realist pluralist." The Pratyabhijñā holds the whole creation as the

56. E. B. Cowell and A. E. Gough. *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha*, English Trans., *Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies*, No. X, pp. 128 ff.

manifestation externally of what exists within. According to it, the Ultimate Reality, gradually through its own energy, unfolds the world on itself as on a screen and divides itself into corresponding and mutually related subjects and objects. The world is, in reality, nothing but the psychical life of the universal soul projected outwardly. God is cause as well as effect, and is the *causa efficiens* and *causa materialis* of the world at one and the same time. According to the Śaiva Siddhānta, He is only the efficient cause. In answer to the question as to what imparts the impetus to the process of the world, the doctrine of *Svātantrya*, the soveriegnty of God's will says : 'It is the will of God which is a *primum datum*.' The development of the world is the work of *Citi*, world-reason, or *Parāvāk*, 'the eternal word', or *Parā-śakti* 'the highest power', all of which are considered identical with each other and with the Lord Śiva. *Citi* allows the Ultimate to divide itself into thirty-six *Tattvas* which represent a scale from the highest and the purest to the lowest and grossest principle. The totality of the phenomena of the universe is reducible to them. In the concept of *Tattva* the idea of matter is particularly inherent, whereas the idea of power is inherent in the concept of *śakti*. The phenomenal universe is thought to be as a varied play of forces, 'towering behind them all in mysterious, terrifying grandeur is *Parā-śakti*.' The five main aspects of the Śakti are *Citi-śakti* (power of consciousness), *Ānanda-śakti* (power of bliss), *Icchā-śakti* (power of will), *Jñāna-śakti* (power of knowledge) and *Kriyā-śakti* (power of action). According to the Śākta-śāstra, Śakti as she creates becomes *ghanībhūta*, i.e., becomes massive or thickens, which implies that it transforms into the gross shape of the universe. In all the earlier Śaiva systems of India there runs a realistic thread which is in accord with the realistic basis of the thought developed in the Upaniṣads. Somānanda's system, like the Bādarāyaṇa's Vedānta system, asserts the emanation of the Universe from the first cause (Śiva, Brahman) as real transformation.

It may be pointed out here that two peculiar concepts are embedded in the Pratyabhijñā system, the dispensation of divine grace (*Anugraha*) by Śiva out of compassion to an individual soul and the conferment of powers (*Śakti-pāta*) as a special gift to some one (by virtue of the sovereignty of His will).[57] The system seems to have also recognised the performance of Śaiva Yoga to speed up the achievement of salvation. Thus we notice that, like the *Pratyabhijñā-hṛdayam*, the *Pratyabhijñā Kārikā* too has incorporated (in *Āgamādhikāra*, 31 Kārikās) all the Āgamic

57. See Kurt F. Leidecker, *op. cit.*, Introduction, pp. 11 ff.

tenets of the system including the very complex system of Śaiva Yoga and the mystic experiences of the Sādhakas in Śaiva *Samāveśa* (the particular state of trance). The rest of the work (160 *Kārikās* of *IPK*) deals with a system of philophical doctrine which can directly be affiliated to the Indian systems of thought evolved from the Vedic and Buddhist sources. It is here that we can draw a line of demarcation between the theological tenets of the Śaivāgamas or the Āgamic doctrines of the system and the purely philosophical content of the Pratyabhijñā Śāstra which is the subject matter of the next chapter.

Role of religion and supernatural in Pratyabhijñā : The West has its philosophy distinct from its religion, while in India we do not have philosophy separate from theology. Zeller says, "Indian Philosophy never lost contact with religion and never became independent." In this country religion has, in fact, led to philosophy. Although it is not possible to set any form of Indian Philosophy free from the dogmas of religion, in the Pratyabhijñā system, however, metaphysics plays a primary role, and theology or religion is relegated to a subordinate position. It may, therefore, be pointed out that, though the Pratyabhjñā system is a purely philosophical system founded on reason and scientific values, it has not totally divorced itself frcm theological matter. As said above the main work on the system entitled 'the *Pratyabhijñā-Kārikā*', includes in one Section (Sec. III, *Āgamādhikāra*) the dogmatic and theological matters of the Trika cult, such as divine hierarchy, bondage and release, the impurities (*Malas*), pure and impure creations, common creation, the subjects called *Vijñānākala*, *Pralayākala*, *Sakala* and *Vidyeśvaras*, two classes of *Saṁsārins* (transmigratory souls), the different states of perceivers and the mystical methods of liberation (*Śāmbhavopāya*, etc.), and so on, as incorporated in the System from the Āgama Śāstra. It will, however, be noticed that philosophical interpretations have been given, in the system, to these supernatural matters.[58]

The Śaiva Yoga : According to the metaphysical point of view of the Pratyabhijñā system, *Parama-śiva*, the Ultimate Being, who is aware of His Transcendental nature in that state, while adopting the limited form of an individual being (*Paśu-bhāva*) by the sovereignty of His will (*Svātantrya Śakti*), forgets (loses the awareness of) His real nature by His own deluding power (*māyā vimohinī śakti*) and becomes limited in his powers of thought and action, thus turning into an inferior and fettered being (*Paśu*). The Pratyabhijñā enables him to recognise his own supreme nature already known to him before his individuation and

58. See *IPV* II, *KSTS*, No. XXXIII, pp. 185 ff.

thus restores to him his higher and deeper powers and the sovereignty of his will (*svātantrya*) innate in him.

The state of realization, said above, according to the point of view of the Trika system, of which the Pratyabhijñā-Śāstra is a manual of philosophy, cannot be achieved without recourse to supernatural practices known in the system as the "*Śaiva Yoga*" or "*Śaiva samāveśa*". The Trika system prescribes various Yogic methods of *Saṁyama* (intuition), i.e., 'intense concentration, contemplation and meditation' to attain the realization or 'Recognitive insight' (*Pratyabhijñā*) which is the means of all the highest human achievements (*samasta sampat samavāpti hetum*). These are variously called *Śāmbhavopāya* (or *Icchopāya*), *Śāktopāya* (or *Jñānopāya*) and *Āṇayopāya* (or *Kriyopāya*). These methods are said to develop in the Yogins, respectively, the powers of will, thought and physical activity. Although the Pratyabhijñā system lays down the basis of this intuitive experience, viz., the system of Yoga, yet it claims to have ultimately revealed another and a new way (*navo mārgaḥ*) of intellectual pursuit, the pursuit of knowledge and reason at the empirical level, which it calls *Anupāya* (a processless way), i. e., which does not need any Yogic—physical and mental—practices at all. The Yogic methods have indeed, been incorporated in the Pratyabhijñā system from the Trika Śāstra and have been considered by the great authorities like Abhinavagupta as indispensable for realization. Abhinavagupta was himself a born Yogin (*yoginībhūḥ*) who constantly practised *Śaiva-samāveśa* in his life.

The Yogic system was known in India from remote ages, not only as a means of developing human personality, but also as a wonderful aid to scientific observation. It is well known that our great thinkers of the past entered deeply into the very core of things by means of yogic processes. The yoga system has proved of great value in attaining to heights in the sphere of knowledge. By practising the threefold yogic method taught in Trika Śāstra, a person is said to manifest his profounder faculty and to get omniscience, all-penetrating grasp, along with many other supernatural powers. The following powers are mentioned by Patañjali in his *Yogasūtras* (Chapter III) which a Yogin can and does manifest : 'Knowledge of the past and future' (Psychometry and premonition) (*Sūtra* 16), 'Knowledge of one's previous births' (18), 'Understanding of other people's minds' (Telepathy) (19), 'Disappearance' (Invisibility of the body) (21), 'Knowledge of the worlds' (26), 'the Knowledge of the starry regions' (27), 'mastery over the elements' (28), and so on.

Yoga is now generally understood as a method of attaining occult powers or magical power, because its right significance is lost in our time. Owing to the desuetude of the yoga tradition, even the value of the *Śaiva samāveśa*, dealt with briefly in the Pratyabhijñā Śāstra, cannot be understood now. It is difficult to follow even the abstruse texts on Śaiva-yoga and understand the Yoga technique such as given by Abhinavagupta in the different chapters of his *Tantrāloka*, under the headings: *Anupāya*, *Śāmbhavopāya*, *Śāktopāya*, *Cakrodaya*, *Kāla tattva*, *Deśādhva*, etc. The Kashmir school of Yoga Śaivism is still an obscure subject. No investigation seems to have been made in this direction by any modern scholar. No attempt has been made even to translate the *Tantrāloka* of Abhinavagupta which comprehensively deals with the methods of Śaiva Yoga. It will be desirable if some scholar takes up an intensive and extensive study of the Yoga system of Kashmir Śaivism and sets to himself the task of elucidating the scientific values of the Yogic exercises given in the particular literature on the subject, viz., *Tantrāloka* and *Tantrasāra*, *Vatūlanātha-sūtras*, etc., already published in several volumes in *KSTS*.

A brief information on the Yoga system based on Dr. Barnett's Note on the subject is given as follows. 'In Yogic theory the human body is conceived as a miniature copy or replica of the world without it; the forces by which this microcosm is controlled at the same time operate upon the macrocosm outside, and thus, by certain physical and mental processes, the Yogin can win for himself not only supernatural powers over his own body and mind but also a miraculous control over the universe, culminating in the complete translation of his soul into the highest phase of Being, the Absolute (usually conceived as Supreme Śiva), for ever and ever.' In the human body there are numerous *nāḍīs* (nerves) among which three are of supreme importance, *Suṣumnā*, *Iḍā*, and *Piṅgalā*, which descend from the brain into the pit of the abdomen. It is stated that between the pudendum and naval is a 'bulb' (*Kanda*) into which the *nāḍīs* debouch. These three *nāḍīs* are in immediate conjunction, *Iḍā* being on the left hand of *Suṣumnā*, and *Piṅgala* on the right. *Suṣumnā* rises vertically from the pelvic region along the vertebral column as far as the *Brahma-randhra* (the upper extremity of *Suṣumnā* and of the inner *nāḍī* enclosed in *Suṣumnā*); there it bends round the right of the *Ājña* circle (see below) and passes up into the left nostril. In the centre of *Suṣumnā* is a *nāḍī* called *citrā*,...There are six *cakras* or circles, which are conceived as being of the form of lotuses, attached at intervals to *Suṣumnā*. In the abdomen is situated the first circle called *Mūlādhāra*, or simply *Ādhāra*, which is imagined to be a lotus of four digits in width, situated two digits above the anus and two digits below the penis.

In the pericarp of this lotus is a triangular space on which dwells the *Kula-kuṇḍalinī* (or simply *Kuṇḍalinī*), which is the *Śakti* or *Cit-Śakti*, the power of spirit, the creative force of the universe. A little distance above *Mūlādhāra*, at the base of the penis, is the second circle, *Svādhiṣṭhāna*, conceived as a red lotus with six petals. The third circle is *Maṇipūra*, a golden lotus of ten petals by the naval. The forth circle is *Anāhata*, a red lotus of twelve petals situated in the heart. Above *Anāhata*, and situated in the throat, is the circle *Viśuddha*, a golden lotus of sixteen petals. The sixth circle is *Ājñā*, a lotus of two petals situated between the eye-brows, which contains the mystic force called *akṣara-bīja*. Above all these circles is the highest of all, *Sahasrāra* conceived as a lotus with a thousand petals, situated at the base of the palate. The object of Yogic contemplation is to absorb the *Kuṇḍalinī* in the microcosm, representing the macrocosmic Energy, into *Sahasrāra* typifying the absolute...In order to effect this transit of *Kuṇḍalinī* through *Suṣumnā* and the *Brahma-randhra* into *Sahasrāra*, the *nāḍīs* must, by the exercise of *prāṇāyāma*, be blocked up with air introduced into them by inspiration (*pūraka*) and retained in them (*kumbhaka*). The final expiration of this retained air is called *recaka*. By performing the mystic exercises, the *Kuṇḍalinī śakti*, i.e., the power of spinal cord, is roused in its six centres (*cakras*); thus the Sādhaka (Yogin) attains supernatural subtle powers of the soul. When the *Kuṇḍalini* is stimulated to a supreme effort by long Yogic exercise, the soul enters into the realm of the Absolute, in which it is merged into the infinite bliss of Parameśvara. It has been suggested that the *cakras* and other terms of Yogic anatomy correspond more or less to real parts of the human body, and the following identifications are proposed. *Suṣumnā* : the spinal cord ; *Iḍā* : the left sympathetic cord ; *Piṅgalā* : the right sympathetic cord ; *Citrā* : the grey matter of the spinal cord ; *Brahma-randhra* : the central canal of the spinal cord ; *Mūlādhāra* : the sacral plexus ; *Maṇipūra* : the epigastric plexus ; *Anāhata* : the cardiac plexus ; *Viśuddha* : the laryngeal or pharyngeal plexus ; *Ājñā* : the cavernous plexus ; *Sahasrāra* : the Medula oblongata.[60]

It is recently that some psychologists have started the study of man and his spiritual nature with the modern scientific method. This has given rise to a new branch of Psychology, known as *Parapsychology* which deals with the deeper and supernormal nature of man. It originated in the great movement, known as *Psychical Research*,

60. L. D. Barnett, 'Preliminary Note on Yoga', *Lalla-vākyāni*, *Asiatic Society Monographs*, *Vol. XVII*, 1920.

i.e., a scientific investigation into such rare, odd and strange phenomena which defy human reason. In 1882, a Society for Psychical Research was formed in England to investigate into the nature of such phenomena with the help of purely scientific method. As a result of the work of this society, we are in possession of a vast scientific knowledge which throws a flood of light on the deeper nature of man. Psychical Research is, now, both a field and a laboratory science. There are Departments and Chairs of it in some well-known universities of the world, such as Cambridge in England and Duke in America. Psychical Research or Parapsychology has penetrated human nature more deeply than any other science, pursuing the modern scientific method, has so far done, although human nature still remains vastly unexplored. The achievements of the society and of the individual investigators in their inquiries into the abnormal phenomena, like *Telepathy* or *Clairvoyance*, *Retrocognition*, *Precognition* or *Premonition*, *Telekinesis*, etc., are, indeed, the mere beginnings of Parapsychology. Supernatural powers achieved by a man practising yogic exercises need a thorough and deeper investigation in the said institutions. Modern Psychologists and Scientists cannot afford to neglect their investigations in this direction. 'A comparative study of Indian Psychology and Western Psychical Research is really everdue', says B. L. Atreya in his paper (Presidential Address) read in the Psychology Section of the *Indian Philosophical Congress*, 1951. Emphasising the great purpose of "Comparative study of Western Psychical Research and Indian thought" for the service of mankind today, B. L. Atreya, while concluding his address, aptly remarks, "we have arrived, I venture to say, at such a juncture in the history of civilisation that a comparative study of Psychical Research and Indian thought should be pursued in right earnest. It will, I think, unite the East and the West, the past and the present, science and religion, more than any other activity of mankind has so far done."[61]

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61. B. L. Atreya, Presidential Address—Psychology Section. *Proceedings of Indian Philosophical Congress*, 1951.

CHAPTER XXIV

PHILOSOPHICAL MOVEMENTS IN INDIA (2) VEDIC AND BUDDHIST

Beginning of the Vedic movement : Philosophical tendencies in the Vedas ; The philosophic thought in the Upanisads ; the earlier philosophical systems—the Cārvāka system ; the Jaina philosophy ; the Buddhist philosophy ; different Buddhist schools ; *Hīnayāna* schools—Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas (*kṣaṇika-vāda*) and *Mahāyāna* schools—Yogācāras and Mādhyamikas (*Vijñāna-vāda* and *Śūnyavāda*) ; the rise of six Brāhmanical schools ; Vaiśeṣika-Nyāya systems ; Sāṁkhya-Yoga systems ; Pūrva-mīmāṁsā and Uttara-mīmāṁsā or Vedānta schools ; Śaṅkarācārya and his Advaita school of Vedānta ; Śaṅkara's criticism of the earlier doctrines ; *Mayā-vāda* ; Rāmānuja and his school of thought ; Rāmānuja's objections to Śaṅkara's doctrine ; the Pratyabhijñā school, its distinctive features ; Differences between the Pratyabhijñā and Vedānta systems ; the concluding remark.

Beginning of the Vedic movement : Philosophical tendencies in the Vedas—There had been a development of philosophical thought in India from a very early age. It grew initially from the Vedic movement which started sometime between the second and the third millenium B. C., when the Aryans had just settled in India, long before the emergence of Buddhism and Jainism took place. Some hymns of the *Ṛgveda*, the oldest of the Vedas, indicate that Vedic seers have tried to unravel the mysteries of the world which are embedded deep in the mesh of philosophical speculation. The Saṁhitas being, primarily, books of religious fervour, devotion and worship were not expected to digress, extensively, into the domain of philosophic discussion. Nevertheless, their occasional allusions which are generally very terse, apt and suggestive are quite revealing.[1] As an instance, in the hymn of creation, which occurs in the tenth Maṇḍala of the *Ṛgveda*, the Vedic seer produces deep philosophical lucubrations showing his growing curiosity to know the origin and nature of creation. Often the obscurity of the mysterious problem baffles his thought and in his attempt to explain the creation, he helplessly explains : "Who knows truly ? Who shall here declare, whence it has

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1. Āchārya Vishva Bandhu, *The Vedas and Śāstras, A General Survey*, V. I. Series 33, p. 17.

been produced, whence is this creation? By the creation of this (universe) the gods (come) afterwards: who then knows whence it has arisen ?[2]

In certain mantras of the *Ṛgveda*, also repeated in the *Atharvaveda*, even the very existence of God is doubted by the Vedic poet who declares, '*kasmai devāya haviṣā vidhema*'. With deep longing the poet seeks and searches after that God and again and again he asks, doubting, seeking and longing, 'Who is this God to whom we present our offering?' He, however, sees the divinity in its manifestation now here, now there, now elsewhere, and still doubts about the existence of God.[3] While coming face to face with various powers of nature and sending forth his simple prayers in their praise, the seer is led to suppose that there is one divinity, one superior power, which he calls by various names and speaks in various ways.[4] Some such allusions to monotheistic tendency 'tend to transport the reader behind all phenomenon and make him stand aghast before the vision of the one, ultimate noumenal reality.' This aspect of the Saṁhitas attained its full bloom in the Upaniṣads.[5]

It is difficult to indicate, with any degree of certainty, the different stages in the development of thought in India. But it is certain that long before the redaction or composition of the hymns of the *Ṛgveda*, Indo-Aryans had outstripped the primitive simplicity of thought and had developed the conception of gods as forces behind the natural phenomena.[6] The different strata of the Vedic literature, Saṁhitas, Brāhmaṇas and Āraṇyakas and the Upaniṣads, indicate the varied tendencies of thought growing and continuously changing, viz., Naturalism, Anthropomorphism, Monotheism and finally Monism, which seem to follow consecutively. Naturalism, the earliest tendency of thought, appears in

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2. को श्रद्धा वेद क इह प्र वोचत् कुत आजाता कुत इयं विसृष्टिः ।
अर्वाग्देवा अस्य विसर्जनेनाथा को वेद यत आबभूव ॥ *Ṛv.* X. 129, 6;
See A. A. Macdonell, *A Vedic Reader*, p. 211.

3. हिरण्यगर्भः समवर्तताग्रे भूतस्य जातः पतिरेक आसीत् ।
स दाधार पृथिवीं द्यामुतेमां कस्मै देवाय हविषा विधेम ॥
Ṛv., X. 121, 1-9; *Av.*, IV. 2, 1-8.

4. इन्द्रं मित्रं वरुणमग्निमाहुरथो दिव्यः स सुपर्णो गरुत्मान् ।
एकं सद्विप्रा बहुधा वदन्त्यग्निं यमं मातरिश्वानमाहुः ॥
Ṛv., I. 164, 46; *Av.*, IX. 10, 28.

See Radhakrishnan. *Indian Philosophy*, vol. I, Chap. 1.

5. See Āchārya Vishva Bandhu, *loc. cit.*

6. Nalinimohan Mukharji Śāstrī, *A Study of Śaṅkara*, 1942, p. 2.

the simple prayers addressed to the gods representing various powers of nature in the Vedas. The anthropomorphic tendency grew with the second stage of the Vedic religion, i.e., the sacrificial cult. Monotheistic tendency appears in certain hymns in which the existence of many gods is doubted. Monism of the Vedānta is the latest stage of the monotheistic tendency which developed in the Vedas and assumed a distinct form in the Upaniṣads. It has also been observed that the nature worship in the Vedas assumed the form of the monistic doctrine of Brahman in the Upaniṣads.

C. D. Sharma states, in his *Indian Philosophy*, that 'there has been a gradual development of the philosophical thought from the Mantras and the Brāhmaṇas through the Āraṇyakas to the Upaniṣads. It is said that we can notice a transition from the naturalistic and antrhopomorphic polytheism through transcendent monotheism to immanent monism in the pre-Upaniṣadic philosophy. The personified forces of nature first changed into real gods and these later on, became mere forms of one personal and transcendental God, the "Custodian of the Cosmic and Moral Order", who Himself, later on, passed into the immanent *Puruṣa*. The Upaniṣads developed this *Puruṣa* into *Brahman* or *Ātman* which is both immanent and transcendent.' The scholar is of the view that 'The key-note of the Vedic hymns is the same spiritual monism, the same immanent conception of the identity-in-difference which ultimately transcends even itself, the same Indescribable Monism which holds both monism and pluralism within its bosom and which ultimately transcends both, which we find so beautifully and poetically developed in the Upaniṣads.' The learned professor thinks that 'there is no development from polytheism through monotheism to monism (as some scholars have observed), but only of monism from the first Mantra portion to the last Upaniṣadic portion.'[7]

Whether the Vedas teach monism throughout from the beginning of Saṁhitas to the last portion of the Upaniṣads, as stated by C. D. Sharma or that monism is the latest stage of the monotheistic tendency which developed in the Vedas (from the earlier stage of naturalistic polytheism) and assumed a distinct form in the Upaniṣads, as generally observed by scholars, it will have to be admitted that it is the Upaniṣads which are the fountain-head of the several forms of the monistic doctrine which later developed in the different Vedic and non-Vedic systems of thought. Passing through the various philosophical epochs in which the later systems flourished, it culminated in the absolute non-dualistic doctrine of Śaṅkarācārya. The Śaivas who existed side by side with the Vaidikas

7. C. D. Sharma, *Indian Philosophy*, pp. 4-5.

borrowed from them the various doctrines including monistic ideas and incorporated the same in the Śaivāgamas from which Pratyabhijñā, the non-dualistic system of Śaiva philosophy developed in course of time.

Tarapada Chowdhury, tracing the various ideas of the later systems of Indian philosophy to the Vedic fount, concludes, in *History of Philosophy Eastern and Western*, 'The above survey (of the Vedic thought) brings out in bold relief the emergence of certain characteristic features of later Indian religious and philosophic thought.........Monism of the Vedānta with a hint at *Māyā* and liberation through knowledge ; .....the three *guṇas* and blind tendencies in matter of the Sāṁkhya ; control of the senses and concentration of the mind of the Yoga ; and right mental perspective and right speech leading to the Absolute of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika are also foreshadowed, besides consideration of the common problems of *Ātman*, *Manas*, the Absolute Reality, the emergence of the universe, *Karman*, rebirth and liberation. No wonder later thought should regard the Vedas as the fountain-head of all religion and philosophy.'[8]

Philosophic thought in the Upaniṣads: The Upanisads do not belong to one particular time and are not the product of a single current of thought. They contain diverse views held by seers belonging to different times. Though the ideas contained in them are not heterogeneous, yet on account of their obscurity and suggestiveness different views could be forced into them with the result that various doctrines evolved from them. Commentators have attempted to explain them variously and reconcile their different points of view in accordance with their particular beliefs. Thus to account for the evolution of creation various theories were set forth, such as *Brahma Pariṇāma-vāda* (the theory of transformation), *Brahma Vivarta-vāda* (the theory of manifestation) and so on. In this manner the diversity and complexity of views gave rise to different schools of philosophy. Even in the Vedas amid all complexity a certain principle of unity was asserting itself which had its growth later on in the Upaniṣads. For instance, in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* IX, Yājñavalkya says, 'These gods (Agni, Vāyu, and so on) are but manifestations of the highest, the immortal, incorporeal Brahman.' In the Vedas the vast order and movement of nature engages attention ; in the Upaniṣads depths of the inner world are explored. The Upaniṣads carry on the tendency of looking at *Brahman*, the cosmic principle, and *Ātman*, the physical principle, as identical. In other words the ideal of discovering the unity comprehending

8. See Radhakrishnan (Ed.), *History of Philosophy Eastern and Western*, Vol. I. pp. 52-53.

the simple prayers addressed to the gods representing various powers of nature in the Vedas. The anthropomorphic tendency grew with the second stage of the Vedic religion, i.e., the sacrificial cult. Monotheistic tendency appears in certain hymns in which the existence of many gods is doubted. Monism of the Vedānta is the latest stage of the monotheistic tendency which developed in the Vedas and assumed a distinct form in the Upaniṣads. It has also been observed that the nature worship in the Vedas assumed the form of the monistic doctrine of Brahman in the Upaniṣads.

C. D. Sharma states, in his *Indian Philosophy*, that 'there has been a gradual development of the philosophical thought from the Mantras and the Brāhmaṇas through the Āraṇyakas to the Upaniṣads. It is said that we can notice a transition from the naturalistic and antrhopomorphic polytheism through transcendent monotheism to immanent monism in the pre-Upaniṣadic philosophy. The personified forces of nature first changed into real gods and these later on, became mere forms of one personal and transcendental God, the "Custodian of the Cosmic and Moral Order", who Himself, later on, passed into the immanent *Puruṣa*. The Upaniṣads developed this *Puruṣa* into *Brahman* or *Ātman* which is both immanent and transcendent.' The scholar is of the view that 'The key-note of the Vedic hymns is the same spiritual monism, the same immanent conception of the identity-in-difference which ultimately transcends even itself, the same Indescribable Monism which holds both monism and pluralism within its bosom and which ultimately transcends both, which we find so beautifully and poetically developed in the Upaniṣads.' The learned professor thinks that 'there is no development from polytheism through monotheism to monism (as some scholars have observed), but only of monism from the first Mantra portion to the last Upaniṣadic portion.'[7]

Whether the Vedas teach monism throughout from the beginning of Saṁhitas to the last portion of the Upaniṣads, as stated by C. D. Sharma, or that monism is the latest stage of the monotheistic tendency which developed in the Vedas (from the earlier stage of naturalistic polytheism) and assumed a distinct form in the Upaniṣads, as generally observed by scholars it will have to be admitted that it is the Upaniṣads which are the fountain-head of the several forms of the monistic doctrine which later developed in the different Vedic and non-Vedic systems of thought. Passing through the various philosophical epochs in which the later systems flourished, it culminated in the absolute non-dualistic doctrine of Śaṅkarācārya. The Śaivas who existed side by side with the Vaidikas,

7. C. D. Sharma. *Indian Philosophy*, pp. 4–5.

borrowed from them the various doctrines including monistic ideas and incorporated the same in the Śaivāgamas from which Pratyabhijñā, the non-dualistic system of Śaiva philosophy developed in course of time.

Tarapada Chowdhury, tracing the various ideas of the later systems of Indian philosophy to the Vedic fount, concludes, in *History of Philosophy Eastern and Western*, 'The above survey (of the Vedic thought) brings out in bold relief the emergence of certain characteristic features of later Indian religious and philosophic thought.........Monism of the Vedānta with a hint at *Māyā* and liberation through knowledge ; ......the three *guṇas* and blind tendencies in matter of the Sāṁkhya ; control of the senses and concentration of the mind of the Yoga ; and right mental perspective and right speech leading to the Absolute of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika are also foreshadowed, besides consideration of the common problems of *Ātman*, *Manas*, the Absolute Reality, the emergence of the universe, *Karman*, rebirth and liberation. No wonder later thought should regard the Vedas as the fountain-head of all religion and philosophy.'[8]

Philosophic thought in the Upaniṣads: The Upanisads do not belong to one particular time and are not the product of a single current of thought. They contain diverse views held by seers belonging to different times. Though the ideas contained in them are not heterogeneous, yet on account of their obscurity and suggestiveness different views could be forced into them with the result that various doctrines evolved from them, Commentators have attempted to explain them variously and reconcile their different points of view in accordance with their particular beliefs. Thus to account for the evolution of creation various theories were set forth, such as *Brahma Pariṇāma-vāda* (the theory of transformation), *Brahma Vivarta-vāda* (the theory of manifestation) and so on. In this manner the diversity and complexity of views gave rise to different schools of philosophy. Even in the Vedas amid all complexity a certain principle of unity was asserting itself which had its growth later on in the Upaniṣads. For instance, in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* IX, Yājñavalkya says, 'These gods (Agni, Vāyu, and so on) are but manifestations of the highest, the immortal, incorporeal Brahman.' In the Vedas the vast order and movement of nature engages attention ; in the Upaniṣads depths of the inner world are explored. The Upaniṣads carry on the tendency of looking at *Brahman*, the cosmic principle, and *Ātman*, the physical principle, as identical. In other words the ideal of discovering the unity comprehending

8. See Radhakrishnan (Ed.), *History of Philosophy Eastern and Western*, Vol. I. pp. 52-53.

both the subject and the object are centred in them. On the basis of this central theme, the Upaniṣads show dissatisfaction with the materialist and vitalist theories of evolution for they are decisive about the principle that *Brahman* is the source of life in all that lives, the single thread binding the whole plurality into a single unity. Śaṅkara's principle of *Māyā* reconciles the appearance of diversity with the reality of the one, for it explains that the entire universe of change is a mere fabric of fancy.[9]

Deussen points out four different theories of creation occurring in the Upaniṣads, (1) That matter exists from eternity independently of God, which He fashions, but does not create, (2) That God creates the universe out of nothing, and the latter is independent of God, although it is His creation. (3) That God creates the universe by transforming Himself into it. (4) That God alone is real, and there is no creation at all. The last view is favoured by Śaṅkarācārya.[10]

The Upaniṣads are rightly regarded as the fountain-head of Indian philosophy. Dr. Radhakrishnan observes : 'Later systems of philosophy display an almost pathetic anxiety to accomodate their doctrines to the views of the Upaniṣads, even if they canot father them all on them.' The *Brahma-sūtras* claim to be the aphoristic summary of the Upaniṣads. The various Ācāryas of Vedānta—Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Mādhava and Vallabha who have commented on the sutras—have regarded the Upaniṣads as the sacred texts and have interpreted them so as to make them suit their theories.

According to the Upaniṣads, the individual self stands self-proved and is always immediately felt and known. One is absolutely certain about the existence of one's own self and there can be neither doubt nor denial regarding its existence. The self is called *Ātman* which means that which pervades all ; which is the subject and which knows, experiences and illuminates the objects ; and which remains immortal and always the same.[11] The *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* says that the senses are higher than the objects, the mind is higher than the senses, the intellect is higher than the mind, the subtle reason (*Mahat*) is higher than the intellect, the Unmanifest (*Avyakta*) is higher than the subtle reason, and the *Puruṣa* (*Ātman*) is higher than the Unmanifest, and there is nothing higher than the *Puruṣa* which is the ultimate end, the highest reality (*Kaṭha* II,

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9. See Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. I, Chap. IV.
10. *Ibid*., pp. 188-9 ; Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, p. 160.
11. यदाप्नोति यदादत्ते यच्चाति विषयानिह ।
यच्चास्य सन्ततो भावस्तस्मादात्मेति कीर्त्यते ॥
Śaṅkara's Commentary on *Kaṭha Up*. 2. 1. 1 ; See C. D. Sharma, *op. cit*., p. 11.

3-4). The word *Brahman* is derived from the root '*Bṛh*' which means to grow or to evolve. *Brahman* is that which spontaneously bursts forth as nature and soul. It is the ultimate cause of the universe. The same reality in its subjective aspect is called '*Atman*' and in its objective aspect '*Brahman*'. The two aspects of the reality as denoted by the two terms are identical. *Brahman* is described in two ways in the Upaniṣads. It is called immanent or cosmic, all-comprehensive, possessed of all qualities—*saguṇa* and *saviśeṣa*. It is called transcendent or acosmic, qualityless, indeterminate and indescribable,—*nirguṇa*, *nirviśeṣa* and *anirvacanīya*. The former is lower *Brahman* (*Apara Brahman*) or Īśvara, and the latter higher *Brahman* (*Para Brahman*) or the Absolute.

C. D. Sharma points out that the various doctrines of the later systems are all rooted in the Upaniṣads. The Jainism has taken its idealism and its doctrine of *Karma* from the Upaniṣads The Buddhism derives its idealism, monism, absolutism, the theory of momentariness of all worldly things, the theory of *Karma*, the distinction between the empirical and the absolute standpoints, and the theory that ignorance is the root cause of this cycle of births-and-deaths (*saṁsāra*) and that *Nirvāṇa* can be attained by right knowledge alone, from the Upaniṣads. The Sāṁkhya derives from them the doctrine of *Prakṛti* (from *Śvetāśvatara*), the theory of the three *Guṇas* (from the three colours in the *Chāndogya*), the doctrine of *Puruṣa*, the relation of mind, intellect and soul (from *Kaṭha*), the doctrine of *Liṅga-śarīra* (from *Praśna*). Yoga is rooted in *Śvetásvatara*. *Kaṭha* speaks of *Dhāraṇā* and *Muṇḍaka* speaks of the soul as a mere onlooker. *Īśa* preaches the combination of *Karma* and *Jñāna* ; Mīmāṁsa takes up *Karma* ; Vedānta takes up *Jñāna* ; some writers take up the combination of both.[12]

The Earlier philosophical systems : The Cārvāka System—In the epic period, i. e., between 600 B. C. and 200 A.D., we have the era of Cārvāka materialists, Buddhists and Jainas. The materialists existed before the Buddhists, since they are mentioned in the early Buddhist scriptures. Bṛhaspati, a heretical teacher, is regarded as the traditional founder of this school. The materialists are called Cārvākas after the name of Cārvāka who is said to be the chief disciple of Bṛhspati and, according to one view, was the founder of this school. They are known also as Lokāyatas or Laukāyatikas. *Lokāyata* may be etymologically analysed as "prevalent in the world" (*loka* and *āyata*). *Laukāyatika* occurs in Paṇini's *ukthagaṇa*.[13]

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12. C. D. Sharma. *op. cit.*, pp. 27-28 ; See R. D. Ranade, *A Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy*.
13. Cf. E. B. Cowell and A. E. Gough., *The Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha*, trans., p. 2, fn. 1.

Summarising the system in *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha*, Mādhavācārya says, 'In this school the four elements, earth etc., are the original principles; from these alone, when transformed into the body, intelligence is produced, just as the inebriating power is developed from the mixing of certain ingredients; and when these are destroyed, intelligence at once perishes also. They quote the Śruti for this (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* ii. 4, 12), "Springing forth from these elements, itself solid knowledge, it (soul) is destroyed when they are destroyed, – after death no intelligence remains."[14] Therefore the soul is only the body distinguished by the attribute of intelligence, since there is no evidence for any soul distinct from the body, as such cannot be proved, since this school holds that perception is the only source of knowledge and does not allow inference, etc.'[15]

Bṛhaspati's Sūtras on the system, which are said to have existed in the remote past, have unfortunately perished. No original work of this school is extant. The chief sources of information about this school are the references to it given in the works of other schools. Some of the important sūtras of Bṛhaspati which are quoted in the various philosophical writings are as follows: (1) *pṛthivyap-tejo-vāyur-iti tattvāni* (Earth, water, fire and air are the elements). (2) *tat-samudāye śarīrendriya-viṣaya-saṁjñā* (Bodies, senses and objects are the results of the different combinations of elements). (3) *kiṇvādibhyo mada-śakti-vad vijñānam* (Consciousness arises from matter like the intoxicating quality of wine arising from fermented yeast). (4) *caitanya-viśiṣṭaḥ kāyaḥ puruṣaḥ* (The soul is nothing but the conscious body). (5) *kāma evaikaḥ puruṣārthaḥ* (Enjoyment is the only end of human life). (6) *maraṇam-evāpavargaḥ* (Death alone is liberation). In the second act of the allegorical play called *Prabodha-candrodaya*, Kṛṣṇapati Miśra sums up the teachings of Materialism thus: '*Lokāyata* is the only Śāstra; perception is the only authority; earth, water, fire and air are the only elements; enjoyment is the only end of human existence; mind is only a product of matter. There is no other world; death means liberation.'[16]

That matter is the ultimate reality is implied from Bṛhaspati's dictum —"Out of matter came forth life." It consists of four kinds of primary elements, viz., earth, etc., and is eternal. Consciousness is the quality of the body. It originates from the material particles when they mysteriously

14. Śaṅkara, in his commentary, gives a very different interpretation, applying it to the cessation of individual existence when the knowledge of the Supreme is once attained. Cf. Śabara's commentary, *Jaimini Sūt.*, I. i. 5. Cowell and Gough, *op. cit.*, p. 3, fn. 2.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 2-3.

16. C. D. Sharma, *Indian Philosophy*, Banaras, 1952, pp. 40 ff

combine and become transformed into a human organism. By '*Mokṣa*' (liberation) the Cārvākas mean either independence or unimpeded power or dissolution of the body. The goal of life of man, according to the school, is enjoyment, gratification of his senses (*kāma evaika puruṣārthaḥ*). The Cārvākas believe Bṛhaspati to have said : 'There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in another world ; nor do the actions of the four castes, orders, etc., produce any real effect. ... While life remains let a man live happily. When once the body becomes ashes, how can it ever return again ?[17]

Sadānanda in his *Vedānta-sāra* mentions four different materialistic schools. One identifies the soul with the gross body (*Sthūla-śarīra*), another with the senses (*Indriyas*) ; another with vital breaths (*Prāṇas*) and the last with the mental organ (*Manas*) (*Vedānta-sāra*, pp. 26-27). All the schools agree in regarding the soul as a product of matter. As mentioned by the same author in his *Advaita-brahma-siddhi*, the theories of identification of "self" with the senses, vital breaths and with mind have been introduced in the Cārvāka System by its later followers. In Pratyabhijñā Śāstra, the four schools of materialists are repeatedly referred to and refuted. Severe and contemptuous criticism has been levelled against the Cārvāka doctrine by all the schools of Indian Philosophy.

Āchārya Vishva Bandhu points out, in his *The Vedas and Śāstras*, that 'the prevalence of materialistic notions dated from the earliest days of the growth of the Vedic literature as indicated in its several sections, notably, the Saṁhitās and the Upaniṣadas. Among the materialistic ideologies, the doctrine of Chance (*Yadṛcchā-vāda*) denied the presence of any orderly scheme in the universe, and the doctrine of Naturalism (*Svabhāva-vāda*) traced all phenomena to their intrinsic nature, independently of any other external influence which according to it there was none. These and other kindred schools of which there was a great number, were generically called *Lokāyatas* because they refused to extend their faith to anything else beyond this visible world (*loka*) and this death-bound existence. They did not believe in any law of retribution (*Karma-vāda*) functioning beyond the pyre nor had they any faith in a previous birth... Accordingly, it is quite understandable why the people of *Lokāyata* persuasion came to be referred to as *Nāstikas* in the Gṛhya-sūtras and the Dharma-sūtras as well as in the Buddhist and the Jain traditions.' The term *nāstika* is the opposite of *āstika* which latter is defined by Pāṇinī and his commentator

17. See *Ibid.*; also Cowell and Gough, *op. cit.* pp. 10-1 ; Cf. Radhakrishnan (Ed.), *History of Philosophy Eastern and Western*, vol. I, pp. 133 ff.

Patañjali as 'one who believed (*mati*) in the existence (*asti*) of the other world (*paraloka*) and, of course, in the operation of the *Law of Karma* as controlling the intercourse between the two worlds.[18]

The importance of the Cārvāka philosophy has been very well pointed out by Dakshinaranjan Bhattacharya, in *History of Philosophy Eastern and Western*, as follows: 'The voice of the Cārvākas was the voice of revolt—of protest against the age-long superstitions and prejudices that had denied freedom of thought. It was an invitation for enjoying the beauties of life unperturbed by the ideas of heaven, hell and God. In the domain of Philosophy, the questions and doubts raised by the Cārvākas set problems for all the other schools, made them think more carefully and saved them from much of dogmatism. Every philosopher in India had to satisfy the Cārvākas before establishing his own view. Thus the contribution of this School to the development of Indian philosophy is really very great'.[19]

C. Kunhan Raja contends that it is the Cārvākas who continue the thought pattern of the Veda, and it is the later systems of philosophy that have deviated from it. He says, in certain points, the Cārvāka system follows the Veda, and their doctrines are in conformity with modern thought. The world is a good world; man is a good man. The remedy for suffering is available in the world itself. There is no need to escape from this world and seek real happiness elsewhere.[20] Kewal Krishan Mittal remarks, it appears that the Cārvākas wished to live in an ordered society, as they were ready to follow the commands of a king and tried to avoid superstitions and belief in the authority of a supernatural kind (the Vedas). It would, therefore, follow that the school was a positive and rationalistic movement.[21]

The Jaina Philosophy: The Jainas were the followers of Vardhamāna who lived in the 6th century B.C. and was a contemporary of the Buddha. He practised extreme asceticism by which he conquered (*ji*) his carnal desires and passions and came to be known as *Jina* (the conqueror) and *Mahāvīra* (the great hero). According to the Jaina tradition, their faith has come down from a remote antiquity through twenty-four Tīrthaṅkaras; Mahāvīra (c. 599—527 B.C.) was the twenty-

18. Āchārya Vishva Bandhu, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-32.
19. *History of Philosophy Eastern and western*, op. cit., p. 133.
20. *Prācī-Jyoti, Digest of Indological Studies*, Vol. I. Part i, pp. 168-9. See *Philosophical Quarterly* (Amalner Maharashtra), Vol. XXXVI, No. 1, pp. 15-31.
21. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, Part i, pp. 225-6. See *Bulletin of the Institute of Post-Graduate* (Evening) *Studies*, Delhi, 1963, pp. 51-9.

fourth and last Tīrthaṅkara (prophet) of this faith, his predecessor Pārśvanātha (c. 776 B.C., death) the twenty-third and Ṛṣabha-deva the first and the chief prophet. When Mahāvīra joined that order of monks, they were known as the *Nigganṭhas* indicating 'the absence of their ties (*granthas*) with the world'. The Jaina tradition mentions as many as three hundred and sixty-three parallel sects that were current at that remarkable period in Indian history.[22]

The Jainas postulate what is called *Anekānta-vāda*, the doctrine of diversity and complexity of reality and looking at it from many points of view. They hold that the ultimate reality is complex in structure and must be examined from various points of view in order to comprehend its nature. A partial and incomplete view of reality is condemned by them as an inadequate description of reality, since it emphasises only one particular aspect (*ekānta*) to the exclusion of the other characteristics which are not to be altogether neglected. Such a one-sided view is, therefore, called *Ekāntavāda*. Thus the Jainas call, for instance, the view point of Advaita-Vadānta School as *Brahma-ekānta-vāda*, and that of a Buddhist School of thought as *Kṣaṇika-ekānta-vāda*, and so on.[23]

Anekānta-vāda is upheld by another well known Jaina theory called *Syād-vāda* which, with the help of its seven propositions (*saptabhaṅgī-nyāya*), proceeds to show that it is not possible to determine, rigidly, whether or not an object exists (*asti*), it does not exist (*nāsti*), it is expressible (*vaktavya*) or it is inexpressible (*avaktavya*). *Asti-nāsti-vāda* (another name for *Syād-vāda*), according to which we can have two contradictory propositions relating to the same object, has perplexed many a non-jaina thinker. Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānuja criticise the theory on the ground of the impossibility of predication of contradictory attributes of *asti* and *nāsti*—'is' and 'is not'—to the same reality. The underlying implication of this logical principle seems not to have been realized by them. What this Jaina doctrine implies is that an object can be described 'from one point of view' that it exists and 'from another point of view' that it does not. As a matter of fact, both *Anekānta-vāda* and *Syād-vāda* are the two aspects of the same theory—realistic and relativistic pluralism. *Anekānta-vāda* says that reality has innumerable characteristics, while *Syād-vāda* means that we can know only some aspects of reality and, therefore, all our judgements are necessarily relative.[24]

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22. Āchārya Vishva Bandhu, *op. cit.*, p. 25-6.

23. Radhakrishnan (Ed.), *History of Philosophy Eastern and Western*, I, pp, 139-40.

24. See *Ibid.*, p. 142 and C. D. Sharma, *Indian Philosophy*, p. 55.

According to *Anekānta-vāda* theory, reality is described to be permanence in the midst of change, identity in the midst of diversity and unity in the midst of multiplicity. The definition of reality according to this view is a combination of threefold nature, appearance, disappearance and permanence. Umāswāmin says : '*Utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya-lakṣaṇam sat*', i.e., reality is characterised by origination, decay and permanence (*Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*). Every object in nature has this threefold aspect. It is most manifest in the organic world. The growth of a plant is a typical example of this threefold nature. The tree begins its life in a seed. If the seed remains permanent as a seed and does not change and decay, the plant will lose its vitality to grow and will soon become dead. But the plant must maintain also the underlying identity throughout its process of growth. Jaina thinkers noticed this important nature of reality and emphasized its complex nature as a permanence in the midst of appearance and disappearance.[25]

In Jaina system, matter (*Pudgala*) and spirit (*Jīva*) are regarded as separate and independent realities. There are infinite material atoms and infinite individual souls which are all separately and independently real. Each atom and each soul possesses innumerable aspects of its own (*ananta-dharmakam vastu*, *ananta-dharmātmakam eva tattvam*).[26] Every object possesses innumerable positive and negative characteristics.

All objects in the world of reality fall in two classes—*cetana* and *a-cetana*—conscious objects and non-conscious objects, called also *jīvas* and *a-jīvas*—the living and the non-living. *A-jīvas* or unconscious things are further divided into different groups. The most important of these is *pudgala dravya* which corresponds to matter. *Pudgala* means that which is liable to integration and disintegration (*pūrayanti galanti ca*).[27] *Pudgalas* or material objects are constituted of *paramāṇus* or atoms. The atoms of different elements build up physical objects which are, therefore, aggregates (*Skandhas*). The whole physical world is itself a *Mahā-skandha*, mighty aggregate. Besides *pudgala* and *ākāśa*, matter and space, there are two other *dravyas*, *dharma* and *adharma* which are here the principles of motion and rest respectively. The reality of *Kāla* (time) is also maintained in the system.

Jīvas are of various kinds, but they are chiefly divided into two major groups, those still in bondage (*saṁsārins*) and those that have been liberated (*muktas*). The Jaina thinkers made an elaborate study of

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25. Radhakrishnan (Ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 140.
26. See C. D. Sharma, *op. cit.*, p. 54, fn., *Anyayoga-vyavacchedikā*, 22, quoted.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 77.

these living organisms (*jīvas*). These are classed into various groups according to the number of sense-organs present in the organism. The lowest of these organisms are plants which are one-sensed (*ekendriyas*), i.e., which are endowed with one sense only, namely touch. The next higher and higher organisms are two-sensed (*dvīndriyas*), three-sensed (*trīndriyas*), and *four-sensed* (*caturindriyas*), i.e., those constituting various types of insects, and above all these the five-sensed (*pañcendriyas*), i.e., the animals possessing five senses, touch, taste, smell, vision and hearing. Organisms possessing five-senses with the addition of mind form a class of beings which include, besides human beings, *devas* (gods) and *nārakas* (inhabitants of hell).[28] The sizes of the *Jīvas* change according to the dimensions of the bodies to be occupied by them for the time being. Their intelligence (*caitanya*) may be obscured by extrinsic causes, but is never destroyed.[29]

Consciousness is regarded as the essence of the soul (*cetana-lakṣaṇo jīvaḥ*). The degrees of consciousness vary in different souls from the highest to the lowest, according to the obstacles of *Karma*. Purest consciousness is found in the emancipated souls which have no shred of *karma*. *Jīva* is generally the same as *Ātman* or *Puruṣa* in other schools, and it is held as eternal. As stated in *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha* of Mādhavācārya, Jaina thinkers controvert the momentary existence of soul held by a school of Buddhists. They say: 'If no continuing soul is accepted, then even the arrangement of the means for attaining worldly fruit in this life will be useless. But surely this can never be imagined as possible—that one should act and another reap the consequences! Therefore as this conviction, "I who previously did the deed, am the person who now reap its consequences", establishes undoubtedly the existence of a continuing soul, which remains constant through the previous and the subsequent period, the discriminating Jain Arhats reject as untenable the doctrine of momentary existence, i.e., an existence which lasts only an instant, and has no previous or subsequent part.'[30]

The theory of *Karma* with transmigration (*punar-janma*) as its concomitant is the key-note of the Jaina system. *Karma* is the link which unites the soul to the body. The human soul by its practice of penance (*tapas*) and *yoga* is able to become, step by step, purer and purer, till it achieves

28. See Radhakrishnan (Ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 143-5.
29. Achārya Vishva Bandhu, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
30. Cowel and Gough, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

spiritual glory and perfection. The Jaina ethics and ascetic code are regarded as the logical consequence of the theory of *Karma*.[31]

Buddhist Philosophy: In Buddha's time (the sixth century B.C.) a congeries of conflicting theories prevailed in India. As stated by Dr. Radhakrishnan 'It was an age of speculative chaos, full of inconsistent theologies and vague wranglings'. The sixty-two theories prevalent at that time are mentioned in the Buddhist work *Brahmajālasutta*. 'Discussions were ripe about the finiteness or infiniteness, or neither or both, of the world and the Self, and distinction of truth and appearance, the reality of a world beyond, the continuance of the soul after death and the freedom of the will.[32] Dasgupta writes, 'There were thus at least three currents of thought: firstly (a blind faith in) the sacrificial *Karma* by......which any person could attain anything he desired; secondly the Upaniṣad teaching that the Brahman, the Self, is the ultimate reality and being, and all else but name and form which pass away but do not abide. That which permanently abides without change is the real and true, and this is Self. Thirdly the nihilistic conceptions that there is no law, no abiding reality, that everything comes into being by a fortuitous concourse of circumstances or by some unknown fate......There were (also) the yoga practices prevalent in the country......'[33] It was at this juncture that Buddha (c. 567–487 B.C.) was born who erected a new superstructure of thought on altogether original lines opening up a new avenue of philosophy for all posterity to come.

During those days there were two large sects in northern India, the Brāhmaṇas and Sāmanas. The complexity of the growing sacrificial cult was responsible for the division among Vaidikas into the two sects. Both the Brāhmaṇa and Sāmana sects had a number of teachers with numerous followers and adherents around them. Both these sects were the followers of different systems of thought and so they were called disputants. Buddha himself was a Sāmana but he agreed with neither of the philosophical systems. His view was quite different from those of either of these sects. He was against any sort of worship or offering. He renounced the world at the age of the thirty-two and devoted himself to austerities and penance and thus discovered a new system of religious thought (*dharma*), known as Buddhism. Dr. Radhakrishnan states that Buddha did not break away completely from the spiritual ideas of his age and country. Buddha himself admits that the *dharma* which he discovered

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31. Āchārya Vishva Bandhu, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
32. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 352-3; see fn. 2 on p. 353.
33. Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 78-80.

by an effort of self-culture is the ancient way, the Aryan path, the eternal *dharma*.[34]

As regards the purpose of Buddha's quest for truth, Maulana Azad remarks, in his Introduction to *History of Philosophy Eastern and Western*, '.....it is easier to see Buddha in the role of a philosopher than in that of prophet (to preach religion). He started on his enquiries in order to solve the problem of life, not to search for the existence of God. Similarly, his quest ended with a solution of that problem and did not concern itself with either the nature or the existence of God. He broke away completely from that religious life of India which believed in innumerable gods and godesses. For him the goal of human endeavour is to find a solution of the problem of life......'[35]

The Buddha taught the Four Noble Truths (*Ārya-satya*), the Noble Eightfold Path (*Aṣṭa-mārga*) and the doctrine of Dependent Origination (*Pratītyasamutpāda*). From his spiritual experience, Buddha became convinced of the four noble truths, that there is suffering (*duḥkha*), that there is a cause of suffering (*duḥkha-samudaya*), that suffering can be suppressed (*duḥkha-nirodha*), and that there is a way to suppress suffering (*duḥkha-nirodha-mārga*). The last is the noble eight-fold path, a practical ethical path by following which suffering and misery can be removed for good.[36] The doctrine of Dependent Origination (*Pratîtyasamutpāda*) is the foundation of all the teachings of the Buddha. It is contained in the second noble truth which gives us the cause of suffering, and in the third noble truth which shows that suffering can be suppressed. Suffering is *Saṁsāra* (cycle of births and deaths); cessation of suffering is *Nirvāṇa*. Troubled by the sight of disease, old age and death, Buddha left his home to find a solution of the misery of earthly life. *Pratītyasamutpāda* is the solution which he found. Why do we suffer misery and pain ? Why do we suffer old age and death (*jarā-maraṇa*) ? Because we are born (*jāti*). Why are we born ? Because there is previous existance or becoming (*bhava*).[37] Why should there be previous existance

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34. See Vimla Charan Law, *History of Pali Literature*, I and II ; Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 360-1.

35. Radhakrishnan (Ed.), *History of Philosophy Eastern and Western*, I, Introduction, p. 17.

36. 'It consists of right faith (*samyag dṛṣṭi*), right resolve (*saṅkalpa*), right speech (*vāk*), right action (*Karmānta*). right living (*ājīva*), right effort (*vyāyāma*), right thought (*smṛti*) and right concentration (*samādhi*).' C. D. Sharma, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

37. From clinging to existence comes becoming or *bhava*, which Candrakirti interprets as the *karma* which brings about rebirth (*punarbhava-janakaṁ karma*, *Mādhyamikā* Vṛtti).' Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 415.

or becoming ? Because we have attachment (cling to the objects of the world) (*upādāna*). Why do we have this attachment ? Because we have desire (craving) for sense-enjoyment ((*tṛṣṇā*). Why do we have this desire for sense-enjoyment ? Because of sensation or feeling (*vedanā*). Why do we have this sensation or feeling ? Because of sense-object-contact (*sparśa*). Why do we have this sense-object-contact ? Because of the six fields (provinces) of contact, i.e., sense-organs (the sixth sense being the mind) (*ṣaḍāyatana*). Why do we have the six fields of contact or sense organs ? Because of the name and form, i.e., psycho-physical organism—mind and body (*nāma-rūpa*). Why do we have this mind and body ? Because of the initial consciousness of the embryo (*vijñāna*). Why do we have this consciousness ? Because of conformations or impressions of *karmas* (actions) (*saṁskāra)*. Why do we have these impressions ? Because of ignorance (*avidyā*). Thus, the complete chain of causation is as follows :— *Avidyā* (ignorance) produces *saṁskāra* (impressions), *saṁskara vijñāna* (consciousness), *vijñāna nāmarūpa* (mind and body), *nāmarūpa ṣaḍāyatna* (the abode of the six fields of contact), *ṣaḍāyatana sparśa* (sense-object-contact), *sparśa vedanā* (sensation), *vedanā tṛṣṇā* (desire for sense-enjoyment), *tṛṣṇā upādāna* (attachment), *upādāna bhava* (becoming or previous existence), *bhava jāti* (birth), *jāti jarā-maraṇa* (decay and death). Hence ignorance is the root cause of suffering. The whole scheme rests on *avidyā*, but we are not told how exactly this *avidyā* arises. The beginning of the circuit is not apparent.[38]

The Doctrine of Dependent Origination is the central teaching of the Buddha ; his other teachings are the corollaries of the same. The theory of rebirth is plainly asserted in the doctrine. The theory was known in India from the age of the Upaniṣads. There has seldom been before or after Buddha any serious attempt to prove or disprove this theory. All schools of philosophy except the Cārvākas believed in it. The Buddha also accepts it as a fact and does not criticise it. The doctrine of *Pratītyasamutpāda* states that there is rebirth (*jāti*) because of previous existence or becoming (*bhava*), i.e., this life presupposes works (*karma*) of another existence, the previous one. This life, therefore, comes only as one

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38. 'Individuality born of *avidyā* is the crux of all life, the original sin of all existence....... The mataphysical problem of the rise of ignorance seems to be evaded.' 'Avidya, then, is the *Śakti* or the force of the absolute which brings about the procession of individual existence from out of the universal.' Radhakrishnan. *op. cit.*, pp. 416-7. See C. D. Sharma, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-1 ; Dasgupta, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-6 ; Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, pp. 410-1.

which had an infinite number of lives before, and which, except in the case of a few emancipated ones, would have an infinite number of them in the future. This is what people believed and the Buddha also. From the chain of causation we find that while *bhava*, i.e., *karmas* (works) of a previous existence, produces the rebirth, *nāmarūpa* (mind and body) is produced by *vijñāna* (consciousness). This *vijñāna* is said to descend in the womb of the mother and produces the five *skandhas* as *nāmarūpa*, out of which the six senses are specialized. *Vijñāna* probably means the principle or germ of consciousness in the womb of the mother upholding the five elements of the new body there. It is the product of the impressions of the past *karmas* (*saṁskāra*) of the dying man and of his past consciousness too. It is believed by the Buddhists that the last thoughts of the dying man determine the nature of his next birth. Besides the theory of rebirth, the theory of *Karma*, the theory of momentariness (*Kṣaṇabhaṅga-vāda*), the theory of causal efficiency (*Artha-kriyā-kāritva*), and so on, are all the corollaries of the doctrine of Dependent Origination.[39]

Buddha formulated a wonderful philosophy of dynamism. 'He reduces substances, souls, monads and things to forces, movements sequences and processes, and adopts a dynamic conception of reality. Life is nothing but a series of manifestations of becomings and extinctions (*Pātubhāvo-uppādo*). It is a stream of becoming.' Buddha indicates that this world is the ceaseless flux of becoming (*Mahāvagga*, i. 121).[40] The theory of *Skandhas* is perhaps developed out of the *nāmarūpa* of the Upaniṣads according to which these constitute the phenomenal self. Buddha was silent about the question of the 'soul'. From this, Nāgasena drew his negative inference that 'there is no soul'. The word self (soul) is dropped altogether, and only states of self are spoken of. The self is a stream of ideas. It is a generic idea standing for a collection of mental states. It is a sum total of conscious contents. Buddha is alleged to have said that what people speak to be the soul is really only the five *Skandhas* together or any one of them, for the *Skandhas* are aggregates of bodily and psychical states which are immediate with us. According to the early Pāli scriptures we do not find anywhere such a permanent essence, any constant life in our changing experiences. Buddha taught that all beings are free from all eternity abiding in *Nirvāṇa*. It is by the touch of ignorance (*Avidyā*) that this dynamic reality assumes all the phenomenal forms of existence.

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39. C. D. Sharma, *op. cit.*, p. 92 : Dasgupta, *op. cit.*, pp. 86-91.
40. Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 367–8.

But to the question 'What causes the ignorance', the answer given is that in the all-conserving mind (*Ālaya-vijñāna*) ignorance manifests itself.[41]

It is interesting to note that *Paccabhiññā* (the Pali form of *Pratyabhijñā*) as a special feature of knowledge, was known to the Buddhist philosophers as early as the fifth century B.C.[42] It will also interest the reader to know that all things comprising minds and bodies and various objects of the world (included in *nāmarūpa*) are so called because 'they manifest' (or, they are manifested) In the Buddhist scripture, *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, the Buddha says, 'O Bhikkhus, it is called *rūpam* because it manifests (*rūpyati*) ; how does it manifest ? It manifests as cold, and as heat, as hunger and as thirst ; it manifests as the touch of gnats, mosquitoes, wind, the sun and the snake ; it manifests, therefore it is called *rūpa*.' (*Saṁyutta Nikāya*, III. 86).[43] This is more or less what *Ābhāsavāda* in Pratyabhijñā implies. About the conception of *Nirvāṇa*, we find that it does not mean, according to Buddhism, communion or blessed fellowship with God 'for that is only a perpetuation of the desire for life'. According to Buddha, *Nirvāṇa* is the goal of perfection unconceivable by us. It is not the abyss of annihilation. It is getting back into the stream of being and resuming the uninterrupted flow. *Nirvāṇa* is not a lapse into a void, but only a negation of the flux and positive return of the self to itself. God's existence is denied 'for a God who can neither adapt nor alter, neither produce nor modify, is no God at all.' So-called gods, Indra, Varuṇa, etc., are said to be unnecessary. 'Even they are involved in the round of births and cannot interfere with the solemn law of moral causation'. The above ideas represent the teachings of the Buddha himself.[44]

Different Buddhist Schools : After Buddha's death Buddhists were divided into many sects. Hīnayānists and Mahāyānists are two most prominant divisions. *Hīnayāna* (little vessel) represents the primitive Buddhism. It emphasises liberation for and by the individual himself. Its goal is Arhat-hood or the state of the ideal saint who obtains personal salvation (*Nirvāṇa*), which is regarded as the extinction of all misery. *Mahāyāna* (great vessel) is that 'which can accomodate a much larger number of people and can safely and securely take them to the shore of

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41. See Dasgupta, *op, cit.*, pp. 93-5 ; Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, 399, 390-2, 395.
42. Dasgupta, *op. cit.*, p. 98 ; see *Supra* p. 107.
43. *Ibid.*, pp. 94-5.
44. Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, 386, 447-50 ; 453-4 ;
See *Dialogues of Buddha*, i. pp. 280 ff., 302 ; *Ibid.*, p. 454 fn. 3.

Nirvāṇa from the troubled waters of the ocean of *Saṁsāra*'. It dubbs the earlier Buddhism as *Hīnayāna*, the small vessel.[45] Hīnayānists followed the earlier doctrines belonging to the period between the rise of Buddhism and the time of Ashoka, the chief feature of which is that all things are momentary (*kṣaṇika*). The Mahāyānists developed during the period from Ashoka to Kanishka. While the *Hīnayāna* school looks upon the soul as a complex of transitory elements of *Skandhas*, the *Mahāyāna* holds that even these elements are not real. The world of experience is phenomenal, but not real. *Mahāyāna* Buddhists liken the universe to *Māyā*, a mirage or a flash of lightening.

A number of schools of Buddhist thought arose before the first century B.C. most of which are not referred to by the later Hindu thinkers. According to them there are four chief Buddhist schools, of which two belong to the *Hīnayāna* and two to the *Mahāyāna*. The *Hīnayāna* schools are the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, and the *Mahāyāna* schools the Yogācāras and the Mādhyamikas. Initially *Hīnayāna* Buddhism gave rise to several schools out of which *Sthaviravāda* (*Theravāda* in Pāli), i.e., 'the Doctrine of Elders', was the most important school. The main branch of the *Theravāda* school was from the second century downwards known as the *Hetuvāda* or *Sarvāstivāda* (*Hīnayāna* pluralistic realism) which bifurcated into the schools of Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas. The *Mahāyāna* School of Yogācāras gave rise to *Vijñānavāda* (Idealism) and that of Mādhyamikas to *Śūnyavāda*. The Mādhyamikas are sometimes called Sarvavaināśikas or nihilists. The four schools, the Vaibhāṣikas, the Sautrāntikas, the Vijñānavādins and the Śūnyavādins, are quite popular and are repeatedly referred to in the Pratyabhijñā Śāstra. As regards the dates of emergence of these Buddhist schools, Dr. Radhakrishnan writes, 'The tendencies of the speculative systems of Buddhism, though they were long in existence, were formulated and codified only after the time of Kanishka ...... We shall not be far wrong if we assign them to the second century A.D., though some of the more distinguished exponents of this or that school may belong to a later era. In the third century after Buddha's death the Vaibhāṣikas came into prominence, and the Sautrāntikas in the fourth century after his death. The Mādhyamikas, according to Āryadeva, came into existence five hundred years after Buddha's death. Asaṅga, the founder of the Yogācāra school, is at least as late as the third century A.D. Buddhist philosophic thought reached its most vigorous life in the fifth, sixth and seventh centuries.'[46]

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45. C. D. Sharma, *op. cit.*, p. 93.
46. Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, pp. 612-3 ; See Dasgupta, *op. cit.*, pp. 112 ff.

Sarvāstivāda (*Hīnayāna* Pluralistic Realism) which gave rise to the two schools of the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, maintains the existence of all things, physical as well as mental. It believes that there is self-existent universe actual in space and time, where mind holds a place on equal terms with other finite things. It denies outright the existence of God whose place is taken by the Buddha and the theory of *Karma*. The so-called soul is reduced to a series of fleeting ideas. The matter is nothing more than a series of momentary atoms of earth, water, fire and air. Everything is momentary. This doctrine is known as *Kṣaṇikavāda* or *Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda*, i.e., the theory of momentariness. Sometimes it is also called *Santānavāda* or the theory of flux or ceaseless flow. It is applicable to mind and matter alike for both are momentary. Sometimes it is also referred to as *Saṅghātavāda* or the theory of aggregates which means that the so-called 'soul' is only an aggregate of the five fleeting *Skandhas*, and the so-called 'matter' only an aggregate of the momentary atoms. Two classical similies are given to illustrate the doctrine of momentariness, that of the stream of a river and that of the flame of a lamp. A river is only a continuous flow of different waters. 'You cannot bathe twice into the same river,' said Heraclitus. A flame of a candle is changing every moment and yet it seems to us as if we have been perceiving the same flame all the while. So all our bodies, our ideas, emotions, etc., all external objects around us are being destroyed every moment and new ones are being generated every moment (as in the case of river water or candle flame), but so long as the objects of the succeeding moments are similar to those of the preceeding moments, it appears to us that things have remained the same and no destruction has taken place.[47]

The doctrines of the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, the two branches of the *Sarvāstivāda* school, are in brief as follows :—The Vaibhāṣikas are so called because they consider the language of the other schools to be absurd, *viruddhābhāsa*, (*Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha*), or because they attached themselves to the *Vibhāṣa* or the commentary on the *Abhidharma*, which only they acknowledged. They hold experience as the means of witnessing the nature of things. The world is open to perception. Without perception there can be no inference. The objects we see cease to exist when they are not perceived. They have but a brief duration like a lightening flash. The atoms are immediately separated and their aggregation is but instantaneous.[48] As regards the Sautrāntikas,

47. C. D. Sharms, *op. cit.*, pp. 94-97,

48. Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, pp. 613 ff.

Madhvācārya says in his *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha*, 'The name *Sautrāntika* arose from the fact that the venerated Buddha said to some of his disciples, who asked what was the ultimate purport (*anta*) of the aphorism (*sūtra*), be Sautrāntikas'. They are, therefore, so called as they take their stand on the sūtras, i.e., '*Sūtta Piṭaka*....to the rejection cf the two other Piṭakas'. The Sautrāntikas admit the extra-mental existence of the phenomenal world. Only we do not hava a direct perception of it. We have mental presentations through which we infer the existence of external objects. They must exist because there cannot be perception without an object of perception. Mādhavācārya describes, in his *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha*, the arguments by which the Sautrāntikas infer the existence of an external world : 'Cognition must ultimately have some object since it is manifested in duality......If the object proved were only a form of cognition, it should manifest itself as such, and not as an external object'. While holding that there can be no perceptual knowledge of objects without external objects, the Sautrāntikas contend that these outer objects are only momentary.[49] Both the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas are also khown as Bāhyārthavādins since they maintain the reality of the external as well as the internal world.

Śūnyavāda and *Vijñānavāda* are the two most popular *Mahāyāna* schools of Buddhism. Śūnyavādins are also known as Mādhyamikas because they adhere to the Middle Path as realized by Buddha during his enlightenment. Vijñānavādins are also known as the Yogācāras because they emphasise the importance of Yoga for the realization of the absolute truth (*bodhi*). In fact *Sūnyavāda* originated from the school of Mādhyamikas and Vijñānavāda from that of Yogācāras. Sometimes both Śūnyavādins and Vijñānavādins call themselves as Mādhyamikas. Asaṅga is generally believed to be the founder of *Vijñānavāda* school, although some other able teachers of the school flourished before him. *Vijñānavāda* holds consciousness (*bodhi*, *vijñāna*) to be the only reality. It contends that thought is self-creative and all-producing. It is the ultimate principle, and even the ultimate type and form of reality. While *Yogācāra* deals with the practical side of the philosophy, *Vijñānavāda* brings out its speculative features. According to the latter everything is the modification of *Vijñāna* (consciousness). The characteristic features of the school are that the *Ālayavijñāna* is immanent in all beings, that there are three kinds of knowledge, illusory, relative and absolute, and that the objective world and the subjective ego are only

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49. *Ibid.*, 619 ff.; Dasgupta, *op. cit.*, pp. 151 ff.

manifestations of the *Ālaya*. Consciousness is divided into individual consciousness (*Pravṛtti-vijñāna*) and absolute consciousness (*Ālaya-vijñāna*). *Ālaya-vijñāna* is generally believed to be an ever-changing stream of consciousness. But in *Laṅkāvatāra* it is said to be a permanent, immortal and never-changing store-house of consciousness which underlies the apparent subject-object-duality. The true metaphysical absolute of the *Yogacāra* school is *Tathatā*. "This is the transcendental truth of everything and is termed *Tathatā*, because its essential nature is real and eternal." This *Tathatā* (pure being) is also called *Ālaya-vijñāna* in its dynamic aspect. The *Ālaya-vijñāna* is a foundational fact of reality revealing itself in individual minds and things. It is not a state, but a process. It is spirituality, *vijñāna* objectifying itself or expressing itself in the object world. The *Ālaya* is also called the *Tathāgata-garbha* or the womb of the *Tathāgata*, pregnant with all possibilities and throbbing with seeds of all *vijñānas*. The subject and the object are only modifications of the *Ālaya* which itself is only a modification of pure consciousness. Hence it is established that pure consciousness is the only reality. This conception of *Vijñāna* comes, in fact, very near to that of Vedāntic *Brahman*.[50]

The Mādhyamika philosophy is a negative critical system. The *Śūnyavāda* of this school denies reality, alike, to being and non-being. It holds that every thing is void, nothing is real. 'Things can only be indicated as mere appearances one after another for they have no essence of true nature. They are merely the appearances of *Māyā*, illusion'. This is only one aspect of what *Śunyavāda* implies. Unfortunately the word *Śūnya*, as used by the Mādhyamikas, has been gravely misunderstood. It does not mean only 'nothing' or an 'empty void' or a 'negative abyss'. *Śūnya* essentially means indescribable (*avācya* or *anabhilāpya*), because it is beyond the four categories of intellect (*catuṣkoṭi-vinirmukta*). It is Reality (called *Tathatā*) which ultimately transcends existence, non-existence, both and neither. That Reality is indescribable and beyond all the categories of intellect and, therefore, it can be called neither *Śūnya* (void) nor *Asūnya* (not void), nor both nor neither, but in order to indicate it, it is called *Śūnya* (void).[51] This is the primary idea that is developed in *Śūnyavāda*. Everything is *Śūnya*—appearances are *Svabhāva-śūnya*

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50. Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, pp. 624 ff.; Dasgupta, *op. cit.*, pp. 145 ff.; C. D. Sharma, *op. cit.*, pp. 143 ff.

51. शून्यं इति न वक्तव्यं अशून्यं इति वा भवेत् ।
उभयं नोभयं चेति प्रज्ञप्त्यर्थं तु कथ्यते ॥
quoted, Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 663, fn. 2.

or devoid of ultimate reality and Reality is *Prapañca-śūnya* or devoid of plurality. Thus *Śūnya* is used in a double sense. It means the relative as well as the absolute. It means relativity as well as Reality. It means *Saṁsāra* as well as *Nirvāṇa*. Nāgārjuna explains this double aspect of *Śūnyatā*. In the realm of the phenomenal it means *svabhāva-śūnyatā* or *nissvabhāvatā*, i.e., appearances are devoid of ultimate reality. *Śūnyatā*, in its second aspect, is Reality itself wherein all plurality is merged, all categories of intellect are reconciled. We are not nihilists, says Candrakīrti, because our doctrine transcends both affirmation and negation. It is the *Madhyama-mārga* or the Midlle Path between affirmation and negation—a path which ultimately transcends both. It does not deny empirical reality to phenomena, it says that they are ultimately unreal. Śūnyavādins say, we deny only the ultimate reality, not the relative existence, of phenomena Thus (1) referring to the absolute reality, *Śūnyatā* is a positive principle, and (2) applied to the world of experience, Śūnyata means the ever-changing state of the phenomenal world. From the one point of view, the absolute is nothing (*Śūnyam tattvam*). We call it *Śūnyam*, since no category used in relation to the conditions of the world is adequate to it. To call it being is wrong, because only concrete things are. To call it non-being is equally wrong, (*tatra astitā vā nāstitā vā na vidyate nopalabhyate*). From the second point of view, 'Śūnya does not mean absolute non-being but only relative being. Even the illusory structure cannot be sustained in the atmosphere of a void. All negation depends on a hidden affirmation. Absolute negation is impossible. In view of this specific thought implied in *Śunyavāda*, it is not correct to call it Nihilism.[52]

Dr. Radhakrishnan sums up the points of view of the above mentioned four Buddhist schools of thought as follows : 'The Vaibhāṣikas started with a dualistic metaphysics, and looked upon knowledge as a direct awareness of objects The Sautrāntikas made ideas the media through which reality is apprehended, and thus raised a screen between mind and things. The Yogācāras quite consistently abolished the things behind the images, and reduced all experience to a series of ideas in their mind. The Mādhyamikas, in a more daring and logical manner, dissolved mind also into a mere idea, and left us with loose units of ideas and perceptions about which we can say nothing definite.

'From the metaphysical point of view, the two-substance theory of the Vaibhāṣikas becomes loaded on the side of mind when we come to the

52. Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, pp. 643 ff.. 662 ff. ; Dasgupta, *op. cit.*, 138 ff.

Sautrāntikas. The Yogācāras dropped the outer world and put mind (*vijñāna*) in the centre of things and the Mādhyamikas affirmed that neither individual selves nor material objects could be held to be ultimately real : the real is the absolute (*Sūnya*). While the Yogācāras confidently apply the concept of self-consciousness to the absolute, the Mādhyamikas consider self as well as not-self to be equally unreal. Personality is not ultimate'.[53]

It will be observed, from a contrast of Utpaladeva's philosophy given in the foregoing chapters with the Buddhist philosophy summarised in the present chapter, that the Pratyabhijñā version of Indian philosophy is a reorientation of Buddhist philosophy, particularly the doctrines of *Vijñāna-vāda* and *Śūnyavāda*. The same is the case also with the Advaita Vedānta philosophy of Śaṅkarācārya. Buddhist philosophy itself is a development of Upaniṣadic doctrines with an emphasis on the transitoriness of life and the principles of ethics. Radhakrishnan writes : 'To develop his theory Buddha had only to rid the Upaniṣads of their inconsistent compromises with Vedic polytheism and religion, set aside the transcendental aspect as being indemonstrable to thought and unnecessary to morals, and emphasise the ethical universalism of the Upaniṣads.'[54] Jaina philosophy is conspicuous for its deeper study of 'the world of nature' or 'the world of reality'. It looks at reality, which is of complex nature, from many points of view. Like *Śūnyavāda*, it believes in relativistic existence of reality. Like other schools, both the systems have taken for granted the doctrine of rebirth, *Karman* and *Mukti* (*Nirvāṇa*) as propounded in the Upaniṣads.

Rise of six Brāhmaṇical schools : The Buddhist era represents the age of the philosophic spirit in India. It was in this age that the six orthodox Brāhmaṇical systems of philosophy arose as a result of the revolt of Buddhism and Jainism. These systems fall in two main divisions : (1) *Dharma-mīmāṁsā* or *Karma-mīmāṁsā*, which later came to be known as *Pūrva-mīmāṁsā*, and (2) *Tattva-mīmāṁsā*, the metaphysical philosophy. The *Pūrva-mīmāṁsā* school is not an independent system of purely philosophic thought, but it is a 'very sound and brilliant methodology of contextual interpretation' pertaining to the Vedic passages enjoining ritual. In fact, it gives a philosophical justification for the Vedic ritualism. The schools of metaphysical philosophy (*Tattva-mīmāṁsā*) are grouped into the Vaiśeṣika-Nyāya systems, the Sāṁkhya-yoga systems and the Vedānta or *Uttara-mīmāṁsā* school.[55]

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53. Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, pp. 667-8.
54. *Ibid.*, pp. 360-1.
55. See J. C. Chatterji, *Hindu Realism*, p. 4.

The common ideas of these six systems are as follows: All the systems accept the authority of the Veda. Intuition and inference are also accepted by the systems. Reason is subordinated to intuition. All the systems protest against the scepticism of the Buddhists and propound a standard of objective reality as opposed to an eternal, unstable flux. The systems accept the view of the great world rhythm, the endless succession of the vast periods of creation, subsistence and dissolution. All the systems believe in rebirth and pre-existence. The systems aim at the practical end of salvation (*mokṣa*) which means the end of rebirths and the consequent end of sorrows and sufferings of life. The *Pūrva-mīmāṁsā* school is an exception. Its aim is the perpetuation of happy life in another world (heaven) by performance of Vedic rites (*kriyā*) in right manner. Kumārila believes that the performance of these actions (rites) is also a means of attaining the ultimate end, i.e., liberation, 'by overcoming past sin and by avoiding future sin'. He propounds *Jñāna-karma samuccaya-vāda*, i.e., a harmonious combination of knowledge and action, as a means of liberation. The systems believe that the cause of bondage or *saṁsāra* (rebirths) is ignorance (*avidya*) and the release can be attained by means of knowledge (*jñāna*) or insight into the truth-(*vidyā*).[56]

While the systems agree on certain ideas as mentioned above and even the use of some terms like *avidyā*, *māyā*, *puruṣa*, *jīva*, etc., is common to them, yet they are distinguished by the different theories propounded by them and by the different significations assigned to the common terms in the different schools. Different views are held with regard to the theory of causation common to all the systems. The question involved in it is: Does the effect pre-exist in its material cause? Those who answer this question in the negative are called *Asatkārya-vādins*, while those who answer it in the affirmative are called *Satkārya-vādins*. According to *Asatkāryā-vāda* the effect is a new creation, a real beginning (*ārambha*). The effect (*kārya*) does not pre-exist (*asat*) in its material cause. Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, *Hīnayāna* Buddhism, Materialism and some followers of *Mīmāṁsā* believe in *Asatkārya-vāda*, which is also known as *Ārambha-vāda*, i. e., the view thet production is a new beginning. A school of Materialism believes in *Svabhāva vādā*. (the theory of spontaneity or naturalism); *Hīnayāna* Buddhism in *Anitya-paramāṇu-kāraṇa-vāda* or *Kṣaṇabhaṅga-vāda* and Vaiśeṣika-Nyāya and some followers of Mīmāṁsā in *Nitya-paramāṇu-kārāṇa-vāda*. The *Satkārya-vāda*, on the other hand,

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56. Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, pp. 24 ff; See C. D. Sharma, *op. cit.*, p. 328.

believes that the effect is not a new creation, but only an explicit manifestation of that which was implicitly contained in its material cause. Here, another important question arises : is the effect a real transformation or an unreal appearance of its cause? Those who believe that the effect is a real transformation of its cause are called *Pariṇāma-vādins* (*pariṇāma*-real transformation), while those who believe that it is an unreal appearance are called *Vivarta-vādins* (*vivarta*—unreal appearance). Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Rāmānuja believe in *Pariṇāma vāda*. The view of Sāṁkhya-Yoga is called *Prakṛti-pariṇāma-vāda*, while the view of Rāmānuja is called *Brahma-pariṇāma-vāda*. *Śūnya-vāda*, *Vijñāna-vāda* and Śaṅkara believe in *Vivarta-vāda* which may respectively be distinguished as *Śūnya-vivarta-vāda*, *Vijñāna-vivarta-vād* and *Brahma-vivarta-vāda*. Pratyabhijñā also believes in another form of *Vivarta-vāda*, called *Ābhāsa-vāda* ; in the former the appearances are unreal, while in the latter the appearances are real manifestations of the Ultimate Cause Śiva. The view of Jainism and of Kumārila can be called *Sadasat-kārya-vāda* 'because according to them the effect is both real as well as unreal before its production—real as identical with the cause and unreal as a modal change thereof, though ultimately both incline towards *Pariṇāma vāda*.'[57]

Vaiśeṣika-Nyāya systems : The Vaiśeṣika system takes its name from *viśeṣa*, or particularity. The category of *Viśeṣa* or particularity plays an important role in the system, and is regarded as the essence of things. Kaṇāda, the founder of the school, laid special emphasis on the intrinsic differentiation (*viśeṣa*) between the cause (*kāraṇa*) and its so-called effect (*kārya*). The Vaiśeṣika is, therefore, the system of 'distinctions' or 'particularity'. The term *Nyāya* means literally that by means of which the mind is led to a conclusion (*nīyate anena iti nyāyaḥ*). So *Nyāya* is equivalent to argumentation. In popular use the term *Nyāya* means right or just, thus the Nyāya implies the science of right reasoning. It is also called *Tarkaśāstra* or the science of reasoning, *Pramāṇa-śāstra* or the science of logic and epistemology, *Hetu-vidyā* or the science of causes, *Vāda-vidyā* or the science of debate, and *Āṇvīkṣikī* or the science of critical study. The two systems (Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya) had been for long treated as parts of one whole. While they seem to have coalesced very early, a difference in the emphasis laid on the logical and the physical sides distinguishes the one from the other. The Vaiśeṣika system arose about the time of Buddha and Mahāvīra and is held by some scholars to be of greater antiquity than the Nyāya.

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57. See C. D. Sharma, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

The *Nyāya-Sūtras* of Gautama are assigned to the third century B.C., the age of *Āhnikas* or 'daily lessons'. According to some scholars, the beginnings of the Nyāya belong to the pre-Buddhistic period, though a scientific treatment of it was undertaken some time about the period of early Buddhism, and its main principles were well established before the third century B. C.[58]

The Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya are held to be *samāna-tantra* or allied systems. The Nyāya system substantially accepts the metaphysical tenets of the Kaṇāda's system. While the Vaiśeṣika has for its main objective the analysis of experience, the purpose of Nyāya is a critical examination of the objects of knowledge by means of the canons of logical proof. According to the Vaiśeṣika, all that is real comes under the object of knowledge and is called a *Padārtha*. The seven *Padārthas* are substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), action (*karma*), generality (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*), inherence (*samavāya*) and non-being (*abhāva*). Originally the school believed in the first six categories only and the seventh, that of *abhāva* or negation, was added later on. The *dravyas* are nine and include material as well as spiritual substances. They are earth (*pṛthivī*), water (*ap*), fire (*tejas*), air (*vāyu*), ether (*ākāśa*), time (*kāla*), space (*dik*), spirit (*ātman*) and mind (*manas*). These nine *dravyas* are held as ultimate realities. There are the four distinct classes of eternal atoms (*aṇus*, *paramāṇus* or *parimaṇḍalas*) which constitute the elements of the earth, the water, the fire and the air. Ether or *Ākāśa* is not atomic. It is one and all-pervading and affords the medium for the combinations of the atoms. The atoms differ from one another both in quality and quantity. They are the material cause of this world of which God, assisted by the unseen power, is the efficient cause. The physical world presupposes the moral order. Evolution is due to the unseen power consisting of merits and demerits of the individual souls which bear fruits as enjoyments or sufferings experienced by the souls.[59]

The Nyāya is a system of atomistic pluralism and logical realism. The physical conceptions of the system are almost the same as those of Vaiśeṣika. It regards the world of nature as a composite of eternal, unalterable, causeless atoms, existing independently of our thoughts. It holds the soul as a real substantive being, having for its qualities desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain and cognition. It proves the existence of the self by means of inference. The materialistic view that

58. Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, pp. 31, 36, 43, 176 ; C. D. Sharma, *op. cit.*, pp. 243, 265 ; Āchārya Vishva Bandhu, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

59. C. D. Sharma, *op. cit.*, pp. 243 ff. ; Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, 176 ff.

consciousness is a property of the body is refuted. The Self is not the senses but what controls them, and synthesises their functions. The permanent Self is not *buddhi* or intelligence, *upalabdhi* or apprehension, or *jñāna* or knowledge. *Buddhi* is non-permanent while the soul must be permanent. The soul is unique in each individual. There are an infinite number of souls. Consciousness is not an essential property of the soul. The soul is an eternal entity which is from time to time connected with a body suitable to its desert. The body is formed under the influence of the unseen force of destiny, and is the result of the persistence of the effect of the previous acts. No serious attempt is made to prove the pre-existence theory, since it is generally accepted. Release is freedom from pain. *Mokṣa* is supreme felicity marked by perfect tranquility and freedom from defilement.[60]

Vātsyāyana, the author of *Nyāya-bhāṣya* argues against several theories of the origin and nature of the world. He criticises the idea of momentariness (*Kṣaṇika-vāda*), the doctrine of impermanence (*anityatā*) and the theory that all is non-being (*abhāva*). He says that the world cannot be produced by *abhāva*, or non-existence. The supporters of the *abhāva* hypothesis argue that no effect arises until the cause is destroyed. For instance, for the sprout to arise, seed must be destroyed. Vātsyāyana says, the sprout is due not to *abhāva* but a rearrangement of seed particles (*N.B.*, iv. 1. 14-8). The view that the world is the result of chance is examined and rejected. The law of causality cannot be denied without stultifying all experience.[61]

Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika represent the analytic type of philosophy. J. C. Chatterji classes them as the creationist or realistic standard, for according to them the universe as it appears and as it is found extended in space and changing in time, with all the objects in it, is a real thing and not as something subjective, existing merely in the mind of the percipient. 'As realism, this standard has reduced the infinite complexity of things to nine classes of ultimate realities. The reduction of the infinite variety of existing and experienced things to these nine classes may be called the analysis or analytic aspect of the universe from this stand point'. Out of these nine classes of ultimate realities, everything that we experience in the universe is formed. It is this standard which came to be known as *Asatkārya-vāda* as well as *Ārambha-vāda*, since, according to it, 'every single effect (*kārya*) was non-existent (*asat*) before it appeared as such

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60. Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, pp. 142 ff. and 144 ff., C. D. Sharma, *op. cit.*, pp. 265 ff.

61. See Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, pp. 143-4.

and, also, every time an effect came into being, it did so as the beginning (*ārambha*) of someting that did not exist before and was entirely new'. Kanāda thought that 'every phenomenal event or incidence was ever new and quite distinct from its material (*upādāna*), efficient (*nimitta*) and general (*sādhāraṇa*) causes (*kāraṇas*) and the interactive operation thereof. When cloth as such came into being, it started a career of behaviour entirely different from how the causes from which it was born, namely, the fibres (*tantus*), the weaver (*tantuvāya*) and his implements (*upakaraṇas*) and the conjunction of the fibres (*tantusaṁyoga*), etc., had been behaving, singly as well as when in league'. The Kaṇāda's system is often referred to as 'Indian Atomism or Realism' on account of its atomic theory and the postulation by it of the nine eternal realities.[62]

Sāṁkhya-Yoga systems: The word '*Sāṁkhya*' is derived from the word '*Saṁkhyā*' which means right knowledge as well as number. *Sāṁkhya*, in the sense of right knowledge, is explained as '*Samyak khyāti* or *jñāna*'. The word '*Saṁkhyā*' meaning number as the name of the system is 'justified as being appropriate to a system which gives an analytical enumeration of the principles of the cosmos'. Dr. Radhakrishnan says that this tendency to enumeration is common to all Hindu Systems of thought. In the early texts, '*Sāṁkhya*' is used in the sense of philosophical reflection and not numerical reckoning. This particular system which expounds by careful reflection the nature of *Puruṣa* or spirit, and the other entities, acquired its significant title. The word '*Yoga*' literally means 'union', i.e., spiritual union of the individual soul with the Universal Soul. In this particular sense, it is used in the Vedānta. According to Patañjali, '*Yoga*' means spiritual effort to attain perfection through the control of the body, senses and mind, and, as Bhoja says, through separation (*Viyoga*) or right discrimination between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*. Dr. Radhakrishnan writes, '*Yoga*' may simply mean 'method'. It is often used in the sense of 'yoking'. The root of all sin and suffering is thought to be 'separation, disunion, estrangement' of the individual soul (in its wordly and sinful condition) from the Supreme Soul. *Yoga* implies the attainment of 'spiritual unification, the consciousness of two in one,' and thus to be rid of sorrow and sin. *Yoga* is intimately allied to *Sāṁkhya*. The *Gīta* calls them one. While *Sāṁkhya* means spiritual knowledge, *Yoga* means spiritual action. *Sāṁkhya* is theory, *Yoga* is practice. The twin Sāṁkhya-Yoga systems are undoubtedly the oldest systems of Indian philosophy. We find references to the Sāṁkhya-Yoga doctrines in some of the Upaniṣads,

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62. J. C. Chatterji, *Hindu Realism*, pp. 10-12 ; Āchārya Vishva Bandhu, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-22.

e.g., in the *Chāndogya*, the *Praśna*. the *Kaṭha* and particularly in the *Śvetāśvatara*, in the *Mahābhārata*, in the *Gītā*, and in the Smṛtis and the Purāṇas. References to the *Sāṁkhya* in the old upaniṣadas indicate that its time of development precedes the age of Buddha. Yoga system of Patañjali is also equally old, since the Buddha is said to have practised *Yoga*.[63]

Kapila, the traditional founder of this system, certainly flourished before Buddha and he must have composed '*Sāṁkhya-Sūtra*' which was lost long ago. The *Sāṁkya-Kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, belonging to the 3rd century A.D., is the earliest available work on the system. Gauḍapāda wrote a commentary on the *Kārikā*. The theory that the effect really exists beforehand in its cause is one of the central features of the Sāṁkhya system. This theory is called *Satkārya-vāda*. The Sāṁkhya defines cause as the entity in which the effect subsists in a latent form. According to *Satkārya-vāda*, nothing new is ever coming into existence. *Prakṛti*, possessed of three qualities (*triguṇa*), is undergoing a constant automatic process of becoming, developing or evolving (*pariṇāma*). The system thus upholds *Pariṇāma-vāda*, the theory of transformation. The Sāṁkhya attempts an explanation of nature as an immense complexity of elements which is ever changing. From the principle of causality it is deduced that the ultimate basis of the empirical universe is the unmanifested (*avyaktam*) *Prakṛti*. *Prakṛti* is the fundamental substance out of which the world evolves. In the unmanifested condition, *Prakṛti* is but the union of opposites, i.e., the state of equilibrium of the three *guṇas* (*guṇānām sāmyāvasthā*). Sāṃkhya admits also separate existence of *Puruṣa* (Self) who is without quality (*nirguṇa*) and is supposed to have no active role to play in the process of evolution. The school believes in the plurality of *Puruṣas*. It maintains qualitative monism and quantitative pluralism of the selves, i.e., the selves are all essentially alike; only numerically are they different. While *Prakṛti* is regarded as essentially dynamic, *Puruṣa* is believed to be inactive, but being near to *Prakṛti* (*Puruṣa-sannidhi mātra*) it disturbs the equilibrium of the *guṇas* and thus leads to evolution. The first product of the evolution is called *Mahat*, the Great. It is the germ of this vast world of objects including intellect, ego and mind. It is cosmic in its nature. *Mahat* produces *Ahaṁkāra*. It is the principle of individuation. Next follows the evolution of *Manas* (4), sensory organs (5-9), motor organs (10-14), *tan-mātras* (15-19), and lastly *mahābhūtas* (20-24). Evolution is the play of these 24 principles which, together with the *Puruṣa* who is mere spectator and outside the play of evolution, are

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63. Radhakrishnan, *op. cit*., pp. 249, 337-8 ; C. D. Sharma, *op. cit*., pp. 205 and 235.

the 25 categories of Sāṁkhya. It is observed that the Sāṁkhya is a real advance on the theory of atomistic pluralism. Pratyabhijñā system has incorporated all the 25 categories of the Sāṁkhya. The school believes, like the other systems of Indian philosophy, that bondage is due to ignorance and ignorance can only be removed by knowledge. The *Jīva* has to realize itself as the pure *Puruṣa* through discrimination between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*.[64]

The Yoga system of Patañjali which is a subsidiary discipline, concerns itself more with the enunciation of a practical course of esoteric Self-realization (*Samādhi*) than with the postulation of any new philosophical concepts. It is reared up in the lap of the Sāṁkhya, in respect of its metaphysical background. It is a great system of spiritual discipline and has found favour with all schools of Indian philosophy except the Cārvāka. The different Śaiva schools of Kashmir, including its Pratyabhijñā system, have incorporated the Yoga discipline from Patañjali's system of Yoga, The *Yoga-sūtra* of Patañjali deals with the nature and object of concentration (*Samādhi*), the means or processes (*Sādhanā*) to realize this end, the supra-normal powers (*Vibhūti*) which can be acquired through Yoga and the nature of liberation (*Kaivalya*). *Yoga* is defined as the suppression of the processes of thought (*yogaś-citta-vṛtti-nirodhaḥ*). It is also called *Samādhi* (*yogaḥ samādhi*). *Samādhi* is meditation or concentration. It is of two kinds, *samprajñāta* (conscious) and *asamprajñāta* (supra-conscious). Supra-normal powers are acquired by perfoming *Samādhi*. Yoga discipline comprises various processes and exercises for the purification of body, mind and soul. But the system has been 'confused with some repulsive practices of the Tāntric cult and the later adaptations of Patañjali's Yoga by fanatical mendicants.'[65]

J. C. Chatterji, in his *Hindu Realism*, classes the two systems as the Psycho-dynamic standard for the reason that 'the principles which it regards as the origin of things are both psychical, i.e., of the nature of feelings, thoughts, and ideas, and dynamic, i.e., of the nature of forces or powers'. With reference to this, Chatterji remarks that 'products already exist in a potential form in the original psycho-dynamic principle. They simply unroll themselves out from this potential state as a tree unrolls itself out from the seed. That is to say, from this point of view, things are not created but evolved ; and what is evolved already exists in a potential state.

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64. C. D. Sharma, *op. cit.*, pp. 205 ff. ; Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, pp. 256 ff. ; Āchārya Vishva Bandhu, *op. cit.*, p. 20-21.

65. C. D. Sharma, *op. cit.*, pp. 235 ff. ; Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, pp. 336 ff. ; Āehārya Vishva Bandhu, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

Therefore it is called *Pariṇāma-vāda*..., the doctrine of evolution ... It is also called *Satkārya-vāda*.'[66]

Uttara-mīmāṁsā or Vedānta School : While Jaimini and his school of *Mīmāṁsā* (*Pūrva-mīmāṁsā*) hold the view that the purpose (*artha*) of the scripture (*āmnāya*) lies only in the understanding and performance of the rites (*kriyā*) prescribed in it, and that, therefore, such portions of the Vedas as do not enjoin ritual, directly, should also be taken as supporting the same purpose, indirectly, and no other, Bādarāyaṇa, the founder of *Uttara-mīmāṁsā* school, dissents from this view and propounds that the scriptural teaching is, partly, of higher (*parā*) status and, partly, of lower (*aparā*) status. In Bādarāyaṇa's view, the latter enjoins the ritual performances for the benefit of the common man and the former enables one who becomes fed up with the world (*virata*) to attain right knowledge (*tattva-jñāna*) leading to the realization of the personal Self (*Ātman*) and the Universal Self (*Brahman*) as the one Ultimate Reality behind this cosmos. As, in this way, the *parā* portions of the *śruti* embody its real significance or the final purpose (*anta*), they have also come to be known as the *Vedāntas* (*Muṇḍakopaniṣad* III, 2, 6).[67]

The date of Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the *Vedānta Sūtra* (*Brahma Sūtra*), is supposed by the Indian scholars to be somewhere between 500 B.C. and 200 B.C. Keith holds that Bādarāyaṇa cannot be dated later than A.D. 200. The school of Bādarāyaṇa accepts the Veda as eternal. According to it *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* of the Sāṁkhya are not independent substances but modifications of a single reality. The world is due to the will (*saṁkalpa*) of God. It is his sport (*līlā*). The diversity of individual souls is determined by their *karma*. Bādarāyaṇa affirms a monistic view of the world. He accepts the two views of Brahman as the indeterminate intelligence (*nirviśeṣa cinmātṛ*) held by Bādari, Kāśakṛtsna and Auḍulomi and determinate personal God (*saviśeṣa*) held by Āśmarathya and *Jaiminī*. The Upaniṣadas declare Brahman as *avikārī* (changeless), *nityam* (eternal), and the world changing and impermanent. The Sūtras simply assert, on the basis of *Śruti*, that Brahman develops itself into the universe and also remains transcendent. Śaṅkara argues that Brahman produces the world without undergoing any substantial change. Rāmānuja and Vallabha believe that the world is the actual product of Brahman, i.e., Brahman is really transformed into the world. Bādarāyaṇa asserts

66. J. C. Chatterji, *Hindu Realism*, pp. 12-15.

67. See Āchārya Vishva Bandhu, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

both identity and difference in nature between Brahman and the individual soul.[68]

The terse and ambiguous style of Bādarāyaṇa led to different interpretations of his sūtras. The earliest commentator was the great Śaṅkara (788-820 A.D.) who based his Bhāṣya on the doctrines (*vādas*) of Non-duality (*Advaita*) and phenomenality (*Vivarta*) which were propounded by his grand-teacher, Gauḍapāda. Within the fold of the Non-dualist School appeared eight other great teachers (*ācaryas*) who wrote their *Bhāṣyas* on the *Brahma-sūtras* and differed from Śaṅkara in their views. Bhāskara (1000 A. D.) propounded Duality-cum-non-duality (*Bhedābheda*); Rāmānuja (1140 A. D,) taught the doctrine of Qualified Non-duality (*Viśiṣṭādvaita*); Nimbārka (1250 A.D.), Śrīkaṇṭha (1270 A. D.) and Śrīpati (1400 A. D.) upheld *Viśiṣṭādvaita* view with a few divergences of sectarian detail. Vallabha (1479-1544 A.D.) based his *Aṇu-bhāṣya* on the Sūtras on his doctrine of pure Non-duality (*Śuddhādvaita*). Vijñānabhikṣu (1600 A.D.) and Baladeva (1725 A.D.) also wrote their Bhāṣyas on the Sūtras from their own *Vaiṣṇava* point of view. Mādhava (1238 A. D.), also a great *Vaiṣṇava* teacher, was another commentator of *Brahma-sūtras*. He founded the dualist (*Dvaita*) school of Vedānta.[69]

Śaṅkarācārya and his Advaita school of Vedānta : Śaṅkarācārya lived from A. D. 788 to A. D. 820. Scholars generally agree with this date of Śaṅkara. Tradition says that he was a descendant of Gauḍapāda who was the teacher of Govindapāda, the teacher of Śaṅkarācārya. Śaṅkara himself most respectfully salutes Gauḍapāda as his teacher's-teacher (*yastam pūjyābhipūjyam parama-gurum amum pāda-pātair nato'smi*).[70]

Gauḍapāda sets forth the central principles of the *Advaita* Vedānta in his *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, also known as the *Gauḍapāda-kārikā*, which forms the first available systematic treatise of the school. There can be no doubt that Gauḍapāda's philosophy is essentially based on the Upaniṣads, particularly on the *Māṇḍūkya*, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and the *Chāndogya*. It has been remarked that he advocates the *Vijñānavāda* and also agrees with the *Śūnyavāda* in certain points. The similarities between the Gauḍapāda's school and the *Mahāyāna* have been pointed out by some scholars to prove that Gauḍapāda is a crypto-Buddhist, while others hold

68. Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, pp. 435-44.

69. See Ācarya Vishva Bandhu, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

70. *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā-bhāṣya*, last verse ; see C. D. Sharma, *op. cit.*, p. 332; see Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, pp. 447, 452-3.

that *Mahāyāna* and *Advaita* are not two opposed systems of thought but only different stages in the development of the same thought which is rooted in the Upaniṣads. The fundamental doctrine of Gauḍapāda is the doctrine of No-origination (*Ajātivāda*). Negatively, it means that the world, being only an appearance, is in fact never created. Positively, it means that the Absolute, being self-existant, is never created (*aja*). Gauḍapāda agrees with the *Śūnyavāda* in maintaining that origination, from the absolute standpoint, is an impossibility.[71]

The main principles of the Advaita philosophy, as expounded by Gauḍapāda in his *Kārikā*, are 'the orders of reality, identity of *Brahman* and *Ātman*, *Māyā*, the inapplicability of causation to ultimate reality, *Jñāna* or wisdom, as the direct means to *Mokṣa* or freedom, and the inconceivability of absolute nothing', and so on. Gauḍapāda says : 'As in dream, so in waking, the objects seen are unreal.' His contention is that whatever is presented as an object is unreal. He recognises that objects of waking experience are common to us all, while those of dreams are the private property of the dreamer, yet the objects of both the experiences are unreal. Objects of waking experience come to naught in dreams, and vice versa. Gauḍapāda thus establishes the unreal character of the world of experience '(1) by its similarity to dream states ; (2) by its presented or objective character ; (3) by the unintelligibility of the relations which organise it ; and (4) by its non-persistence for all time.' The argument that all objects are unreal and only the subject that is the constant witness, Self, is real, is suggested in some Upaniṣads and developed with negative results in Buddhistic thought. Gauḍapāda employs it to prove that life is a waking dream. According to him 'everything is produced by the power of *saṁvṛti* (concealment of truth, or relative truth), and nothing is therefore eternal ; everything, again, is unborn, being inseparable from *sat*, and there is nothing therefore like destruction'. Production and destruction are only phenomena, and in reality there is nothing produced or destroyed. Gauḍapāda uses the arguments which the Buddhist *Vijñānavāda* school employs to prove the unreality of external objects of perception and traces them to ideas of mind. The Vijñānvādins combat the contention of the realists (Bāhyārthavādins) that ideas and feelings would not arise if external things did not cause them. They say that the object exists as an object for the knowing subject ; but it does not exist outside of consciousness because the distinction of the subject and the object is within consciousness itself. Consciousness is the only reality and it is never related to any external object, neither in the past nor in

71. See C. D. Sharma, *op. cit.*, pp. 334-5.

the present nor in the future (*Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* IV, 25-27). Gauḍapāda is in complete agreement with the Vijñānavādins here. He refutes even the central position of the *Vijñānavāda*, viz., the reality of *citta*. He says, "Therefore mind (*citta*) does not originate, nor do objects cognised by the mind originate."[72]

Gauḍapāda examines the different alternatives suggested to account for creation. "Some regard it as the manifestation (expansion) of God (*Vibhūti*),[73] while others regard it as of the nature of dream or illusion (*svapnamāyā*) ; others maintain that it is the will of God, while those who believe in time declare that everything proceeds from time (*kāla*). Some say that creation is for the sake of enjoyment (bhoga), while others hold that it is for sport (*krīḍā*)." Rejecting all these views, Gauḍapāda declares that 'it is the inherent nature of the shining one (*devasyaiṣa svabhāvo'yam*). What desire can he have who has attained all the desired objects (*āptakāmasya kā spṛhā*)" ?[74] Here Gauḍapāda seems to reject the view that the world is comparable to a dream or an illusion, and to contend that it is the manifestation of the very nature of God, the expression of his power. A realistic conception of the world is also indicated by other passages, such as "the *Ātman* imagines himself by himself through the power of his *Māya* (*svamāyayā*). He alone cognises the objects so sent forth...."[75] Here, the term *Māyā* is used by Gauḍapāda in the sense of wonderous power ; it is the *svabhāva* or the nature of the *Ātman*, "inseparable from the ever-luminous who is hidden by it." *Māyā* has also been held as beginningless cosmic principle which hides reality from the vision of man.[76]

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72. See Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, pp. 452-8 ; C. D. Sharma, *op. cit.*, p. 341-2.

73. *Vibhūti* is interpreted by Śaṅkara as expansion (*vistaraḥ*) of God. *Vibhūti* literally means the expression of the transcendental power of God, hence materialization of God.

74. विभूतिं प्रसवं त्वन्ये मन्यन्ते सृष्टिचिन्तका: ।
स्वप्नमायासरूपेति सृष्टिरन्यैर्विकल्पिता ॥
इच्छामात्रं प्रभो: सृष्टिरिति सृष्टौ विनिश्चिताः ।
कालात्प्रसूतिं भूतानां मन्यन्ते कालचिन्तकाः ॥
भोगार्थं सृष्टिरित्यन्ये क्रीडार्थमिति चापरे ।
देवस्यैष स्वभावोऽयमाप्तकामस्य का स्पृहा ॥
Māṇḍūkya-kārikā (*MK*), I, 7-9. Cf. *Śvetāśvatara Up.* I, 2-3.
"काल: स्वभावो नियतिर् यदृच्छा भूतानि योनिः पुरुष इति चिंत्या ; ... ... ॥
ते ध्यान-योगानुगता अपश्यन् देवात्म-शक्ति स्वगुणैर्निगूढाम् ; ... ... ॥"

75. कल्पयत्यात्मनात्मानमात्मा देव: स्वमायया ।
स एव बुध्यते भेदानिति वेदान्तनिश्चय: । *MK*, II, 12.

76. Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, pp. 459-60 ; see *MK*, II, 19, 16. C. D. Sharma, *op. cit.*, pp. 335-6.

Another predecessor of Śaṅkarācārya, whose views were similar to his, is Bhartṛhari who died about 650 A.D. Unlike the Buddhists he posits the reality of Brahman and identifies it with the eternal word (*sphoṭa*) (*sphoṭākhyo niravayavo nitya-śabdo brahmaiveti*, *SDS*, p. 140). 'Brahman without beginning or end, which is eternal essence of speech, is changed into the form of things; thus the evolution of the world is brought about'.[77] Bhartṛhari understands the world with all its distinctions as imaginary (*kalpanikam*). He insists on the phenomenality of the world which is a *vivarta* or a phenomena based upon Brahman. Things of the world are soulless (*nairātmya*), though words give them individuality.

Saṅkaracārya asserts the standpoint of his predecessors and teaches the doctrine of Advaita (monism). According to it Brahman is the only reality which is non-dual and self-revealed as the Supreme Self. The world is mere *vivarta* or phenomena based upon it. Śaṅkara bases his entire philosophy upon *Māyāvāda* for which he has been denounced by an indian tradition opposed to him. He is held as a Buddhist in disguise and his *Māyāvāda* but crypto-Buddhism. In the *Padma Purāṇa*, Īśvara declares to Pārvati that 'the theory of *Māyā* is false doctrine, a disguised form of Buddhism'. Yāmunācārya and his successor, Rāmānuja, hold the same opinion. The phenomenalism of the Buddha is akin to the doctrine of *Māyā*. It is held that Śaṅkara incorporated certain Buddhistic elements such as the doctrine of *Māyā* into the Vedānta philosophy. Dr. Radha-Krishnan says that there are no doubt similarities between the views of Buddhism and Advaita Vedānta, and this is not surprising in view of the fact that both these systems had for their background the Upaniṣads. Though the *Māyā* doctrine is not found in the early Upaniṣads, still it is an intelligent development of the Upaniṣadic view. Some of the early Buddhists even declared that there was nothing at all behind appearances. Here the reference is to a school of Śūnyavādins. Śaṅkara claims that beyond the unreal character of the world phenomena, in its deepest depths, there is the real spirit.[78] Dr. Radhakrishnan observes, in his *Indian Philosophy*, that 'The Advaita Vedānta philosophy has been very much influenced by the Mādhyamika doctrine. The *Alātaśānti* of Gauḍapāda's *Kārikās* is full of Mādhyamika tenets. The Advaitic distinction of *vyavahāra*, or experience, and *paramārtha*, or reality, correspond to the *saṁvṛti* and the *Paramārtha* of the Mādhyamikas. The

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77. श्रनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यद् अक्षरम् ।
विवर्ततेऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः ॥ *Vākyapadīya*, i, I.
See Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 465.

78. *Ibid.*, pp. 47I-3.

Nirguṇa Brahman of Śaṅkara and Nāgārjuna's *Śūnya* have much in common. The force of *Avidyā* introducing the phenomenal universe is admitted by both. The keen logic which breaks up the world into a play of abstractions, categories and relations appears in both......With the Buddhist's attitude to the unseen, Nāgārjuna does not dwell much on the positive absolute, though he admits its reality. By his negative logic, which reduces experience to a phenomenon, he prepares the ground for the Advaita philosophy.'[79] There is no doubt that Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta doctrine is a development of the Yogācāra (*Vijñānvāda*) and Mādhyamika (*Śūnyavāda*) tenets, which are first incorporated by Gauḍapāda in his *Kārikā* and later modified by Śaṅkara in the direction of his own school of thought. In view of this, Śaṅkara's philosophy is the reorientation of the Buddhist Philosophy.

Śaṅkara's *Vivarta-vāda* is classed by J. C. Chatterji, in his *Hindu Realism*, as polyonymic standard, as he says, "It shows how the universe, with its infinite variety, is and must be but an appearance, namely, of mere 'names and forms'......That is to say, it shows how it is one and the same thing which, remaining what it is, yet appears as many, under many names and concepts." Chatterji calls *Vivarta-vāda* as 'the doctrine of production in which the originating Reality remains what it is and yet brings about the result'. The scholar seems to confuse the idea of *Svātantrya-vāda* with that of *Vivarta-vāda*. In *Svātantrya* theory of Pratyabhijñā, the originating reality (the ultimate Cause) remains what it is and yet brings about the effects. In *Vivarta-vāda*, the original reality appears as an illusive phenomenon (*bhrānti*) by Nescience (*Māyā*). Śaṅkara's *Vivarta-vāda* is also called as *Satkāraṇa-vādā*, that is to say, the doctrine of the reality of only the originating source or basis of things. Chatterji distinguishes it from idealism in any Western sense of the word by calling it 'Polyonymism', though the use of this term is not appropriate as it denotes only the idea of 'variety in names' and not 'variety in forms.'[80]

Śaṅkarācārya's criticism of the earlier doctrines: In the *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya*, Śaṅkarācārya refutes all the important doctrines of the earlier systems of philosophy opposed to the Vedānta view. He argues against these doctrines and establishes his own view. The teachers of Pratyabhijñā also adopt the same line of argument against the doctrines.

Jainism—The Jainas acknowledge seven categories (*Tattvas*), viz. soul (*Jīva*), non-soul (*A-jīva*), etc. They also teach that there are five

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79. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 668
80. See Chatterji, *Hindu Realism*, pp. 15-17.

so-called *Astikāyas* ('existing bodies', i.e., categories), viz., the categories of soul (*Jīva*), body (*Pudgala*), merit (*dharma*), demerit (*adharma*), and space (*ākāśa*). All these categories they again subdivide in various fanciful ways. To all things they apply the *Saptabhaṅgīnayā* method of reasoning : somehow it is ; somehow it is not ; somehow it is and is not ; somehow it is indescribable ; somehow it is and is indescribable ; somehow it is not and is indescribable ; somehow it is and is not and is indescribable. The Jainas also say that a thing may be one as well as many, eternal as well as momentary. Śaṅkara impugnes the reasoning, as he says that contradictory attributes like being and non-being, unity and plurality, eternity and momentariness, etc., cannot belong to one and the same thing, just as light and darkness cannot remain at the same place and just as the same thing cannot be hot and cold at the same time.[81] The Jaina doctrine that aggregates are formed from the atoms, by them called *Pudgalas*, is not also accepted by Śaṅkara.[82]

Buddhism—The theory of momentariness is the main doctrine of Buddhists. Śaṅkara states that on the basis of this doctrine remembrance cannot take place 'for we observe that what one man has experienced is not remembered by another man'. According to the doctrine of momentariness the person who perceived at the previous moment is not the same person who remembers at the later moment. The fact of memory and recognition evidently contradicts the theory of momentariness. The past is recognised and remembered in the present and this implies the existence of a permanent synthesising subject without whom knowledge shall always remain an impossibility.[83] Utpaladeva also argues similarly in *Īśvara Pratyabhijña Kārika* (I,ii-iii). Moreover, the antecedent link in the causal series cannot even be regarded as the efficient cause of the subsequent link because, according to the theory of momentariness, the preceding link ceases to exist when the subsequent link arises.[84]

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81. नह्येकस्मिन्धर्मिणि युगपत्सदसत्त्वादिविरुद्धधर्मसमावेशः संभवति शीतोष्णवत् । *Śaṅkara* on *Brahma Sūtra* II, ii, 33—"नैकस्मिन्नसंभवात्".

82. Ref. Thibaut, *The Vedānta-Sūtras*, with the Commentary of Śaṅkarācārya, translated, Sūtras II, 33-36, Vol. I, pp. 428-34.

83. पुरुषान्तरोपलब्धिविषये पुरुषान्तरस्य स्मृत्यदर्शनात्, कथं ह्यहमदोऽद्राक्षमिदं पश्यामीति च पूर्वोत्तरदर्शिन्येकस्मिन्नसति प्रत्ययः स्यात्........यत्रैवं प्रत्ययस्तत्र दर्शनस्मरणयोर्भिन्नमेव कर्तारं सर्वलोकोऽवगच्छति ।

Śaṅkara on *Brahma Sūtra* II, ii, 25—"अनुस्मृतेश्च".

84. Ref. Thibaut, *op. cit.*, Sūtra II, ii, 25, pp. 413-5 ; C. D, Sharma, *op. cit*, pp. 370-3.

Bāhyārthavādins or Sarvāstivādins (Realists) maintain that everything external as well as internal is real. According to them, 'what is external is either element (*bhūta*) or elementary (*bhautika*); what is internal is either mind (*citta*) or mental (*caitta*). The elements are earth, water, and so on; elemental are colour, etc., on the one hand, and the eye and the other sense organs on the other hand. Earth and the other three elements arise from the aggregation of the four different kinds of atoms......The inward world consists of the five so-called 'groups' (*skandhas*), *Rūpaskandha*, *Vijñānaskandha*, *Vedanāskandha*, *Saṁjñāskandha* and *Saṁskāraskandha* (the groups of sensation, knowledge, feeling, verbal knowledge and impressions); which taken together constitute the basis of all personal existence'.

The above doctrine is refuted by Śaṅkara. He says 'It cannot be explained how the aggregates are brought about. For the parts constituting the (material) aggregates are devoid of intelligence, and the kindling (*abhijvalana*) of intelligence depends on an aggregate of atoms having been brought about previously. (Mind, on the Bauddha doctrine, presupposes the existence of an aggregate of atoms, viz., the body.)[85] And the Bauddhas do not admit any other permanent intelligent being, such as either an enjoying soul or a ruling Lord, which could effect the aggregation of the atoms. Nor can the atoms and *Skandhas* be assumed to enter on activity on their own account; for that would imply their never ceasing to be active.[86] Nor can the cause of aggregation be looked for in the so-called abode (i.e., the *Ālayavijñāna-pravāha*, the train of self-cognitions); for the latter must be described either as different from the single cognitions or as not different from them. (In the former case it is either permanent, and then it is nothing else but the permanent soul of the Vedāntins; or non-permanent;) then being admitted to be momentary merely, it cannot exercise any influence and cannot therefore be the cause of the motion of the atoms......And if the Sarvāstivādin states that the course of the mundane existence is rendered possible through the mutual causality of the Nescience and so on (Nescience, impression, Knowledge, name and form, the abode of the six.....birth, species, decay, death, grief.....mental afflication, etc.), we need not look for any other combining permanent intelligent principle of the nature either of a ruling Lord or an enjoying soul. The argumentation of the

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85. See Thibaut, *op. cit.*, p. 403, fn. 2.
86. चित्ताभिज्वलनस्य च समुदायसिद्धयधीनत्वात्। अन्यस्य च कस्यचिच्चेतनस्य भोक्तुः प्रशासितुर्वा स्थिरस्य संहन्तुरनभ्युपगमात् निरपेक्षप्रवृत्त्यभ्युपगमे च प्रवृत्त्यनुपरमप्रसङ्गात्। Śaṅkara on *Brahma Sūtra* II, ii, I8.

Bauddhas merely assigns efficient causes for the origination of the members of the series, but does not intimate an efficient cause for the formation of the aggregates. On the basis of the doctrine of momentariness there cannot be a causal relation between Nescience, etc., 'because on the origination of the subsequent moment the preceding one ceases to be' (*Uttarotpāde ca pūrva-nirodhāt*).[87]

Yogācāras declare that the self is a series of impermanent mental states and nothing beyond it. Refuting this view,, Śaṅkarācarya says that we cannot, on the basis of this theory, account for the facts of memory and recognition. Against the doctrine of Vijñāna-vādins, according to whom the ideas are the only reality, Śaṅkara states that the so-called internal cognition (*Ālaya-vijñāna*) cannot constitute the abode of the mental impressions 'because that cognition also being admittedly momentary, and hence non-permanent, cannot be the abode of impressions any more than the quasi-external cognitions (*Pravṛtti-vijñāna*). For, unless there exists one continuous principle equally connected with the past, the present and the future, or an absolutely unchangeable (Self) which cognises everything, we are unable to account for remembrance, recognition, and so on, which are subject to mental impressions dependent on place, time and cause.'[88]

Paramāṇu-kāraṇavāda of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika—The Vaiśeṣikas maintain : 'the world emanates from atoms set in motion by the *Adṛṣṭa*.' The doctrine is refuted by Śaṅkara as follows : 'It must be admitted that the Atoms when they are in a state of isolation require action (motion) to bring about their conjunction ; for we observe that the conjunction of threads and the like is effected by action. Action again, which is itself an effect, requires some operative cause by which it is brought about ; for unless some such cause exists, no original motion can take place in the atoms. If, then, some operative cause is assumed, we may, in the first place, assume some cause analogous to seen causes, such as endeavour or impact. But in that case original motion could not occur at all in the atoms, since causes of that kind are, at the time, impossible

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87. See Thibaut, *op. cit.*, Sūtras II, ii, 18-28, pp. 401. ff.
88. See *Ibid.*, Sūtras II, ii, 28-31. pp. 418 ff. See Śaṅkara on Sūtras : "नाभाव उपलब्धेः" and "क्षणिकत्वाच्च"—
"यदप्यालयविज्ञानं नाम वासनाश्रयत्वेन परिकल्पितं तदपि क्षणिकत्वाभ्युपगमाद-नवस्थितस्वरूपं सत् प्रवृत्तिविज्ञानवन्न वासनानामधिकरणं भवितुमर्हति। नहि कालत्रयसंबन्धिन्येकस्मिन्नन्वयिन्यसति कूटस्थे वा सर्वार्थदर्शिनि देशकालनिमित्तापेक्षवास-नाधानस्मृतिप्रतिसंधानादिव्यवहारः संभवति।"

......The same reason precludes the assumption of other seen causes such as impact and the like. For they all are possible only after the creation of the world has taken place,......If, in the second place, the unseen principle is assumed as the cause of the original motion of atoms, we ask: Is this unseen principle to be considered as inhering in the soul or in the atom? In both cases it cannot be the cause of motion in atoms, because it is non-intelligent...........' The teacher further states, if the atoms were essentially active, their activity would be permanent so that no *pralaya* could take place. If they were essentially non-active, their non-activity would be permanent, and no creation could take place. If the *Adṛṣṭa* being in permanent proximity to the atoms be assumed to be the operative cause that sets the atoms in motion, then the atoms on their part would be permanently active. And, in case the *Adṛṣṭa* will not be admitted to be functioning as the operative cause, there would be permanent non-activity on the part of the atoms. For these reasons the emanation of the world from atoms, even the formation of binary and tertiary atomic compounds, is impossible unless some intelligent cause is accepted.[89]

Śaṅkarācārya treats of the non-difference of the effect from the cause against the Vaiśeṣika tenet according to which the effect is something different from the cause. He supports his view by the Śrutis: "*vācārambhanaṁ vikāro nāmadheyam, mṛttiketyeva satyam*"; "*etad ātmyam idaṁ sarvaṁ tat satyaṁ sa ātmā*" and "*brahmaivedaṁ sarvam*". In his argument Śaṅkara impugnes the *Pariṇāma* theory and upholds the theory of *Vivarta*.[90]

Sāṁkhya—Śaṅkara upholds the theory maintained by Bādarāyaṇa that insentient *Pradhāna* of the Sāṁkhya is unable to create and dispose. It is argued, the insentient *Pradhāna* cannot create the world 'on account of the orderly arrangement (of the world), being impossible (on that

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89. Ref. Thibaut, *op. cit.*, Sūtras II, ii, 11-17, pp. 387-400. See Śaṅkara on Sūtras "उभयथापि न कर्मातस्तदभावः" and "नित्यमेव च भावात्".
"अथादृष्टमाद्यस्य कर्मणो निमित्तमित्युच्येत...नादृष्टनिमित्तमणुषु कर्मावकल्पेतादृष्टस्याचेतनत्वात्। न ह्यचेतनं चेतनेनानधिष्ठितं स्वतन्त्रं प्रवर्तते प्रवर्तयति वेति सांख्यप्रक्रियायामभिहितम्।...अदृष्टादेर्निमित्तस्य नित्यसंनिधानान्नित्यप्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गात् अतन्त्रत्वेऽप्यदृष्टादेर्नित्याप्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गात्।"
90. Ref. Thibaut, *op. cit.*, Sūtras II, i, 14-20, pp. 320 ff.; see Śaṅkara on Sūtra: "तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः".

hypothesis), and on account of (the impossibility of) activity'.[91] The pūrvapakṣin may state that *Pradhāna* moves like milk or water. The uttarapakṣin replies that there also the motion is due to intelligence.[92] The pūrvapakṣin may question again that the *Pradhāna* modifies itself spontaneously like grass, etc., (eaten by animals) which turns into milk. The uttarapakṣin states that milk does not exist elsewhere (in bulls, etc.) but only in the female animals. Moreover, the cow, which is an intelligent being and loves her calf, makes her milk flow by her wish to do so, and the milk is in addition drawn forth by the sucking of the calf. Thus it is impossible for *Pradhāna* to create being devoid of the power of intelligence. Utpaladeva also refutes the Sāṁkhya doctrine that insentient *Pradhāna* is the cause of creation.[93]

Asatkārya-vāda—Asatkārya-vādin argues that the effect does not exist before its origination and is different from the cause. Satkārya-vādin questions, 'If before their actual origination all effects are equally non-existent in any causal substance, why then should curds be produced from milk and not from clay also, and jars from clay only and not from milk as well?' The Asatkārya-vādin rejoins, 'there is indeed an equal non-existence of any effect in any cause, but that at the same time each causal substance has a certain capacity reaching beyond itself (*atiśaya*) for some particular effect only and not for other effects; that, for instance, milk only, and not clay, has a certain capacity for curds; and clay only, and not milk, an analogous capacity for jars.' The Satkārya-vadin asks, "What do you understand by that *atiśaya*? If you understand by it the antecedent condition of the effect (before its actual origination), you abandon your doctrine that the effect does not exist in the cause, and prove our doctrine according to which it does so exist. If, on the other hand, you understand by the *atiśaya* a certain power of the cause assumed to the end of accounting for the fact that only one determined effect springs from the cause, you must admit that the power can determine the particular effect only if it neither is other (than cause and effect) nor is non-existent...Hence it follows that that power is identical with the Self of the cause, and that

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91. Thibaut, *op. cit*, Sūtras II, ii, 1-2 pp 363-9 :
'आस्तां तावदियं रचना। तत्सिद्धयर्था या प्रवृत्तिः साम्यावस्थानात्प्रच्युतिः... विशिष्टकार्याभिमुखप्रवृत्तिता सापि नाचेतनस्य प्रधानस्य स्वतन्त्रस्योपपद्यते,...
Śaṅkara on Sūtras: "रचनानुपपत्तेश्च नानुमानम्" and "प्रवृत्तेश्च".
92. Śaṅkara on Sūtra : "पयोम्बुवच्चेत्तत्रापि" (II, ii, 3).
93. See Thibaut, *op. cit*, pp. 369-70. "न च प्रधानस्येच्छादि-सम्भवः पुरुषार्थता।" (*Iśvara-Siddiḥ*, 36.), See *Siddhitrayī* I, KSTS XXXIV.

the effect is identical with the Self of that power......" Śaṅkara quotes another Upaniṣad citation to establish that before the origination of this creation it existed in the cause, the Ultimate Reality: "*sad eva somyedam agra āsīt*."[94]

Pariṇāmavāda—Śaṅkara maintains *Brahma-kāraṇa-vāda* as he recognises Brahman as the cause of the world. But, according to his *Vivarta-vāda*, the world is only a phenomenal appearance on Brahman. Śaṅkara is opposed to *Brahma-pariṇāma-vāda*. The world is neither a real creation by Brahman nor a real modification of Brahman. Brahman is the ground on which the phenomenal world is superimposed by *Māyā* (the principle of Nescience). *Pariṇāma-vāda* and *Vivarta-vāda* are, as Sarvajñātma-muni observes, not absolutely opposed. *Pariṇāma-vāda* logically leads to *Vivarta-vāda* which is only a step ahead of it.[95] According to Śaṅkara creation is ultimately an impossibility. He agrees with the Śūnya-vādins and Gauḍapāda on this point. Why should Brahman really create, as it has no ambition or desire (*āpta-kāmasya kā spṛhā*)? The following Sūtras of the *Brahma Sūtra* are explained by Śaṅkara on the basis of his *Vivartavāda*.

The Sūtras: '*kṛtsna-prasaktir niravayavatva-śabda-kopo vā*', and so on, (*BS* II, i, 26-29) state that 'Brahman does not in its entirety pass over into the world, and, although emitting the world from itself, yet remains one and undivided'. This is possible, according to Śaṅkara, because the world is unreal. According to Rāmānuja, the creation is merely the visible and tangible manifestation of what previously existed in Brahman in a subtle imperceptible condition. In the context of the Sūtra '*ātmani caivam vicitrāśca hi*' (Ibid., 28), Śaṅkara quotes the Śruti: '*na tatra rathā na ratha-yogāḥ*'. "there are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads, but he himself creates chariots, horses and roads" (*Br. Up.* IV, 3. 10). As there exist multiform creations in the one Self of a dreaming person and in gods, in their ordinary life, so multiform creation may

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94. Thibaut, *op. cit.*, pp. 334-5. See Śaṅkara on Sūtra II, i, 18: "युक्तेः शब्दान्तराच्च",

"युक्तेश्च प्रागुत्पतेः कार्यस्य सत्त्वमनन्यत्वं च कारणादवगम्यते,...दधिघटरुचकार्थिभिः प्रतिनियतानि कारणानि क्षीरमृत्तिकासुवर्णादीन्युपादीयमानानि लोके दृश्यन्ते।...अथाविशिष्टेऽपि प्रागसत्त्वे क्षीर एव दध्नः कश्चिदतिशयो न मृत्तिकायां, मृत्तिकायामेव च घटस्य कश्चिदतिशयो न क्षीर इत्युच्येत, तर्ह्यतिशयवत्त्वात्प्रागवस्थाया असत्कार्यवादहानिः सत्कार्यवादसिद्धिश्च।...तस्मात्कारणस्यात्मभूता शक्तिः शक्तेश्चात्मभूतं कार्यम्।"

95. "विवर्तवादस्य हि पूर्वभूमिर्वेदान्तवादे परिणामवादः।"
quoted, C. D. Sharma, *op. cit.*, p. 366, fn. 1.

exist in Brahman also. In Sūtras: '*sarvopeta ca tad darśanāt*' and '*vikaraṇatvān neti cet tad uktam*' (*Ibid.*, 30-1), Bādarāyaṇa states that Brahman, although destitute of instruments of action, is enabled to create the world by means of the manifold powers which it possesses. Śaṅkara supports Bādarāyāṇa's view with the Śruti: '*sarva-karmā sarva-kāmaḥ*'. He seems to agree with the doctrine of the Pratyabhijñā school which assigns various powers (*icchā-jñāna-kriyā-śaktayaḥ*) to the Ultimate Being (Maheśvara). Explaining the Sūtras: '*na prayojana-vatvāt*' and '*lokavat tu līlā kaivalyam*' (*Ibid.*, 32-3), Śaṅkara maintains that 'Brahman in creating the world has no motive in the strict sense of the word, but follows a mere sportive impulse'. Further in his *Bhāṣya* on the Sūtras: '*upasaṁhāra-darśanān neti cen na kṣīra-vaddhi*' and '*devādi-vadapi loke*' (*Ibid.* 24-25) also, Śaṅkara clearly asserts, on the basis of his theory of *Vivarta*, that although destitute of material and instruments of action, Lord (Brahman) may yet produce the world, just as gods by their mere power create palaces, animals, and the like, and as milk by itself turns into curds.[96]

The *Brahma Sūtras* II, ii, 37-41 are directed against those (Māheśvaras, Śaivas) according to whom the Lord is the cause of the world only in so far as he is the general ruler (*adhiṣṭhātā*) or the operative cause, and not the material cause (*upādānam*). The last four sūtras of the section, II, ii, 42-5, are meant to refute the doctrine of the Bhāgavatas who assert that the Lord is the material as well as the operative cause. While agreeing with the view of Bādarāyaṇa, Śaṅkara seems to refute the views of the Māheśvaras and the Bhāgavatas on the basis of his *Vivarta* theory. His ultimate view is that the origin of *jīva* (*Saṅkarṣaṇa*) from the Lord (*Vāsudeva*) is nor real but is *kalpita*, i. e., based on *bhrānti* (*Māyā* or *Vivarta*); the origin of the mind (*Pradyumna*) from *Jīva* and the principle of egoity (*ahaṅkāra*) from the mind is not possible as 'it is not observed that instrument (tool) is produced from the agent (workman) (*na ca kartuḥ karaṇam*). In fact, no 'real' connection is possible between the Lord and the souls, and so on, (*saṁbandhānupapatteś ca*).[97]

The nature of the individual soul is defined in the *Brahma-Sūtra* II, iii, 18 as '*jña*' (*jño 'ta eva*). This means, according to Śaṅkara, that intelligence or knowledge does not, as the Vaiśeṣikas teach, constitute a mere attribute of the soul which in itself is essentially non-intelligent,

96. See Thibaut, *op. cit.*, pp. 346-57.

97. See *Ibid*, pp. 434 ff.; "न च संबन्धः संभवति,......सिद्धान्ते तु अविद्याप्रेरकत्वं कल्पिततादात्म्येनोपपद्यत इतिभावः"—*Brahma-sūtra Vṛtti* by Sadāśivendra Saraswati, 1909, p, 120.

but is the very essence of the soul. The soul is not knower but knowledge ; not intelligent but intelligence (*svayam-jyotiḥ svarūpaḥ*). Rāmānuja, on the other hand, explains "*jña*' as '*jñātṛ*', i.e., knower, knowing agent.[98]

We have thus reviewed in brief Śaṅkara's criticism of the views of some of the earlier schools, opposed to the Vedānta doctrine.

Māyāvāda : The distinctive feature of Śaṅkara's school is the doctrine of *Māyā*. *Māya*, in many hymns of the *Ṛgveda*, is praised as 'the world-sustaining power', but the term in the sense of cunning and adaptation of deceptive forms appears first in "*rūpaṁ rūpaṁ pratirūpo babhūva,......; indro māyābhiḥ pururūpa īyate......*" (*Ṛgveda* VI, 47, 18). In *Praśna-upaniṣad* I, 16, the term is used in the sense of cunning or 'trickery' (*mithyācārarūpā*). In *Śvetāśvatara-upaniṣad* verse : "*māyāṁ tu prakṛtiṁ viddhi māyinaṁ tu maheśvaram*", the power of *Māyā* is attributed to the Lord. The term, as used by Śaṅkara, means the concealment of the real and the projection of the unreal. Śaṅkara's principle of *Maya* or *Avidyā* is *mithyā* or false, yet it is something positive or *bhāvarūpa*. It has thus two aspects. In its negative aspect it conceals (*āvṛnoti*) Reality and acts as a screen to hide it. In its positive aspect it projects (*vikṣipati*) the world of plurality on the basis of Brahman. It is neither real nor unreal (*sadasat-vilakṣaṇā*) ; in other words, it is indescribable as real or unreal (*sadasad-anirvacanīyā*). It is not real for it has no existence apart from Brahman ; it is not unreal, for it projects the world of appearance. It is beginningless (*anādi*). It has a phenomenal and a relative character (*vyāvahārika sattā*). It is an appearance only (*vivarta*). It is of the nature of superimposition (*adhyāsa*). It is an error (*bhrānti*) like that of a 'rope-snake' or a 'shell-silver'. It is wrong cognition or illusion, i.e., Nescience. It is removable by right knowledge (*vijñāna-nirasyā*). When *vidyā* dawns, *avidyā* vanishes. Its substratum or locus (*āśrava*) as well as object (*viṣaya*) is Brahman and yet Brahman is really untouched and unaffected by it.[99]

The entire system of *Advaita* Vedānta is summarised in half a verse : "*brahma satyam jagan mithyā jīvo brahmaiva nāparaḥ*", i.e., 'Brahman is the only reality ; the world is ultimately false ; and the individual soul is non-different from Brahman'. The world is a creation of *Māya*. Śaṅkara is keen to emphasize the phenomenal reality of the world. The phenomenal world is often condemned by Śaṅkara as unreal exactly in the spirit of *Mahāyāna* Buddhism and of Gauḍapāda. It is said to be like mirage-water (*marīcyambhaḥ*), rope-snake (*rajju-sarpa*), shell-silver

98. Thibaut, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 33-5. 99. See C. D. Sharma, *op. cit.*, pp. 385 ff.

(*śukti–rajata*), dusty surface of the sky (*ākāśa-tala-malinatā*), city of Gandharvas (*gandharva-nagara*), illusion (*Māyā*), dream (*svapna*), bubble (*jala-budbuda*), foam (*phena*), moving fire-brand (*alāta-cakra*), illusion of two moons in place of one moon (*dvicandra-darśana*), magic (*indra-jāla*), etc. Like Gauḍapāda, Śaṅkara also uses many words which are commonly used in *Mahāyāna*.[100] The world which cannot be called real either in the beginning or in the end, must be unreal in the middle also.[101]

The *Māyāvāda* of Śaṅkarācārya is criticised by some of the later schools of Indian philosophy, out of which the schools of Rāmānuja and Pratyabhijñā are particularly referred to below.

It is important to survey briefly the views held by some of the teachers of the post-Śaṅkara Vedānta who give their varying explanations to Śaṅkara's doctrines of *Māyā* or *Avidyā*, *Ātman* or *Brahman*, unreality of difference (duality), non-duality, etc., round which doctrinal divergences arose among the later teachers of Vedānta. Maṇḍana holds *Avidyā* (ignorance) as *māyā* (illusion) and *mithyābhāsa* (false appearance). The substrate or locus of *Avidyā* is the individual soul (*Jīva*). Ultimately the *Jīvas* are identical with Brahman but phenomenally they are diverse. Diversity is the product of *Avidyā*. According to Vācaspati also, the locus of *Avidyā* is the *Jīva*. The illusion is psychological for which each individual is himself responsible. Unlike Maṇḍana and Vācaspati, Sureśvara holds that *Avidyā* is based, not on the individual *Jīva*, but on Brahman itself. Brahman is the locus as well as the object of *Avidyā*. Padmapāda, Prakāśātmā and Sarvajñātmā also believe that Brahman itself is the locus as well as the object of *Avidyā*. According to Padmapāda, *Avidyā* is beginningless (*anādi*), material (*jaḍātmikā*) power (*śakti*). Its function is to obstruct the self-revealing nature of Brahman. Prakāśātmā proves that *Avidyā* is something positive (*bhāvarūpā*). Vimuktātmā says that *Avidyā* or *Māyā* is neither identical with nor different from nor both identical with and different from Brahman. For Śrīharṣa also, *Avidyā* is ignorance ; it is positive and material and is indescribable as real or unreal. For Vidyāraṇya too, *Avidyā* is a beginnigless power which is neither real nor unreal. Diversity, says Maṇḍana, is rooted in unity and not vice versa. The unity alone is real while diversity is only an appearance. Reality, says Sureśvara, is one and

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100. See *Ibid.*, p. 384, 390.

101. "आदावन्ते च यन्नास्ति वर्तमानेऽपि तत्तथा"
(Gauḍapāda), *Ibid.*, quoted, p. 366.

so diversity cannot be ultimate. Vācaspati holds, Reality is the pure Self (*svaprakāśa cit*) which is pure consciousness, which can never be contradicted. Padmapāda and Prakāśatmā maintain that consciousness is self-revealing, which is the Self itself (*ātmā saṁvidrūpaḥ*). Maṇḍana tries to prove the ultimate unreality of difference by means of dialectical arguments. Śrīharṣa also asserts the ultimate fact of non-duality as taught in the Upaniṣads. Difference is unreal. Madhusūdan Sarasvati, in his *Ādvaita Siddhi*, proves the truth of non-dualism (*Advaita*). This doctrine in fact, has its essential roots in the Upaniṣadic philosophy.[102]

Rāmānuja and his school of thought: Rāmānuja was born in A.D. 1017 and died in 1137. He thus flourished after the Kashmirian Abhinavagupta, the expounder of the Pratyabhijñā doctrine, had just quitted the scene. Late in his life Rāmānuja came in contact with Yāmunācārya who moulded him to his own thought pattern. It is said that on his death Yāmunācārya indicated his three unfulfilled desires by folding three out of the five fingers of his right hand, which was noticed by Rāmānuja. One of his desires was to write a commentary on the *Brahma Sūtras* according to his view, which was fulfilled by Rāmānuja by writing his *Śrī-bhāṣya*. His commentary on Vedānta Sūtras is an "exposition of what may be called the Theistic Vedānta". Beside this he wrote *Gītā-bhāṣya* and a few other works.[103]

Rāmānuja agrees with Śaṅkarites in maintaing that the Self is an eternal self-conscious subject and that knowledge is its essence. But he differs from them in refusing to indentify the Self with the pure consciousness. There is nothing like pure consciousness. Consciousness is always qualified and possesses specific attributes. It always belongs to a subject and points to a object. The Self is a self-luminous substance to which belongs and from which proceeds consciousness. Knowledge always belongs to and exists for the Self. Hence it is called *dharma-bhūta-jñāna* or attributive knowledge. Knowledge is like the light; the Self is like the lamp; the *dharma-bhūta-jñāna* is like the rays. The rays belong to and proceed from the light and are subject to contraction and expansion. Knowledge is a unique adjunct of the Self and is eternally associated with it. According to Rāmānuja identity is always qualified by difference. Śaṅkara is wrong in saying that Brahman is pure differenceless being. Brahman (Reality) cannot be indeterminate, undifferentiated, qualityless substance. It is determinate and qualified. Brahman is the abode of all good qualities and is the incarnation of all perfection. Brahman is God and He is not formless identity, but an individual, the 'Supreme Person'

102. See *Ibid.*, pp. 414 ff.

103. See *Ibid.*, pp. 486-7.

(*parama-puruṣa*), who is always qualified by matter and souls which constitute his body. They are completely controlled and supported by him for his own ends, and are absolutely subordinate to him.[104] All the individual souls are real spiritual substances which are pervaded by God. In liberation they do not merge in God, but only become similar to him and serve him. Śaṅkara is not correct in saying that the Self is identical with Brahman and absolutely merges in it.[105]

Rāmānuja's view is *Viśiṣṭādvaita* or non-dualism qualified by difference. The Absolute is an organic unity, an identity which is qualified by diversity. It is a concrete whole (*viśiṣṭa*) which consists of the inter-related and interdependent subordinate elements which are called '*Viśeṣaṇas*' and the immanent and controlling spirit which is called '*viśeṣya*'. Unity means the realization of being a vital member of this organic whole (*viśiṣṭāntarbhāva eva aikyam*). God or the Absolute is this whole.[106]

Rāmānuja's objections to Śaṅkara's doctrine : At the outset of his *Śrī-bhāṣya*, Rāmānuja argues point by point Śaṅkara's doctrine in the form of polemic or debate (*Vada*). The various points of Śaṅkara's doctrine are summed up by Rāmānuja in his *Mahā-pūrvapakṣa*. Some of the points refuted by Rāmānuja are, in brief, as follows :- (1) The only Reality is Brahman, which is pure intelligence and opposed to all difference ; and everything alse is essentially false (*mithyā*). (2) The appearance of plurality is due to Avidyā. This entire world, with its distinction of gods, men, animals, inanimate matter, and so on, is, owing to an imperfection (*doṣa*), wrongly imagined (*kalpita*) in the highest Brahman, and therefore is false in so far as it may be sublated by the cognition of the nature of the real Brahman. What constitutes that imperfection (*doṣa*) is beginningless Nescience (*Avidyā*), which, hiding the reality of things, gives rise to manifold illusions, and cannot be defined either as something that is or as something that is not. The lasting truth of things is that intelligence only is real and everything else unreal. (3) *Avidyā* is put an end to by true knowledge. (4) The Upaniṣad texts like *Taitt. Up.* II, i which refers to Brahman as devoid of qualities have greater force. Perception reveals to us non-differenced substance

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104. "सर्वं परमपुरुषेण सर्वात्मना स्वार्थे नियाम्यं धार्यं तच्छेषतैकस्वरूपमिति सर्वं चेतनाचेतनं तस्य शरीरम् ।" *Śri-Bhāṣya* (II, i, 9), *Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit series*, No. LXVIII, p. 414 ; see Thibaut, *The Vedānta Sūtras*, with the Commentary of Rāmānuja, translated, Pt. III, p. 424.

105. See C. D. Sharma, *op. cit*,, pp. 493-6.

106. *Ibid.*, 496-8.

only. All judgements and propositions relative to difference are founded on error only. Difference (*bheda*) does not admit of logical definition. The persisting consciousness only has real being; it alone is. (5) Being and consciousness are one. Consciousness is *svayam-prakāśa* (self-luminous) and is not something which is inferred or proved through some other act of knowledge; but while proving everything else it is proved by itself. (6) Consciousness is eternal and incapable of change, for it is not capable of any form of non-existence, being self-established. The conclusion is that consciousness is free from difference of any kind. (7) The apparent difference between consciousness and the conscious subject is due to unreal *ahaṁkāra*. It is self-luminous consciousness itself which constitutes the so-called 'knower'. Rāmānuja sums up the *pūrvapakṣa* view thus: As the outcome of all this, it follows that 'eternal, absolutely non-changing consciousness, whose nature is pure non-differenced intelligence, free from all distinctions whatever, owing to error illusorily manifests itself (*vivartate*) as broken up into manifold distinctions—knowing subjects, objects of knowledge, acts of knowledge. And the purpose for which we enter on the consideration of the Vedānta-texts is utterly to destroy what is the root of that error, i.e., Nescience, and thus to obtain a firm knowledge of the one-ness of Brahman, whose nature is mere intelligence—free, pure, eternal.'[107]

Rāmānuja criticises the above-mentioned points of Śaṅkara's doctrine, in his *Mahā-siddhānta* as follows, in brief, here:—He says, this entire theory rests on a fictitious foundation of altogether hollow and vicious arguments. (1) There is no proof of non-differenced substance. All means of right knowledge have for their object things affected with difference. All consciousness implies difference. (2) *Śabda* proves difference, as it possesses the power of denoting only such things as are affected with difference. (3) *Pratyakṣa* (perception)—with its two sub-divisions of non-determinate (*nirvikalpaka*) and determinate (*savikalpaka*) perception—also cannot be a means of knowledge for things devoid of difference. (4) The *bhedābheda* view, i.e., the view that there is difference and absence of difference at the same time, is untenable for the same reason as stated in the case of perception. (5) As perception has for its object only what is marked by difference, so inference also shows difference, for its object is only what is distinguished by its connection with things known through perception and other means of knowledge. (6) Perception does not reveal mere being, and, as such, it cannot be devoid of difference for

107. Thibaut, *op. cit.* Commentary of Rāmānuja, pp. 20-39; See *Śrī-bhāṣya*, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-27.

its object. It is through the apprehension of difference only that the idea of non-difference comes to an end. (7) Plurality is not unreal. The view that all difference presented in our cognition—as of jars, pieces of cloth and the like—is unreal because such difference does not persist, is altogether erroneous. Where two cognitions are mutually contradictory, as in the case of the illusion of snake on a piece of rope, the difference presented in our cognition is certainly unreal, because the cognition of what is sublated (snake) does not persist. But cognitions of jars, pieces of cloth and the like, do not contradict one another, since they are separate in place and time; hence in their case, the difference is not unreal. (8) Being and consciousness are not one. Hence mere being does not alone constitute reality. And as the distinction between consciousness and its objects is proved by perception, the assertion that only consciousness has real existence is also disposed of.

(9) As to the *svayam-prakāśatva* (self-luminousness) of consciousness, there is no absolute rule as to all consciousness never being anything but self-luminous. For common observation shows that the consciousness of one person may become the object of the cognition of another. It cannot be said that a person's own past states of consciousness, and the conscious states of others—because being objects of knowledge—are not themselves consciousness. (10) Consciousness is not eternal. The pūrvapakṣin maintains that as consciousness is self-established it has no antecedent non-existence and so on, and that this disproves its having an origin. The teacher replies, it is wrong to say that there is nothing to make us apprehend that non-existence, for there is something to make us apprehend it, viz., consciousness itself. (11) There is no consciousness without object. Its essential nature consists in illuminating objects. (12) Consciousness is capable of change. (13) Consciousness is the attribute of a permanent conscious Self. It cannot be asserted that consciousness constitutes the Self. The Self, in fact, is not mere knowledge, but is the knowing 'I'. (14) The view that the conscious subject is something unreal, due to *ahaṁkāra*, cannot be maintained. From this it would follow that consciousness which is erroneously imagined as the Self is also false. (15) The conscious subject persists in deep sleep, for from the reflection of a person risen from deep sleep, it appears that even during sleep the Self, i.e., the 'I', was a knowing subject and perceptive of pleasure and not 'pure consciousness free from all egoity......' (16) The conscious subject persists in the state of release. The view that the consciousness of the 'I' does not persist in the state of final release is altogether inappropriate. It in fact amounts to the doctrine that final release is the annihilation of the Self. The 'I' constitutes the very nature of the Self, that persists after release. (17) In cases of scripture conflicting with

perception, scripture is not stronger. The teacher comes to the logical conclusion that 'the Brahman under dispute is false because it is the object of knowledge which has sprung from what is affected with Nescience, as the phenomenal world is'; it is difficult indeed to show that knowledge of a true thing, viz., Brahman, can be derived from Scripture, if Scripture—as based on Nescience—is itself untrue.

(18) Rāmānuja strongly attacks the Śaṅkarite theory of Nescience (*Māyā* or *Avidyā*) and levels seven important charges *(anupapatti)* against the theory: (i) *Āśrayānupapatti*—'What is the substrate (or locus) of this Nescience which gives rise to the great error of plurality of existence?' It cannot exist in 'the individual soul'; for the individual soul itself exists in so far only as it is fictitiously imagined through Nescience. Nor can it exist in Brahman; for Brahman is nothing but self-luminous intelligence, and hence contradictory in nature to Nescience, which is avowedly sublated by knowledge. Thus *Māyā* or *Avidyā* cannot exist either in Brahman or in *Jīva*. It is an illusory concept, a figment of the Advaitin's imagination. (ii) *Tirodhānānupapatti*—How can *Māyā* or *Avidyā* conceal Brahman? If Brahman is of the nature of self-luminosity, it is absurd to say that *Māya* (ignorance) veils its essence just as darkness can hide light. You thereby assert the destruction of Brahman's essential nature. (iii) *Svarūpānupapatti*—What is the nature of *Māyā* or *Avidyā*? Is it positive or negative or both or neither? All the four alternatives involve self-contradiction. (iv) *Anirvacanīyatvānupapatti*—*Avidyā* is defined by the Advaitins as indefinable or indescribable which means that it is neither real nor unreal. But this is absurd. If we should assume that of states of consciousness which are limited to this double form (*sat* and *asat*), the object can be something which is neither existing nor non-existing, then anything whatever might be the object of any state of consciousness whatever. (v) *Pramāṇānupapatti*—By what *pramāṇa* or means of valid cognition is *Avidya* cognised? It can neither be perceived nor inferred; scriptures declare *Māyā* to be a real power of God by which this wonderful world is created. (vi) *Nivartakānupapatti* (or *nivartaka-jñānānupapatti*)—There is no remover of *Avidyā*. The Advaitin believes that knowledge of Brahman removes *Avidyā*, but the knowledge of unqualified attributeless Brahman is not possible. (vii) *Nivṛtyanupapatti*—*Avidyā* (Nescience) which is said to be positive (*bhāvarūpa*), cannot be terminated by the simple act of cognising Brahman as the Universal Self. The bondage of the soul is something real, a concrete thing, being due to *Karma*; it cannot be put to an end by abstract knowledge. The bondage can be removed by '*karma, jñāna, bhakti* and *prasāda*'. The ignorance of the soul is destroyed when the *karmas* are destroyed. The cessation of bondage is said to be ultimately

obtained through the grace of the highest Self pleased by the devout meditation of the worshipper. Rāmānuja further says that Scripture does not teach that release is due to the knowledge of a non-qualified Brahman. The Śruti : '*tat tvam asi*' (Thou art That) does not convey the idea of the absolute unity of a non-differenced substance ; on the contrary, the words 'that' and 'thou' denote a Brahman distinguished by difference.[108]

The Pratyabhijñā School; its distinctive features : The Pratyabhijñā School emerged about two centuries before the time of Rāmānuja. As already stated above, the originators of the school flourished in the ninth and tenth centuries of the Christian era, just after Śaṅkara's exit. The Pratyabhijñā is also one of the schools, certainly earlier than that of Rāmānuja, that levelled vehement criticism against Śaṅkara's school of Vedānta as well as Buddhist thought which appears to be the possible basis of Śaṅkara's phenomenalism. As has been pointed out by Thibaut, Rāmānuja's criticism against the school of Śaṅkara "shows evident traces of being not the mere outcome of Rāmānuja's individual views, but of resting on an old and weighty tradition."[109] This tradition can be traced, in Kashmir, to the *Śivadṛṣṭi* of Somānanda, the founder of the Pratyabhijñā school, who criticises, perhaps for the first time, the views held by the various schools of 'Vedāntavādins' like those who believe in the phenomenality of the world and hence its unreality (*ātmabrahmaiva... bhrāntirūpatām yāti ; viśvaṁ na satya-rūpatvam*), the theory of *Avidyā* abiding in Brahman being the cause of unreality of objects (*avidyaiva kalpyā brahmaṇi saṁgatā tathā bhāveṣv asatyatvam*), the *Vivarta* theory of *Citrabrahmavādins*, the 'reflection' theory of *pratibimbavādins*, and so on,[110] though none of these theories is ascribed to Śaṅkara.

As already stated, two distinct lines of thought are embedded in the Pratyabhijñā-Śāstra. The first, comprising the theological speculations or the Āgamic tenets of the system, has already been traced in the preceding chapter. In the *Pratyabhijñā-hṛdayam* of Rājānaka Kṣemarāja, this forms a predominant part. The second, viz., the purely philosophical content of the Śāstra, plays a primary role in Utpaladeva's *Pratyabhijñā Kārikā*, which has a quite different context and a direct bearing with the Vedic systems of thought. This is also, no doubt, the outcome of the thought which found expression in the Vedānta and Buddhist schools. The central idea of the philosophy proper of the school, as formulated in a

108. Thibaut, *op. cit.*, Commentary of Rāmānuja, pp. 39-156. See *Śrī-bhāṣya*, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-132 ; See also C. D. Sharma, *op. cit.*, pp. 514 ff.
109. Thibaut, *The Vedānta Sūtras*, *SBE* Part I, p. xvii.
110. See *ŚD* VI, 3-4, 8-17.

systematic order in the four books (*adhikāras*) of *IPK*, is in brief as follows:—

The teacher states in Book I (*Jñānādhikāra*), 'recognition' (*Pratyabhijñā*) of Maheśvara (the Great Lord, the Ultimate Reality) is the means of accomplishing all the highest human achievements, viz., prosperity, felicity and beatitude (*samasta sampat*).[111] This Maheśvara is no other than one's personal Self (*Ātman*). Thus the system holds that the means to the realization of the Ultimate Reality (*Maheśvara*) is "Self-recognition" ; it is not knowledge or cognition (*jñana*) of the unknown but recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) of the already known ; i.e., it is related not to the unknown but to the known, for the Self has never before been unrealized (*nānanubhūta-pūrvaḥ*).[112] On the other hand, '*Jñāna*' implies that 'the knowledge of the Self' is lacking before its attainment. The system considers 'Self-recognition' as the end and object of a philosophical quest, not 'knowledge' (*jñāna*) of the Self, as it is according to the Vedānta system This is the one striking point of difference between the Pratyabhijñā and the Vedānta systems.

The system maintains that the Self (*Ātman*) is the Supreme Lord (Maheśvara) who is endowed with the powers of 'Action' and 'Cognition', as his two primary powers. He possesses also the Sovereignty of will (*Māheśvarya*) as his another power,[113] i.e., the soul is endowed with 'the absolute liberty and autonomy of consciousness'. Somānanda, the teacher of Utpaladeva, also states in his *Śivadṛṣṭi* that Śiva Who is the 'essence and identity' (Self) of every being is 'an unrestricted stream of will (free will) and a spontaneous flow of Cognition and Activity'.[114] The question arises, as the Self (Ātman) is a fact of everybody's experience (*ādi-siddha*) being the self-luminous Maheśvara, all talk of proving or disproving His existence, or for that matter his realization, is in vain. The teacher replies, although *Ātman* is self-luminous, i.e., a fact of everybody's experience, yet his real nature is not manifest due to his own deluding power (*Māyā-vimohinī-śakti*). The same becomes manifest by his own perceiving power (*dṛkkriyātmikā-śakti*).[115] It is the 'recognitive insight' (*pratyabhijñā*) which revives the perceiving power. The teacher next establishes that Māheśvara is not only the Self of sentient beings, but is also the Self of insentient objects, because the existence of the latter depends upon the sentient beings. The powers of knowledge and action are the very life of the living beings.[116] Thus in their very manifestation the insentient objects are also endowed with these two powers. Out of these two, the power of

111. *IPK* I, i, 1.
112. See *Supra*, p. 109.
113. *IPK* I, i, 2.
114. *ŚD* I, 2.
115. *IPK* I, i, 3.
116. *Ibid.*, 4.

knowledge is self-established (*svataḥ-siddham*); so also is the power of action. The latter, when associated with a particular body, is perceptible to other limited perceivers. It is from action that the existence of the power of knowledge in others is inferred.[117] Thus knowledge and action are inter-dependent in relation to sentients as well as insentients.

A discussion is introduced to refute the theory, propounded by the Buddhist Saugatas, that the perceiving Self is not a permanent being. The theory is based on the Buddhist doctrine of general momentariness. Utpaladeva rejects the theory mainly on the ground of the phenomenon of remembrance. If the experiencing Self were not permanent, how can there arise memory?[118] The teacher concludes the discussion saying, if there be not one permanent Self, who is essentially self-luminous and possesses the powers of remembrance, knowledge and differentiation, the settled order of the world will come to an end.[119] The nature and function of these three powers, *Smṛti-śakti*, *Jñāna-śakti* and *Apohana-śakti*, are further discussed comprehensively. It is also established that these three powers rest in one substratum, the permanent Self (*Ātman*). Finally, in the Book I of *IPK*, the teacher explains the nature and function of the Sovereignty of the Lord's will (*Māheśvarya*), viz., 'the absolute liberty and autonomy of consciousness'.[120] Here a new theory is set forth, viz., *Svātantrya-vāda*, the Universal Voluntarism.

Svātantrya-vāda is the chief doctrine of the Pratyabhijñā school. It explains the Lord's self-dependent power which evolves into the world of diverse nature, and 'the sovereignty of the Lord's will' which imparts the impetus to the process of the creation. According to *Svātantrya-vāda*, the Lord is *sarva-kriyā-svatantra*, i.e., free (*svatantra*) in all his actions from the internal stir (*antarīya-spandana*) to the external stir (*bahir-spandana* or *unmeṣa*). It is the self-dependent power (*svātantrya-śakti*) of the Lord which causes the multiplicity and diversity of effects from the one Supreme Cause (*tat sāmarthyam svātantryam*).[121]

In Book II, (*Kriyādhikāra*), which treats of the power of Action or physical activity, the teacher says that the whole creation is the result of the *Kriyā Śakti* of the Ultimate Reality. It fuctions under the operation of its three laws, viz., the law of Division (*bhedābheda*), the law of Perception

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117. *Ibid.*, 5.
118. *Ibid.*, ii, 3; see *Bhāskarī* III, p. 22.
119. *IPK* I, iii, 6 and 7.
120. See *Ibid.* iv-viii.
121. चितिः प्रत्यवमर्शात्मा परावाक्स्वरसोदिता ।
स्वातन्त्र्यमेतन्मुख्यं तदैश्वर्यं परमात्मनः ॥ *IPK* I, v, 13.
The Kārikā implies that 'the universe is the concretisation or manifestation of the free Universal Mind or Will (*cittiḥ*)'. See *Bhāskarī* III, Introduction, p. ccv; see also K. C. Pandey, *Abhinavagupta*, pp. 203–4.

(*māna tat phala meya*) and the law of Causation (*kāraṇa-kārya*), and thus turns into the constituent power (*Nirmāṇa-śakti*) which brings into existence (or manifests) the whole cosmos comprising the variety of subjects and objects.[122] Utpaladeva first discusses about the nature of *Kriyā-śakti*. The Bauddha views the action purely objectively and holds it a series being characterised by succession (*krama*) and therefore multiple which is contrary to the nature of the Self which is, in essence, devoid of plurality. The Pratyabhijñā asserts the multiple nature of action as observed externally, but this action, taking it in its subjective or internal aspect, is only an expression of the will of the individual and the will is one because of the oneness of the purpose that it aims at. Thus action, taken in both of its aspects, is unity in multiplicity : the unity is internal and subjective and multiplicity is external and objective.[123] *Kāla-śakti* (the time factor) is responsible for the plurality of *Kriyā* (action),[124] viz., plurality is the result of perception of an object at different moments of time. The time is in reality the succession observable in the movements of the sun and other planets, in production of different flowers (in different seasons) and in the alternation of summer and winter seasons.[125] The Self possessing *Kriyā-śakti* as one of his powers is unaffected by *Kāla-śakti* and is thus free from the nature of plurality. *Kriyā-śakti* is responsible for the manifestation of temporal and spatial orders, but it is free from the temporal and spatial limitations. This is explained by the theory of Manifestation, *Ābhāsa-vāda*, which is also a newly-coined theory in the Pratyabhijñā system.

According to *Ābhāsa-vāda*, *Ātman*, the Supreme Lord (Maheśvara) is the manifester of diverse manifestations (*citrābhāsa-kṛt-prabhuḥ*)[126] in the form of the various objects of the universe. The *Kāla-śakti* of this Lord (*Ātman*) differentiates various manifestations at different moments of time as distinct entities. 'The Lord makes the spatial succession manifest by means of the manifestations of bodies (*mūrti-vaicitrya*) and the temporal succession by means of the manifestation of the variety (of forms) in action (*kriyā-vaicitrya*)'.[127] Almost similar to *Vivarta-vāda* of Vedānta

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122. *IPV* II, ii, iii and iv,
किं तु निर्माणशक्तिः साप्येवं विदुष ईशितुः ।
तथा विज्ञातृविज्ञेय-भेदो यदवभास्यते । *IPK* II, i, 8.
123. *Ibid*. II. i ; see *Bhāskarī* III, Introduction, pp. cciii–iv.
124. सक्रमत्वं च लौकिक्याः क्रियायाः कालशक्तितः । *IPK* II, i, 2.
125. कालः सूर्यादिसंचारस्तत्तत्पुष्पादिजन्म वा ।
शीतोष्णे वाथ तल्लक्ष्यः क्रम एव स तत्त्वतः ॥ *Ibid*., 3.
126. *Ibid*., 4. 127. *Ibid*., 5.

school, *Ābhāsavāda* also holds the world objects as manifestations or *Ābhāsas*. Whereas in the Śaṅkara's system of Vedānta, the *Ābhāsas* are fictitious and hence unreal, in the Pratyabhijñā system, the manifested objects are real as they exist in the Supreme Reality. i.e., they appear on the background of the Self (*Svātmabhitti*). Thus we have two aspects of the Self, *Prakāśa* and *Vimarśa*; the one (former) stands as the substratum of manifestations and the other is the process of manifestations going upon this substratum. On the basis of *Ābhāsavāda*, the dualism involved in the relations of plurality and unity (*Bhedābheda*); 'subject', 'awareness' and 'object' (*Pramātā*, *Pramāṇa* and *Prameya*); and cause and effect (*Kāraṇa-kārya*) is explained in conformity with the doctrine of Monism (*Advaita*). Ultimately there exists unity in plurality i.e., the law of Division. This is the first or the fundamental law of *Kriyā-śakti* of which the other two laws, the law of Perception and the law of Causation, are derivatives or corallaries. The three laws are comprehensively discussed in the three separate sections of *Kriyādhikāra*.[128] In spite of the multiplicity of the universe, the school rejects dualism, and accepts Concrete Monism as opposed to Abstract Monism (to put it in Hegelian term) that looks upon the whole universe as mere illusion. The universe is the concretisation (materialization) or manifestation (externalization) of the Supreme Reality (Maheśvara).[129] The unity of the Supreme Reality or the Lord remains unaffected in spite of the multiplicity of the universe manifested in it. The universe has no existence separately from and independently of the Supreme Being. Ultimatety the one Lord is both the manifester, subject (*aham*), and the manifested, object (*idam*).

In Book (III) *Āgamādhikāra*, the manifested world is analysed into thirty-six *Tattvas*, the essential principles of creation, from *Śiva*, the highest principle, to the earth, the principle of solidity. This is indeed an elaborate analysis of the the Universal Energy (*Śakti*), 'primordial natural force-principle' or the *prima materia* of all things, to put it in terms of the Western Philosophy. The doctrine of *Tattvas* is also found in other systems of Śaivism with slight variations. Initially the Sāṁkhya school enumerates 25 *Tattvas*. Kashmir Śaivas bring the total number of Tattvas to 36.[130]

The fourth book (*Tattvārthasaṅgrahādhikāra*) explains the essential nature of the Supreme Being which is the Self of all the living beings.[131]

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128. *IPV* II, ii, iii, iv. 129. See *Supra*, fn. 121.
130. *IPV* III, i. See chart against *Supra* p. 12.
131. स्वात्मैव सर्वजन्तूनामेक एव महेश्वरः। *IPK* IV, i. 1.

The *summum bonum* of the system is to 'recognise' the supreme inheritance and free nature of the Self, and to realize that all this world is one's own creation.[132] Thus fully knowing the Self and its highest potential powers of Cognition and Action, the aspirant thinks and acts aright and accomplishes all his desired objects.[133] When one recognises one's profounder Self, he attains all that is of highest value and may achieve the transcendental power (*siddhi*) without much effort.[134] Somānanda also says, if the nature of fire is known that it gives light and heat, we can make proper use of it for lighting our houses and for other purposes. Similarly by knowing the value and the qualities of gold we can make proper use of it. Thus if the nature of *Śiva-ātman* (Self) is known, proper use of his powers—*icchā*, *jñāna* and *kriyā*—will enable us to accomplish our desired objects of highest value.[135]

The above gives in brief the central idea of the doctrine as enunciated in the Pratyabhijñā Śāstra. It will be observed that, in this school, the conception of the Ultimate Reality (*Maheśvara*) has changed from that of the Vedāntin's Brahman symbolising only pure universal consciousness (*sat-cid-ānanda*). The Ultimate Reality in the Pratyabhijñā system is recognised as of the nature of *Prakāśa* and *Vimarśa* (its two aspects), which symbolise respectively universal consciousness and physical activity in nature. It is owing to these two aspects of the Ultimate Reality that the universe consists of mind and matter—subjects and objects. The Psychological phenomena are attributed to the *Jñātṛtva Śakti* (Omniscience) of Maheśvara, and the physical phenomena to His *Kartṛtva Śakti* (Omnipotence). *Ātman*, the individual self, is *prakāśa-vimarśa-maya*. *Prakaśa* makes Ātman conscious of itself and *Vimarśa* makes him conscious of the external object world. According to Somānanda, Maheśvara (Reality), in its creative aspect (*vimarśa*), is vibration (*ghūrṇana*), stir or movement (*spanda*), creative outburst (*uccalatā*). It is Śiva's sentience (i.e., consciousness) which, when it tends

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132. सर्वो ममायं विभव इत्येवं परिजानतः । *Ibid.*, 12.

133. एवमात्मानमेतस्य सम्यग्ज्ञानक्रिये तथा ।
जानन्यथेप्सितान्पश्यञ्जानाति च करोति च ॥ *Ibid.*, 15.

It is impossible for a man who truely sees God in all things to err.

It is generally held that in the abstract Monism of Śaṅkara's system of Vedānta, there is no place for practical life and ethical values; nor does it meet the epistemic necessity. In the Pratyabhijñā system no such objections can arise.

134. जनस्यायत्नसिद्ध्यर्थं ......*Ibid.* IV, ii, 3.

135. *ŚD* VII, 3, 6, 10, 23, 29. See *Supra*, p. 105.

towards the creation of diversified objects, shines forth (*vikasati*) and expands (*sphurati*) as wonderful manifestation (*camatkāra, sphūrti*) or amazing vibration (*jṛmbha, ghūrṇanam*). Such being the nature of the Self, all our activities of physical or psychic order, are produced, originally, from a kind of tension, or urge which unfolds inside us. This tension (*vimarśa*) or an element of 'drive', of 'urge', of an 'inner conation' (*saṁrambha, aunmukhya, udyoga, samudyama*) is the most intimate and central activity of consciousness. In short, all forms of our knowledge as well as the objects of knowledge come from *Prakāśa* (luminosity) and *Vimarśa* (stir, movement) innate in the Self (*Ātman, Śiva*).[136]

Differences between Pratyabhijñā and Vedānta: There are so many points common to the Pratyabhijñā system and the Vedānta, yet these two schools are different from each other in many respects. As regards the fundamental differences between the two, the Śaiva argues as follows: According to the Vedānta, the nature of Brahman (the Ultimate Reality) is *sat, cit* and *ānanda*, i.e., existence, consciousness and bliss. It is of the nature of changeless or inactive consciousness (*śānta-cit*), but lacks in *Vimarśa* which implies changing nature (*kṣobhatvam*) and activity (*Kriyā*), viz., the innate power of expansion into the cosmos.[137] *Vimarśa* is lacking in Brahman as it is contrary to its tranquil or inactive nature (*śānta-cidrūpatvam*). *Vimarśa* of *Śaivas* is, according to the Vedāntins, a form of *Vikalpa*, i.e., superimposition or illusion. On this point the Śaiva says, it is illogical to hold *Vimarśa* as *Vikalpa* and thus to attribute an unlike characteristic (*Vijātīya-dharma*) to Brahman.[138] Hence, the Vedāntins will have to accept *Vimarśa* not as *Vikalpa*, but as a real characteristic of Brahman which qualifies him to be of the changing nature (*kṣobhatvam*). According to the Śaivas, Śiva is all-powerful and is endowed with both *Prakāśa* and *Vimarśa*. *Prakāśa* is the pure consciousness unaffected by material change, which is almost equivalent to the Vedāntins' '*Sat-cid-ānandam Brahma*'. And *Vimarśa* is the activity, the changing nature (*kṣobhatvam*). Both *Prakāśa* and *Vimarśa* are innate in Śiva. It cannot be supposed that something extraneous causes in Śiva the nature of changing into the form of the universe, as the Vedāntins do in attributing Nescience (*Māyā*) to Brahman for causing the superimposition (*adhyāsa*) of the world in itself as its

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136. See *Supra*, pp. 66-7.

137. तदेव च शान्तचिद्रूपत्वम्। शान्तत्वं हि विमर्शाख्यक्षोभरहितत्वमेव तेषामिष्टम्। *Bhāskarī* I, p. 10.

138. विमर्शस्य हि ते विकल्पत्वाशंकया क्षोभत्वमेव शंकते। न च तद्युक्तम्, विजातीयस्या-गन्तुकस्य धर्मस्यैव तत्त्वात्। *Ibid*.

substratum. Nothing extraneous causes the power of burning in the fire, but it is innate in the fire. The nature of *Vimarśa* is thus innate in Śiva. The Śaiva further questions: How can Brahman be of the nature of *Vikalpa*, since the Vedāntins themselves admit Brahman as assuming the forms of *Jīvas* which is evident from the Śruti: '*yathāgneḥ kṣudrā visphuliṅgā vyuccaranty evam eva asmād ātmanaḥ ... sarvāṇi bhūtāni vyuccaranti*' (*Bṛ. Up.* II, i, 20), i.e., *Jīvas* evolve from Brahman as sparks from the fire (*agni-kaṇa-nyāyena*). In support of this doctrine another Śruti is quoted: "*anena jīvena anupraviśya nāma-rūpe vyākaravāṇi*", i.e., the Self transforming itself into diverse creations assumes various names and forms. From this it is clear that *Jīva* is of the nature of Brahman. As, according to the Vedāntins, Brahman lacks the *Parāmarśa-śakti*, viz., the power of differentiating between subjects and objects, *Jīva* should also lack it.[139] Thus its very existence as *Jīva* becomes null and void. But, just as we find that a spark has by its nature the power of burning which originally belongs to the fire from which the spark evolves, so we must admit that *Parāmarśa-śakti* is innate in Brahman from which *Jīva* imbibes it. The Vedāntin objects to this point and says that *Vimarśa* arises in *Jīva* by adopting *upādhi* (body).[140] The Śaiva questions: Can smoke arise from water in an *upādhi* (pitcher) of wood? *Upādhi* means that which conditions limitation to holding capacity. Thus *upādhi* renders *Jīva* limited in powers,[141] but *Vimarśa* cannot arise in *Jīva* by adopting an *upādhi*. The Vedāntin accepts *Māyā-śakti* as the principle that divides Brahman into limited forms. On this point the Śaiva questions: Is *Māyā-śakti* innate in *Jīva* or Brahman? It cannot be supposed to be innate in *Jīva* as, in that case, the division into *Jīva* and Brahman is impossible. If *Māyā-śakti* is supposed to be innate in Brahman, then its purity will be impaired by limitation which is contrary to the nature of Brahman.[142] On this inconsistency the Vedāntin says that, in essence,

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139. तत्र च यदि ब्रह्मणः सा परामर्श-शक्तिर्नास्ति जीवस्य कुत आगच्छेत्, अग्निचयदाहक-शक्तिपूर्वकं तत्कणदाह-शक्ति-दर्शनात्। *Ibid.*, p. 12.

140. ननु देहाद्युपाधिना सात्र स्फुरिता? *Ibid.*

141. न, इन्धनोपाधिना जलादपि धूमं उत्तिष्ठेत्,
परिमितभावस्तु यद्युपाधिकृत उच्यते, उच्यताम्। *Ibid.*

142. सा किं जीवनिष्ठा ब्रह्मनिष्ठा वा। यदि जीवनिष्ठा तदा तत्पूर्वसिद्धस्य जीवब्रह्म-विभागस्य तत्कृतत्वकथनमयुक्तम्। ......अथ ब्रह्मनिष्ठा तदस्य शुद्धत्वमसम्भवोपहतमेव। *Ibid.*

Maya is not a real thing.[143] 'What is it then ?', the Śaiva asks. The Vedāntin says, it is of the nature of illusion by which one appears in the form of many. 'What is the essential nature (*rūpa*) of this *Māyā* ?', the Śaiva asks. The Vedāntin says, it is of the nature of ignorance (*Avidyā*). The Śaiva questions : Is it of the positive character (*bhāva-rūpā*) or of the negative character (*abhāva-rūpā*), i.e., characterised by the absence of knowledge (*jñānābhāva-rūpā*) ? In the latter case, i.e., in the absence of knowledge, there will not be the manifestation of diverse objects. It will also be impossible for the pure Brahman to become the substratum of the impure world which is of the nature of illusion,[144] for then it will be reduced to nothingness (*abhāva-rūpam*). As to the other alternative, the Śaiva questions, what is the nature of this positive entity, i.e., the ignorance of positive character (*bhāva-rūpā*) ? The Vedāntin replies, it is inexplicable (*anirvācyā*). The Śaiva says, if so, how do you call it *Māyā* ? The Vedāntin replies, 'inexplicably' (*anirvācyatayā iti*). Then, the Śaiva arrives at the conclusion that *Māyā* is the same as Brahman, as the Śruti speaks of Brahman '*Yato vāco nivartante...*' (from whom all expressions become void). Thus Vedāntin will have to accept *Māyā* and Brahman as identical, having the power (*śakti*) to assume the form of the world. The Śaiva holds that *Māyā-sakti* is innate in Śiva (*sva-svarūpa-bhūtā*).[145]

The general veiw of the Vedāntins is that the universe is false, having a visionary existence, the cause of which is the beginningless *Avidyā* (a sort of ignorance). The Śaiva says, if *Avidyā* is false, it cannot be the cause of this universe which has been existing from times immemorial. How can a thing, which is false and unsubstantial, bring into existence anything substantial ? It is not clear as to whom this *Avidyā* involves. It cannot involve Brahman which is ever pure, all-knowledge and all-bliss. Now it could involve a limited soul, but no limited soul, according to Vedānta, does really ever exist. It is only Brahman that exists. So Vedānta leaves this problem unsolved. In view of the Śaivas, the universe is not false. It is real ; the universe exists. It always existed in the all-pervading Śiva. He has both the transcendental aspect (*parā* or *anuttarā daśā*) and the universal aspect (*aparā daśā*) as his nature is both *Prakāśa* and *Vimarśa* ; *Prakāśa* is pure luminosity and pure consciousness, and *Vimarśa*, which is given another name *Spanda*, implies vibration-like activity. It is, in fact, his luminosity which is called *Śakti* or his energy.

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143. ननु माया परमार्थंत: किमपि वस्तु न विद्यते एव । *Ibid.*

144. न च शुद्धस्य ब्रह्मणो मलिन-जगदधिष्ठानत्वं युक्तम् । *Ibid.* p. 13.

145. See (i) *Bhāskari* I, pp. 10-14 and (ii) R. K. Kaw, Art. 'The Doctrine of Recognition', *Sharada Peetha Research Series* II, pp. 66-72.

This energy of Śiva is a sort of stir in him. Therefore, the Lord is not lifelessly tranquil like space. But he exists as Śiva, and is, therefore, always full of energy, which is a divine stir in him. That stir is always making this universe of limited subjects and objects appear in countless and varying forms. Both aspects of Śiva (*parā* and *aparā*) are true in reality. How can, therefore, a person dispense with the universe as something visionary and absolutely false.[146]

Concluding remark: In the annals of the development of Vedāntic thought, the emergence of Śaṅkara's school is an important landmark as it demarcates the ancient Vedānta from the later or '*Śaṅkara*' Vedānta.[147] The view of the later Vedāntins, viz., Śaṅkarites, is absolutely different from the ancient Vedānta which latter holds *Māyā* as the power of the Supreme Lord by which he creates the world. According to this veiw the world is real, as *Māyā* is not an illusive principle. The view of the Śaṅkarites that there is absolute identity of *Jīva* and Brahman is not correct according to the ancient theory of *Bhedābheda*, identity-in-difference. The theory of identity of power and its bearer holds that nothing is unreal if it originated from the power of the real Brahman. The Upaniṣads have preached this powerful or energetic nature of Brahman. Bādarāyaṇa has maintained this view in his *Brahma Sūtras.* Gauḍapāda has realized this nature of the Self and there are clear hints to this effect found in his Kārikās. Even Śaṅkara has at places expressed this view. But, in spite of all this, this view-point has not been clearly asserted or maintained by the Vedāntins. All the major works on the Vedānta have emphasised the falsehood of the universe and the passive tranquility and inertness of Brahman. There are two points of view expressed in the Upaniṣads regarding the nature of Brahman. One is the positive approach, as in the expressions: "everything is Brahman", "I am Brahman", "thou art that," and so on;[148] the other is the negative approach, as in "*Brahman* is not this", "He is not that",[149] and so on. But it is this latter approach which has become popular with the Vedāntins and has been responsible for all the criticism against the Vedānta.[150]

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146. See B. N. Pandit, Art. 'Kashmir Śaivism', *Jammu and Kashmir University Review* (Vol. II, No. 1), May 1959.

147. G.S. Waray calls, inappropriately, "*Śaṅkara* Vedānta" as "Modern Vedānta", in his research paper: 'Non-difference of Sāṁkhya and Vedānta in ancient times', 21st *AIOC*, 1961, *Summary of Papers*, p. 171.

148. "सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म" ; "अहं ब्रह्मास्मि" ; "तत् त्वमसि" ।

149. "स (आत्मा) नेति नेति..."

150. See B. N. Pandit, Art. 'Kashmir Śaivism', *op. cit.*

As is noticed above, the history of the later Vedānta begins with the system of Śaṅkarācārya. In the course of time the doctrine of *Māyā*, as taught by Śaṅkara, invited criticism from the Vedāntins like Bhāskara, who is probably not removed from Śaṅkara by more than two centuries. Rāmānujācārya joined Bhāskara in vehemently criticising Śaṅkara's interpretation of the Upaniṣads and the *Brahma-sūtras*. Rāmānuja was followed by Ācāryas like Nimbārka, Mādhava, Vallabha and Caitanya and many other saints and religious teachers. They also criticised Śaṅkarācārya. Vallabhācārya (1473-1531 A.D.) tells us that he was asked by Lord Kṛṣṇa to appear in the world and to offer a correct interpretation of the Upaniṣads and the *Brahma-sūtras*, as these sacred works were misrepresented by Śaṅkarācārya. Accordingly he taught a system of Vedānta known as *Śuddhādvaita*. It clearly shows that the non-duality, as taught by the Upaniṣads can be very well explained even without the help of *Māya*, which appears in the system of Śaṅkara.[151] The teachers of the Pratyabhijñā school also revelled in criticising Śaṅkarācārya's theory of *Māya* and the dreamlike or illusive character of the world. The Pratyabhijñā is, in fact, almost in full accord with the ancient Vedānta, although it does not acknowledge the authority of the Vedic scriptures for its thought, which it attributes only to the Āgamas.

It will be important to point out here that, in the Pratyabhijñā system, *Ābhāsa-vāda* has replaced the *Vivarta-vāda* of Śaṅkara's system; the two theories are not, in fact, much different from one another, since both maintain the phenomenality of the world with a slight variation in its interpretation, and hold the world objects as manifestations or *ābhāsas*. The only difference between the two lies in the point that the *ābhāsas* in the Pratyabhijñā system are real in nature, whereas those in Śaṅkara's system are fictitious and illusive (dreamlike) and hence unreal. Both the theories are later developments in the Indian philosophy. It will be observed that Bādarāyaṇa as well as Somānanda, the early teachers of the Vedānta and the Pratyabhijñā schools, respectively, made a realistic approach to the problem of the universe. Both establish the world as the actual transformation or materialization of the Supreme Reality (Brahman or Maheśvara) by instances like clay changing into pots or gold into ornaments and so on. Another example, that the creation of the world is like the creation of the Yogin or an individual in dreams, as given both by Somānanda and

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151. See G. H. Bhatt, Art. 'The System of Vallabhācārya', *The Cultural Heritage of India*, I, 597.

Bādarāyaṇa to illustrate the emanation of the universe from the Absolute Reality, cannot prove that idealism is first taught by them. The latter example simply illustrates that the Ultimate Being possessing wonderous powers undergoes change in various ways and yet remains as one changeless and eternal Supreme Principle. The idealism is a later growth in the Vedānta system and the Pratyabhijñā philosophy, as Śaṅkarācārya as well as Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta appear to have been under the direct influence of the Buddhist phenomenalism. It may be possible that Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta were directly under the influence of Śaṅkara's philosophy as has been noticed by Gough and Bühler. Bādarāyaṇa and Somānanda even admit the diversity (*bheda-bhāva*) in the nature in respect of the multiplicity of objects, sentient and insentient, as well as the absence of diversity or non-dualism (*abheda-bhāva*) in relation to One Ultimate Reality being the only principle of life and growth in all the created beings. The Upaniṣads which are admittedly the common reservoir of both the systems, impress this very fact, viz., that one Universal Self is immanent in the cosmos consisting of great elements, luminous planets, etc., nay in every form of life and growth and the subtle powers of seeing, hearing and so on. This shows that, in the earlier stages, the teachers of the two systems (Bādarāyaṇa and Somānanda) taught the unity-in-multiplicity and not the absolute monism. It is Śaṅkara and Utpaladeva who teach absolute monism.

PLACE OF PRATYABHIJNA IN PHILOSOPY :
INDIAN AND WESTERN XXIII-VI

CHAPTER XXV

PHILOSOPHICAL MOVEMENTS IN THE WEST : ANCIENT AND MODERN

Ancient Philosophy in the West : Physical philosophers—Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Democritus Socrates, Plato and Aristotle (Plato's theory of ideas) ; Neo-Platonists, the Alexandrian School ; Medieval philosophy : English Philosophy; Sūfism; Modern Philosophy : Bacon and Descartes ; Spinoza (Realistic Idealism) ; Hobbes and Locke (Psychology); Berkeley, Hume and Condillac (Idealist systems) ; Reid and Kant (Realist systems); Fichte, Schelling and Hegel (three different forms of Idealism) ; Schopenhauer's system ; Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer (Positive Philosophy and Scientific Philosophy) ; Similarity of Philosophical problems in Indian and Western thought (Idealism and Realism) ; Approach of Pratyabhijñā to the problem of the Ultimate Cause ; Specific contribution of Pratyabhijñā to Philosophy ; Pratyabhijñā as synthesis of diverse currents of thought.

Ancient Philosophy in the West (600 B.C. to about 529 A.D.) : Unlike India, the West has its philosophy almost distinct from its religion. It has its origin in the Greek race. The Greeks themselves supposed their early teachers to have imbibed wisdom at the eastern fount. The Western Philosophy thus starts with Greek Philosophy and ends with modern European Philosophy. In Greek philosophy, we first meet with the physical philosophers like Thales, Anaximander and others as we had in India the early materialist thinkers like Bṛhaspati, Kapila and Kaṇāda, the founders of the Cārvāka, the Sāṁkhya and the Vaiśeṣika systems.

Physical philosophers : Thales (624-546 B.C.) is the first known Greek philosopher who held that water was the beginning, the fundamental thing or *Prima Materia* of all things. It is surprising to find a similar thought expressed in India by a Vedic sage in the famous hymn of creation (*Ṛgveda* X, 129,1) : "...*tadānīm...ambhaḥ kim āsīt gahanaṁ gabhīram*" (Before the creation, was there water, unfathomable, profound ?). Anaximander (610–547 B. C.) thought that the material cause and first element of things is the infinite, a boundless something from which all things arise and to which they all return again. And they repeat the same process again. Anaximenes (588-524 B. C.), almost like the Indian materialist—*Prāṇātmavādin*, believed that the elemental air is the origin of things as he accepted it as the 'infinite substance' of Anaximander. He held that air, being eternal

and an imperishable substance, is also necessarily endowed with consciousness. It is from air that all things that are and have been, and shall be, took their rise. Pythagoras (582-506 B.C.) taught that 'numbers are the cause of the material existence of things.' All numbers are but the numerical relations of the one. One is necessarily the beginning of things. This idea tends to approach to monism. Some later thinkers held that this abstract number 'one' is one God or one Finite or Infinite Being. The early Pythagoreans are known also for their views on 'transmigration' and their interest in mathematics. Heraclitus of Ephesus (535-475 B.C.) found the world element in cosmic fire 'which envelops the terrestrial atmosphere and of which the heavenly luminaries were supposed to be found'. It will be of interest to note that Agni, the first of the Vedic gods, represents the terrestrial fire, the heavenly luminaries and the elemental fire, as explained by Yāska. The theory that "fire' is the Primary Substance 'brings with it a certain way of looking at the change and movement of the world'. This is known as Heraclitus' Doctrine of Flux or Becoming. Heraclitus also believed in the *Bhedābheda* view—the truth 'that the "many" apparently independent and conflicting things we know are really "one", and that, on the other hand, this "one" is also "many".' Empedocles (495-435 B.C.) represents in the West almost the Cārvāka materialist of India in as much as he declares that creation and destruction, which according to him are impossible and mere appearances, arise from the union and separation of the four everlasting substances—earth, air, fire and water (called the "four roots"). He tells us of two causes—moving and material, the former being "love" and the latter "strife", the one a combining and the other a dissociating power. "Strife" separates all the elements in the sphere, and "Love" is needed to bring them together again. Anaxagoras (500-428 B.C.) thought that 'an infinity of elements (called "seeds") are fused at every point of the infinite All'. He called elements as "seeds", which were not the four simple "roots", fire, air, earth and water of Empedocles ; on the contrary, they were compounds. According to him 'all things were together ; then reason came and put them in order.' Leucippus, the ancient atomist of the West, held, like Kaṇāda of India, that 'all bodies are composed of hard, indivisible, unalterable, indestructible, invisible particles differing in size and shape but so constructed as to hook on to one another in more or less permanent but not unbreakable chains.' Democritus (460-370 B. C.) followed his theory. He says, 'in causal reality only atoms and space exist.'[1]

1. G. H Lewes, *A Biographical History of Philosoyhy*, pp. 29, 30 ff. 34 ff., 39 ff., 78, 84 ff., 97 ff., 105 ff. ; Dr. Radhakrishnan (Ed.), *History of Philosophy Eastern and Western* II, pp. 26 ff. ; see also W. E. Stace, *A Critical History of Greek Philosophy*.

The period of physical philosophers was followed by an epoch of intellectual crisis in Greek philosophy. It was marked by insufficiency of all attempts towards a solution of the problem of existence as well as that of knowledge. In this epoch we come across the sophists so known for purposely using fallacious arguments. For instance, Gorgias preached Nihilism. He maintained (1) that nothing exists ; (2) if anything exists, we cannot know it; (3) if we know it, there is no possibility of communicating our knowledge to others'. Gorgias argues like the Śūnyavādin of India.

Socrates, Plato and Aristotle : Among Sophists, there appeared a strange antogonist, Socrates who 'introduced sanity into the disordered intellectual life of the time'. He was the author of philosophical tendencies and of a philosophic method. The Sophists had founded knowledge upon perception, with the result that all objective standards of truth had been destroyed. Socrates founded knowledge upon reason and thereby restored to truth its objectivity. He thought that knowledge is knowledge through concepts (general ideas). Reason is the faculty of concepts. Socrates' method to base philosophic thoughts on reason, finds a close resemblance with that of Gautama in the realm of Nyāya Philosophy. Socrates was followed by Plato (427-347 B C.) who completely adapted and applied the Socratic method. Plato is known for his theory of knowledge and dialectic, the theory of ideas. He is considered as one of the greatest philosophers of Europe.

Plato's theory of ideas is the theory of the objectivity of the concepts. The concept is not merely an idea in the mind but something which has a reality of its own, outside and independent of the mind ; this is the essence of the philosophy of Plato. This doctrine is based upon the view that 'truth means the correspondance of our ideas with the facts of existence. If I see a lake of water, if there is really a lake, then my idea is true. But if there is no lake, then my idea is false. It is a hallucination. Some of the characteristics of the ideas are—(1) They are substances. The substance means that which has its whole being in itself, whose reality does not flow into it from anything else, but which is the source of its own reality. It is self-caused and self-determined. (2) The ideas are universal. (3) The ideas are not things, but thoughts. (4) Each idea is a unity. (5) The ideas are immutable and imperishable. (6) The ideas are the essences of all things. (7) Each idea is, in its own kind, an absolute perfection and its perfection is the same as its reality. (8) The ideas are outside space and time. (9) The ideas are rational ... Besides ideas, Plato, after the view of Heraclitus, affirms that there is an 'absolute becoming', and he identifies it with the world of sense, which contains nothing permanent but is a constant flow. The idea always is and never

becomes. According to dialectic theory, we have (1) the world of ideas, and (2) matter, an absolutely formless, chaotic mass. By impressing the images of the ideas upon this mass, 'things', the specific objects of sense, arise. Plato seems only to imagine that things are produced by a world-designer, who, like a human artist, fashions the plaster matter into images of the ideas. God, the creator, the world-designer, finds besides him, on the one hand, the ideas, on the other, formless matter. First he creates the world-soul. As to how the actual universe of things arise out of that ground, the first principle—ideas, we are told by Platonic philosophers that the things of sense are 'copies' or imitations of the ideas. According to Plato, human soul is divided into two parts, the highest—rational—part, the reason, and the lowest—irrational—part. Plato connects the doctrine of the immortality of the rational soul with the theory of ideas by means of the 'doctrine of recollection'. He concludes that rational knowledge must be already present in the mind at birth. Why is it that we do not remember (knowledge) at once? 'Because the soul, descending from the world of ideas into the body, has its knowledge dulled and almost blotted out by its immersion in the sensuous'. The soul is pre-existent as well as immortal. Its natural home is the world of ideas where at first it existed, without a body, in the pure and blissful contemplation of ideas. But because it has affinities with the world of sense, it sinks down into body. After death, if a man has lived a long life, and if he has cultivated the knowledge of ideas, philosophy, the soul returns to its blissful abode in the world of ideas, till, after a long period it again returns to earth in a body. This almost corresponds with the doctrine of transmigration of soul, according to the Buddhist thought.

The next great philosopher we know of, was Aristotle (384-322 B. C.) who was a student of Plato. Aristotle's system is founded upon ideas. It is an attempt to found an idealism free from the defects of Plato's system. Aristotle's system falls in five divisions: (1) Logic (2) Metaphysics, (3) Physics, (4) Ethics and (5) Aesthetics. His Metaphysics grows out of his polemic against Plato's theory of ideas. He argues against this as follows: (1) Plato's ideas do not explain the existence of things. (2) The relation of ideas to things is not explained. (3) No attempt has been made to explain the unceasing becoming of things. Even if the existence of things is explained by the ideas, their motion is not. The world is a world of becoming, change, motion, life. (4) The world consists of a multitude of things, why another multitude of things, viz. ideas, has been assumed by Plato. (5) Ideas are supposed to be non-sensuous, but they are in fact sensuous. (6) It assumes that ideas are

the essences of things and yet it places those essences outside the things themselves...The fundamental principle of Aristotle's philosophy is that the universe is indeed the Absolute Reality. Aristotle accepts four kinds of causes : (1) The material cause, the matter, of which the thing is composed. (2) The efficient cause, defined as the cause of motion. It is the moving force required to bring about the change. (3) The formal cause, defined as the substance or essence of the thing. It is the concept or the idea of the thing. (4) The final cause is the end, purpose, or aim towards which the movement is directed. Aristotle's famous definition of God is 'the thought of thought'. He thinks only his own Self (*aham-vimarśa-maya*, in the Pratyabhijñā system). God lives in the eternal blessedness (*ānanda*) and his blessedness consists in the ever-lasting contemplation of His own prefection (*nirvṛti-cit*, according to Somānanda). Evidently, Aristotle's doctrine shows some notions of Somānanda's thought.

The physics is called the philosophy of Nature. The object of Aristotle's physics is to explain the passage of matter into form in its various stages in the world of nature. He argues that (1) If nothing in nature is aimless or useless, it does not mean, in the narrow sense, that every thing exists for the use of man. (2) It is a mistake to suppose that design in nature means that nature is conscious of her designs ; or, on the other hand, there is any existent consciousness outside the world which governs and controls it. The fact is that God is not an existent conscious person. Man alone is conscious of his ends.[2]

Neo-Platonists—the Alexandrian School : After Aristotle there arose, in Greece, the movement of the Sceptics, the Epicurians, the stoics and the New Academy. After the movement of the New Academicians, philosophy no longer found a home in Greece ; it was exiled from Greece from where it made its way into Alexandria and Rome where it flourished. Roman philosophy had no importance. Alexandria was the theatre of the philosophical movement of the Neo-Platonists. The Neo-Platonists hailed Plato's defects as true and inner secret of his doctrines, developed and combined them with the philosophies of the east. Philo, the Jew, is known to be the first of the Neo-Platonists ; but it is Ammonius Saccus (175-242 A.D.) who was the real founder of this school. His disciple was Plotinus (205-270 A.D.). He accepted the oriental monism (*Advaita*) considered by the westerners as 'an impossible abstraction', for even the one is supposed to involve duality. Plotinus thinks that God is absolutely one. He is neither thought, nor volition, nor activity. He holds that God,

2. G. H. Lewes, *op. cit.*, pp. 151 ff., 208 ff., 247 ff. ; Dr. Radhakrishnan (Ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 46 ff., W. E. Stace, *op. cit.* ; Frank Thilly, *A History of Philosophy*, pp. 57 ff.

by reason of His super-perfection, overflows Himself, and this overflow becomes the world. This idea exactly corresponds with the doctrine of Somānanda that the Lord (Maheśvara) materializes Himself in the form of the cosmos. The school believes that, just as a flame emits light and snow cold, so do all lower beings issue from the one. The first emanation from the one is called the Naus, which is thought, mind and reason. From Naus, as second emanation, proceeds the world soul. It is outside time, incorporeal and indivisible. It thinks rationally, yet it is not conscious. The total darkness is matter. It is considered to be the ground of plurality and the cause of all evils and hence the object of life can only be, as with Plato, to escape from the material world. Its distinct character comes out in its theory of the mystical exaltation of the submission to God. It is considered by the westerners as forcing of the individual subject to the centre of the universe, to the position of the Absolute Being. This thought is similar to the teachings of the *Advaita* Vedānta.

The Alexandrian School was mainly a school of theology. It preached the doctrine of Trinity ; i.e., God is triple, and, at the same time, one. His nature contains within it three distinct 'Hypostases' (Substances, i.e., 'Persons'), and these three make one Being. The first is the Unity : not The One Being, not Being at all, but simple Unity. The second is the Intelligence, which is identical with Being. The third is the Universal Soul, cause of all activity and life. According to the second Hypostasis, God is mind, absolute, eternal and immutable. But nothing is external to God : in him there can be no distinction, no determination, no relation. Therefore God, in his highest hypostasis, cannot think, cannot be Thought, but is something superior to Thought. Hence the necessity for a third hypostasis, which third in the order of discovery is first in the order of being : it is Unity. The Unity is not Existence; neither is it intelligence—it is superior to both : it is superior to all action, to all determination, to all knowledge. It is impossible to discover the truth of things until we have arrived at this absolute Unity. Unity is omnipresent : it is the bond which unites even the most complex things. It is the absolute univeral One in its perfect simplicity. It is the highest degree of perfection—the ideal beauty, the Supreme God. Thus, the school propounds the nature of God. Regarding the origin of the world, the Alexandrian school postulates the doctrine of emanation. God, as Unity, is not Existence ; but he becomes Existence by the first Emanation from his Unity (Intelligence), and by the second emanation from his Intelligence (Soul), and this Soul in its manifestations is the World. This is in brief the law of Emanation. The Neo-Platonic thought almost fully

accords with the ancient Vedānta, as well as the Pratyabhijñā thought.[3]

The Ancient Philosophy in the West is said to come to an end with Proclus (b. 412 A. D.), the last teacher of Alexadrian School of Neo-Platonists. The time of its official end is recorded by Frank Thilly as 529 A. D. From this date, evidently, the Medieval Philosophy starts in Europe. According to some scholars, it begins with the philosophy of Christianity, i.e., since the first centuries of the Christian era. From Medieval Philosophy, it is important to give glimpses of the views held by early English Philosophers and sūfī thinkers.

Medieval Philosophy: English Philosophy—English philosophy has been distinguished as a separate philosophy by W. R. Soreley. The beginnings of it have been traced from the middle ages. It started with Erigena, in the 9th century A. D., and developed on the basis of similar notions as were held by the Greek philosophers and the Christian mystics. Erigena (Irish, b. 810 A.D.), the first known English philosopher, divides the whole reality into four classes: 1. That which creates and is not created. 2. That which is created and creates. 3 That which is created but does not create. 4. That which neither creates nor is created. The last class is not mere non-existence. In general it may be said to signify the potential as distinguished from the actual. In the ultimate analysis it is the goal or end towards which all things strive, so that, in it, they may find rest. 'It is therefore God as final cause, uncreate creator, God as efficient cause--beginning and end of all things from which they proceed and to which they return'. In fact this thought has originated from the Upaniṣads. Sir John Davies (1569-1626), another English poet-philosopher, regards soul as akin to the universal order (*Vedic ṛtam*). He feels the correspondance between the natural order and man's activity.[4]

Sūfīsm—The Sūfī movement originally arose in Arabia in the 7th and 8th centuries A.D. It spread in the adjoning countries of the West and the East, including India. In the beginning, it was only an ascetic movement which emerged from Islam. From the tenth century, as a result of the infiltrations from the Greek and Indian philosophies, the speculative and pantheistic tendencies became predominant in Sūfīsm. It started teaching the immateriality of the spirit (*rūh*, the soul), the conception of *Allāḥ* as a transcendent personality and the theory of divine unity (*tauhīd*). Ibn 'Arabi was first to formulate in the 13th century the

3. G. H. Lewes, *op. cit.*, pp. 287 ff., 299 ff., Dr. Radhakrishnan (Ed.), *op. cit*, pp. 93 ff.; see also W. E. Stace, *op. cit.*

4. See W. R. Soreley, *A History of English Philosophy*.

doctrine of existentialist monism (*wahdat al-wudjūd*), according to which 'the existence of created beings is nothing but the very essence of the existence of the creator' (*wudjūd al-makhlūkāt 'ain wudjūd al-khālik*). This is the main doctrine that the Upaniṣads teach. Some of the ideas of Ibn 'Arabi's philosophy are that things emanate from divine prescience in which they pre-existed (*thubūt*) as ideas. God is Absolute Being, and is the sole source of existence; in Him alone Being and Existence are one and inseparable. The universe possesses 'relative being, either actual or potential; it is both ... eternal-existent, as being in God's knowledge, and temporal-non-existent, as being external to God'. Thus God is both Transcendent and Immanent, transcendence and immanence being two fundamental aspects of Reality. The *Haqq* (Reality) of whom trenscendence is asserted is the same as *Khalq* (creation) of whom immanence is asserted although (logically) the creator is distinguished from the created. Before coming into existence, things of the phenomenal world were latent in the mind of God as fixed prototypes, and were thus one with the Divine Essence and consciousness. As is apparent from the above, there is indeed a surprising similarity between Ibn 'Arabi's Sūfi thought and the doctrines of the Vedānta and the Kashmir Śaivism. Another glaring instance of similarity between Sūfīsm and the Indian thought is the idea of *an 'l-haqq* (I am the truth), as pronounced by the Muslim mystic Mansūr al-Hallāj (858-922 A.C.).[5]

The Modern Philosophy in the West: Bacon and Descrates—The era of the Modern Philosophy covers the period from that of Bacon (1561-1626 A.D.) to the present day. Bacon and Descartes are known as fathers of Modern Philosophy. Bacon deals with modern Science (Physics) and Descartes with modern Metaphysics. Bacon found his method of induction and Descartes the deductive method, though the latter was nothing new. Descartes (1596-1650) applied his deductive method to prove the existence of God. He understood by God 'a substance infinite, eternal, immutable, independent, omniscient, omnipotent'. Man exists 'as a miserably imperfect, finite being—subject to change—greately ignorant, and incapable of creating anything.' He finds by his finitude that he is not the All; by his imperfection, that he is not perfect. Yet an infinite and perfect being (God) must exist, because infinity and perfection are implied, as correlatives, in man's ideas of imperfection and finitude. As to the distinction between body and soul, Descartes thinks that the fundamental attribute of substance

5 R. K. Kaw, Art. "Rise of Sūfism and its spread in Kashmir", *Sharada Peetha Research Series* II, pp. 22 ff., see A. J. Arberry, *Sūfīsm*.

must be "extension", because we can abstract from substance all the qualities except extension. The fundamental attribute of mind is "thought", because by this attribute mind is revealed to itself.[6]

Spinoza (Realistic Idealism): The system of Spinoza (1632-77) is but the logical development of the system of Descartes. While the existence of God was demonstrated by Descartes, Spinoza demonstrated the existence of God—and of no other existence but that of God. Spinoza asked himself—what is the "*noumenon*" which lies beneath all "*phenomena*"? We see everywhere transformations perishable and perishing; yet there must be something beneath which is imperishable, immutable. What is it? We see a wonderous universe peopled with wonderous beings, yet none of these beings exist *per se*, but *per aliud*; they are not the authors of their own existence, they do not rest upon their own reality, but on a greater reality. What is this reality? The question, Spinoza thought, could not be answered by the idea of Perfection. No; the great reality of all existence is "substance"; not substance in the gross and popular sense of "body" or "matter", but that which is "*Substans*"—which is standing under all phenomena, supporting and giving them reality. What is a phenomenon?—An appearance, a thing perceived: a state of perceiving mind. But what originates this perception—what changes the mind from its prior to its present state? Something, external and extrinsic, changes it. What is this something? What it is, in itself, we can never know; because to know it would bring it under the forms and conditions of the mind, i.e., would constitute it a phenomenon. It is, therefore, unknown, but not denied. Kant calls this "noumenon". This, Spinoza calls "Substance."

Spinoza thinks that all Science, as all existence, must start from "one" principle, which must be the ground of all. Descartes thought it to be Perfection, Spinoza Substance. Spinoza held that Substance is the primal fact of all existence. The absolute Existence—the Substance—is God. Regarding the nature of God, Spinoza says, 'There is but one infinite substance, and that is God. Whatever is, is in God; and without him, nothing can be conceived. He is the universal Being of which all things are the manifestations. He is the sole Substance, Everything else is "Mode"; yet without Substance, Mode cannot exist. God, viewed under the attributes of Infinite Substance, is the *natura naturans*—viewed as a manifestation: as the modes under which his attributes appear, he is *natura naturata*. He is the cause of all things, and that immanently,

6. G. H. Lewes, *op. cit.* pp. 400-1; see Dr. Radhakrishnan (Ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 202 ff.

but not transiently. He has two infinite attributes—"Extension" and "Thought". Extension is visible Thought; and Thought is invisible Extension; they are the Objective and Subjective phases of which God is the identity. Every thing is a mode of God's attribute of Extension; every thought, wish, or feeling, a mode of his attribute of Thought. Such is the brief outline of Spinoza's thought. His system perfectly corresponds with the *Advaita* thought in the Indian Philosophy. The idea of Spinoza's "Thought" and "Extention" is almost similar to that of *Prakāśa* and *Vimarśa* aspects of the one Ultimate Reality (Maheśvara) in the Pratyabhijñā philosophy.[7]

Hobbes, Locke (Psychology): The doctrine of Spinoza was of great importance, as it brought about the first crisis in Modern Philosophy. The question now arose: 'Can we transcend the sphere of our Consciousness and know things *per se*?' or 'Have we ideas independent of experience?' The object of the succeeding philosophers was to settle this question and Psychology thus assumed importance. Hobbes (1588-1679) thought, 'It is that our sensations do not correspond with any external qualities: that what are called sensible qualities. Sensible qualities are nothing but modifications of the sentient Being. The subject wherein colour and image are inherent is not the object or the thing seen. There is nothing without us really which we call image or colour. The said image or colour is but an apparition into us of the motion, agitation or alteration which the object works in the brain'. Thus to Hobbes, sensation was the origin of our ideas. But, according to Locke (1632-1704) who followed Hobbes, it is sensation (*anubhava*) and reflection (*vimarśa*), since experience is of two kinds, viz., of external objects and of internal operations. We could never know things in themselves, but only things as they affect us; in other words, we could only know our ideas.

Berkeley, Hume and Condillac (Idealist systems); The above thought produced three distinct systems: (1) Berkeley's Idealism, (2) Hume's Scepticism and (3) Condillac's Sensationalism. Berkeley (1684-1753) showed that we have no experience of an external world independent of perception, nor can we have any such experience. He pronounced matter, therefore, to be a figment. Hume (1711-76), who followed Berkeley, took up the line where Berkeley had cast it. He found that not only was matter a figment, but mind was no less so. We are ignorant of spirit as of substance. We know the mind only in its manifestations, we cannot know it *per se* as a

7. G. H. Lewes, *op. cit.*, pp. 420-2, 430; see Dr. Radhakrishnan (Ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 208 ff.

substratum. Hume's Scepticism was followed by Sensationalism of Condillac (1715-80). According to his thought, the origin of knowledge is reduced to sensation by the confusion of thought with feeling. He laid down the fundamental principle that sensations and the operations of the mind are materials of all our knowledge—materials which reflection sets in action by seeking their combinations and relations. The above three systems produced the reaction of common sense.[8]

Reid and Kant (Realist systems): Reid (1710—1796) combats the theory of ideas. He postulates his theory of perception as follows: External objects occasion certain sensations in us. With these sensations we perceive the existence of certain qualities capable of producing them. These he distinguishes into primary and secondary. The primary, he says, we perceive immediately; the secondary mediately. Reid was followed by Kant (1724-1804). His system is known as the critical philosophy. His object was to examine the deep and intricate question of human knowledge. He said that there are two sources of knowledge, on the one side external objects, and on the other human understanding. Knowledge has but one source and that is the union of object and subject. The whole world is to us a series of phenomena. Are these appearances the production of the mind to which they appear; or are they the pure presentation of the things themselves? According to Kant, the world exists, that is to say, the noumena of the various phenomena which we perceive, exist. The world is not known to us as it is *per se* but only as it is to us—as it is in our knowledge of it. Although we can only know the appearances of things, we are forced to conclude that the things exist. Thus Kant postulates the existence of an object as the necessary correlate to a subject, thereby tending towards Realism. But, the western philosophy is again converted to Idealism.[9]

Fichte, Schelling and Hegel (three different forms of Idealism): Fichte (1762-1814) is the next to teach idealism. Kant, who was unwilling to embrace idealism, postulated the existence of non-ego. But, according to Fichte, it is the ego which thus creates the necessity for a non-ego; it is the ego which thus answering to the necessity, creates the non-ego wanted. He thus clearly declares that 'substance is nothing but the synthesis of accidents and it is a mental synthesis.' Idealism or realism? Neither, yet both. The question is: What is the relation of object and

8. Lewes, *op. cit.*, pp. 438, 439 ff., 463 ff,, 487 ff., 506 ff, 521 ff.; see Dr. Radhakrishnan (Ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 225 ff.

9. Lewes, *op. cit.*, pp. 531 ff., 542 ff.; Dr. Radhakrishnan (Ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 238 ff.

subject ? Fichte's solution is that subject and object are identical. *Fichte's* idealism is marked by the doctrine of 'will'. He sought to convince people that in 'will' lay man's divinity. Fichte's doctrine of 'will' is analogous to Somānanda's doctrine of 'will'. The ego (*ātman*) is essentially an activity ; it is free, endowed with *svātantrya-śakti*. The ego, as simple subject, does not exist ; it has only a potentiality of existence. To exist, it must realize itself and become subject-object. Thus, according to Fichte the world is but an incarnation of the ego. In Fichte's system object has indeed reality, but is solely dependent upon the subject. Schelling (1775-1854) adapted the principle of the identity of subject and object in knowledge. Fichte said that non-ego was created by the ego. Schelling said that the two were equally real, and that both were identified in the Absolute. Knowledge must be knowledge of something. *It is impossible to conceive a subject knowing without an object known and conversely to conceive an object known without a subject knowing.* Hence philosophy has two primary problems to solve. In the transcendental philosophy the problem is to construct. nature from intelligence – the object from the subject. In the philosophy of nature the problem is to construct intelligence from nature—the subject from the object. Hegel adopted the principle of the identity of subject and object. It follows from his principle of the identity of contraries which is the foundation stone of his system. Two contraries are commonly supposed to exclude each other reciprocally : existence excluding non-existence. This notion has been pronounced by Hegel to be false. Everything is contradictory in itself. Contradiction forms its essence ; its identity consists in being the union of two contraries. Being was at the same time non-being ; subject was at the same time object ; and object was subject ; force was at the same time impotence ; light was also darkness and darkness was also light.

"Nothing in this world is single,
All things by a law divine in one another's being mingle."

Hegel's point of view has been illustrated as follows : I see a tree. The common psychologist tells me that there are three things implied in this one fact of vision, viz., a tree, an image of that tree and a mind which apprehends that image. Fichte says that it is I alone who exist. The tree and the image of the tree are one thing, and that is a modification of my mind. This is the subjective idealism. Schelling says that both, the tree and my ego, are existences equally real or ideal, but they are nothing less than manifestations of the Absolute. This is the objective idealism. But Hegel says that all these explanations are false. The only thing really existing (in this one fact of vision) is the idea, the relation. The ego and the tree are but two terms of the relation and owe their reality to it. This is absolute idealism. According to Hegel's School of thought, nature is

made one with God ; and God one with nature. In truth, nature is but the exteriority of God. This is what Kashmir Śaivas also believe. The vulgar notion of theologians is that God created the world by an act, but Hegel says that 'the creation is not an act, but an eternal moment, not a thing done, but a thing perpetually doing. God did not create the world, he is eternally creating it'[10] The same idea is held by the Pratyabhijñā school.

Schopenhauer's System : 'The modern pessimist philosophy of Germany, that of Schopenhauer and Hurtmann, is only a revised version of ancient Buddhism in India', states Dr. S. Radhakrishnan in his *Indian Philosophy*, I. Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) does not believe in the modern materialism, nor in Science. He says, the materialism 'can at best explain only the shell not the kernal of nature'; Science has for its province the world of phenomena. It can never tell us what a thing really and intrinsically is, but only why it has become so. It can only, in other words, refer us to one inscrutable as the ground and the explanation of another inscrutable. In this manner, Schopenhauer teaches pessimism in his philosophy. The most prominent point of his philosophy is the doctrine of "will", i.e., 'the world as "will" and "idea".' He holds that the chief place in philosophy belongs not to the intellect, but to the "will", the system of feelings and desires :

> "A motion and spirit that impells,
> All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
> And rolls through all things." (Wordsworth)

This inner self, undivided, absolute, 'one and all', Schopenhauer names "will". So naming it, he implies that this truer aspect of ourselves is not a mere cognition or intellectual power, but an acting, suffering, feeling, moving being—a force of spontaneity, urgency, and sense of effort, and not an abstract idea—an impulse, instinct and spring of life, and not a mere conception or proposition. From the will consciousness, and in some degree knowledge, cannot be wholly excluded. The aim of intelligence, he thinks, is to reach to the "Will". He is probably drawn to this phase of philosophy (Voluntarism) by observation of the phenomenon of love. Such a will is a metaphysical—which means for Schopenhauer a supernatural—power. In Schopenhauer's doctrine of "will"—'the world as Will and Idea', lies one of the parallelisms in the German philosophy and Somānanda's system of thought.[11]

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10. Lewes, *op. cit.*, pp. 584 ff., 602 ff., 613 ff. ; Dr. Radhakrishnan (Ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 263 ff.

11. See Caldwell, *Schopenhauer's system in its philosophical significance* ; W. Wallace, *Schopenhauer* ; Dr. Radhakrishnan (Ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 285 ff. ; Frank Thilly, *A History of Philosophy*, 496 ff.

The idealistic trends in the Western Philosophy were followed by the later rationalistic speculations which resulted in the emergence of realistic schools. In the Victorian era the general public (in England) had ceased to be occupied with matters of speculation. John Stuart Mill (1806-73), an English philosopher, complained that philosophy was falling more and more into disrepute. He formed a distinct view of matter and mind. Realist schools of thought arose also in other parts of Europe.

Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer (Positive Philosophy and Scientific Philosophy) : Comte (1798–1857)—Comte's Positive Philosophy arose in France to put an end to intellectual anarchy in Europe when religions opposed religions, philosophies opposed philosophies, and religion and philosophy were at war with each other. It was observed that 'in the present state of things, the speculative domain is comprised of two very different portions : viz., general ideas and positive sciences. The general ideas are powerless because they are not positive ; the positive sciences are powerless because they are not general.' The new philosophy was intended to put an end to this anarchy. Comte's 'law of human progress', called also 'law of mental evolution', is explained as follows :—The human mind, by its nature, employs in its progress the three methods of philosophising, viz. the theological method, the metaphysical method and the positive. Human knowledge has thus progressed successively through three stages : 1st, the supernatural (theological) ; 2nd, metaphysical (abstract) ; 3rd, the positive or scientific, i.e., it passed from faith to reason, metaphysics ; and from metaphysics to positive science. Each of these three general systems of conceptions on the aggregate of phenomena, includes the others. The theological system arrived at the highest perfection of which it is capable, when it substituted the providential action of a single being for the varied operations of the numerous divinities which had been imagined before. In the same way, in the last system of the metaphysical system, men substitute one great entity (Nature) as the cause of all phenomena instead of the multitude of entities at first supposed. In the same way, again, the ultimate perfection of the positive system would be, to be able to represent all phenomena as particular aspects of a single general fact, such as gravitation, etc. Comte thinks that positive method is the only method adapted to human capacity, the only one on which truth can be found.[12]

Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) thinks that there is a great variety of opinions in the various forms of religion, philosophy and the like ; but

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12. See G. H. Lewes, *op. cit.*, pp. 643 ff. ; Harriet Martineau, *The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte*, translated; Frank Thilly, *op. cit.*, pp. 519 ff.

the truth is that the diverse forms of beliefs which have existed and which still exist, have all a basis in some ultimate fact. In the religious ideas of one kind or other, there are found vague notions concerning the origin and hidden nature of surrounding things. Science aims at disclosing the established order of the universe, philosophy seeks for wide and deep truths. 'To reach that point of view from which the seeming discordance of religion and science disappears and the two merge into one, must surely be worth an effort.' The criterion of a philosophical quest, according to Spencer, is to seek 'the knowledge of the highest degree of generality' after the elimination of the discordant elements in the diverse conceptions of philosophy, which is its definition in the simplest and the clearest terms. Spencer gives the highest place to philosophy as he says: 'Knowledge of the lowest kind is the un-unified knowledge, Science is partially-unified knowledge, philosophy is completely-unified knowledge.'

Herbert Spencer, after a deeply concentrated scientific inquiry into various physical phenomena, space, time, matter, motion, force, evolution and dissolution, etc., arrives at the broadest truth after the unification of the general phenomenal truths. He examines certain primary truths, or general laws of nature, such as 'the indestructibility of matter', 'the continuity of motion,' and 'the persistence of force' of which the last is the ultimate and the others derivatives. In this enquiry he observes some general truths which involve certain other truths like 'that force can neither arise out of nothing nor lapse into nothing' and that all phenomenal changes are direct or indirect results of 'the persistence of force.' He ultimately arrives at the highest general truth, viz., the existence of 'the Unknown Reality' of which Matter, Motion and Force are but symbols. This Unknown Reality, a power, the nature of which remains for ever inconceivable, and to which no limits in time or space can be imagined, works in us certain effects. These effects have certain likeness of kind, the most general of which are classed together under the names of Matter, Motion and Force. The interpretation of all phenomena in terms of Matter, Motion and Force, is nothing more than the reduction of our complex symbols of thought to the simplest symbols. Force, being the ultimate symbol of the Unknown Reality, is, hence, accepted as the beginning and the first cause of things, Matter and Motion being the other symbols of the same. Why Spencer names this Ultimate Cause of things as some Unknown Reality, is because of this deepest, widest and most certain of all facts—that the power which the universe manifests to us is inscrutable. While generalizing all phenomenal changes under the one 'Unknown Reality', Spencer thinks that Spirit and Matter are its two aspects. He says, "... though the relation of subject and object renders necessary

to us these antithetical conceptions of Spirit and Matter, the one is no less than the other to be regarded as but a sign of the Unknown Reality which underlies both." The system of thought represented by Herbert Spencer maintains that 'the universe, whether physical or psychical, whether as mind or matter, is a play of force, mind, life and matter being each varying aspects of the one cosmic process from the first cause.'[13]

Similarity of philosophical problems in Indian and Western thought (Idealism and Realism): In the above brief survey of the main philosophical movements in the West, it may be observed that, as in the Indian systems of philosophy, there has been an effort to reach to the one Ultimate Reality, the beginning and the first cause of things, and to arrive at that Reality, there have been two courses, two contending problems, *viz*., Idealism and Realism, *the earlier and the later trends in the European philosophy. In the various philosophical speculations held by the early* Western thinkers, there are different hypotheses respecting some universal principle which is the essence of all kinds of being. To the question—'what is that invariable existence of which these are variable states ?'—there were sundry answers—'water, air, fire, or all the four elements, or atoms, or even abstractions like numbers'. Some held that 'One is the beginning of all things', that 'the One is God', that 'the One is Finite or Infinite Being', that 'Intelligence is the governing principle of things', and so on. We thus find that the earlier materialistic conceptions of the Universal Substratum of all things were later tending towards the abstract notions of the same. These conceptions were followed by the three idealistic movements which culminated in Hegel's Absolute Idealism. There were other diversions in the western philosophy, like Pessimism, etc. In the last century realistic trends, like the schools of the Positive Philosophy and the Scientific Philosophy, emerged. Spencer's all-important inquiry shows that our ultimate ideas imply contradictions. Mansel (1820-71), developing Hamilton's doctrine that human knowledge is strictly limited to the Finite and "conditioned", held that the human mind could not attain to any positive conception of the nature of God. Spencer agrees with Mansel that the three conceptions, the Cause, the Absolute, the Infinite, all equally indispensable, imply contradictions to each other, when viewed in conjunction, as attributes of one and the same being (the Ultimate Reality). He cites Mansel who says: 'A cause cannot, as such, be absolute; the absolute cannot, as such, be a cause ... The absolute cannot be conceived as conscious, neither can it be conceived as unconscious ; it can-

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13. See Herbert Spencer, *Synthetic Philosophy*, and *First Principles*; Frank Thilly, *op. cit*., pp. 545 ff. ; Dr. Radhakrishnan (Ed.), *op. cit*., pp. 354 ff.

not be conceived as complex, neither can it be conceived as simple; it cannot be conceived by difference, neither can it be conceived by the absence of difference; it cannot be identified with the universe, neither can it be distinguished from it...' It is stated to be like the Advaitin's *anirvācya* (indescribable). The conception of the Absolute and Infinite, from whatever side we perceive it, appears encompassed with contradictions. Similarly, polytheism, monotheism, pantheism, and so on, when rigorously analysed, severally prove to be wholly unthinkable, being full of contradictions. Concluding his inquiry, Spencer says, 'thus, if religion and science are to be reconciled, the basis of reconciliation must be this deepest, widest and most certain of all facts that the power which the universe manifests to us is inscrutable.' Similar problems are also faced by the Indian thinkers to arrive at the essential nature of the Ultimate Reality.

It is plain from Spencer's inquiry, as is also evident from the above survey, that the Western Philosophy has sought for wide and deep truths, as distinguished from the multitudinous detailed truths which the surface of things and actions present. This shows that Western Philosophy has also made throughout a monotheistic approach to the problem of the Ultimate Reality. This approach has adopted two courses, idealistic and realistic. Fichte, Scelling and Hegel represent the three idealistic movements in the modern European Philosophy, and Spencer the later realistic movement. Spencer's system accepts Force as the beginning and the first cause of things. James Weir, in his *The Energy System of Matter*, attempts to prove that every physical phenomenon is due to the operation of energy transformations or energy transmissions embodied in material. He holds that phenomena must ever be accepted simply as phenomena, as the inscrutable manifestations of the nature. Spencer thinks that the very power which the nature manifests is inscrutable. The Western Philosophy has also arrived at the notion of the existence of the one General Reality, Force, as the Indian Philosophy believes in the existence of One Brahman or Mahésvara as the first cause and the beginning of things. As to the evolution of consciousness, we read, in the poetic account of the genesis of the material universe as given in an ancient book of the West, that 'in the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. And the earth was without form, and void... ; in the beginning there was the brooding of a divine spirit, a mind at work, planning and executing.' In India also the Vedic seer held similar notions in the *Ṛgveda* X, 129, 2: 'Desire in the beginning came upon that "One", desire that was the first seed of mind.' The sage says that 'this "One" arose through the power of *tapas* (heat).' *Tapas* implies 'the first conscious activity or brooding.' Thus both the spiritualists of India as well as those of the West believed

that the evolution of creation is not automatic, haphazard, and mechanical, requiring no mind. Some planning and thinking being stands behind nature, viz., the physical and mental universe, who is the author of *vicitra-racanā* (construction of wonderful and diverse forms). Ralph Cudworth (1617-88) says, "The true intellectual system of the universe shows that the whole world is probative of God." He argues: "Were there no other substance than matter, there could be neither motion, nor intellection nor volition, but all would be a dead lump, nor could anything penetrate another." This is evidently the idea of "*Caitanyam*" as we have in the Indian Philosophy, particularly as understood by the Pratyabhijñā system, that stands behind this cosmos both as Transcendent and Immanent Conscious Being. How the idea of "*Caitanyam*" progressed in different Indian systems of philosophy, on similar lines as those of the Western Philosophy, has already been traced in the two preceding chapters. A brief review of the same with a stress on Pratyabhijñā conception of the Ultimate Reality, in contrast with the western notions, will follow in the next para.[14]

Approach of Pratyabhijñā to the problem of the Ultimate Reality: As stated above the monistic currents of thought grew in India from the Vedic movement. The doctrine of Monism is for the first time established beyond any dispute in the principal Upaniṣads, which are agreed to one root prinicple Brahman. Though absolute unity was aimed at in them in a general way, there was difference of opinion as to the nature of this one Ultimate Reality. It was difficult to grasp the real idea of unity in view of all our knowledge of the universe resting on duality in opposition to unity. The universe was viewed in three different standards of reality by the three classes of philosophers who followed different schools of thought. In the technical terms used by J. C. Chatterji in his *Indian Realism*, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems viewed the universe in the *Creationist* or *Realistic* Standard, the Sāṁkhya-Yoga system in the *Psycho-dynamic* Standard and Śaṅkara's School of Vedānta in the *Polyo-nymic* Standard. While the first two classes of philosophers represented the two stages of realistic thought, the third school followed the idealistic philosophy of ever-changing names and forms. The first class of thinkers was that of physical philosophers like Gotama and Kaṇāda, similar to those we meet with in Western philosophy in Thales, Anaximenes, Leucippus and others; and the second class is that of the practical psychologists like

14. See Herbert Spencer, *op. cit.*; Bertrand Russell, *The problems of Philosophy*; Sir Oliver Joseph Lodge, *Evolution and creation*; Rufus Matthew Jones, *Studies in Mystical Religion*.

Kapila and Patañjali. The first class believed in the existence of various external realities constituting the universe and the second in the Conscious and Dynamic principles—'*Puruṣa*' and '*Prakṛti*'—from which all creation is evolved. The third class of philosophers, Śaṅkarites, aimed at the Upaniṣadic Monism by teaching Absolute Idealism. They sought to identify subject and object and prove the phenomenal character of the world, thus reducing the facts of life to unreal manifestations. Corresponding to this thought in the Indian Philosophy, we meet with the School of Neo-Platonists and the later idealist schools in the Western Philosophy. It is first from Kashmir that opposition was levelled against Śaṅkara's Idealism or Illusionism. The Pratyabhijñā school sought to correct the irrational tendency of Śaṅkara's Philosophy by uprooting its cause in the earlier doctrines of the Buddhist systems, like *Kṣaṇika-vāda*, *Vijñāna-vāda*, and *Śūnya-vāda*. In this school the conception of the Ultimate Reality, Maheśvara, changed from that of the Vedāntins' Brahman symbolising only pure Universal Consciousness. The Ultimate Reality in the Pratyabhijñā System included *Prakāśa and Vimarśa* as its two aspects, which symbolise, respectively, the Universal Consciousness and Physical or Material Activity in nature. Similar to the Pratyabhijñā thought, Spinoza's system in the Western Philosophy holds that there is but one infinite substance that is God, 'the cause of all things.' He has two infinite attributes 'Extension' and 'Thought'. Extension is visible thought and Thought is invisible extension. They are the objective and the subjective phases of which God is the identity. Everything is a mode of God's attribute of extension; every thought, wish, or feeling, a mode of His attribute of thought. *Prakāśa and Vimarśa* represent in the Pratyabhijñā Philosophy the two aspects of the Ultimate Reality symbolised in Spinoza's system in terms of Thought and Extension. The Pratyabhijñā conception of the Absolute Reality is that which includes both Subject and Object or Spirit and Matter. The various animate and inanimate beings, subjects and and objects, thought and physical activity, mind and body, and the world around us are all real in the Ultimate Being. The Pratyabhijñā system transcends the earlier systems in making distinction between subjects and objects as two kinds of sentient and insentient waves in the ocean of the Ultimate Reality.

Specific Contribution of Pratyabhijñā Philosophy: The original contribution of the Pratyabhijñā School to Philosophy is, at least, its four novel doctrines, viz., *Svātantrya-vāda*, *Ābhāsa-vāda*, the three laws of *Kriyā-śakti* (objective reality) and the doctrine of *Tattvas* (the catagories of the objective reality). *Svātantrya-vāda* or the Universal Voluntarism is the chief doctrine of the school. It means the doctrine of 'self-

dependence' or the 'sovereignty of the Lord's will', i.e., 'the absolute liberty and autonomy of consciousness'. In the earlier systems, the three main theories are propounded to account for the process of the creation, viz., (1) the Realistic or Creationist view (*Ārambha-vāda*), (2) the theory of Transformation (*Pariṇāma-vāda*), and (3) the theory of manifestation (*Vivarta-vāda*). The Pratyabhijñā school proves them unsound. According to the first theory there exist nine classes of realities out of which everything in the universe is formed. It does not give any reason how Effect comes out of the Cause in which the former does not exist before it comes into existence. According to the second view Cause brings out Effect after it undergoes complete destruction. For instance, milk is transformed into curds after it no longer exists in that form. Seed changes into plant after it is completely merged in the soil. Milk is the transformation of the grass consumed by cattle. But when the *Pariṇāma-vāda* strictly postulates that Effect appears only after the destruction of its Cause, it has failed to explain the instances : that the birth of a babe takes place not after the destruction of its Cause, the parents ; the creation and multiplication of bacteria do not involve the destruction of the former bacterium. According to the third theory, *Vivarta-vāda* which is postulated by Śaṅkara, all effects are the product of *Māyā*, the Nescience, hence fictitious and not real On the basis of this theory, the world is superimposed on the only reality which is Brahman, and is thus supposed to be phenomenal, illusive and dreamlike in character. According to the Pratyabhijñā Philosophy, the theory is the result of irrational and unscientific thinking. It is absurd to think all the facts of experience as the product of the fictitious principle, *Māyā*. Pratyabhijñā holds Śaṅkara's theory of *Māyā* as fallacious. The school makes a realistic and rational approach to the problem and postulates a new theory, *Svātantrya-vāda*, to replace the earlier theories which are held to be objectionable. On the basis of this theory, it is due to the sovereignty of the Lord's Will that Effect evolves from Cause. It is the Lord's Self-dependent Power (*svātantrya-śakti*) that multiplies effects from a single Cause without destroying itself (the Cause). The production of species from parents, expansion and growth of cells from a single cell, creation and multiplication of bacteria from the first bacterium,—all these are the examples of the *svātantrya-śakti* of the Supreme Cause. The Universal Voluntarism is the only explanation that rational thinking can give for the wonderous creative power in Nature. It may be pointed out that Fichte's idealism in the West is, in the first instance, distinctly marked by the doctrine of Will. By this doctrine Fichte sought to explain that in 'will' lays man's divinity. Schopenhauer's doctrine of Will : 'the world as Will and Idea'—Will as a force of spontaneity and sense of

effort, an impulse, instinct and spring of life, a supernatural power, exactly corresponds to the *Svātantrya-vāda* of the Pratyabhijñā system.[15]

Another new theory, *Ābhāsa-vāda*, the theory of Manifestation, allied to *Svātantrya-vāda*, has also been coined in this system for the explanation of the Doctrine of Monism. The system holds that it is the very nature of *Parama Śiva*, the one Supreme Cause, to manifest Himself in the diverse forms of the universe, which are held as manifestations or *ābhāsas*. We cannot question why the fire burns. To burn is the very nature of fire. So we cannot question why Śiva manifests himself in the form of the universe of diverse nature. It is incorrect to say that the Lord transforms Himself into the various objects of the world, for such an assumption involves the division of the Lord into parts which leads to many objections. The theory of Manifestation (*Ābhāsa-vāda*) postulates that as to burn is the very nature of fire, so to manifest externally what lies within is the very nature (or power) of the Self. This power is, therefore, known as *Svātantrya-śakti*, because it does not depend upon any thing else, but represents the principal power of the Supreme Self (*Parama Śiva*). The change of the Ultimate Reality into the world objects is a different arrangement of the ever-existing material in the Self. The transcendental state (*Parā* or *Anuttara avasthā*) of the Supreme Self is pure Consciousness unaffected by material change and his immanent state (*Aparā-avasthā*) is that which is visible in the changing world : (*viśvamayaḥ prasaraḥ, viśvottīrṇaś ca saṁvit*).[16]

Another important contribution of the Pratyabhijñā school to Philosophy is its three laws of *Kriyā-Śakti* (the objective reality), viz., the law of Division (*bhedābheda*), the law of Perception (*māna tat phala meya*) and the law of Causation (*kārya kāraṇa*), which account for the multiplicity of the universe, as discussed in the preceding chapters XVIII-XX. In conformity with the doctrine of Concrete Monism (*Advaita*), which the School aims at, in opposition to Śaṅkara's Absolute Monism, *Ābhāsa-vāda* explains, on the basis of these three laws, the dualism involved in the relations of Plurality and Unity ; Subject, 'awareness' and Object ; and Cause and Effect which constitute the essential nature of this diverse universe. Ultimately, the relation of unity-in-plurality (*bhedābheda*), i.e., the law of Division, is the fundamental law of nature.[17]

The last, but not the least, important contribution of the school to philosophy is its doctrine of *Tattvas* that gives an elaborate analysis of the

15. See *Supra*, pp. 66-67.
16. See *Supra*, pp. 173 ff.
17. See *Supra*, Chapters XVIII-XX.

objective reality, which it takes to be the Universal Energy (*Kriyā-Śakti*), 'primordial natural force principle', or the *Prima Materia* of all things. According to the Kashmir Śaivas, the thirty-six *Tattvas*, categories (or orders) of the objective reality, constitute the whole creation. This is indeed a definite advancement in the Scientific philosophy of the West as represented by Herbert Spencer. The peculiar analysis of the objective reality into the categories may not sound very convincing now, in the light of the modern scientific advances, but the entire conception is highly dramatic.

It may be observed that all the *Tattvas* seem to be indispensable for the ultimate constitution of the universe and the functions of the creation. The importance of the twenty-five categories of the Sāṁkhya, wholly incorporated in the Pratyabhijñā system, cannot be over-estimated. All the created beings are constituted of *Puruṣa* (individual subject) and *Pradhāna* or *Prakṛti* and its following twenty-three offshoots: the thirteen *Karaṇas* (capacities)—the three mental operations, *Manas*, *Buddhi* and *Ahaṅkara*; the five powers of sense-perception (*Jñānendriyas*), *Śrotram* (hearing), etc., the five capacities of action (*Karmendriyas*), *Vāk* (expression), etc.; the ten *Kāryas* (material elements)—the five *Mahābhūtas* (great elements), *Ākāśa* (Vacuity), etc.; and the five *tanmātrās* (subtle elements), *Śabda* (sound), etc. These are generally known and need not be explained here.

Beyond the *Sāṁkhya* categories, is the *Māyā-Tattva*, the principle of limitation and differentiation, which not only differentiates objects from subjects but also plays an important role in the great scheme of creation through its five offshoots, *Kalā*, *Vidyā*, *Rāga*, *niyati* and *Kāla*, which, respectively, cause limitation to the universality of action, knowledge, interest, place and time in relation to various *jīvas* (individual subjects). The *Māyā-Tattva*, in itself, serves as the connecting link between omnipotence and limited action, omniscience and limited knowledge, perfection and limited interest, omnipresence and limited space, and eternity and limited time. With regard to the various limited beings, *Kalā* constitutes the limitation in authorship or practice of arts, *Vidyā* in the knowledge of particular objects, *Rāga* in interest, *Niyati* in determining space, and *Kāla* in determining time.

Next to the *Māyā-Tattva* and its five offshoots, in the ascending order, are the last five *Tattvas*: *Śuddhavidyā-tattva*, *Īśvara-tattva*, *Sadāśiva-tattva*, *Śakti-Tattva* and *Śiva-tattva*, which are also supposed to be in action in the creation. *Śuddhavidyā-tattva* is the state of pure knowledge in which there is no distinction between subject and object. This state is also called *Parāparā daśā*, i.e., the state of unity of the

Transcendental (*parā*) and non–Transcendental (*aparā*) states. *Īśvara-tattva* is that in which the external state of *Kriyā-śakti* (power of activity) is predominant, and *Sadāśiva-tattva* is that in which the internal state of pure knowledge (*jñāna*) is predominant, without any taint of activity and change (*Kriyā*). While *Īśvara-tattva* implies *bahir-unmeṣa* (opening out), the state of exteriority, i.e., in which the universe becomes externally manifest, *Sadāśiva-tattva* implies *nimeṣa* (closing in), i.e., in which the universe dissolves itself or all manifestations merge. *Śakti-Tattva* is the Power principle or Energy which transforms into matter. It is the *Vimarśa*-aspect (power of perception) of *Parama-Śiva*, the Supreme Reality. From *Śakti-Tattva* the universe imbibes the power of physical activity (*Kriyā-Śakti*). The last is *Śiva-tattva*, the *Prakāśa*-aspect of *Parama-Śiva*, the principle of consciousness or power of manifestation. It is from *Śiva-tattva* that the whole universe, from microcosm to macrocosm, imbibes the Cognitive power (*Jñāna-śakti*). Above all these thirty-six categories (*tattvātīta*) stands *Parama-Śiva* or *Maheśvara* (Supreme Being, the Ultimate Reality), called also '*Caitanyam*' (the Supreme Consciousness) in the school, which is free from qualities (*nirguṇa*).[18]

The school has, in the above-said process, analysed the one Absolute Reality (*Parama-Śiva*) into thirty-six primary realities and, by the reverse process, synthesised the latter into the former, reaching back to unity, the monism.[19]

Pratyabhijñā as a synthesis of diverse currents of thought: The Pratyabhijñā system, which teaches Concrete Monism, is, mainly, a realistic school of thought, as it has condemned outright Śaṅkara's idealism and the nihilistic doctrines of the Bauddhas and all such theories in the various forms of escapism and negation. The system, however, shows a synthesis of 'the realistic, idealistic, voluntaristic, absolutistic and mystic currents of thought' as were possibly then prevailing in Kashmir.[20] But, in reality, it has a main stress on realism. The diverse approach emphasises that the Reality is many-sided. Why so many approaches are made to understand the underlying principle of life is because the problem baffles the thought of man, the more he tries to know about it. N. Mukharji explains why it is necessary to study the problem as a whole from various points of view : "The life or the universe is a synthesis and any comprehensive view

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18. See *Supra*, Chapter XXI.

19. तदयं प्रमाता...स्वतन्त्रः। स्वातन्त्र्यं च अस्य अभेदे भेदनं भेदिते च अन्तरनुसंधानेन अभेदनं—इति......तदेव अस्य पारमेश्वर्यं मुख्यमानन्दमयं रूपम् इति। *IPV* I, p. 31.

20. *Bhāskarī* II, Introduction.

of either must be in the form of a synthesis. The *Darśanas*, therefore, attempted to understand the nature of man and his relation to the universe as a whole and accepted no arbitrary, conventional or limited application. Again, the whole is not a mere mathematical aggregate of parts and it is not possible to have a conception of the whole merely by knowing the separate parts.... In the case of the universe, even the parts can never be known exhaustively. If, however, the whole is comprehended, the parts are comprehended. If the concept of man is comprehended, each individual man is comprehended. To know the whole truth about the smallest atom of matter, the scientist must know the Infinite Self in whom all things eternally are. To know the whole truth about the subjective Self, the philosopher must know the objective world as it is in itself. To know the whole truth about the Infinite Self, the ecclesiast must comprehend the Finite in whom the Infinite finds his expression. In fact, Science, Philosophy and Religion are three phases of fundamentally inseparable human thought and experience.... For, Truth is the fundamental thing sought by Science, Philosophy or Religion from its particular standpoint and is the same in every case, so that one form of truth cannot be antagonistic to another without stultifying itself... *Darśana*—a term more comprehensive than philosophy—implies a search for the deepest truth—an inquiry after the permanent underlying reality of all phenomena..."[21]

21. N. Mukharji Shastri, A Study of Śaṅkara, Introduction, p. 9.

CHAPTER XXVI

PRATYABAIJÑĀ THOUGHT IN MODERN CONTEXT

Importance of philosophy ; role of Pratyabhijñā ; Spiritual and human values according to Pratyabhijñā ; Humanistic movement in Kashmir (as the composite Śaiva-cum-Sūfī philosophy) ; Lalleśvarī (Lal Ded), the first apostle of the dynamic philosophy (Humanism).

Importance of Philosophy : It will be in vain to say that 'philosophy has gradually been displaced by positive science and will finally disappear.' Science, in spite of its great strides, can at best disclose some aspects of phenomena of nature, but it cannot claim to have reached the culmination of knowledge. The mysteries of nature, underlying the various activities of the conscious individual entities and the unconscious atomic matter, which are unfathomable, will ever attract the thought of a philosopher. Philosophy has more or less served as a guiding power in scientific investigation. It has passed through many stages to become a positive science. It was the impulse to all early speculation ; nay, it was the parent of positive science. In the present age when all branches of knowledge are coming close to one another, philosophy can never be dissociated from science. The scientific facts should now be treated as the rudiments of philosophy and philosophy should proceed beyond its primitive notions to matters of scientific inquiry into the hidden nature of things. Thus, mutually serving, both will enlarge the scope of human knowledge. Dr. Radhakrishnan says, "Philosophy should base itself on positive knowledge of actuality and not speculative idealism, on facts of outward nature, facts of the individual mind and facts of spiritual life, of what is without us, of what is within us, of what is above us." The scholar thinks that "philosophy is an essential aid to life... We are required to think and reflect on the nature of cosmos, the meaning of right and wrong, the destiny of the human individual. It is a law of man's intellectual consciousness to search for the truth of things and strive to live in the spirit of truth." J. B. Baillie says, "man in his lifetime must needs play many parts and one of those is to be a philosopher." Thus, one cannot ignore philosophy as unimportant for life or an idle pursuit.

Role of Pratyabhijñā : In the different systems of Indian philosophy metaphysical inquiries about the nature of soul and the universe, life and

existence, the absolute cause and creation, and the like are generally mixed up with matters of theology and supernatural (as based on particular religious beliefs) like the processes of creation (*Sṛṣṭi*), transmigration (*punarjanma*), salvation (*mukti*), the law of action (*karma*), etc. The Pratyabhijñā is, however, an exception to this. It is, mainly, a quest in the direction of the study of life and existence looking at nature from both sides, as microcosm and as macrocosm. The conception of the macrocosm in the Pratyabhijñā system is based on a very deep study of the microcosm. It admits the essential identity of microcosm and macrocosm. The system probes deep into the nature of Reality underlying the universe in its psychological and physical aspects. It is a study of spirit and matter, the two aspects of Reality, both of them being dynamic, which appear in the innumerable forms of animate and inanimate objects, sentient and insentient entities. Pratyabhijñā analyses all the human faculties—man's entire physical, mental and spiritual organisms—and explores the deep layers of his consciousness. The system, being broad-based, tackles, in fact, all problems of human interest in a spirit of realism, and lays a great stress on the spiritual values of life.

Spiritual and human values according to pratyabhijñā ; The Pratyabhijñā thought is, mainly, a school of spiritual Pragmatism which takes up seriously the cause of the mental, moral and spiritual elevation of humanity, and stresses the need of the development of human personality and character. All its doctrines—spiritual, epistemical, ethical and moral—have a practical bearing upon human interests. The Pratyabhijñā professes to be a means of accomplishing the fulfilment of one's all the desired objects (*samasta sampat samavāpti hetum*). Man's desires are different ; one aspires to higher things in life ; other to purely spiritual satisfaction and raptures. There are still others whose sole ambition in life is to attain what is of highest value to man. The Pratyabhijñā is meant for all. *Svātantrya* (freedom) in the system is the sole avenue to all those things, viz., the fulfilment of all the aspirations of man. Pratyabhijñā, however, lays stress on the awareness of the highest ideal or real progress a man should seek to attain, the ignorance of which is the main cause of human misery and suffering. We are often mistaking what is really not progress, for progress. To quote Dr. Rajendra Prasad : 'We are apt to be carried away by many things...on account of their glamour and their shine. And we are very often misled into thinking that all that glitters is gold. But that is not always so. I believe we have really to define what is progress, and I personally do not always feel that what we call progress is always progress. I sometimes wonder if in speaking of

progress, we are not mistaking what is really not progress, for progress". Pratyabhijñā reveals what is of highest value to man ; and what is of highest value to man is what is condusive to the good and benefit of one and all.

The ideal of liberation in the system is quite different from that of other Indian systems ; to a Pratyabhijña philosopher it means 'freedom' (*Svātantrya*) : 'The individual is essentially free, freedom is the inner being of the individual.' So also does the law of *Karma* play a different role in the Pratyabhijñā ethics, as the school recognises 'Sovereignty of Will' (*svāntantrya-śakti*) as a means of accomplishing all the desired objects. It does not believe in the fate of man as being rigid and unchangeable. It condemns those who do not stir to bring a change in their lot for a better and happier life. It does not recognise disinterested action (*niṣkāma karma*) as a way or aim and object of Self-realization, as it believes in human endeavour to be indispensable for success (*siddhi*). The philosophy of 'action' taught in the system, which, perhaps, accords with the Socialist idea of 'action', is unique in the whole domain of Indian Philosophy, as *kriya*, in Pratyabhijñā, implies Unity-in-plurality. In accordance with the Western ideal, it does not also recognise a life of non-attachment to or renunciation of the world as an ideal in life, as it is considered not to be of any good to humanity.

Though Pratyabhijñā believes in the unity and equality of human beings, it is equally conscious not only of their inequalities but also of their limitations and infirmities. Men are not all equally intelligent, or equally good, or equally trustworthy. They have limitations of sense and reason and suffer from inferiority complex. Their infirmities are many, such as 'injustice, intemperance, cowardice and ignorance', as pointed out by Plato, and all kind of 'vileness, wildness and cussedness in the nature of man', as observed by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, which cause so much of human misery. Pratyabhijñā brings into awareness these limitations and infirmities of man, which it calls the man's fetters (*pāśas*) and impurities (*malas*), and awakens his good-consciousness, viz., 'humane recognition of human dignity in each and every individual.' Dr. S. Radhakrishnan states, 'Our religions have proclaimed from the very beginning that each human individual is to be regarded as a spark of the divine'.

The Pratyabhijñā system discloses the true spirit of Indian Philosophy ; in other words, it is a proper evaluation of Indian culture. The basic principle of all democracy is implicit in the famous Vedānta texts : '*Tat tvam asi*' (That thou art) and '*Jīvo brahmaiva nāparaḥ*' (Every living being is Brahman, the Great Divinity). In Pratyabhijñā Philosophy, the same principle is implied in the text : '*Svātmaiva sarvajantūnām eka*

eva maheśvaraḥ' (the self of all living beings is the one great Lord). This notion signifies, in modern terms, the democratic idea of sovereignty of the human individual, superiority and dignity of man, and the unity and equality of human beings. The ancient Vedāntic concept of Ātman as Brahman, viz., 'a being who comprehends in himself all things that are human in knowledge, will and action' lost its meaning of unity and equality of human beings and the divinity or dignity of man, in the course of the ages, and in Śaṅkarācārya's time Brahman came to be understood as the 'impersonal being in which there can be no distinction of this or that, the good and the evil, the beautiful and its opposite.' Thus the conception of the Vedānta changed to Absolute Monism. This conception needed re-orientation and so many later schools of thought, like the schools of Pratyabhijñā, Rāmānuja and Vallabhācarya emerged to explain the central point of the Indian Philosophy, 'the integral outlook about Reality' and the meaning and purpose of life, that influences and shapes all human activities and behaviours on earth. The Pratyabhijñā system, which arose in Kashmir just after the time of Śaṅkarācārya, believed in '*recognition* of the supreme inheritance of man and *recognition* of the supreme ends of life.' It emphasised the principles of unity, equality and liberty of mankind in such terms as *sarva-śivatā*, *sarva-samatā* and *sarva-svātantrya*. *Sarva-śivatā* in the system implies not only unity and divinity, but also the peace and tranquility of the whole human race. Besides, *sarva-śivatā* signifies superiority and dignity of man, since *śivatā* (divinity) stands for modern dignity which means that the personality of every human individual is sacred. *Sarva-samatā* means equality and fraternity; the expression lays emphasis on equality and universal brotherhood of mankind, irrespective of diversity of caste, creed, colour and nationality. *Sarva-svātantrya* means liberty for all or freedom of man.

As said above, the Pratyabhijñā system has laid a great emphasis on Liberty, Equality and Fraternity which are recognised as the cardinal values of human culture. The doctrine of human equality and universal brotherhood has originated from all the religious schools. The Christian doctrine bases its ethics on the notion that 'God is the father of human community; men, his children, owe him an account of their acts...Love of God, the father of all men, is to be translated into the accomplishment of the law of neighbourly love, that is to say, the love of all men.' Likewise, the doctrine of Islam teaches the universal brotherhood and the love of one's fellow men. The same doctrine of universal brotherhood and world peace is taught by the Sikh Gurus. Buddhism and Jainism have their dogmas of universal love, altruism and non-violence. The Pratyabhijñā school also recognises these values as the essentials of human society.

The highest ideal of the Pratyabhijñā School, which is in fact a re-orientation of Indian Philosophy, is to build one world Society (*vasudhaiva kutumbakam*) on the basis of 'a spiritual kinship which is universal among the people of mankind'. India has regarded the entire humanity as comprising a single family. From time to time, seers and saints of this country have preached and practised what is best and noblest for human being. The Vedic seers have repeatedly prayed for the unity and unanimity of hearts and tranquility and peace of mankind. The Upaniṣads have emphasised the need of recognising the principle of unity and equality of mankind for the peaceful existence and welfare of the whole human race (See *Īśāvāsya Up.* 6 and 7, *Supra* p. 19). The *summum bonum* of the Upaniṣads is to achieve lasting world-peace (*viśva-śānti*). This spiritualistic mission of India has been heralded in the modern age by great Indian leaders, like Mahatma Gandhi, Tagore, Aurobindo and Radhakrishnan. Gandhi impressed the values of truth, love and non-violence. Tagore taught that consciousness of spiritual unity of all human beings is the only remedy for 'such an epedemic of moral perversity, such a universal churning up of jealousy, greed, hatred and mutual suspician.' Aurobindo says, 'equality of the spirit is the sole real equality, oneness which is for ever immanent in all the multiplicities of the universe.'

Dr. Radhakrishnan says, "within each incarnate soul dwells the good consciousness which we must seek out and awaken. When mankind awakes to the truth, universal brotherhood will follow... One whose life is rooted in the experience of the Supreme, spontaneously develops love for all creation. He will be free from hatred for any man... He will boldly work for a society in which man can be free and fearless... He will oppose terror and cruelty... He will give voice to those who have no voice..." At another place, the scholar advises, "Men must use the instruments of science for the improvement of the conditions of life, for the fault is not in science and technology. What is demoniac is in the nature of man. If we wish to cure this element of vileness, wildness, cussedness, in the nature of man, it is essential for us to mobilize the great spiritual resources of mankind. The cure for that is to restore the truths of the spirit to the central place in the minds of men. Let those truths of the spirit sway the minds of men, transform the lives of men. The truths of the spirit are liberality, understanding, freedom. ... Let us, therefore, send out...a message to this groping, uncertain, discontented world: that love and not hatred, that freedom and not fear, that faith and not doubt, have in them the healing of the nations. If we carry out these principles in our daily life and in our international relations, out of the anguish of the world will be born a new unity of mankind, a unity

in which the ideals of the spirit will find safety and security." What we need is 'a recognition of those supreme ends of life to which science and organization, discipline and obedience are to be harnessed". Human culture that the Indian Philosophy teaches is 'an evolution of man towards his emancipation, his liberation from material dangers, his advance to a state in which all the sublime germs, of which he is the chosen vessel, may develop—Art, Science, the social idea, the philosophic idea...'. The inner significance of India's philosophy is 'the spiritualism of life' or 'the divinization of humanity'. 'This is how India's soul', says Aurobindo, 'preserved the knowledge that preserves the world'. The spiritual awakening of mankind alone is potent to stop the present ailment of humanity turning into a 'conflagration of suicide'.

The humanistic movement in Kashmir (*as the composite Śaiva-cum-Sūfī Philosophy*): The 14th and 15th centuries were characterised by great spiritual and political upheavels in Kashmir. It was during this period that Islam spread in the valley. Sūfīsm was introduced into Kashmir by Sayyids and their followers who came from Persia to settle down there (in the 14th century). The presence of Sayyids and their followers in the country seems to have stimulated the spiritualistic and mystic tendencies which were prevailing there already among the Hindu and Muslim saints in the form of Śaivism as well as Islamic asceticism. The contacts of the Sayyids with the indigenous saints and savants, known as Ṛṣis and Bābās, deeply influenced the latter with the Sūfī thought. The spread of Sūfī doctrine side by side with Śaiva (Pratyabhijñā) philosophy brought forth a composite humanitarian thought (in the valley) which found expression through the medium of Kashmiri poetry. This composite Śaiva-cum-Sūfī Philosophy has been a levelling force 'with a passion for equality' amidst the differences of caste and creed. The new dynamic composite culture in Kashmir has been called 'idealistic, sentimental or religious humanism'. It is eclectic in its essence and contains the noble truths and glorious cultural achievements of both Śaivism and Sūfīsm.

Lalleśvarī (Lal Déd), the first apostle of the dynamic philosophy (Humanism): The Hindu hermitess Lalleśvarī (b. 1335 A.D.) was the first votary and apostle of the Religious Humanism in Kashmir. She met Shāh Hamdān, the great Muslim saint, who had come from Persia, and had prolonged discussions with him on philosophy, religion and spiritualism. This proved to be a turning point in her life. Having assimilated the basic teachings of both Śaivism and Sūfīsm (Islamic philosophy), Lalla became the harbinger of the humanistic movement in Kashmir and was acclaimed both by the Hindus and Muslims as the spiritual preceptor, and the prophet of the new movement. She preached

her doctrine in the language of the masses (the then Kashmiri) and not in Sanskrit. She unreservedly denounced dogmas, rituals, narrow-minded fanaticism and debasing distinction of caste. She taught, with a positive stand, that social equality (*samatā*), human brotherhood, love and sincerity are the core of religion. She acknowledged the essential oneness in the basic philosophies of all creeds and religions.

The age of Lalla was the age of 'renaissance of man's spirit'; as she opened an era of human brotherhood in Kashmir in which the differences of caste and creed, birth and position, and the like, would be meaningless. Lalla believed in the search of truth and the ultimate goal of freedom. Man is the master of himself, the forger of his own destiny, the builder of his own future. To work, to strive in spite of the repeated set-backs and finally to attain the objective, was what she taught. Man need not seek the help of any unseen powers beyond himself. Let him have faith in himself to achieve freedom. This, in nutshell, was the message of Humanism that emerged from the fusion of the two religious philosophies of Śaivism (Pratyabhijñā) and Islām (Sūfīsm) as preached by Lalla. Lalla was followed by another preacher of humanism, Sheikh Noor-ud-Din, a Hindu saint converted to Islam, who lived a perfectly saintly life and remained devoted to the noble principles of one-ness of all religions and universal brotherhood of man. He quitted from this world in 1438 A.C.

It is evident from the above that Lalla and his followers introduced, for the first time, new trends in the world thought, the philosophy of humanism, the doctrine of the brotherhood of mankind. Lalla was in fact recognised to be the precursor of the great medieval reformers of India, like Kabir and others, who voiced forcefully the elimination of the differences of caste and creed, colour and station in life. Lalla's philosophy of *Samatā* (social equality) was destined to be the leaven for mutualism and world brotherhood of today, not only in Kashmir but, beyond its confines.

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"Do not believe in what ye have heard; do not believe in traditions because they have been handed down from many generations; do not believe in anything because it is rumoured and spoken of by many; do not believe merely because the written statement of some old sage is produced. Do not believe in conjectures; do not believe in that as truth to which you have become attached by habit; do not believe merely on the authority of your teachers and elders; after observation and analysis, when it agrees with reason and is conducive to the good and benefit of one and all, then accept it and live upto it."

—BUDDHA.

नित्यं शिवं शान्तिसुखं वृणीष्व

(Choose the pleasure of everlasting tranquility and peace.)

* * *